






Orthodox yet Modern: Herman Bavinck’s 







Cory C. Brock 











This dissertation is submitted 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  





I confirm that this thesis presented for the degree of PhD in Systematic Theology, has  
(i) been composed entirely by myself. 
(ii) been solely the result of my own work. 



























Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), perhaps the most remarkable dogmatician and intellectual 
of the Dutch Reformed (gereformeerde) tradition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, committed himself to what he called a ‘Reformed’ and ‘catholic’ theological task. 
For the modern dogmatician, this task is neither repristination nor abandonment of one’s 
confessionalist tradition, but, being driven along by the Scriptural witness, to appropriate 
‘catholic’ dogma to the grammars of modern conceptual frameworks. Such a task led 
Bavinck to a certain eclecticism in style and source for which he earned in twentieth 
century scholarship the pejorative label of dualism, applied both to his person and his 
theological content. Regarding his person, this thesis of the two Bavincks follows a 
biographical narrative of a student and blossoming theologian divided between the 
orthodox and modern. Regarding his content, interpreters move to and fro between 
Bavinck the scholastic and Bavinck the post-Kantian, subjectivist dogmatician.  
 
This study nuances this picture and participates in James Eglinton’s recent call for an 
overturning of said dualisms applied to Bavinck’s person and work by outlining the most 
significant example of Bavinck toiling to complete his ‘catholic’ dogmatic task: his 
appropriation of Friedrich Schleiermacher. In distinction from Bavinck’s milieu, he did not 
demonize Schleiermacher, but, while willing to critique Schleiermacher’s material 
dogmatics, regarded Schleiermacher as ‘deeply misunderstood’. The two primary locales of 
Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher include (i) the question of the epistemic ground 
of the unity of being and thinking; (ii) the grammar of subjective and objective religion. In 
both, Bavinck adopts Schleiermacher’s concepts of ‘feeling’, ‘absolute dependence’, and 
‘immediate self-consciousness’ to complete his own logic.  
 
Understanding Bavinck’s adoption of Schleiermacher’s conceptual framework, particularly 
that of the introduction from Schleiermacher’s Der christliche Glaube, makes visible just how 
Bavinck determined to work as a modern theologian post-Kant and within the freeing 
 
 iv 
confines of his orthodox, Dutch confessionalist heritage. His appropriation of 





























Herman Bavinck was born in 1854 and died in 1921. He was an important theologian in 
the Netherlands during his lifetime and continues to be read widely today. Part of his 
interests as a Christian theologian, one who studies and writes about the Christian God, 
was to reflect carefully on how the older forms of theology (the study of God), including 
both the methods used and the doctrines cultivated relate to the modern forms of 
theology. By modern, he was interested in the time after the French Revolution especially. 
One of the ways he examined this relationship and enacted a modern and orthodox 
sentiment in his own work was by using a predominantly older form of theology that was 
guided by his own church’s confessions (texts that outline basic beliefs about God using 
the Bible as a primary source) but he constructed theological sentences with modern ideas 
drawn from the contemporary trajectories in philosophy.  
 
The most important person in the modern theological context that Bavinck studied and 
from whom he borrowed extensively was a German pastor and theologian named 
Friedrich Schleiermacher who died in 1834. From Schleiermacher’s books, he learned ways 
to speak about how the human mind relates to the world outside of the mind. And, 
Bavinck incorporated his beliefs about God and how God reveals himself to the human 
being into this idea of the relation between the human mind and the world. He also used 
some of Schleiermacher’s ideas to explain the relationship between humanity and religion. 
For example, why is it that religion is universal in all times and places? Using 
Schleiermacher’s terms, Bavinck explained that every human has a universal taste for the 
infinite, which arises in their normal life experiences in their heart, or more technically, in 
what he called the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ or, the consciousness of being related 
to God.  
 
Bavinck’s use of Schleiermacher is a good example and the most important one that helps 
explain how Bavinck strove to let the modern and older theologies speak to one another. 
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He decided to ground his own theology in an older tradition in which he grew up in called 
‘Dutch Reformed’ which takes its name from the Reformation in the sixteenth century and 
is specific to the Netherlands, but he did so adapting his language to a modern context 
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‘Modern… and yet orthodox’, so begins McCormack’s study of Barth.1 This study begins with 
a parallel statement about its subject Herman Bavinck: ‘orthodox … and yet modern’. The 
latter dictum provides the answer to a question that much of Bavinck scholarship has been 
asking for the last half-century: what is the relationship of his orthodoxy to what has been 
called ‘the challenges posed… by modernity’ in his turn-of-the-century Dutch context?2  
 
These terms orthodox and modern are difficult to define. Regarding Bavinck (1854-1921), 
there are two contexts for expressing their meanings. On the one hand, there is European 
culture—what of the spiritual kingdom of God in relation to the changing social milieu of 
post-Revolutionary Europe? This was a principal question for the leaders of the neo-Calvinist 
movement in the Netherlands, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) and Bavinck, leading to the 
public theology for which it is well known. How ought we, they queried, relate the social order 
after 1789 (French Revolution) and 1848 (European revolutions) with Christ’s hands and feet 
in an evolving polis? On the other hand, there is dogmatics. With the epistemological barriers 
constructed by Kant, the lingering rationalism of the philosophes, the historical consciousness of 
the Romantic spirit, Hegel’s sublation (Aufhebung) of religious thinking, the reign of historical-
critical hermeneutics, and the theology/religious studies division in the academy, so stands 
dogmatics wondering where it goes from here. Bavinck put it accordingly in 1895: 
But today it is, above all, the philosophical underpinnings of dogmatics that 
are under fire; not some isolated doctrine but the very possibility of dogmatics 
is being questioned. The human ability to know is restricted to the visible 
world, and revelation is considered impossible. In addition, Holy Scripture is 
                                                 
1 Bruce L. McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2008), 9. 
2 John Bolt sets modernity in sharp contrast to Reformed orthodoxy: ‘Bavinck was a man of 
deep piety and great learning who faced head-on the challenges posed to Reformed orthodoxy 
by modernity without forsaking his deep, pietistic roots’. John Bolt, Bavinck on the Christian Life: 
Following Jesus in Faithful Service (Wheaton, Ill: Crossway, 2015), 38. 
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being robbed of its divine authority by historical criticism and even the warrant 
for and value of religion is being seriously disputed. Consequently… religious 
life today is dramatically less vigorous than before… there is little genuinely 
religious life… The childlike and simultaneously heroic statement “I believe” is 
seldom heard and has given way to the doubts of criticism. People perhaps still 
believe their confessions, but they no longer confess their faith (Schweizer).3 
 
Doubt regarding the possibility of knowing God and the diminishing religious life were the 
problems of Bavinck’s ‘today’. The era of the reign of the theology of Dordt, the Belgic 
confession, and Heidelberg waned in the first half of the nineteenth century in the 
Netherlands. Bavinck especially lamented the atrophy of confessional theologies after Kant, 
Napoleon, and Darwin. Considerations of this modern culture and its ideas in the Dutch, neo-
Calvinist context continue to provoke articles and monographs.4  
 
i. Modern-Orthodox Bi-Polarity? 
 
The structuring question of this study makes explicit the central tension in Bavinck 
scholarship to date: was Bavinck, in fact, modern, orthodox, or both? This query participates 
as a species in the genus Tillich calls the ‘perennial question’ regarding the relation between 
the ‘Christian message and the modern mind’: ‘can the Christian message be adapted to the 
                                                 
3 Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, IV vols (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1895), I.45. Hereafter, GD I-IV; 
RD 1.106. 
4 The rise of the Bavinck readership and secondary scholarship follows the publication of his 
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek in English, the Reformed Dogmatics. The question of Bavinck’s orthodoxy 
in relation to his modernity was treated implicitly in nuanced forms recently in James 
Eglinton, Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2012); Brian Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny: Eschatology and the Image 
of God in Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics (Leiden: Brill, 2011); and Wolter Huttinga, 
Participation and Communicability: Herman Bavinck and John Milbank on the Relation Between God and 
the World (Amsterdam: Buijten en Schipperheijn Motief, 2014). Related to the discussion of 
Bavinck and modernity, also see George Harinck, C. van der Kooi, and J. Vree, eds., ‘Als 
Bavinck nu maar eens kleur bekende’, Aantekeningen van H. Bavinck over de zaak-Netelenbos, het 




modern mind without losing its essential and unique character’?5 For Bavinck’s theology, the 
question arises first from the most important details of his biography. Herman, son of Rev. 
Jan Bavinck, a pioneer of the Dutch secessionist movement (Afscheiding), moved from his 
place at the Kampen theological school of the seceder church to gain a more scientific and 
modern education at the University of Leiden.6 One version of the narrative that follows is of 
a student in internal conflict, torn asunder between a pietistic anti-modernity of the secession’s 
confessionalism and the post-Kantian milieu of the theological academy.7  
 
The search for the latter, led by the fathers of modernity themselves, from Lessing and Herder 
to Kant and Schleiermacher, was taken up in revision by their Dutch progeny, van Heusde, 
Hofstede de Groot, and the Groninger School, and then to Bavinck’s teachers, Johannes 
Scholten and Abraham Keunen at Leiden. 8  Between secession and Leiden, Bavinck 
underwent, so the narrative goes, what Eglinton satirizes as a ‘Jekyll and Hyde bi-polarity, a 
lifetime of crisis concerning theological and philosophical identity’—the obvious outworking 
of orthodoxy meeting modernity, Afscheiding meeting the legacy of German theological 
                                                 
5 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 7.  
6 Known as the Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerken, see Eric D. Bristley, Guide to the Writings of 
Herman Bavinck (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008), 12. For an introduction 
to the Afscheiding, Peter Y. De Jong and Nelson Kloosterman, eds., The Reformation of 1834: 
Essays in Commemoration of the Act of Secession and Return (Orange City, IA: Mid-America 
Reformed Seminary, 1984); J.C. Rullmann, De Afscheiding in de Nederlandsch Hervormde Kerk de 
XIXe Eeuw (Kampen: Kok, 1930). George Harinck and Lodewijk Winkeler, ‘The Nineteenth 
Century’, in Handbook of Dutch Church History, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Bristol, CT: 
Vandenheock & Ruprecht, 2015), 435-520.  
7 However, the seceder’s relationship to the ‘modern’ is more complex even within Bavinck’s 
household as a child. For examples of the older narrative see Jan Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie: 
De Openbarings- en Schriftbeschouwing van Herman Bavinck in Vergelijking met die der Ethische Theologie 
(Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1968), 108-11; John Bolt, A Theological Analysis of 
Herman Bavinck’s Two Essays on the Imitatio Christi (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 
39-78. For a critique: Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 27-50; Brian Mattson, Restored to Our 
Destiny, 9-18. The secession was especially provoked by King William’s centralization of 
ecclesiastical authority in 1815-16. For a brief history from the Nadere Reformatie to the 
Secession, see Bolt, A Theological Analysis, 42-49. 
8  K.H. Roessingh, De Moderne Theologie in Nederland: Hare Voorbereiding en Eerste Periode 
(Groningen: Ervan B. van der Kamp, 1914), §2.26-43. 
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liberalism at Leiden. 9  The modern/orthodox duality present in the milieu of Bavinck’s 
secessionist church is summarized no clearer than in his friend Henry Dosker’s letter to 
Bavinck after the transfer to Leiden: 
I thank God that you have remained true, amongst all the heathen attacks 
around you. What are Herman’s reasons for studying theology there was the 
question which, perforce, arose in my mind. Leiden, the focal point of 
modernism. The names of Kuenen, Schölten, etc. are, alas, all too familiar. 
What can you seek there… Only this, in my opinion, a thorough knowledge of 
the plan of attack, the weapons and the enemy’s strength. God help you, 
Herman, to remain true to your choice to persevere and to choose the clear 
truth of faith of our historical Christianity above all the flickering light rays of 
an enemy science. And yet, you risk a lot. We are both susceptible to the 
influence of apparently logical arguments. We are growing, tender plants that 
are bent in the storm and easily keep a misshapen form; you will, I think, have 
to withdraw within the narrow walls of your own opinions; you will have to be 
on the defensive and as a result have to adopt a somewhat terse opinion of the 
truth, while you can grow and develop only by attack. These are just a few 
points that I would like to see cleared up in your next letter. What are your 
reasons for studying in Leiden? What do you expect?10 
 
Harinck comments that this letter was ‘a typical secessionist reaction’ to Bavinck’s choice.11 
Building upon such reactions, an older narrative of dualism follows providing a sharp 
juxtaposition between the concepts modern and orthodox. The representative institutions, 
Leiden (modern) and Kampen (orthodoxy), and their accompanying ideas existed in an 
entirely converse relation. For Dosker, the relation is metaphorically expressed as a war. For 
Bavinck, however, modernity and orthodoxy were not each other’s opposite. The relation was 
more nuanced exhibiting difference and development. The meaning of the concepts therefore, 
for this study, are derived first from Bavinck’s own voice with attention to his Dutch context. 
Those in the secessionist environment did at times read their history according to this sharp 
modern/orthodox binary and while Bavinck used the binary to describe his historical-
                                                 
9 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 28. 
10  H.E. Dosker to H. Bavinck, December 23, 1876, H. Bavinck Archive, Historisch 
Documentatiecentrum, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, #346/12. Translated by G. Harinck, 
‘“Something that Must Remain, If the Truth Is to Be Sweet and Precious to Us”: The 
Reformed Spirituality of Herman Bavinck’. CTJ 38, no. 2 (2003): 248–62, 251.  
11 Harinck, ‘Something that Must Remain’, 251.  
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theological moment, he did so with striking nuance. He was as Harinck characterizes him, ‘a 
remarkable appearance, loved by his students, respected for his professional qualities by the 
church, but distrusted because he openly criticized the narrow-minded and sectarian sentiment 
within his circle’.12 Bavinck gave one of his earliest and most refined expressions of ‘the times’ 
in his 1888 article on catholicity: 
How the times have changed! … [In the middle ages], the church was the 
center of life in the same way that the church building was the center of city 
and town… However, the emancipatory forces that existed alongside the 
Reformation have since then grown in power and influence and have, after a 
brief struggle, gained the upper hand over virtually all of Christendom. A new 
world-view has arisen that does, to be sure, grant freedom of religion to all that 
is itself unconnected with Christianity and the church and seeks to eliminate 
the latter from public life… for the most part, our contemporary culture takes 
place without reference to Christianity and church. Our situation is thus quite 
different—a new order prevails…13 
 
Bavinck’s classification of cultural modernity testifies to the development of the public square, 
to the privatization of religion, and to the freedoms of pluralism. And, likewise, there is a 
related theological modernity for which he holds modest antipathy especially regarding its 
dispute with the trustworthiness of Scripture. He remains, nevertheless, keenly aware of his 
own situation as participant in the ‘modern world-view’. He presented both a cultural and 
theological taxonomy of this new order accordingly: 
Among those [new] realities we must consider are the modern idea of the state 
with its complete neutrality… the new world of finance and business, 
industrialization, and factory life. All these have greatly complicated social 
relationships. The field of science, too, brings its challenges including… the 
faith in the absoluteness of causality that governs all inquiry; the emancipation 
of childrearing and education, of schools and universities; the so-called 
independent science that denies the knowability or existence of God, contests 
the trustworthiness of Scripture at every point, turns upside down the geo- and 
                                                 
12 George Harinck, ‘Calvinism Isn’t the Only Truth: Herman Bavinck’s Impressions of the 
USA’, in The Sesquicentennial of Dutch Immigration: 150 Years of Ethnic Heritage; Proceedings of the 
11th Biennial Conference of the Association for the Advancement of Dutch American Studies, eds. Larry J. 
Wagenaar and Robert P. Swierenga (Holland, MI: The Joint Archives of Holland, Hope 
College, 1998), 151-160, 154.  
13 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, trans. John Bolt, CTJ 27 
(1992): 220-51, 244. Emphasis added.  
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anthropocentric view of the universe, applies the law of evolution to 
everything, and from that one starting point reconstructs psychology, 
anthropology, ethics, politics, and every other discipline, while allowing 
theology at best a small discreet place next to the terrain of science… In 
addition, we ourselves, perhaps more than we imagine, are influenced by this modern world-
view. Our view of things is quite different from that of previous generations.14 
 
Awakened to the early development of hermeneutical theories, as passively formed subjects, 
the context did more work on his readers than they supposed, Bavinck argues. The Jekyll and 
Hyde bi-polarity caricature mentioned above, while overstated, does have its ground in a real 
tension between an antipathy for much of the modern taxonomy of ideas and his embrace of 
aspects of the modern situation. He described his ‘new orientation’ as the adoption of an ethic 
that cherishes the security of the temporal in order ‘to make this life as tolerable and as 
comfortable as possible’. He affirms its attempts to ‘alleviate misery, to reduce crime, to lower 
the mortality rate, to enhance health, to oppose public disorder, and to limit panhandling’.15 
More importantly and ironically, the changes within this modern order he argued, provide 
better the opportunity for the recognition of the catholicity of Christianity. When the 
Christian religion gains an earthly focus only then can its spiritual movement of proclamation 
toward the ‘the organic reformation of the whole cosmos, of nature, and country’ become a 
more visible power—one that says God loves the world.16 
 
Four years after his article on catholicity, he expressed this tension again in an address 
following his first reis naar Amerika (trip to America). While traveling, he awoke to the reality, 
that ‘Calvinism isn’t the only truth’!17 As Harinck suggests, this was a startling phrase for his 
fellow Kampen faculty: ‘if anything was clear and holy to them it was that the Reformed 
                                                 
14 Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, 244-5. Emphasis added. 
15 Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, 245.  
16 Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, 246.  
17 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Influence of the Protestant Reformation on the Moral and Religious 
Condition of Communities and Nations’, Proceedings of the Fifth General Council of the Alliance of 
the Reformed Churches Holding the Presbyterian System (London: Publication Committee of the 
Presbyterian Church of England, 1892), 48-55, 50.  
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doctrine was the truth, which implied that all other doctrines were wrong’.18  Herein lies the 
dichotomy present in his context: orthodoxy (Calvinism) stands entirely against its converse, 
modernity so-called. In 1892, Bavinck argued both that Calvinism is ‘the only consistent 
theological view of the world and humanity’, and that it also promotes extremisms ‘guilty of 
exaggeration’ insofar as ‘it has often disowned and killed the natural [and] sometimes 
nourished a hardness of sentiment, a coldness of heart, and a severity of judgment, which 
cannot impress favorably. The free, the genial, the spontaneous in the moral life, have often 
been oppressed and killed by it’.19  
 
While attuned to the complexity of his location within the modern context, Bavinck 
maintained an uncertain attitude of secession from many of its ideologies. Two years after 
announcing the necessity of epistemic modesty in locating the truth in a singular movement 
like Calvinism, he re-affirmed the confessionalist Reformed tradition as that expression of 
theology which conforms more than any other to ‘thinking God’s thoughts after Him’. In 
‘The Future of Calvinism’ he both characterized other modern theologies capitulation to 
philosophy as a ‘down-grade movement’ and pronounced: ‘the revival of Calvinism is of 
double importance. Its significance would not be so great if Holland had not experienced the 
influence of all those modern theological tendencies’.20 These modern tendencies, he argued, 
desire a ‘[modification] of the old Calvinism in accordance with the so-called demands of the 
times’.21 He subtly identified ‘modern tendencies’ as variations of mediation theologies, first 
coming from Germany and then developing in the Netherlands, both after Schleiermacher: 
All dogmas [today] must submit to modification—the doctrine of Scripture, of 
the Trinity, of election, the divinity of Christ, His satisfaction, the Church, 
eschatology; they are all to be thrown into the crucible, in order that the 
impure dross may be purged away, and the pure religious and ethical elements 
                                                 
18 Harinck, ‘Calvinism Isn’t the Only Truth’, 156. 
19 Cited in Harinck, ‘Calvinism Isn’t the Only Truth’, 156. Interestingly, Harinck adds in fn. 22: 
‘In his comprehensive reproduction of Bavinck's speech he, [Hepp], left out these remarks’. 
See V. Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1921), 215-18. 
20 Bavinck, ‘The Future of Calvinism’, The Presbyterian and Reformed Review V (1894): 1-24, 18. 
21 Bavinck, ‘The Future of Calvinism’, 16. 
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retained… the whole of theology is to be transformed into a religious, ethical, 
“Christological” direction.22  
 
He also maintained such expression regarding the complex relationship between the modern 
and orthodox into his late career. The 1911 essay titled Modernisme en Orthodoxie unveiled 
Bavinck’s perspectival consistency. Here, although stamping the validity of the binary in the 
title, he argued that the two modes of classification are neither static nor related in a total 
converse manner. Orthodoxy, ‘holding high the Christian confession’, he wrote, cannot ‘be 
against the modern in every way. Just as modern theology, in general, thinks and lives out of 
the Christian tradition much more than they themselves suppose, so orthodoxy does also—
unless it entirely shut itself off from the environment—in greater or lesser degree under the 
influence of the spiritual currents of this century’.23 Bavinck, therein, considered the terms 
‘orthodox’ and ‘modern’ ill-suited as generalizations of current societal trends and ‘orthodoxy’, 
referring to confessional adherence, only useful when combined with a freedom of thought 
and expression.  
 
There are three points in this article pertinent for the entire study. First, note Bavinck’s simple 
definition of orthodoxy in this address: ‘holding high the Christian confession’, a term further 
qualified by adherence to a particular Christian tradition. Second, modern and orthodox 
theology did not exist, he argued, in a mere relation of contradiction. Modern theology is, in 
part, a genealogical derivative of orthodox theology and orthodox theology cannot pretend 
                                                 
22 Bavinck, ‘The Future of Calvinism’, 17-18. These three adjectives, religious, ethical, and 
Christological, are in this instance pejoratives used in a similar way here as in RD 1.497ff on 
dogmatic methods. They are referents to ways of re-structuring dogmatic foundations in 
religious experience, in an ‘ethical’ existentialism, and in an imprudent Christocentrism. These 
trends he associates to Schleiermacher originally. Contemporary scholarship generalizes the 
method as ‘experiential expressivism’.  
23 Bavinck, Modernisme en Orthodoxie: Rede Gehouden bij de overdracht van het rectoraat aan de Vrije 
Universiteit op 20 oktober 1911 (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1911), 15. Original: ‘Trouwens, niemand, die 
meeleeft met zijn tijd, kan in elk opzicht tegen al het moderne gekant zijn. Zooals de moderne 
theologie over het algemeen nog veel sterker uit de Christelijke traditie denkt en leeft dan zij 
zelve vermoedt, zoo staat ook de orthodoxie, tenzij zij zich geheel van hare omgeving afsluit, 
in zwakker of sterker mate onder den invloed van de geestes stroomingen dezer eeuw.' 
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that it stands untouched by the modern context and its ideas. Third, orthodox theology must 
not suppose itself to be an end in itself, lest it become a dead orthodoxy: ‘even as the anti-
revolutionary and political spheres…’, he writes, ‘were open to the Christian-historical 
principles of Groen van Prinsterer and always opposed conservatism, so too can and must 
those who profess the Reformed religion, as long as they remain true to their origins, never 
give the impression that for them orthodoxy per se is the highest truth’.24 For this reason and 
for the fact of its relative dependence on a specific tradition, the term ‘orthodoxy’ fails to 
adequately describe Bavinck’s concept of true faith. So, he writes: 
 
In the Reformation saving faith took on a completely different character from 
the beginning. It was a matter more of the heart than of the head, more heart 
than the mind, a trust in God’s grace in Christ and an assurance of salvation. 
The name “orthodox” completely undervalues this element and gives the 
impression that agreement with the confession is the only thing that counts; 
and that is not so and must not be so. The university that brings us together 
here in this hour does not place itself on an orthodox but on a Reformed 
basis, and the churches with which its theological faculty is affiliated are not 
called orthodox but Reformed churches. This name deserves preference far 
above orthodox and also that of Calvinistic or Neo-Calvinistic.25 
 
There are multiple other expressions of this complexity in Bavinck’s Dutch context. 
Puchinger, commenting on Bavinck’s dogmatics, highlights such contextual tension by 
recasting the binary in terms of dogmatic irenicism and isolation: ‘There is irony in the course 
of history but it is undeniable [that] the most ecumenical work of protestant dogmatics was 
composed in Kampen, where theology was professed in the most isolationistic way’! 26 
Puchinger’s insight reflects Bavinck’s expression of his own modern-Calvinist dogmatic ethic: 
‘modern Calvinists’, he wrote, ‘do not wish to repristinate and have no desire for the old 
conditions to return. They heartily accept the freedom of religion and conscience, the equality 
of all before the law… They strive to make progress, to escape from the deadly embrace of dead 
                                                 
24 Bavinck, Modernisme en Orthodoxie, 14-15. 
25 Bavinck, ‘Modernism and Orthodoxy’, translated by Bruce Pass, TBR 7 (2016), 63-114, 82. 
26 G. Puchinger, ‘Bavinck en de volkhistorie’, Ontmoetingen met theologen (Terra: Zutphen, 1980), 
113. Cited in G. Harinck, ‘Calvinism Isn’t the Only Truth’, 154. 
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conservatism, and to take their place, as before, at the head of every movement’.27 Harinck, 
commenting on the pluralistic social context, further concludes that Bavinck’s ‘openness to 
cultural relativism reveals [him] as a modern man’.28 Flipse also notes, ‘the late Bavinck…had 
shown more openness to modern culture’. 29  But, in addition to his openness to cultural 
pluralism, within his title ‘modern Calvinist’ is an awareness that a particular, guarded 
openness extends beyond the domain of the mere cultural into theological construction.  
 
Bavinck’s later and mature expression of the modern/orthodox relation counteracts the sharp 
antithesis between Bavinck’s orthodoxy and the ‘challenges of modernity’ proposed in the 
Jekyll-Hyde narrative. In addition to assuming a sharp converse relation, the older narrative 
dons a thesis of a ‘modernity in general’ to which orthodoxy must stand opposed. Bavinck, 
however, understood that the modern intellectual spirit of the late nineteenth century was 
manifold. As Harinck comments ‘Bavinck refused to leave [either orthodoxy or modernity] 
out in the cold and searched throughout his life for a certain synthesis between modernity and 
religion’.30 Bavinck’s 1911 essay, as he had done three times before, offered a genealogy of the 
diversity of theologies before and after Kant, stating that one ought not suppose there is one 
‘modern’. The older narrative, in contrast, provides a picture of a sweeping generalized 
singularity—an event or disposition that transfers the age of old into the age of the new.  
 
Modernity and orthodoxy were not, however, each other’s opposite and they cannot be 
defined as de facto enemies in any holistic manner.31 The nuanced modern/orthodox relation 
                                                 
27 Bavinck, ‘The Future of Calvinism’, 13. Emphasis added. 
28 G. Harinck, ‘Calvinism Isn’t the Only Truth’, 154. 
29 A. Flipse, ‘The Origins of Creationism in the Netherlands: The Evolution Debate among 
Twentieth-Century Neo-Calvinists’, Church History 81:1 (March 2012), 104-47, 118. 
30 G. Harinck, ‘Something That Must Remain, If the Truth Is to Be Sweet and Precious to Us’, 
249.  
31 The relationship between modernity and pre-modernity is not consistently converse but 
both developmental and antagonistic. For Dutch Reformed ‘orthodoxy’, ‘heresy’ is the clearest 
designation of its theological converse but, considering the political and cultural modes in 
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was a child of both the complex consanguinity from pre-modern to modern contexts and the 
multifarious nature of the modernity birthed.32 This is to say, modernism so-called neither 
arose instantly nor expressed itself in any singular form. When considering the ‘challenges 
posed…by modernity’, such a narrative fails to account for the actual diversity of its 
instantiations.  
 
For this reason, as Gay suggests, modernity is much ‘easier to exemplify than define’.33 One 
must take an approach in recognizing modernity, he supposes, that gives credence to the 
simple ability to identify vast innovation; the ambiance of novelty is the spirit of modernity. 
Modernity so construed is not as much a temporal as qualitative category that manifests itself 
in various modes connected by a shared newness. When one pans across the movements of 
the pre- and post-Enlightenment arts from da Vinci to Rembrandt, Caspar David Friedrich to 
Salvador Dali, or tunes in to the grandeur of Mozart and the innovation of Wagner, the 
characteristics of modernity appear diverse and at the same time share a similar quality of 
novelty.34 Such movement exists, also, in a complex relation of development to the past rather 
than in the mode of sharp antithesis or clear in-breaking. 
 
The reduction of the manifold of modernities to a concept of ‘modernism in general’, beyond 
locating a shared ambiance of novelty, is a difficult task and, furthermore, while remaining a 
convenient ‘ism’ precludes correspondence to any actual given.35 Mapping modernism in all its 
                                                                                                                                                    
which heresy has become manifest in history, the relationship is more complex than simple 
polarization allows when used as a historical referent.  
32 For a summary of the multifarious nature of modernism, see Matthew Lauzon, ‘Modernity’, 
in The Oxford Handbook of World History, ed. Jerry Bentley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 73-74. Also, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2002).  
33 Peter Gay, Modernism: The Lure of Heresy (New York: Random House, 2007), 1. 
34 Gay offers a host of other transitions and adds: ‘all [these examples] offer trustworthy 
testimony to what we are attempting to identify … each carries its own credentials. That, we 
say, is Modernism.’ Modernism: The Lure of Heresy, 2.  
35 Hence, modernity as a concept is a necessary generalization used for a system of qualitative 
evaluation. The concept, while typically containing historical parameters, is more a referent to 
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ebb and flow, for this reason, remains a project so sweeping that it demands an encyclopedia 
rather than a monograph. The only characteristic all modernists agree on in fact is, Gay thinks, 
that ‘the untried is markedly superior to the familiar, the rare to the ordinary, the experimental 
to the routine’.36  Modernity is the ‘lure of heresy’ in the face of convention. This lure was 
dangled in the face of Bavinck, so the narrative would have us believe; sometimes he took 
hold of it, and sometimes he did not. It is, Bolt suggests accordingly, ‘not unfair to 
characterize Bavinck as a man between two worlds’, between the spirit of old and new, 
orthodox and modern.37 
 
This study, therefore, can only enact a modest engagement with a particular aspect of 
modernity. It is impossible to consider the question proposed, ‘is Bavinck modern, orthodox, 
or both’, as it pertains to his relation to the manifold of modernities. It is possible to qualify, 
nevertheless, the most important aspects of modernity for Bavinck studies. Prior scholarship 
has established Bavinck’s status as a ‘modern man’ as it relates to his public life and his 
complex rapport with the movements of the political liberalism of his day. 38  Bavinck’s 
theologico-philosophical method, however, shaped at least in part by an ethic of escape from 
the ‘deadly embrace of dead conservatism’, has been little explored as it pertains to his relation 
to modern theologies. One may, therefore, narrow modern generalities by constraining 
interest first to theological modernity. To study Bavinck is to study a theologian foremost. If 
theological modernisms change theological reasoning as well as the logic of (Christian) ethics, 
then of interest here is whether Bavinck wholly opposed such changes in his own theological 
reasoning. Or, did he adopt these new ways of theological reasoning into his own dogmatic, 
                                                                                                                                                    
an ethos. As McCormack notes, ‘not everything that has happened in the last two hundred 
years is modern’. Bruce McCormack, ‘Introduction’, in Mapping Modern Theology, eds. Kelly 
Kapic and Bruce McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 2.  
36 Gay, Modernism: The Lure of Heresy, 3. 
37 Bolt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, RD 1.13. 
38 See both G. Harinck, ‘Calvinism Isn’t the Only Truth’ and esp. Harinck, ‘The Religious 
Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion: A Case Study of Herman 
Bavinck’s Engagement with Modern Culture’, Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29, no. 1 
(2011), 60-77.  
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philosophical, and ethical writings? This question assumes a notion of the whence of such a 
change.  
 
ii. The Authority of Philosophy in Theological Modernities 
 
Bavinck’s given definition of orthodoxy, holding high the church’s confession, within his 
context is defined by the Three Forms of Unity. Orthodoxy includes a confessional assent 
combined with a pietistic ethic, a lifestyle of hard work and Sabbath rest. Yet, beyond 
confessionalism, orthodoxy in the context of the Dutch secession means the exegesis of the 
Scriptures with application to the Christian life—the imitation of Christ. It gives authoritative 
credence to the Reformation’s liberated conscience under the logic of sola Scriptura. If 
theological modernity includes a movement toward new styles of thought and alternative 
methodological patterns of doctrinal formation39 then this study is an examination of, for 
Bavinck, the extent to which he implemented instantiations of these new forms and patterns 
into his own contextualized Reformed orthodoxy.  
 
Modern theology as a generalized expression, for Bavinck, classifies theologies that 
accommodate traditional grammars of theological propositions in some degree to the 
mediation of historical-critical studies and the discoveries of the natural sciences. But, above 
all, these idiosyncratic expressions of a new methodology were largely developed in response 
to the pressures of philosophy, and especially Kantian epistemology. In modernity, he writes, 
‘theology lost its undisputed control and became dependent on philosophy’.40 It is, therefore, 
important to pay attention to how new philosophical patterns emerged within theological 
modernity. Per his historiography, Descartes is the hinge: 
                                                 
39 This is one aspect of defining theological modernity in McCormack, Orthodox and Modern, 9-
12. 




There has been a significant change in the relationship between theology and 
philosophy since Descartes and also thanks to him. Prior to this time, theology 
was the mistress with unlimited authority; she fashioned for herself a philosophy 
or appropriated an existing one such as that of Aristotle as she had need of it 
and could use it without doing harm. In more recent times, however, the roles 
were reversed. Theology lost its undisputed control and became dependent on 
philosophy. Consequently, it experienced the influence of Descartes and Wolff, 
of Kant and Fichte, and of Hegel and Schelling. It has now come so far that it is 
impossible to know and understand theological positions without serious 
examination of the philosophical positions to which they have attached 
themselves. One could almost say that the study of philosophy is as essential for 
understanding the principles of contemporary theology as that of the theology 
itself.41 
 
Bavinck’s estimation of the characteristic of modern theologies is that various philosophical 
principles have replaced theological foundations for theology. Theology can remain no longer 
a self-contained enterprise possessing its own principia. The former theological-philosophical 
relation has been replaced by the philosophical-theological, expressing itself in various forms. 
The acceptance of the ‘philosophy of Immanuel Kant…[has] step by step, [caused] the 
subjective practical notion of theology’ to find general acceptance, he argues.42 The epistemic 
separation between thinking and knowing in Kant’s first Critique and the derivative illusion of 
casting the concept ‘God’ in terms of ‘knowledge’ has promoted a subsequent trajectory that 
emphasizes the subjective and practical uses of theological reasoning in place of the objective 
and theoretical.43 There are two primary results of this adoption of an absolutised epistemic 
modesty in the discipline of theology, Bavinck suggests.  
 
The first includes the placement of apologetics ‘at the head of theological disciplines’ to derive 
for theology a foundation from outside its own resources. 44  The second is that most 
nineteenth century theology embraced the ‘turn to the subject’—a general theological method 
                                                 
41 Bavinck, ‘The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl’, 123. 
42 RD 1.135.  
43 For Kant’s critique of rational theology see Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, eds. Paul 
Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), A580/B608. Hereafter, CPR.  
44 See RD 1.55-56. 
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after Kant, which is antithetical to the other significant response to rationalism in the 
nineteenth century, biblicism.45 
As a result of the great reversal that occurred in recent decades in philosophy, 
there has come into vogue yet another method in addition to the traditionalistic 
and biblical method. This method does not start out from the doctrine of the 
church or from the teaching of Scripture but from the believing subject, from the 
Christian consciousness. Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel were in agreement in no 
longer regarding religious truth as objectively given in Scripture or confession, 
and all three believed that it could be found in and derived from the religious 
subject. While their ideas about the origin and essence of religion diverged 
widely, each of them still took a different road to arrive at the knowledge of 
God and divine things.46 
 
While admittedly diverse among its members, Bavinck categorizes the primary impact of 
philosophy in relation to theology as the production of a movement he calls ‘consciousness-
theology’,47 which holds, he thinks, powerful influence in his century. He traces its origins to 
its chief philosopher, Kant, to a subsequent neo-Kantian revival, and to its chief theologian, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, and his progeny, the mediation theologians (Vermittlungstheologen). 
Rightly, consciousness theologians understand the point of theology: Nicht Lehre, sondern Leben 
(not doctrine, but life). Yet, he argues, together they have adopted such epistemic reservation 
about the true object of theology, God, that they have turned into themselves and mistaken 
the unified center of self (heart, consciousness) as both an object and source for theology—
more than a principium in general but an objective principium, a self reflecting on itself as 
Christian consciousness. Because it is a Christian consciousness, it, alongside the generalized 
Christian consciousness of the mediating community, becomes a source for defining the 
material content of the Christian confession. 48  It is Schleiermacher, therefore, that he 
                                                 
45 He also offers other characteristics throughout his corpus. These include reducing the space 
in published theologies for material dogmatics and the reciprocal expansion of the formal 
(prolegomena), the triumph of reason over revelation, the priority of rationalist natural theology, 
pronouncements pointing toward the impossibility of revelation, and theological methods that 
establish the non-necessity of Scriptural authority. See RD 1.106ff. 
46 RD 1.66. 
47 See RD 1.70, 91, 421.  
48 ‘If we take this assertion seriously, it implies the idea that though God reveals himself 
nowhere else, he still makes himself known in the hearts, minds, consciousness, or feelings of 
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recognizes as the central, most important theologian of modernity. And, in reply, Bavink 
argues that this general method of consciousness offers more of a religious psychology and 
cultural ethnography than the knowledge of God. 
Anyone who only wished to describe the religious experiences of the inner self 
objectively, in a historical report, would perhaps give us an important religious 
psychology but not dogmatics. Dogmatics presupposes that there is a source of 
religious knowledge and that from it we can derive this knowledge, not by a 
neutral intellect, but by a personal faith. So, despite themselves, the proponents 
of consciousness theology also prove that for dogmatics to be a body of truth it 
must have its own source, object, and authority and also that in order to 
recognize and use them one must have personal faith.49 
 
To understand in any measure the ‘essential principles of contemporary theology’ contained in 
consciousness theologies or otherwise, he writes, one must understand modern movements in 
philosophy and, particularly, the turn to the subject—a requirement due to the modern 
interchange between queen and handmaiden. This is to say, philosophical concepts within the 
bounds of theological discourse that are derivative of particularly Kantian influence and 
focused on the grammars of self, subject, ego, or consciousness, are a quintessential mark of 
much of what Bavinck classifies as modern theologies. And he expressed the fact of his own 
expansive philosophical study of the turn to the subject clearly throughout his entire corpus. 
As Veenhof put it: ‘Bavinck has always concentrated on philosophy throughout his whole life, 
with an intensity that is striking even for a systematic theologian with dogmatics as a principal 
subject’.50 And ‘practically, the borders [between philosophy and theology] are somewhat fluid 
[for Bavinck]’.51 Veenhof’s double-verdict depends upon Bavinck’s prior judgments. First, one 
cannot understand modern theologies without deep acquaintance with philosophical 
                                                                                                                                                    
human beings. In that case the inner self of human beings possesses a specific quality and 
needs to be considered as the object and source of the discipline of dogmatics since God 
reveals himself there’. RD 1.92. 
49 RD 1.92. 
50 Jan Veenhof, ‘De God van de filosofen en de God van de bijbel’, in Ontmoetingen Met Herman 
Bavinck, eds. George Harinck and Gerrit Neven (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2006), 219-234, 219. 
‘Bavinck heft zich immers gedurende heel zijn leven in de filosofie verdiept, met een 
intensiteit die zelfs bij een systematisch theoloog met dogmatiek als hoofdvak opvallend is’. 
51  Also: ‘feitelijk zijn de grenzen bij hem enigszins vloeiend’. Veenhof, ‘De God van de 
filosofen en de God van de bijbel’, 219.  
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developments. Second, philosophical concepts regardless of the system from which they come 
are indeed porous enough to serve the purposes of theological reasoning:  
Theology is not in need of a specific philosophy. It is not per se hostile to any 
philosophical system and does not, a priori and without criticism, give priority to 
the philosophy of Plato or of Kant, or vice versa. But it brings along its own 
criteria, tests all philosophy by them, and takes over what it deems true and 
useful. What it needs is philosophy in general. In other words, it arrives at 
scientific theology only by thinking. The only internal principle of knowledge, 
therefore, is not faith as such, but believing thought, Christian rationality. Faith 
is self-conscious and sure. It rests in revelation. It includes cognition, but that 
cognition is completely practical in nature, a knowing (γιγνωσκειν) in the sense 
of Holy Scripture.52 
 
Consideration of Bavinck’s relation to modern theology and the trajectory of philosophical 
foundations so-perceived directs one towards the broadest of claims regarding just how 
Bavinck related modern theologies to his own self-categorized Reformed orthodox theological 
construction. The answer is that in acknowledgement of the fact that the essential principles 
of contemporary theology cannot be understood without knowledge of philosophical 
movements, the fact of subjectivity became a locus in his work. It was in facing the ‘challenges 
posed by modernity’, that his own constructive efforts reflected the subject matter of those 
challenges: the turn to the subject. In doing so, he obeyed his own dictum that theology is not 
in need of any single philosophy. While Bavinck was certainly a student of Aristotle, this study 
explores his adoption of a grammar drawn from a post-Kantian milieu and specifically that of 
the consciousness theologies. In turn, Bavinck’s study of the modern philosophical-theological 
grammars led him to a peculiar relation to Schleiermacher, above all other modern 
theologians, precisely due to his estimation of Schleiermacher as the catalyst and father of the 
consciousness theological trajectory. 
 
iii. The Question and Answer 
 
                                                 
52 RD 1.609.  
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The question regarding the relation between Bavinck’s seceder theological tradition and his 
modernity when considering the multifarious nature of theological ‘modernity’ demands an 
explanation beyond the scope of this study. To answer adequately would be to explore 
Bavinck’s relation to numerous theological modernities in relation ranging from Kant to 
Feuerbach, Dorner to Hermann. Considering Bavinck’s vast corpus, this list could designate 
several hundred names. For this reason, the present study narrows to the modern theology that 
was most important for Bavinck, a claim to be defended throughout the remainder of the 
study, the so-called father of modern theology, Friedrich Schleiermacher. Bavinck’s reduction 
of the fundamental trend of theological modernity as a ‘turn to the subject’ that bred 
‘consciousness-theology’ points directly to Schleiermacher as the primary theological 
interlocutor.  
 
As McCormack described Barth ‘modern and yet orthodox’ he did so by setting Barth in 
conversation with the father of modern theology, supposing a revision of the 
Barth/Schleiermacher relation per the possibility of a more significant family resemblance 
(‘Barth might be justly located within the Schleiemacherian tradition’) and perhaps, inciting an 
argument of methodological appropriations.53 And, in a similar way, McCormack’s project 
with Barth anticipates this project in style although not so in content. The first sentence of 
this chapter provided the answer to the question ‘is Bavinck modern, orthodox, or both’? He 
is ‘orthodox yet modern’—a reversal of McCormack’s estimation of Karl Barth.  
 
It is in Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s grammar of consciousness, this study 
suggests, that he is first proved ‘orthodox… yet modern’. In accordance with the investigation 
of Bavinck’s relationship to Schleiermacher and the general conclusions to be drawn from it, a 
more specific thesis is required: Bavinck is orthodox yet modern insofar as he subsumes the philosophical-
theological questions and concepts of theological modernity under the conditions of his orthodox, confessional 
                                                 
53 McCormack, Orthodox and Modern, 37.  
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tradition. 54  This is to say, for Bavinck, the affirmation of his confessional tradition in 
consanguinity with the general confessional hermeneutic of his Reformed scholastic 
predecessors is a priority. Yet, his Reformed orthodox identity does not preclude the adoption 
of a particularly modern philosophical grammar used for the expression of his confessionalist 
theological rationality. He adopts, therein, an Schleiemacherian grammar of consciousness, 
particularly drawn from the early sections of the Glaubenslehre, or Christian Faith, and even an 
Schleiemacherian rationality, as a primary expression of his own theological-philosophical 
discourse. This is the central claim to be proven in the remainder of the study. 
 
An examination of Bavinck’s relationship to Schleiermacher cannot exhaust the question of 
his modern/orthodox relation. It serves, rather as a principal argument whose answer can be 
used as a paradigm for exploring other relations in the future of Bavinck scholarship. While 
recognizing the multiplicity of theological modernities one can, nevertheless, generalize about 
Bavinck’s relationship to theological modernity through studying his relationship to 
Schleiermacher. Bavinck regarded Schleiermacher as the most important of all modern 
theologians: ‘Schleiermacher has exerted incalculable influence’, he writes. ‘All subsequent 
theology is dependent on him’.55 Schleiermacher offers, therein, a premiere or paradigmatic 
example of Bavinck’s relation to theological modernity.  
 
If, as Bavinck described, theological modernity in general is identified by new styles of thought 
and patterns of doctrinal formation according to a new method in response to the pressures 
of philosophy, then Schleiermacher is indeed the appropriate candidate for such an 
investigation. Schleiermacher has consistently been identified as the most momentous of 
modern theologians before Barth. When asked why Schleiermacher studies remain alive and 
resurgent today, Crouter proposes that his own interest in Schleiermacher ‘rests on the 
                                                 
54 McCormack, Orthodox and Modern, 17. Barth subsumes orthodoxy under the conditions of 
modernity.  
55 RD 1.166. 
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brilliance and versatility of his achievement in shaping a distinctively modern Protestant 
Christian thought’.56  And if the acquiescence to new philosophical pressures is the key mark 
of theological modernity as Bavinck identified it, then this thesis suggests that Bavinck took 
some of the philosophical tendencies of post-Kantian thought, particularly Schleiermacher’s 
central philosophical motifs (the borrowed propositions), and subsumed them under the 
strictures of his Reformed orthodox commitments in their theological applications.  
 
Bavinck, in other words, expanded his theological horizons using the new philosophical 
grammar of the nineteenth century. The first and broadest claim is that, through the influence 
of Schleiermacher’s tradition, Bavinck too turned to the subject. These philosophical 
concepts, in turn, re-informed doctrines of old and offered opportunities for expansion. But, 
they did so under the conditions of his own identity barriers. Bavinck developed a modern 
theological philosophy in his later career, a philosophy of revelation, under the conditions of 
his dogmatic commitments. 
The paradigmatic case of Bavinck’s ‘modernity’ in his adoption of Schleiermacher is his 
persistent use of the concept ‘self-consciousness’ (and especially immediate self-
consciousness) set within a broader framework of emphasis on the human subject and with 
specific attention to ‘feeling’. These concepts are present in most of his published work 
throughout his entire career and often set in close relation with the conceptual pairs relative 
and absolute ‘dependence’. The attuned reader of historical theologies will instantly recognize 
in the terms themselves why Schleiermacher is the likely interlocutor. Schleiermacher’s 
influence perpetuated the concept immediate self-consciousness and its important religious 
(fromm) element (the feeling of absolute dependence) for modern theologies a century 
following.57 
 
                                                 
56  Richard Crouter, Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2005), 1. 
57 The most famous presentation of which is in CF §3-5.   
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While much of Bavinck’s use of the concept remained un-cited, he revealed his indebtedness 
to Schleiermacher explicitly in his 1908 Stone lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary: ‘the 
core of our self-consciousness is, as Schleiermacher perceived much more clearly than Kant, 
not autonomy, but the feeling of dependence’.58 While an opponent, as Bolt correctly suggests, 
of ‘modern theology’ in general according to its adoption of the subjective consciousness as a 
source-foundation for theological construction (as Bavinck understands it), in obedience to his 
own suggestion regarding the requirement that one must comprehend and engage modern 
philosophy in order to participate in contemporary theology, Bavinck appropriated much of 
the philosophical grammar that consciousness theologies so promoted. Schleiermacher 
showed Bavinck that feeling offers a unique, original form of ‘knowing’ (a pre-discursive 
certainty, an intuition with no direct object in view) and that such faith-knowledge, as Bavinck 
put it, is the foundation of religion and a universal fact of human nature.  
 
This thesis, while proposing that Bavinck maintained a significant dependence on 
Schleiermacher and his progeny throughout his career, must be read with nuance lest 
misunderstanding ensue. The argument that Bavinck appropriated Schleiermacher’s concept 
of immediate self-consciousness into his dogmatic and philosophical work should not be 
reduced to a holistic ‘ism’. The suggestion is not that Bavinck is ‘Schleiermacherian’ like he has 
been called Augustinian, Calvinistic or, more appropriately, Reformed. It is, rather, that he 
borrowed and indeed learned from Schleiermacher in a very specific way. That way hardly 
pertains to Schleiermacher’s unique theological method (per the logic of divine causality or the 
                                                 
58 PoR, 66. WO, 55. ‘De kern van ons zelfbesef is, gelijk Schleiermacher veel beter dan Kant 
inzag, geen autonomie maar afhankelijkheidsgevoel’. Bavinck is transliterating here directly 
from Schleiermacher’s Abhängigkeitsgefühl.  The English translation of PoR by Vos and others 
uses ‘sense’ instead of ‘feeling’ but gevoel is best translated ‘feeling’ to maintain consistency with 
its German source. The German translation corroborates by using Schleiermacher’s term: ‘Der 
Kern des Bewußtseins unseres Selbst ist, wie Schleiermacher viel besser als Kant erkannte, 
keine Autonomie, sondern Abhängigkeitsgefühl’. Bavinck, Philosophie der Offenbarung, trans. 





search for a sufficient transcendental applied to the individual and communal Christian 
consciousness in its religious affections) in deriving the materials of his dogmatics, seine 
Glaubenslehre. Bavinck, rather, uses Schleiermacher to adapt the grammar of older dogmatic 
concepts to a world of ideas that had been re-shaped by Kant’s relegation of theology to mere 
thinking and he does so with the permission of his reading of Augustine: ‘Augustine expressly 
states that God can be known from the things that are visible but refers especially to self-
consciousness and self-knowledge as the road to eternal truth’.59 
 
Given that Bavinck’s deep appropriation of Schleiermacher has never been argued, an ethic of 
modesty is also in order. Beyond mere suggestions of a superficial adaptation of 
Schleiermacher and slight recognitions of similar wording, Bavinck readers have rarely given 
any due to this appropriation.60 Amongst older commentators, Bremmer briefly acknowledges 
that Bavinck’s Magnalia Dei gives priority to the subjective, internal organon called 
‘impressionability’ (vatbaarheid) as the passive faculty that receives God’s general revelation. 
This faculty, Bremmer notes, is the correlative of Schleiermacher’s concept of dependence 
used to express the ‘how’ in Bavinck’s doctrine of general revelation.61 Recently, B. Hoon 
Woo is most explicit about a Bavinck/Schleiermacher groundwork throughout Bavinck’s 
corpus, correctly arguing that Bavinck ‘wrestle[s] with the theology of Schleiermacher’ 
                                                 
59 RD 1.303. It is important already to note that Bavinck understood the distinction between 
knowledge of self that requires self-objectification and a pre-discursive consciousness of self.  
60 For brief mentions of Bavinck’s use of Schleiermacher see Eugene Heideman, The Relation of 
Revelation and Reason: E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Sheboygan Falls, WI: Van Gorcum, 1959), 7; S. 
Meijers, Objectiviteit en Existentialiteit: Een onderzoek naar hun verhouding in de theologie van Herman 
Bavinck en in door hem beinvloede concepties (Kampen: Kok, 1979), 285-86; Henk van den Belt, The 
Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 239. R. H. 
Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus (Kampen: Kok, 1961), 175, 328-331. The most 
nuanced of the earlier scholars is Veenhof who does begin his survey of Bavinck’s relation to 
Schleiermacher with instances of praise for Schleiermacher. The survey is, nevertheless, very 
brief. Jan Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie, 400-404, 557-561.  
61 R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus, 165.  
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throughout his career.62 Woo offers a reading of the Bavinck/Schleiermacher relation with 
regard to the doctrine of revelation that is novel material indeed. But, more precisely, Woo’s 
work is a study of both Bavinck and Barth’s interaction with Schleiermacher on the doctrine 
of revelation that organizes Bavinck’s criticisms of Schleiermacher in RD into an article. Woo 
does, however, helpfully point out Bavinck’s dependence on Schleiermacher in PoR but 
underestimates Bavinck’s relationship to Schleiermacher by setting it in equal terms with that 
of Kant. He mistakenly suggests that Bavinck puts Schleiermacher’s fundamental definition of 
self as dependent agent in tandem with Kant’s ‘perspective’ on human freedom.63 Woo also 
misunderstands Bavinck’s adoption of the term ‘immediate’ and its distinct uses in PoR and 
RD leading to the claim that ‘there is no immediate revelation’ conceptually in Bavinck’s 
corpus.64 Woo bases this conclusion on a qualification Bavinck makes in RD 1.309 but fails to 
see that Bavinck is speaking there in the ‘strictest sense’ referring to the fact that there is no 
‘direct’ access to God in se, no pure visio Dei, that God does not reveal God without means.  
 
But Bavinck also uses ‘immediate’ alongside Schleiermacher’s notion of immediacy as an 
intuitive, pre-discursive, underlying consciousness of self, world, and God, that accompanies 
all states of representational life. 65  Here, ‘immediate’ is in relation to ‘self-consciousness’, 
which is a domain of revelation that has no direct object in view (because self, world, and God 
are not objects to be perceived) and is directly associated with ‘feeling’. In this way, God can 
                                                 
62  B. Hoon Woo, ‘Bavinck and Barth on Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of Revelation’, Korea 
Reformed Theology 48 (2015): 38-71, 40-41.  
63 Woo, ‘Bavinck and Barth on Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of Revelation’, 50. 
64 Woo, ‘Bavinck and Barth on Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of Revelation’, 65. 
65 Regarding Schleiermacher, an editor’s note in CF helpfully explains his notion of immediate: 
‘In the proposition, the adjective unmittelbar (“immediate”) before “self-consciousness” means 
without any mediation … It does not mean instantaneous’. CF §3.2, n.4. 
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be revealed in immediate self-consciousness, because that experience is a feeling of being in 
relation with God. Here, in this primal subjective experience of self, God is not an object in 
view. But, what is immediate is the awareness or consciousness of being a self in distinction 
from not-I, the objective. Therein, the correlate of feeling arises from being in relations that 
are both relative and absolute. Bavinck, following Schleiermacher, uses immediate with respect 
to the self to refer to the pre-cognitive (as prior to thinking as the reasoning process), in which 
the domain of ‘feeling’ qualifies the term ‘immediate’. For Bavinck, feeling is indeed an aspect 
of the knowing faculty, but ‘feeling’ is a term that signifies one aspect of knowing. Hence, 
while self-, world-, and God-consciousness arise in the experience of being a self in the world, 
they are not first concepts that result from thinking (denken). The ‘immediate’ it must be 
emphasized, qualifies ‘self-consciousness’ and not one’s relation to God, which can never be 
immediate. Immediate, therefore, is a word that speaks of the self’s intuition of the self. And 
this consciousness has a correlative relationship to a feeling of dependence on that which is 
not-self. The idea of the immediate, for Bavinck, in relation to revelation does not refer to the 
negation of means in which one is removed in self-consciousness from human life in the 
world or of a direct consciousness of God in se. Rather, ‘immediate’ with respect to self-
consciousness is a reference to an intuitive, felt unity of the self with the world, which 
together depend absolutely on a personal, Absolute essence. Such self-consciousness is 
immediate because the basic awareness of the ‘I’ (Ik) is the ground of all thinking and willing. 
It is not discovered, but given. This feeling of self, of world, and of the Absolute God, before 
all evidence, for Bavinck, is the primal subjective correlate of the fact of God’s general 
revelation, what he calls after Calvin and Schleiermacher, pietas, referring to a religious feeling 




Woo’s point in the end is that Bavinck offers better resources than Barth for overcoming 
Schleiermacher’s subjectivity, and this may be the case. Regardless, the point is made by 
treating three mammoth figures who each left a prodigious corpus with only the briefest of 
strokes.66  
 
Henk van den Belt offers the most precise account of Bavinck’s relation to Schleiermacher 
thus far. He correctly remarks that Bavinck stands closer to Schleiermacher and the German 
mediation theologies than does his Dutch audience. 67  His comments are derivative of 
Bavinck’s adoption of self-consciousness as the solution to the epistemic problems of modern 
philosophy in PoR. Van den Belt’s remarks are brief, however, and his purpose is to uncover 
the fact that Bavinck moved beyond Schleiermacher.  
 
It remains true that the proceeding argument pertaining to Bavinck’s appropriation of 
Schleiermacher’s fundamental philosophical-theological motifs is nearly new territory. There 
are several possible reasons for Schleiermacher’s omission from general claims regarding 
influence including translation error (as it pertains to Anglophone readers), which has and will 
be highlighted throughout. But primarily, there is in general a deep suspicion in Bavinck’s 
theological tradition of even the mildest adoptive reference or interaction with modern 
                                                 
66 While brief, Woo also offers helpful evidences for perceiving a unique Bavinck-
Schleiermacher relation throughout Bavinck’s corpus citing proofs like the immense number 
of instances that Bavinck interacts with Schleiermacher in RD, and the fact that Bavinck 
always treats Schleiermacher’s impact amid each dogmatic locus. These evidences and more are 
developed in detail in Ch. 3 in this work. Yet, Woo’s comment that, like Barth, Bavinck ‘wrote 
[a book] about the theology of Schleiermacher’ is misleading (pg. 40). The book he cites is 
Bavinck’s treatment of the theology of de la Saussaye, a French-Dutch pastor and theologian, 
who was influenced by Schleiermacher’s legacy (see Ch. 3). He derives this misunderstanding 
directly from Eugene Heideman.  
67 Henk van den Belt, ‘An Alternative Approach to Apologetics’, in The Kuyper Center Review: 




theologians or philosophers that might be something other than critique—this is to say, a 
suspicion of contamination. For example, Mattson writes: ‘while Bavinck appreciates 
Schleiermacher’s emphasis on the subjective feeling of absolute dependence, it is of little use 
to him because of its pantheistic character’.68 While the opposite is the case, such suspicion 
rightly stems from Bavinck’s own position as a thoroughgoing orthodox and Dutch Reformed 
theologian that did, in fact, stand up against the ‘challenges of modernity’ and criticized the 
dogmatic works of theologians like Schleiermacher often.  Yet, one must not let his general 
theological identity mask the reality of his development of ideas.69  
 
In total, Bavinck used Schleiermacher’s concepts to develop his own grammar regarding the 
given certainty of human experience as well as a religious certainty in feeling (gevoel) correlative 
to a universal revelation of God first felt before discovered by reason. The point thus far, 
nevertheless, is that there are no other interpretative battles in the secondary literature to 
address as it pertains to how Bavinck uses Schleiermacher and very few as it pertains to the 
fact that he is using Schleiermacher. It is important, therefore, that the argument be 
considered with nuance from the outset and to recognize that the claim does not obstruct 
Bavinck’s adherence to the boundaries of his tradition’s commitments.70 
 
iv. The Way Forward 
 
                                                 
68 Restored to Our Destiny, 111, fn. 47. 
69  The suspicion was also clear in Pass’ earlier considerations of Bavinck’s use of ‘cogito’ 
following van den Belt: ‘At first glance [at Bavinck’s use of cogito], this statement appears 
extraordinarily subjective, a statement one might expect from the pen of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher rather than the doyen of the Dutch. If one reads further though, it soon 
becomes apparent that Bavinck is not proposing a quasi-idealist religious proof for the 
existence of God, but as Henk van den Belt notes, Bavinck invokes the cogito to illustrate the 
strength of religious certainty over and against a merely “scientific” certainty’. Bruce Pass, 
‘Herman Bavinck and the Cogito’, Reformed Theological Review 74:1 (May, 2015): 15-33, 15.  




The way forward in the final four chapters of five will be a simultaneously chronological and 
thematic examination of Bavinck’s corpus that advances four levels of claims across two parts 
in a relation of interdependence on one another. These claims appear in simultaneity across 
the whole of the study. The first claim is that Friedrich Schleiermacher and his progeny in 
both Germany and the Netherlands were Bavinck’s most significant modern-theological 
interlocutors. The second is that Bavinck adopted their terminology and emphases and, in 
fact, appropriated the arguments of Schleiermacher into his own corpus. The third is that, 
within this milieu, Bavinck awoke to the fact of subjectivity and set his own constructive work 
on the relation between subject and object in the theological lineage of Augustine, Calvin, and 
Schleiermacher. The fourth, this appropriation of Schleiermacherian concepts and arguments 
unveils precisely Bavinck the Reformed catholic theologian’s subjection of the demands of the 
modern theological intellect to the boundaries of his confessional Reformed heritage.  
 
Before taking up the essential evidence of this argument in part II, part I, which includes 
chapters one through three, is a presentation of the context of the question presented and a 
historical/textual development of the argument from Bavinck’s early corpus. Chapter one 
provides some further details regarding Bavinck scholarship offering a justification of the 
broader modern/orthodox question in relation to trends in secondary literature. It also 
provides, more importantly, a reading of Bavinck’s philosophy or sophia (approaching 
dogmatics with wisdom) regarding the task of the dogmatician as self-consciously Reformed 
catholic. This reading is intended to make sense of his eclectic use of modern theologies in a 
broadly antithetical tradition.  
 
Chapter two addresses the question of Schleiermacher as a primary modern interlocutor for 
Bavinck. How did Schleiermacher reach Bavinck (the question of history)? Subsequently, 
chapter three asks a derivative question: did Bavinck appropriate Schleiermacher in his early 
work? In consideration, then, are Bavinck’s works from 1880 through 1901. These dates mark 
the completion of his doctorate at Leiden unto the publication of the final volume of the first 
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edition of the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek as well as the final year of his lectureship at the Kampen 
Theological School, but this chapter especially focuses on his earliest works. Particular 
attention is paid in chapter two to his study of Christian ethics, which establishes the early use 
of the concepts of self-consciousness and dependence in his corpus.  
 
Turning to part II, both chapters four and five argue for a development in his career and 
investigate the climax of Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s conceptual framework in 
his 1908 Stone lectures and its 1909 publication as The Philosophy of Revelation. This text is 
important for proving Bavinck’s dependence on Schleiermacher and unveiling his 
development from his early works. In chapter four, the focus is on Bavinck’s appropriation of 
Schleiermacher’s concepts in relation to the philosophical. In chapter five, the central focus is 
Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s concept of dependence as it relates to religion. 
For Bavinck, immediate self-consciousness and the feeling of dependence are, in short, 






























Reformed Catholicity between the Modern and 
Orthodox 
 
Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s concepts unveils a paradigmatic example of how 
he perceived the theological task. This chapter unveils that perception pertaining especially to 
his methodological catholicity. What is the task, in other words, of the theologian in his 
relationship to the old and new? If one adopts the modern ethic as Lauzon recounts it—‘to be 
modern… meant more than simply to see the present as equal or superior to the past; it also 
implied the rejection of the idea that the past should in any way constrain the present’—then 
Bavinck rejects wholly the modern methodology.1 Francis Bacon likewise argued in his 1620 
Novum Organum that the failure of Aristotle, particularly the Organon, lead to the necessity of 
‘new foundations’, a position that finds no place in Bavinck’s corpus. He regularly upholds 
Aristotelian logic and common principles.2 René Descartes, like Bacon, in his search for a 
certainty that could only begin from an absolute doubt, affirmed something comparable.3 In 
contradistinction, Bavinck as a modern theologian outlined the very structure of his dogmatics 
in order to let the ancient speak to the modern and the modern to the ancient; to speak from a 
                                                 
1  Matthew Lauzon, ‘Modernity’, in The Oxford Handbook of World History, ed. Jerry Bentley 
(Oxford: OUP, 2011), 73-74. 
2 Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon (New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1877), 1.74. 
Quoted in Lauzon, ‘Modernity’, 74. 
3 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Michael Moriarty (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 
17. In his thought experiment, Descartes dismissed all that he had learned and searched for a 
new ground of certainty, one that ignored history and experience: ‘I saw that at some stage in 
my life the whole structure [of built opinions] would have to be utterly demolished and that I 
should have to begin again from the bottom up if I wished to construct something lasting and 
unshakeable in the sciences’.  
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tradition (gereformeerd), under the authority of Scripture guided by the confessions—a 
requirement of his Reformed catholicity and the recognition of his position as a dependent, 
finite creature.4 The past must constrain the present, he argued, insofar as the doctrines of his 
Reformed confessional theology offered a fence of freedom within which to work. His use of 
Schleiermacher did not tear down that fence but sought to make the most use of its territory. 
In a phrase, his catholic task demanded a search for truth wherever it could be found.  
 
In the broadest of claims, it was stated in the introduction that Bavinck, through the influence 
of Schleiermacher and the mediation theologies (what he calls the ‘consciousness-theology’ 
tradition), turned to the fact of subjectivity as a prominent motif in his corpus. And in this 
broad adoption, more specifically, this study unveils what Bavinck learned from 
Schleiermacher most specifically: a grammar and logic for conceptualizing his theological-
philosophical speech in the light of the principle of subjectivity. He applied Schleiermacher’s 
philosophic-religious reasoning to the problem of the duality of subject and object especially. 
The duality, often construed by Hegel as that between nature and spirit,5 by Kant as that 
between subject and object, 6  and Schleiermacher, between being and thinking, 7  was the 
context in which Bavinck constructed the problems facing modern philosophies. By indirect 
                                                 
4 Schleiermacher too possessed an irenic sensibility. Both his epistemic modesty and wide use 
of authoritative voices that move beyond the Christian consciousness of his ‘given time’ are 
notable examples of irenicism in CF. Such a sensibility is characteristic of the highest 
theologians of the Reformed theological tradition.  
5 ‘In §18 of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel writes that “the Idea shows itself as the thinking that is 
merely identical with itself [Logic], and this at once shows itself to be the activity of positing 
itself over against itself [Nature], in order to be for-itself, and to be, in this other, only with 
itself [Spirit]” (TWA 8, §18: 63)’. Cinzia Ferrini, ‘Hegel’s Transition to Spirit: Some 
Introductory and Systematic Remarks’, Hegel-Studien Band 46 (2012): 117-150, 124. Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke in 20 Bänden, vol. 8 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1983).  
6 Kant, CPR, A115, B131–2, B134–5. 
7 For example, ‘we bear in ourselves the identity of being and thinking’. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schleiermachers Dialektik (1822), ed. Rudolf Odebrecht (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988), 270. Translated in David E. Klemm, ‘Mediating 
Schleiermacher: The Prospect for a Transcendental-Anthropological Theory of Religion’ in 
Schleiermacher, the Study of Religion and the Future of Theology: A Transatlantic Dialogue, eds. Brent 
Sockness and Wilhelm Gräb (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 165-178, 175. 
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implication, Bavinck found the unity of thinking and being along the path (weg) of immediate 
self-consciousness, which was a discovery situated within his general turn to the fact of 
subjectivity.8  
 
The treatment of this central thesis of appropriation begins in part II, chapter four. In part I, 
in preparation for the arguments of appropriation, one must begin by establishing justification 
for the broader proposition of his modern/orthodox relation. Before embarking on the study 
of Bavinck’s texts to vindicate the introductory claims, it is important to investigate first (i) 
Bavinck and his interpreters—the justification for the modern/orthodox question develops 
directly from the prevailing trends of Bavinck scholarship. Among these scholarly trends, 
there are two that deserve attention foremost: (a) the two-Bavincks hypothesis in relation to 
the organic motif; (b) Bavinck’s contested genealogical relation to both post-Reformation 
scholastic theology and post-Kantian philosophy and theologies. These two trends, however, 
are not equals. The two-Bavincks hypothesis, the bi-polarity narrative briefly presented in the 
introduction, consists of architectonic questions regarding the presuppositions of Bavinck 
interpretation from which other questions must be asked. 
 
One begins then by considering appropriate aspects of Bavinck’s biography and the most 
recent debates regarding tension and bifurcation in his life and thought between what has 
been called a pull of two distinct traditions creating ‘two Bavincks’. A brief examination of 
these recent scholarly trends will reveal in this chapter that all of them, at base, are offering 
responses to the modern/orthodox binary without necessarily giving specific attention to the 
question in this manner. An investigation of Bavinck and his interpreters will make clear that 
all agree that he is both a modern and orthodox theologian, although under the guise of 
various definitions. 
 
                                                 
8 PoR, 55. 
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The penultimate portion of this chapter, (ii) the task of the Reformed catholic theologian, 
unveils Bavinck’s theological method by answering this question: ‘what is the duty of the 
theologian in his development of dogmatics with regard to the relationship between old and 
new’? The answer provides a norm for understanding why Bavinck generously used 
Schleiermacher within an opposing tradition. To state it positively, his appropriation of 
Schleiermacher exemplifies his conception of the task of a Reformed catholic theologian as 
one who hunts for truth wherever it can be found.  In the final section of this chapter, before 
turning to the material evidence of the historical argument, it is critical to briefly consider (iii) 
the nature of proof. Such a foray into the historical and textual dimensions of Bavinck’s 
relationship to Schleiermacher demands some remarks regarding a description of the 
characteristics of evidence.  
 
1.1. Bavinck and His Interpreters 
 
Born on 13 December 1854 in Hoogeveen, Bavinck’s location in the history of Dutch 
ecclesiastical development reflects the question presented. To elucidate the narrative 
mentioned earlier, the culmination of the secession movement was the 1834 separation from 
the Hervormde Kerk, the state church of the Netherlands, because of overreach by the state 
coupled with doctrinal issues and a call to renewed spirituality.9 The newly formed body, 
originaly known as the Afgescheidenen and later called the Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk, 
organized a seminary for ministerial training in Kampen by the year of Bavinck’s birth. Jan 
Bavinck declined an offer from the Synod to be one of its first professors after casting lots in 
the form of two letters (one with ja and one with nee). The Afscheiding (secession) associated 
                                                 
9 Bolt categorizes the secession movement as a modern equivalent in theology and piety to 
both English Puritanism and the Nadere Reformatie. John Bolt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, RD 1.12. 
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with the spiritual roots of the Nadere Reformatie found some companionship in a parallel 
movement to which Kuyper attached himself, the aristocratic and evangelical Réveil (revival).10  
 
The religious climate of the secession lobby and Bavinck’s education at home and church 
throughout his childhood and teenage years were pietistic and confessional. He also attended a 
top school at the Gynasium in Zwolle. According to Bolt, ‘Bavinck’s church, his family, and 
his own spirituality were thus definitively shaped by strong patterns of deep pietistic Reformed 
spirituality’ as well as surrounded by a sectarian climate.11 While the sectarian narrative is 
somewhat troubled with respect to Bavinck’s family (see Ch. 2), it is generally recognized to 
obtain for the Kampen environment, which Dosker’s letter previously quoted affirms. To the 
disappointment of a small segement of the secession community, after attending the 
theological school at Kampen for one year, Bavinck chose to attend the University of Leiden 
to attain a ‘more scientific’ induction into academic theology. 12  This transfer to Leiden 
embodies what has been called a two-fold constituency: the pull between the modern and pre-
modern, liberal scientific theology and an old orthodox and pietistic oriented secessionism.13 
 
1.1.a. Two-Bavincks and Organic Unity 
 
The early move from Kampen to Leiden, as mentioned previously, introduces a narrative of 
biographical extremes that has been used as a caricature and the basis of a dualistic 
hermeneutic known as the ‘two-Bavincks hypothesis’, which presupposes incoherence and 
challenges Bavinck’s own intellectual facility. This tension is often expressed as the 
competition between secessionist orthodoxy and religious engagement in culture, a this-
                                                 
10  For a concise theological introduction to the Dutch ‘second Reformation’ or Nadere 
Reformatie see Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian's Reasonable Service, vol. 1, trans. Bartel Elshout 
(Morgan, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1992), lxxxv-cxi. 
11 Bolt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, RD 1.12.  
12 R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten (Kampen: Kok, 1966), 20. 
13 This ‘pull’ runs parallel in multiple ways to Schleiermacher’s own development between 
Moravian pietism and his education at Halle (see Ch. 2).  
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worldly vs. other-worldly (Kingdom of Heaven) binary.14 The dualism was first posited by one 
of his principle biographers, Valentijn Hepp, and then one of his most significant interpreters, 
Jan Veenhof.15  
 
Eglinton offered the premiere reconstruction and critique of this hermeneutic. ‘The two-
Bavincks hypothesis’, Eglinton argues 
rests on a particular interpretation of his personal narrative… it combines the 
factors of his… employment as a reformed dogmatician, involvement in 
politics, philosophy, psychology, and education and various events of his old 
age (the most famous being the sale of his theological library and dying 
statement: “My dogmatics avails me nothing, nor my knowledge, but I have 
my faith and in this I have all”).16  
 
The two-Bavincks hypothesis is an attempt to frame conceptually a real tension in Bavinck’s 
life and works. After studying at the University of Leiden, Bavinck described an anxiety in his 
soul concerning his participation in the scientific and modern world. At the completion of his 
studies at Leiden in 1880, Bavinck reflects on the costs of his decision: ‘Leiden has benefitted 
me in many ways: I hope always to acknowledge that gratefully. But is has also greatly 
impoverished me, robbed me, not only of much ballast (for which I am happy), but also of 
much that I recently, especially when I preach, recognize as vital for my own spiritual life’.17 
Accordingly, A. Anema, Bavinck’s colleague at the Vrije Universiteit, recognized this duality:  
Bavinck was a secession preacher and a representative of modern culture… 
that was a striking characteristic. In that duality is found Bavinck’s significance. 
That duality is also a reflection of the tension—at times crisis—in Bavinck’s 
life. In many respects it is a simple matter to be a preacher in the Secession 
Church, and, in a certain sense, it is also not that difficult to be a modern 
person. But in no way is it a simple matter to be the one as well as the other.18 
 
                                                 
14 Bolt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, RD 1.14-15. 
15 V. Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck, 317-18; Jan Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie, 108-11. 
16  Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 28; V. Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck, 317–18; Henry Elias 
Dosker, ‘Herman Bavinck’, Princeton Theological Review 20, no. 3 (1922), 21. 
17 Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck, 84. 




In turn, a Wellhausian-like hermeneutic has been applied to Bavinck’s texts using both a ‘M’ 
(modern) and ‘S’ (secessionist) source.19 Eglinton argues, however, that ‘Bavinck’s theological 
vision is considerably more sophisticated and united than the normative reading makes out’.20 
The two-Bavincks hypothesis initially profited from a misreading of Bavinck’s organic motif, 
which created a ‘de facto apartheid’ between modernist and secessionist readings. The organic 
motif, argues Eglinton, is the conceptual framework that governs the plurality of Bavinck’s 
works and disciplines: the coherence and interdependence of all created being as universe or 
world instituted by the Triune God and revealed in the fact of nature and human 
consciousness. The concept of organism means in simplest form the vital movement of 
growth unto an ultimate unification, to the negation of chaos, and is applied lavishly across his 
corpus. The concept signals unity and blossoming, parts coming together for a purpose, unto 
the Kingdom of God as the summum bonum of existence. In an ironic turn, Eglinton proves 
that the organic motif, while previously misunderstood, is not an agent of disunity but unity 
across the spectrum of Bavinck’s works. The chief irony is, perhaps, that Bavinck was a 
theologian most antithetical to all dualisms—sin in his Augustinian rendering, being the power 
of disunity, disorder, non-being, and chaos.  
 
Organicism is, regarding Bavinck, an ontic expression with ethical implications. It is a concept 
derivative of God’s act as creator that identifies both the unified structure of reality (cosmos) 
and every individual sphere of reality (the diversity of creation) in its relation to the whole. It 
further identifies the trajectory of that unity—the blossoming of the Kingdom of God (thus, 
the metaphors of mustard seed, vine/branch, bread/leaven and kernel/husk are incorporated 
throughout). Bavinck nowhere offers a comprehensive definition of this concept. There are 
several ways to construct a precise definition by piecing the concept together from various 
                                                 
19 The ‘M’ and ‘O’ is a play on the Documentary Hypothesis from historical-critical studies of 
Torah/Isaiah, etc. The allusion to Wellhausen was first made by Mattson, Restored to Our 
Destiny, 12. 
20 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 29. 
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texts. One way is to examine the definition and task of dogmatics located in the Prolegomena to 
see the motif in action. 
 
The definition begins then with the dogmatic task. The task of dogmatics is the sum of his 
ontic and epistemic principia: it is the science of ‘thinking God’s thoughts after Him’.21 In 
reflecting on this task, at least three implicit strands of organicism come to the fore: (i) the 
self-conscious God is a (vital and personal) unity in his Triune being. God is one. His essence 
is his existence. In creation, God organizes a unified, organic cosmos that analogously reflects 
his unity. Yet in the realm of creation, unity is qualitatively creaturely. The realm of the 
creature strives toward a complex (not simple) unity and coherence. The scope of revelation 
and purpose of redemption is, therefore, all-encompassing in its ‘organic’ movement dispelling 
the powers of dis-unification as the attribute of sin; (ii) in an analogous way, the science of 
dogmatics must seek an organic unity in its parts that reflects in human speech the nature of 
God’s revelation ad extra by constructing a coherent system—a mark of its scientific purpose. 
It is the task of the dogmatician to repristinate God’s thoughts systematically because they 
cannot stand in contradiction if God’s self-manifestation in history is, in fact, God’s self-
manifestation. The dogmatician recognizes, however, that this task is one taken up in finitude, 
containing paradox, and temporally incomplete, remaining always a process of becoming; (iii) 
in this task, the dogmatician is united to the whole of the church of all ages, which is itself an 
organic unity, the body of Christ. The catholic scope of the body presupposes, for Bavinck, 
the catholicity of the Christian religion unto the establishment of the Kingdom.  
 
Bavinck draws the reader’s attention from the start to an organic motif that contains at least 
three dimensions within the outline of the dogmatic task. The task is one, in other words, that 
depends upon the conditional: if God’s being is essential unity, then all his creation images a 
unity analogous to his being while remaining entirely distinct from his being. From within, this 
                                                 
21 RD 1.44.  
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motif beckons the ethic of catholicity in pursuit of a system constructed from God’s revealed 
speech while seeking interpretative unity with the Spirit-filled church of the ages. This relation 
between the unity of the church, the horizon of the coming Kingdom, catholicity as a present 
task, and speaking of God in a way commensurate with God’s revealed being is, for Bavinck, a 
world and life view of organism in, through, and for the glory of Christ Jesus, the appointed 
judge of heaven and earth: 
The worldview of Scripture and of all Christian theology… its name is theism, 
not monism; its orientation is supernatural, not naturalistic. According to this 
theistic worldview, there is a multiplicity of substances, forces, materials, and 
laws. It does not strive to erase the distinctions between God and the world, 
between spirit (mind) and matter, between psychological and physical, ethical 
and religious phenomena. It seeks rather to discover the harmony that holds all things 
together and unites them and that is the consequence of the creative thought of 
God. Not identity or uniformity but unity in diversity is what it aims at.22 
 
In order to construct his own precise definition Eglinton turns to Bavinck’s 1904 work 
Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (The Christian Worldview) where Bavinck provides the closest 
instance, perhaps, of a primary definition of the organic. 23  The idea of organism is first 
contrasted here with the mechanistic, a closed-system monistic universe. 24  In 
contradistinction, according to Bavinck, ‘there is a most profuse diversity [in the cosmos] and 
yet, in that diversity, there is a superlative kind of unity. The foundation for both diversity and 
unity is in God’. 25  Eglinton then derives four principles that guide the reader through 
Bavinck’s organic concept: (i) ‘the created order is marked by a simultaneous unity and 
diversity …it must reflect [God’s] identity as three-in-one’;26 (ii) in this Triniform structure, 
                                                 
22 RD 1.368. Emphasis added. 
23 Herman Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1904), 51. 
24 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 67. 
25 RD 2.435-6. 
26 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 67. It is important to note that Bavinck is not offering what is 
called today a ‘social Trinity’. To suppose so would be anachronistic and conceptually false. 
The Trinity does not offer a paradigm for the social ethic or its ideal construction. The Trinity 
is absolutely mysterious and dogmas constructed about the Trinity are done so with attention 
to the fact that the theologian does not comprehend who God is in himself but only reflects 
on God’s self-disclosure. It is, however, also important to note that his organic language is 
used in a similar fashion (the language of unity-in-diversity) by Stanley Grenz and others. That 
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‘unity precedes diversity’; 27  (iii) arguing that organicism is quite ‘unlike the chaos of 
multiformity’, unity-in-diversity is orchestrated by a common idea, a synchrony like that of the 
human body;28 (iv) and it has a ‘teleological definiteness’: the glory of the Triune God.29  
 
In RD, Bavinck explicates the all-encompassing scope of his organic motif. Many 
relationships, nature and grace, creation and re-creation, God’s revelation and the life of the 
cosmos, all exhibit a ‘connectedness’ that find their meaning in reference to the Trinity and 
their fulfillment in an eschatological definiteness, the Kingdom. Revelation, herein, is the 
secret, the mystery of all existence: 
To this, finally, we must add that these arguments uncover and preserve the 
connectedness between nature and grace, between creation and re-creation. 
The God who created and sustained us is also he who re-creates us in his 
image. Grace, though superior to nature, is not in conflict with it. While 
restoring what has been corrupted in it by sin, it also clarifies and perfects what 
is still left in it of God’s revelation. The thinking mind situates the doctrine of 
the Trinity squarely amid the full-orbed life of nature and humanity. A 
Christian’s confession is not an island in the ocean but a high mountaintop 
from which the whole creation can be surveyed. And it is the task of Christian 
theologians to present clearly the connectedness of God’s revelation with, and 
its significance for, all of life. The Christian mind remains unsatisfied until all 
of existence is referred back to the triune God, and until the confession of 
God’s Trinity functions at the center of our thought and life.30 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
creaturely being is, for Bavinck, diversity is not a reflection on God in himself in a manner 
that suggests God as unity between three diverse beings with three distinct centers of 
consciousness and will. Rather, organic creaturely ontology is derivative of God as one in 
essence and three in person with a single Divine Consciousness in the most qualitatively 
absolute way. His doctrine of God is utterly opposed to anthropological projection and tri-
theism. While creation is like the Trinity insofar as God is its ultimate source and principle of 
being, the Trinity is not like anything, including the social order of creaturely community. One 
wonders, nevertheless, if Bavinck was writing today if he might alter his grammar.  See, for 
example, Stanley Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago 
Dei (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 302. 
27 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 68. 
28 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 69. 
29 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 69. 
30 RD 2.330. 
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The purpose of this reconstruction of the organic motif for this study is three-fold. First, this 
motif provides a fundamental hermeneutical key to interpreting Bavinck’s texts in tension. 
Second, this rendering of the organic motif is a reinterpretation of the motif that has 
inaugurated a paradigm shift that now demands reconsideration of the most salient themes in 
Bavinck scholarship. ‘Bavinck has hitherto been read through a hermeneutic based on a highly 
particular interpretation of his personality’, Eglinton writes.31 In rejecting this reading for a 
reconstruction of the organic motif, Eglinton is proposing that the Bavinck readership 
recognize and presuppose a unified Bavinck without ignoring the modernist/secessionist 
(orthodox) tension. Third, the concept of the organic is interdependent with the concept of 
immediate self-consciousness as an awareness of organic unity of self as mind/body, subject 
and object. The turn to the self throughout his corpus makes good on his argument for the 
organic nature of reality insofar as the unity of self is a microcosm of the unity of the finite, 
establishing human beings as the mikro-theos of creaturely existence. This is to say, that ‘full’ 
self-consciousness leads to an awareness of the gift of organic unity of self, of the organic 
relation between self and world, and of the God who gives, a self- and God-consciousness.32  
 
This study, to summarize, participates in the ongoing rereading of Bavinck’s texts that both 
appropriates and investigates the unified Bavinck under the banner of the organic motif. ‘If it 
is only appropriate to speak of a single Herman Bavinck’, Eglinton argues, ‘it is not simply the 
organic motif that must be reappropriated. Rather, the breakdown of the two-Bavinck’s model 
calls for nothing less than a paradigm shift in Bavinck studies’.33 The unified Bavinck and 
particularly the organic motif will serve both, at times, as a point of departure and an object of 
investigation throughout this work, which in reconsidering the modern/orthodox relation in 
the detail of his appropriation of Schleiermacher, participates in Eglinton’s call. It is in the 
                                                 
31 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 207.  
32 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God, the Highest Good’, trans. Nelson Kloosterman, TBR 2 
(2011): 133–170 150. Hereafter: ‘KGHG’. This idea has a downstream relation to 
Schleiermacher’s ‘original unity of consciousness’ (see Ch. 2, 4), OR, 42; CF §4.3.   
33 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 209. 
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thesis that Bavinck is orthodox yet modern exemplified in his subsumption of 
Schleiermacher’s conceptual framework under and within his tradition, that this study stamps 
Eglinton’s conclusion that there is a real modern/orthodox tension in Bavinck without the 
need for claims of personality or theological dualism.  
 
The focus of the two-Bavincks hypothesis with Eglinton’s thesis also offers additional insight 
into previous scholars’ conception of modernity in general. This narrowing of the concept of 
modernity is two-fold. The most prominent definition has largely been constructed based 
upon the duality that existed for Bavinck as an orthodox dogmatician, Bavinck als dogmaticus, 
with living as a participant in modern society.34 For Bavinck, Kuyper, and the neo-Calvinist 
movement, according to Puchinger, their theory of modern culture rested with Groen van 
Prinsterer, the father of the anti-Revolutionary sentiment, and his antipathy toward principles 
and outcomes of the French Revolution. Puchinger notes, the ‘French Revolution gave the 
Netherlands a powerful, initially unexpected push towards a Christian, anti-revolutionary 
conscience which…promote[s] the message and rights of religion’. 35  The neo-Calvinists’ 
antithesis to the ‘Ni Dieu, ni maitre’ (neither God nor master) defines their opposition to the 
revolutionary and novel aspects of modern culture and society. This revolutionary dictum, as 
it pertains to participating in modern society, is the modernity that Bavinck so opposed. 
 
On the other hand, however, neo-Calvinism was a thoroughly modern movement according 
to the way Harinck has defined the term: novel social ‘practices’.36 Present in the development 
of aspects of modern society, according to its practices, are the underlying concepts of 
freedom, democracy, and progress. Bavinck’s relation to social modernity in general, then, is 
                                                 
34 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 207. 
35  G. Puchinger, ‘Groen van Prinsterer, aangestoken door de Franse Revolutie’, Radix 15 
(1989), 120; cited in Hugo den Boer ‘Another Revolution: Towards a New Explanation of the 
Rise of Neo-Calvinism’, eds., James Eglinton and George Harinck, Neo-Calvinism and the French 
Revolution (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2014), 177–178. 




not only antithetical. In this way, Bavinck, den Boer argues, ‘testified to this ambiguity in that 
[he] accepted the practices deriving from the French Revolution, but at the same time placed 
the Christian faith in absolute opposition to the so-called principles of the French Revolution 
out of which modernism had arisen’.37 In terms of society and culture, Bavinck’s relationship 
with modernity was nuanced and dialectical rather than a simple ‘for’ or ‘against’.38  
 
It cannot be denied therefore that Bavinck was a modern man shaped by modern ideals. He 
was not primarily an aggressor against the advancement of modern culture but lived under the 
conditions of modern culture as an active participant. Bavinck argued for a plurality of 
religious voices in the public sphere and saw this as a positive condition of the ‘religious 
character of modernism’.39 The relationship of Bavinck to this aspect of social modernity has 
been widely explored because public theology stands at the very center of common definitions 
of the neo-Calvinist movement.  
 
Yet, as stated in the introduction, there is a second and, for this work, primary locus for the 
term ‘modern’. It relates to the tension between Bavinck’s dogmatiek and the modern dogmatiek 
rather than Bavinck als dogmaticus in relation to Bavinck as participant in modern culture.40 
Both aspects deal with the tension of orthodoxy and modernity. In the former, the tension 
appears in the relationship regarding the question of Christ (orthodox) and culture (modern). 
In the latter, the tension is present between Dutch Reformed theology (orthodox) and post-
Kantian liberal theologies (modern). 
 
                                                 
37 Den Boer, ‘Another Revolution’, 181. 
38 See, for example, John Bolt, The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman 
Bavinck; Harinck, ‘The Religious Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of 
Religion’, 60-63. 
39 Harinck, ‘The Religious Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion’, 
60.  
40 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 205-210.  
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Bavinck, in his early career in the 1880s, identifies these ‘modern’ theologies by offering each 
of them space in several separate publications. As seen in the introduction, they include the 
philosophy and theologies of Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Ritschl; the 
derivative theologies of the Vermittlungstheologie (especially Rothe, Schweizer, and Dorner) and 
the various adaptations of German influence in the Netherlands: the Groningen school, the 
Modern Theology (a proper name for Leiden’s theological school) and, most importantly, the 
Dutch Ethicals, particularly D. Chantepie de la Saussaye—all of which he subsumes under the 
broad title ‘consciousness-theology’. 
 
In other words, it is one thing to speak of a tension between an orthodox theology and living 
as a participant in modern culture and, while closely related, another to speak of the 
consanguinity between an orthodox and modern theology. It is in this latter sense that the 
question and thesis of this study is posed. That Bavinck was a theologian trying to engage a 
modern culture with Christianity is not in question. Yet, was he a modern theologian while 
engaging a modern culture? 
 
That he is both, at least at times, is the supposition of most Bavinck interpreters of the last 
century. That there is a tension between his modernity and orthodoxy is basic to both the 
two-Bavincks hypothesis and the unifying organic motif. Locating Bavinck’s orthodoxy in 
these previous debates is not, therefore, in question. His embrace of the codification of the 
theology of the Reformers in the Three Forms of Unity situates his theology thoroughly in 
what is Reformed, Calvinistic and today called ‘classical theism’. The contested activity of the 
two-Bavincks hypothesis, rather, consisted in setting his modernity against his orthodoxy in a 
relation of contradiction. The disagreement is over this question: is his appropriation of 
modern theological-philosophical trends as a committed Dutch confessionalist theologian 
evidence of a dualistic thinker or commensurate with a kind of unity per an idiosyncratic, 
irenic theological method? After Eglinton’s work of answering that question contra dualism, 
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one is left with the task of precisely defining the relationship between the modern-orthodox 
tensions that remain. His relationship to Schleiermacher is key for this task.  
 
 
1.1.b. Between Calvin and Kant 
 
In addition to the undermining of the two-Bavincks hypothesis, there stands another closely 
related trend in historical-theological Bavinck scholarship: identification. Identification refers 
to the attempt to locate his motifs predominately within specific traditions. Here one 
understands more of the second aspect of the tension. Bavinck’s orthodoxy is in continuity 
with the Reformed scholastic theology emphasizing the knowledge of God as the object of 
theology. This tradition prioritizes the revelation of God inscripturated and prizes adherence 
to the confessional codification of the Reformer’s theology in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Evidences of continuity from this tradition are ample in Bavinck’s RD. They 
include, for example, striking similarities to the dogmatics of Bullinger, Junius, Voetius, 
Polanus, and de Moor, consistently making use of Aristotelian logic, and the structuring 
presence of the fundamental distinction between archetypal and ectypal theology, a doctrine 
that first appears in Junius.41 In addition to the generations that codified the Reformation 
theology, Bavinck’s orthodoxy is indebted even more to Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Calvin. 
His defense of Chalcedon parallels various attacks on two-nature Christology from ‘modern’ 
theologies. He is, nevertheless, above any other single theologian, influenced by Saint 
Augustine. While quantity does not guarantee influence, he does cite Augustine nearly eight 
hundred times in the RD, which is substantially more than his use of Calvin.42 
 
                                                 
41 Franciscus Junius, A Treatise on True Theology with the Life of Franciscus Junius, trans. David C. 
Noe (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), 1-58. See the index of RD 4 for 
references. 
42 The index of RD 4 offers a host of these references, but not all. 
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In light of Bavinck’s confession to this tradition of orthodoxy, the most substantial of these 
proposed identities is to argue, and rightly so, for his affinities with post-Reformation 
Reformed scholastics. 43  ‘From Bavinck’s numerous citations of key Dutch Reformed 
theologians such as Voetius, De Moor, Vitringa, van Mastricht, Witsius, and Walaeus as well 
as of the important Leiden Synopsis purioris theologiae, it is clear he knew that tradition well and 
claimed it as his own’.44 This second trend is closely aligned with the first in that the division 
within the two-Bavincks hypothesis between the modern and secessionist Bavinck results in 
identifying the latter in terms of the Dutch Reformed scholastic tradition in antithesis to the 
developments of the late eighteenth century. ‘It is evident that the broader issue of the ‘two 
Bavincks’, Mattson argues, ‘repeatedly finds its focal point in the narrower question to 
Bavinck’s relationship to scholasticism’.45 The appropriation of Bavinck’s scholastic identity 
can be broken down further into two discussions that, while closely related, have functioned 
separately: (i) the genetics of the neo-Platonic/neo-Thomistic and (ii) the Kantian contra 
Thomistic. The interest here is only to reveal the importance of the modern/orthodox tension 
for each rather than offer a defense or rebuttal.  
 
(i) The discussion surrounding neo-Thomism and its neo-Platonic heritage is not as current as 
the discussion regarding Bavinck’s epistemology between Thomas and Kant. Although, 
Huttinga’s recent monograph re-raises the question of Bavinck’s relation to neo-Platonic 
themes like participation. The central thesis of this relatively older form of identification is to 
                                                 
43  For example, see David S. Sytsma, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology: The 
Argument and Sources of His Principia of Science’, in Five Studies in the Thought of Herman 
Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology, ed. John Bolt (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2011), 
1–56; John Bolt, ‘Sola Scriptura as an Evangelical Theological Method?’, in Reforming or 
Conforming: Post-Conservative Evangelicals and the Emerging Church, ed. Gary L. W. Johnson and 
Ronald N. Gleason (Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2008), 154–65; Theodore G. Van Raalte, 
‘Unleavened Morality? Herman Bavinck on Natural Law’, in Five Studies in the Thought of 
Herman Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology, ed. John Bolt (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen, 2011), 57–100. 
44 Bolt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, RD 1.11. 
45 Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 10. 
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suggest that Bavinck’s conceptual framework is a synthesis of neo-Platonic and Aristotelian 
themes which he acquired through the era of the post-Vatican I neo-Thomism in which he 
lived. The commentator who offers the clearest explanation of what he means by ‘Bavinck the 
neo-Thomist’, is Albert Wolters. According to Wolters, ‘Bavinck’s conceptual apparatus is 
very largely borrowed from neo-Thomism, whereas Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd have 
evolved a categorical framework and terminology of their own, which do fuller justice to the 
religious intuition of Calvinism’.46 Wolters explains the ‘conceptual apparatus’ of Bavinck’s 
neo-Thomistic framework as a system of Aristotelian categories of substance and accidents, an 
indisputable claim to be sure. In an earlier essay, Wolters, however, offers another 
characterization: Bavinck’s theology is ‘neo-Platonic’. 47  According to Wolters, in fact, the 
tradition of Neo-Platonism is essentially equivalent with all western Christian orthodoxy—
what Hans Boersma distills into the monolithic idea of ‘the Great Tradition’ as a ‘Platonic-
Christian synthesis’.48  
 
The early neo-Calvinists, Wolters argues, were all dependent upon the neo-Platonic ontology 
of the chain of being and their theology represented a continued synthesis of Christian, 
Platonic, and Aristotelian themes. 49  Bavinck exemplifies such dependence on Platonism 
thought through his well-known dictum in the RD: ‘for [Bavinck], scholarship was a matter of 
“thinking God’s thoughts after him’”. 50  Wolters does not explain the precise connection 
between such a hierarchical ontology and Bavinck’s dictum. He does explain the neo-Platonic 
ontology that influenced Bavinck briefly: ‘God is defined as the highest grade of “being” 
                                                 
46 Albert Wolters, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Jan Veenhof, Nature and Grace in Herman Bavinck, 
trans. Albert Wolters (Sioux Center, IA: Dordt College Press, 2006), 1-6, 3. 
47  Albert Wolters, ‘Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview, Philosophy and Rationality’, in 
Rationality and the Calvinian Tradition, eds. H. Hart, J. van der Hoeven and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(Toronto: UPA, 1983), 113-131, 125. 
48 Wolters, ‘Dutch Neo-Calvinism’, 125. Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a 
Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 33-39. 
49 Wolters, ‘Dutch Neo-Calvinism’, 125. 
50 Wolters, ‘Dutch Neo-Calvinism’, 125. See RD 1.44. 
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(summum ens) and “being” itself, as both “substance” and “essence,” and is defined as the 
objective correlate of rationality (logos, nous)’. In the church, Aristotelian categories were used 
to elucidate ‘the basic ontology of the visible world’.51 From Augustine to Aquinas to Bavinck, 
Wolters draws a simple and straight line. For all of them, the Son is the archetype of ideas in 
the mind of God and these ideas are transmitted to the world by ectypal rationality. 
Disturbing to Wolter’s distillation, perhaps, is Bavinck’s strong Creator-creature distinction as 
an absolute difference. Further, Bavinck’s dictum ‘thinking God’s thoughts after him’, is 
intended to point to the theologian’s ethic under the authority of the biblical witness, and does 
not first convey a neo-Platonic sub-text. Wolters, nevertheless, takes his thesis further by 
asserting that this neo-Platonic structure results from Bavinck’s relationship to neo-Thomism: 
‘Bavinck, more than the other neo-Calvinists, was influenced by the revival of Thomism that 
was taking place in Catholic circles in response to the encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879)’.52 
 
Wolters was not the first to posit this reading. According to R. H. Bremmer’s 1961 work, ‘all 
Bavinck commentators agree that the neo-Thomistic philosophy has exercised great influence 
over [Bavinck]’. 53  In fact, for Bremmer, neo-Thomism is the primary ‘ground-motif’ in 
Bavinck’s dogmatiek. 54  Other interpreters have offered similar statements about Bavinck 
including Veenhof, Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, and Van Til, although for different reasons 
and with nuances.55 The point of these interpretations (principally Wolters) is to suggest that 
Bavinck along with the other early neo-Calvinists, in Veenhof’s words, made ‘too great use of 
                                                 
51 Wolters, ‘Dutch Neo-Calvinism’, 124. 
52 Wolters, ‘Dutch Neo-Calvinism’, 125. 
53 R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus, 328. ‘Nu zijn alle Bavinck-commentatoren 
het er over eens, dat de neothomsitische wijsbegeerte grote invleud op hem geoefend heeft’. 
54 R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus, 386. 
55 See for example, Cornelius Van Til, ‘Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article’, WTJ 24, 
no. 1 (1961): 48–64. Van Til reviews Bremmer’s conclusion that one must go beyond 
Bavinck’s scholastic, Platonic tendencies. Van Til defends Bavinck against Bremmer at times 
determining that Bavinck provides the impetus for ‘going beyond’ scholasticism in his 
scriptural commitments. Yet, he affirms with Bremmer that Bavinck is inconsistent.  
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unbiblical ways of thinking’ because they were overly indebted to Greek thought as was the 
‘whole of traditional theology, including Reformed Theology’.56  
 
In contradistinction to Bavinck and Kuyper, the late neo-Calvinists (Dooyeweerd particularly) 
were set against such a synthesis of Reformed scholasticism and neo-Thomism, so they argue. 
The implication of this evaluation is that only Dooyeweerd’s Cosmonomic philosophy 
structured according to the hermeneutical norm of special revelation appropriately constructs 
a theological philosophy or a philosophy that is truly coram Deo. Bavinck, in succumbing to the 
legacy of neo-Platonic and Aristotelian concepts has committed the occasional error of both 
the early (Hellenized fathers) and the modern Roman tradition: appealing to a universal 
intelligibility governed by the general principles of philosophy and allowing this sphere of 
common reason to penetrate the frame of his dogmatics.  
 
While tempting, it is beyond the intention of this study to critique this reading.57 These claims 
treat Greek thought and neo-Thomism in a similar way as some treat modernity: as 
thoroughly monolithic. In contrast, the diversity of Greek philosophies and the multiplicity of 
Thomisms troubles the picture presented. This reading, nevertheless, is pertinent for the 
present study insofar as the underlying question that pervades the initial assertion of neo-
Thomism concerns the relation between a modern and orthodox theology. Wolters, for 
instance, has implied that ‘orthodoxy’ is theology decoupled from any non-Christian thought 
patterns, or, in this case, without the conceptual baggage of Enlightenment rationalistic and 
autonomous pagan thinking, especially Aristotle and Plotinus. Per these readings, Bavinck 
only came halfway. Under the conditions of modernity, particularly the modernity of neo-
Thomistic thought in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bavinck lost the purity of a 
                                                 
56  Jan Veenhof, ‘Theology and Spirituality in the Dutch Reformed Churches’, CTJ 28.2 
(November 1993), 266-297, 281. 
57 For a critique, see Cory Brock, ‘Bavinck the Neo-Thomist?’, (MTh dissertation: University 
of Edinburgh, 2014). Also, Kevin Vanhoozer offers a list of counter-proposals to the 
Hellenization thesis: Remythologizing Theology (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 139-49. 
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biblically infused conceptual orthodoxy to Leo XIII’s call to return to Thomas Aquinas. The 
irony herein is that in succumbing to something very old at the beckoning of something very 
new, Bavinck’s ‘orthodoxy’ was derivative of a modern, Leonine, and Roman Catholic 
movement baptized in the Protestant waters of Reformed scholasticism.  
 
While this study will not deal with the question of Bavinck’s neo-Thomism specifically, the 
investigation of the way Bavinck relates modern theological developments to the tradition of 
Reformed orthodoxy is basic to the question of the extent to which he allows neo-Thomism 
(as defined by its post-Vatican I expression) to be an actual influential force in his work.58  
 
(ii) In consanguinity with the ‘Bavinck the neo-Thomist’ thesis, dispute over Bavinck’s 
epistemic foundations and their implications have taken place more recently and largely in 
North American publications. Most of this debate is set in the context of defining Bavinck’s 
relationship to later Dutch thinkers in the tradition of the Amsterdam school. Due to the 
relatively recent translation of Bavinck’s major works into English, much of the secondary 
literature regarding epistemology functions as comparison material that does not deal 
significantly with the deep logic or the wide scope of Bavinck’s texts across the span of his 
lifetime with nuanced attention to developments. 59  While Dooyeweerd and Kuyper had 
secured a prominent Anglophone audience in the middle of the twentieth century, Bavinck 
has long stood under their shadow and scholarship concerning his lesser-known texts is 
                                                 
58  On the multiformity of Thomisms see Étienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 130-134, 144-147. Such generalizations 
do little to help one understand the genealogy of Bavinck’s texts. When considering the details 
of the text, only slight attention is paid to the ‘who’ of this neo-Thomist influence by 
Bremmer and his claim is based on seven total citations of the neo-Thomist Matteo Liberatore 
across the whole of the RD.  
59 A significant study of Bavinck’s epistemology that considers the whole of his writings on 
knowledge is a primary need. 
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lacking, particularly in the Anglophone world.60 This fact is the result of the ever-diminishing 
privation of translated primary sources rather than something based in merit.  
 
While there have been several works61 that contain discussions of Bavinck’s epistemology, the 
most recent and focused conversation regarding Bavinck’s epistemic foundations that 
epitomizes the spirit of the whole is by Arvin Vos.62 Vos’ treatment of Bavinck’s moderate 
realism is a development of Sytsma’s articulation of the scholastic sources underlying 
Bavinck’s ‘Thomistic epistemology’. Vos proposes that Bavinck uses Aquinas to ‘counter’ 
empiricism, rationalism, idealism, and particularly Kant’s philosophical thought. Although his 
presentation is a reduction that lacks specific treatment of ‘rationalism(s)’, this is the case to be 
sure. He also notes with helpful nuance that Bavinck’s discussion of the same epistemic 
themes in PoR is ‘recast to meet the current debates including the Kantian tradition’.63 Vos 
argues that although Bavinck uses Aquinas to counter the opposition of subject and object in 
Kant’s first Critique, he nonetheless falls short of ridding himself of Kantian influence. Vos is 
correct in this supposition insofar as Bavinck structures his entire constructive corpus within 
the parameters of the subject-object relation after Kant. Yet Bavinck, although critical of 
Kant, cannot move beyond the Kant he criticized because he fails to break with Kant’s 
conception of subject and object, Vos argues. Bavinck needs, Vos suggests, an entirely 
                                                 
60 Attention will be drawn to many of these texts in this study starting in chapter two. 
61 David S. Sytsma, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology: The Argument and Sources 
of His Principia of Science’; John Bolt, ‘Sola Scriptura as an Evangelical Theological Method?’, 
154–65; Theodore G. Van Raalte, ‘Unleavened Morality? Herman Bavinck on Natural Law’, 
57–100; Laurence O’ Donnell, ‘“Bavinck’s Bug” or “Van Tilian” Hypochondria? An Analysis 
of Prof. Oliphint’s Assertion That Cognitive Realism and Reformed Theology Are 
Incompatible’, in For the Healing of the Nations. Edited by Peter Escalante and W. Bradford 
Littlejohn (Burford: The Davenant Press, 2014), 139-172. 
62 Arvin Vos, ‘Knowledge According to Bavinck and Aquinas’, TBR 6 (2015), 9-36. 
63 Vos, ‘Knowledge According to Bavinck and Aquinas’, 24. 
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different account of objectivity if he is to be free of modernity. He adds: ‘there are also 
elements [in Bavinck’s Foundations of Psychology] which have a strongly Kantian flavor’.64  
 
The reason Vos epitomizes the trajectories of these discussions regarding Bavinck’s 
epistemology is that he brings together, albeit in a mostly descriptive fashion, two distinct 
trends. There are those, on the one hand, that describe Bavinck’s epistemology solely in 
Thomistic terms especially highlighting his indebtedness to Aristotle.65 These presentations, 
however, while presenting a true facet of Bavinck’s philosophical grammar are also one-sided 
lacking broad treatment of Bavinck’s widest corpus with attention to his diverse borrowings 
of other frameworks (see Ch. 4). There are those, on the other hand, who have pushed against 
such notions and argued for an additional particularly modern conceptuality existent within 
much of his later philosophy alongside his use of an Aristotelian conceptual framework.66 
Regarding the latter, van der Kooi argues that ‘Bavinck’s epistemology is not just a repetition 
of realism, or reduced to a form of logos speculation. In his thought, a central place is 
                                                 
64 Vos, ‘Knowledge according to Bavinck and Aquinas’, 30. And Vos is correct, especially as it 
pertains to this quote: ‘Reason and understanding [make up] so little of the essence of man 
and so little of the entire content of our knowing capability, that they are merely particular 
activities of the knowing capability, which first begin their work after the basic elements of 
human knowing are already laid down broad and deep in the unconscious. Understanding and 
reason are not thereby robbed of their value... they must bring law and order to the chaos of representations. 
But they are limited to their own task and must therewith be satisfied’. Bavinck’s psychological 
construction consistently admits of the fact of the distinction between representation and the 
thing in itself and that the human psyche ‘brings’ categories to the manifold. Emphasis added. 
Original: ‘Zoo weinig zijn verstand en rede het wezen van den menschen en de gansche 
inhoud van het kenvermogen, dat ze daarvan veeleer slechts bijzondere werkzaamheden zijn, 
die dan eerst hun arbeid beginnen, als de fundamenten der menschelijke kennis reeds breed en 
diep, tot in het onbewuste toe, gelegd zijn. Daarmede worden verstand en rede niet van hun 
waarde heroofd ... da ze juist in dien chaos van voorstellingen orde en regel hebben te 
brengen. Maar ze worden beperkt tot de hun eigene taak en moeten daarmee tevreden zijn’. 
Herman Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, tweede herziene vermeerderde druk bezorgd door Hepp 
(Kampen: Kok, 1923), 97-8.   
65  See especially Sytsma, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology’, and O’Donnell, 
‘“Bavinck’s Bug” or “Van Tilian” Hypochondria?’. 




assigned to the knowing subject…[This] betrays, in a high degree a post-Kantian situation, 
and could never really have been uttered by someone like Calvin’.67 He critiques Bavinck for 
placing the religious subject as the ‘cornerstone’ of theology and asks: ‘Does the anchoring of 
theology in the believing subject not lead to the danger that one ends up in the anthropo-
centrism that is a hallmark of post-Kantian, modern, and postmodern culture’?68 He goes on 
to suggest that ‘Bavinck cooperates in the turning towards the subject, and thereby (probably 
more than he likes) pays tribute to the anthropocentrism of modernity’.69 Van der Kooi, while 
considering Bavinck’s subjectivism ‘dubious’, stands in a small corner of Bavinck scholars that 
have correctly identified Bavinck’s consistent emphasis on the fact of subjectivity as an 
‘anchoring’ point in his theology. It is one of the purposes of this study to situate and explain 
this turn in detail.  
 
Additionally, Eglinton has suggested that points of general similarity are clear between the 
shape of the dogmatics of Bavinck and Barth: Bavinck’s triniform structure, his totalizing use 
of the doctrine of God as the whole of theology, his suspicion of natural theology, and the 
central place of the doctrine of revelation over against speculative and natural forms of 
knowing God. Indeed, Eglinton locates this last point as Bavinck’s ‘Nee!’ corresponding to 
Barth’s ‘Nein!’70 According to Bavinck, ‘strictly speaking, natural theology never existed any 
more than “natural rights” and “natural morality”’. 71  Natural theology, so he argues, is a 
proper activity only under the authority and logic of revealed theology.  
 
                                                 
67 Cornelius van der Kooi, ‘The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit, Especially in H. 
Bavinck’, JRT 2:2 (May 2008): 103-112, 108. 
68 C. van der Kooi, ‘The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit’, 104. 
69 C. van der Kooi, ‘The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit’, 107. 
70 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif, 90, 95, 
106, 120, 137, 174. 
71  RD 2.70. Also: ‘our Reformed theologians [treat] Theologia Revelata before the Theologia 
Naturalis’. Bavinck, ‘The Conscience’, trans. Nelson Kloosterman, TBR 6 (2015), 23. 
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Therefore, those fundamental aspects of Bavinck’s ‘pre-modernity’ include his affinity for an 
Aristotelian conceptual framework, realism (which is difficult to reconcile in whole with his 
quote in fn. 64 from Beginselen der Psychologie if that realism is registered as a ‘common-sense’ 
that denies representation or ascribes the mind/object relation to the naïve ‘given’), Dutch 
confessional orthodoxy, and the synthesizing of Platonic notions of participation with 
incarnational theology. And the relation between those characteristics with the modern post-
Kantian trend toward what van der Kooi, after Barth, calls subjectivist anthropocentrism, 
remains unclear. In articulations like those of Vos, one is directed backwards toward the two-
Bavincks once more—a man who could not decide between Thomas and Kant.  
 
The combination of these themes highlights the eclecticism of Bavinck scholarship, which 
features the eclecticism of Bavinck as a writer and thinker. ‘It needs to be noted’, Bolt rightly 
argues, ‘that Bavinck was not simply a chronicler of his own church’s past teaching. He 
seriously engaged other theological traditions, notably the Roman Catholic and the modern 
liberal Protestant ones, effectively mined the church fathers and great medieval thinkers, and 
placed his own distinct neo-Calvinist stamp on the Reformed Dogmatics’.72  
 
For purposes of this study, underlying both the discussions of Bavinck’s relation to neo-
Thomism and his epistemology is the question of his relationship to a particular modernity. In 
the former, it is for his attachment to something acutely old by way of a new Leonine 
influence that interpreters have challenged his framework and, in the latter, it is his attachment 
to new Kantian concepts for which he is said to be incomplete or contradictory.  
 
Like the two-Bavincks hypothesis and Eglinton’s organic synthesis, advocates of both the new 
and old are correct in identifying a tension that corresponds to reality. Without attention to it, 
interpretations remain myopic. Bavinck’s dogmatics is birthed in his Reformed scholastic 
                                                 
72 Bolt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, RD 1.11. 
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tradition. Bavinck’s theology is not, however, a mere repristination of Reformed protestant 
theology in method and content. 73  As Richard Muller has noted, ‘with little formal and 
virtually no substantial dogmatic alteration, orthodox or scholastic Reformed theology appears 
in the works of Charles Hodge, Archibald Alexander Hodge, and Louis Berkhof’.74 One might 
say, Bavinck is not absented from this list by accident. Louis Berkhof’s theology is of direct 
derivation from Bavinck’s dogmatics yet lacks attention to the most salient motifs of 
Bavinck’s corpus including the emphasis on the human agent and the modern-romantic 
concept of the organic. There is a discontinuity in Bavinck’s theology from that of Reformed 
scholasticism. In Bavinck, the reader finds a modernity, a newness that has been pointed 
toward but not defined—something alternate to, for example, the theologies of the 
Princetonians. Absent from Bavinck’s scientific account is the inductivist-biblicist approach 
that downplays the mediation of the self, among other things, present in a theologian like 
Charles Hodge. This study identifies one prominent aspect of his distinction from this 
tradition: the incorporation of the grammar and rationality of Schleiermacher.  
 
One must, therefore, turn first to a proper identification of Bavinck as Reformed catholic 
theologian, an identification marker that aids the reader in recognizing diversity and 
eclecticism across his texts and barricades readings that reduce his conceptual framework to 
one past movement (e.g. Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomistic, Kantian, Augustinian, Calvinistic). 
By exploring his own professed task as a Reformed catholic, one can locate the impetus 
behind his appropriations of Schleiermacher and the consciousness progeny. 
 
1.2. Reformed Catholicity and its Task 
 
                                                 
73 This latter claim is admittedly a reduction of the great diversity of the Reformed scholastic 
era and its use here corresponds to a caricature in relation to the current discussion.  
74  Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed 
Orthodoxy; Volume 1: Prolegomena to Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 29. 
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Herman Bavinck’s theology is catholic, ecclesial, and ecumenical. Harinck remarks that G.C. 
Berkouwer’s memoir described Bavinck’s task using only one idea: catholicity.75 The RD along 
with Bavinck’s wider writings is not a repristination of classical orthodoxy so-named but a re-
appropriation of it in a modern context.76 Consider his doctrine of God. God is, Bavinck 
proclaims in a modern grammar, Absolute, fully self-conscious, and personal.77  
In humans, we witness only a faint analogy of divine personality. Personality in 
humans arises only because they are subjects who confront themselves as 
object and unite the two (subject and object) in an act of self-consciousness. 
Hence three moments (constituents) constitute the essence of human 
personality… In God, however, because he is not subject to space or time, to 
extension or division, these three are not moments but “hypostases,” modes of 
existence of one and the same being… This self-differentiation results from 
the self-unfolding of the divine nature into personality, thus making it tri-
personal… the unfolding of his being into personality coincides with that of 
his being unfolding into three persons. The three persons are the one divine 
personality brought to complete self-unfolding, a self-unfoldment arising out 
of, by the agency of, and within the divine being.78 
 
Isaak Dorner, in 1879, describes ‘the eternal result of the eternal Self-discrimination of God 
from Himself, together with the equally eternal re-entrance into Himself’ as ‘the Organism of 
the Absolute divine Personality’.79 For Dorner, this latter description of God is a rejection of 
the traditional expression of God as ‘absolute substance’.80 While unwilling to set ‘absolute 
substance’ and ‘absolute personality’ in antithesis, Bavinck self-consciously sees his description 
of God as comporting with the ancient concept but also a grammatical augmentation. He 
                                                 
75  G.C. Berkouwer, ‘Katholiciteit. H. Bavinck’, in Zoeken en Vinden. Herinneringen en ervaringen 
(Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1989), 40-70; Harinck, ‘Something That Must Remain, If the Truth Is to 
Be Sweet and Precious to Us’, 250.  
76 A distinct form of some of the material in this section was published in Cory Brock and 
Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Eclecticism: On Catholicity, 
Consciousness, and Theological Epistemology’, SJT no. 3 (2017), 310-32. 
77 RD 2.194.  
78 RD 2.303.  
79 Isaak Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, vol. 1, trans. Alfred Cave (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1880), 412.  
80 Stephen R. Holmes, ‘Divine Attributes’, in Mapping Modern Theology: A Thematic and Historical 




consistently turns both to Aquinas and Calvin and, in moments, to Dorner, Schelling, and 
others, to construct his doctrine of God.81  
 
His theology, therefore, never cries ad fontes without inciting development. Bavinck’s 
catholicity brings the ancient into conversation with the modern but never precludes the 
modern by rousing the ancient: ‘to cherish the ancient simply because it is ancient’, he writes, 
‘is neither Reformed nor Christian. A work of dogmatic theology should not simply describe 
what was true and valid but what abides as true and valid. It is rooted in the past but labors for 
the future’.82 In 1879, in a letter to his dear friend at Leiden, Snouck Hurgronje, Bavinck was 
critical of modern theology (a title particularly associated with Leiden) but then defended his 
time at Leiden expressing his desire that ‘we both through struggle and doubt and suffering, 
always seek that which is inherently true and good…’.83 It is at the center of Bavinck’s concept 
of catholicity to be both a Reformed orthodox dogmatician, appealing to the creeds and 
confessions from the early ecumenical to the (Dutch) Reformed as accurate interpretations of 
the Scriptures, and a modern dogmatician engaged in the new questions of both philosophy 
and theology looking for truth where it can be found. If one looks for the so-called ‘modern 
Bavinck’ by setting him across from his orthodox self, each staring into the eyes of the other 
recognizing their opposite as a moment of confusion, then neither will be found. Rather, his 
modern self is an aspect of his commitment to his orthodox self, standing shoulder to 
shoulder rather than across.  
 
Before developing one of the premier examples of such catholicity and eclecticism regarding 
his relationship to Schleiermacher, one must examine Bavinck’s use of a well-known set of 
                                                 
81 See RD 2.115, 260ff.  
82 Herman Bavinck, ‘Foreword to the First Edition (volume 1) of the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek’, 
trans. John Bolt, CTJ 45, (2010), 10. 
83  Translation by Harinck. Bavinck to Snouck Hurgronje, August 19,1879, in Een Leidse 
vriendschap: De briefwisseling tussen Herman Bavinck en Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, 1875-1921, ed. J. 
de Bruijn and G. Harinck, (Baarn, 1999), 57.  
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terms in the much neglected and, in the Anglophone world, relatively unknown original 
foreword to the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. In this text, Bavinck explains the task of his dogmatic 
project regarding the relationship between theological modernity and ancient unto early 
modern orthodoxy using two concepts: reformed and catholic. For Bavinck, the point is this: 
the requirement for modern theological, dialectical engagement is already contained in the 
concept of Reformed catholicity and its given ethic. 
 
In his address to the Kampen Theological School in 1888, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and 
the Church’, Bavinck reflects upon the ancient symbol, the Apostles’ Creed, and its confession 
regarding the ‘catholic church’. According to Bavinck, the creedal use of ‘catholic’ is 
synonymous with ‘universal’. Bavinck employs the universal concept in three ways that reflect 
his use of the organic motif: (i) the church is a unified whole, (ii) is inclusive of all believers of 
every nation in all times and places, and (iii) the church embraces the whole of human 
experience including both the provision of the cure of sin and its reach in reforming the entire 
life of humanity. 84  Yet, his central point is that the notion of a ‘catholic Church’ must 
presuppose a catholic faith (a catholic Christianity). The resurrection of Christ, for Bavinck, 
accomplishes and inaugurates this reality of a truly catholic religion wherein the national 
election of Israel, in the ascension, stretches to encompass all peoples, institutions, and spaces:  
Christianity knows no boundaries beyond those which God himself has in his 
good pleasure established; no boundaries of race or age, class, or status, 
nationality, or language. Sin has corrupted much; in fact, everything… The 
Gospel is a joyful tiding, not only for the individual person but also for 
humanity, for the family, for society, for the state, for art and science, for the 
entire cosmos, for the whole groaning creation.85 
 
The catholicity of Christianity is expressed within the bounds of the grammar of the organic 
nature of the Kingdom—a movement that will have dominion over all, in bloom, under the 
kingship of the exalted Christ. And it is this idea that first, prior to any concept of catholicity 
as retrieval, controls his notion of theological mission. While Bavinck’s 1888 address 
                                                 
84 Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, 220. 
85 Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, 224. 
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proclaims the ontological reality of the catholicity of the church (as both an invisible and, 
partly, visible unity) set within a broader conception of the catholicity of the Kingdom in 
becoming, his 1895 foreword outlines catholicity in action. In other words, he discusses 
catholicity as a task, as an imperative in obedience to its indicative. He answers this question: 
what does a dogmatician do in a religion that is catholic? The task of catholicity, for Bavinck, 
comprises three elements: (i) universal communion, (ii) ecumenical polemics, (iii) and the hunt 
for truth. 
 
The first task of the catholic dogmatician is to commune, to fellowship with the generations 
of the saints of the past and present. One returns here to the fact that dogmatics is the 
enterprise of ‘thinking God’s thoughts after Him’. 86 Such an illumined form of rationality 
based on something more than reason left to itself, operates under the conditions of God’s 
thought made speech and God’s speech grasped hold of in faith. In doing so, one forms an 
organic synchronous relation to the whole of history (which is, for Bavinck, a redemptive 
organism itself) with all those who have engaged in the same. The task of theology, then, 
fulfills the command that the church be one body. The one body drinks deeply from the 
depths of every other age, tribe, nation, and tongue not for the sake of creating structures of 
authority but in order to read the Scriptures in community toward the truth, Jesus Christ, and 
the telos of the pilgrimage of faith.  
 
Accordingly, in the RD, the reader will find an immense quantity of citations and engagement 
with traditions other than Bavinck’s own. For Bavinck, ‘Irenaeus, Augustine, and Thomas do 
not belong exclusively to Rome; they are Fathers and Doctors to whom the whole Christian 
church has obligations’.87 He also aims, nevertheless, the principle of catholic communion at 
the present—it is not merely a principle of ressourcement or ‘retrieval’. Perhaps to the reader’s 
                                                 
86 RD 1.44. 




surprise, Bavinck’s engagement with Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Ritschl nearly 
parallel in quantity the citations and engagement with Augustine, Thomas, and Calvin. 88 
Bavinck’s catholicity takes none as authority but precludes none as interlocutor and partner in 
‘thinking God’s thoughts’. Dogmatics as a task embraces a universal communion of both the 
past and present, which is reflected in Bavinck’s method: eclecticism. His eclecticism, which is 
implicit in the foreword itself, precludes a reductionist identification of a singular tradition in 
the RD as total and is an agreement with his discourse on the theological-philosophical 
relation, that theology makes use of any philosophy to serve its needs.89  
 
The second task of the catholic dogmatician is to make distinctions. Through polemical 
engagement, the dogmatician pursues the purity of the church catholic. In the context of the 
late nineteenth century after the publication of Aeterni Patris and the establishment of papal 
infallibility at the First Vatican Council, Bavinck emphasizes the commonality that 
Protestantism shares with Rome. He does so, however, without ignoring disagreement or 
refusing to engage in irenic polemics. It is here that Bavinck’s ecumenicity considering his 
commitment to polemics comes to the fore. For Bavinck, the catholic dogmatician necessarily 
polemicizes against what Bavinck sees as the nature/grace dualism of Rome.90 One does so, 
                                                 
88 The point here is to make note of the extent of engagement. While much of it is, admittedly, 
critical of modern philosophical-theological thought, it is also appreciative and adoptive. 
Bavinck’s use of Schleiermacher is surprisingly vast. See the index of RD 4 for examples.  
89 This is not to say that he does not prioritize conceptual frameworks. It is the argument of 
this thesis that he prioritizes Schleiermacher’s grammar among modern theological discourse. 
90  Bavinck’s presentation of Roman Catholic nature/grace dualism has been questioned 
repeatedly and particularly by Eduardo Echeverria. Echeverria agrees with Bavinck’s 
refutation of this RC interpretation of protology and eschatology but disagrees with his 
insistence that nature/grace dualism represents the whole of RC theology. Echeverria’s project 
is well represented by this quote: ‘The main point here is to show my critical appreciation, as a 
Catholic, for Bavinck's position on natural theology, to outline the shape of a Catholic natural 
theology, and to show that an ecumenical rapprochement between Catholic and (neo-) 
Calvinist can be found in Bavinck’s thought on the nature and significance of natural 
theology’. Eduardo Echeverria, ‘The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology: A Catholic 
Response to Herman Bavinck’, CTJ 45 (2010), 87-116, 88. Regardless, if one addresses 
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however, for the sake of pursuing (i) the possibility of ecumenicity (ii) and because of the fact 
of the Church as a unity in diversity, for the promotion of a pan-Christendom that embraces a 
wide-ranging ecclesiology which transcends any instantiation of the church as an institution 
and power structure in one geographic locale.91  
 
According to Bavinck, then, the catholicity of the church demands an organic rather than a 
merely institutional concept of the church. The task of Christianity as a renewing leaven rather 
than a systematic elevation of the natural order (which he perceives from Rome’s institution) 
is the presupposition of this necessary polemical task: 
It depends on our concept of this universalism of the Christian religion 
whether we become narrow or broad in our ecclesiology. How we relate grace 
to nature, re-creation (herschepping) to creation (schepping), determines whether 
our ecclesiastical vision will be broad or narrow. The affirmation of the 
catholicity of the church and of the universalism of Christianity is of the 
greatest significance in our time, which is so rife with errors and schisms.92 
 
Additionally, he writes, ‘with this, Rome, that considers itself to be truly catholic, changes the 
character of New Testament catholicity’. 93  The catholicity of the Christian principle that 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bavinck on his terms, the point about his catholicity remains true even if his presentation of 
Rome is over-influenced by current events, e.g. Aeterni Patris. 
91 This is not to suggest that Bavinck did not have specific views regarding ecclesial structure 
but that its structures need to be transcended in the affirmation of an invisible and universal 
church under the headship of Christ. 
92 Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, 229. 
93 Bavinck’s protest against the Roman notion of ‘catholic’ is similarly defined with respect to 
the reformers’ self-conscious protest against Rome in Kevin Vanhoozer’s recent work on the 
five solae of the Reformation, Biblical Authority after Babel: Retrieving the Solas in the Spirit of Mere 
Protestant Christianity, 51: ‘The Reformers did not view themselves as schismatics, nor were 
they. To protest is to testify for something, namely, the integrity of the gospel, and, as we will 
see, this includes the church’s catholicity. It also includes prophetic protest (the negative 
gesture) whenever and wherever the truth of the gospel is at risk. Unity alone (sola unitas) is 
not enough unless the unity in question is a unitas of veritas (truth). What Luther objected to 
was not the church’s catholicity per se but the narrowness of its Roman qualifier--that is, to 
constricting catholicity to the city limits (so to speak) of Rome. In John McNeill's words: “It 
was, then, the narrowness of Rome's alleged catholicity that antagonized Luther”’. 
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purifies and sanctifies everything is exchanged for a dualism that separates the supernatural 
from the natural.94 
 
The Christian principle is the idea of the application of the power of the gospel, the authority 
of Christ that authorizes, as a leaven that does the work of renewal and reformation by the 
Spirit and, eschatologically, upon the whole cosmos. This principle works from within the 
church outward by the agency of the Spirit of Christ in the human heart unto the nations, the 
arts, and sciences, but is ultimately located in the advent of the Kingdom of God. For this 
reason, Bavinck’s principle of ecumenicity requires a polemic against Rome’s soteriology and 
ecclesiology. Bavinck interprets Rome’s sacramental soteriology (because of a nature/grace 
dualism) and the ecclesiological bounds of the church catholic to its hierarchy, as a mechanical 
rather than organic relation between the two. For Bavinck, the concept of catholicity requires 
the recognition of a pan-Christendom that promotes the broad work of the Church, visible 
and invisible at once, within the natural order. The grace of God renews and restores nature. 
Grace does not elevate nature to super-nature. Immanuel, the principle of condescension is the 
first word of redemption. 
 
The third and final task of the catholic dogmatician is an assumption of the previous two: one 
must search for what is true and valid no matter where it is found. The search for the truth 
transcends the retreat to structures of institutional authority, but stands on the authority of 
God’s self-manifestation and theological reason. The principles of communion and polemics 
assume the search for truth in the contemporary age: ‘a work of dogmatic theology should not 
simply describe what was true and valid but what abides as true and valid. It is rooted in the 
past but labors for the future’.95 
 
                                                 
94 Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, 229. 
95 Bavinck, ‘Foreword’, 10. 
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The term ‘reformed’ (gereformeerd) is, for Bavinck, a catholic nuance. Its scope is limited in 
relation to the weight of the word ‘catholic’. The concept ‘reformed’ is a reference to the way 
catholicity performs, a recognition that one works from a tradition. It is a theological 
sensibility. He argues that the Reformed tradition contains the most relatively pure reflections 
on theology ever produced. According to Bavinck, nevertheless, while generally being the 
purest statement of truth, the Reformed tradition is not ‘exclusively’ so.96 As noted in the 
introduction, he proclaimed as much at the fifth general council of the Alliance of Reformed 
Churches Holding the Presbyterian System in Toronto in 1892: ‘Calvinism is not the only 
truth!’97  
 
The term ‘reformed’, nevertheless, employs only one sense because the concept catholic co-
inheres with the concept reformed. To be reformed is to be catholic. The adjective reformed 
adds little to its noun. ‘In no other confession [than the Reformed] does the Christian faith in 
its religious, ethical, and theological character come as clearly into its own; nowhere else is it 
acknowledged as deeply and broadly, so widely and freely, is it so truly catholic, as in the 
churches of the Reformed tradition’, he proclaims.98  
 
One of the central reasons for writing the RD is that Bavinck read the most recent era as a 
devolution in reformed thought, particularly in the eighteenth century where theology 
increasingly became wedded with rationalism, so he recalls. He hints here at the motivation 
for his own dogmatic work: ‘the Reformed faith has also experienced a lack of progress and 
even deformation’.99 
                                                 
96 Bavinck, ‘Foreword’, 10. 
97 Herman Bavinck, Mijne reis naar Amerika, ed. George Harinck (Barneveld: Uitgeverij De 
Vuurbaak, 1998), p. 58. ‘Het calvinisme is toch niet de eenige waarheid’. See George Harinck, 
‘Calvinism Isn’t the Only Truth. Herman Bavinck's Impressions of the USA’, 151-160. 
Bavinck makes clear that the concepts Calvinism and Reformed are not entirely the same but 
one can permit the synonymous use here as he often does.  
98 Bavinck, ‘Foreword’, 10. 




Bavinck’s catholic dogmatics and broad theological project is epitomized using the 
kernel/husk metaphor.  
The author, who has a preference for the older generation whose freshness 
and originality exceeds that of later ones, thus reserves the right of a dogmatic 
theologian to distinguish kernel from husk in the history of Reformed 
theology. To cherish the ancient simply because it is ancient is neither 
Reformed nor Christian. A work of dogmatic theology should not simply 
describe what was true and valid but what abides as true and valid. It is rooted 
in the past but labors for the future.100   
 
While maintaining a preference for the older generations, Bavinck searched for the kernel of 
the truth wherever it was to be found. It is not insignificant then that fourteen years after 
expressing his task using the kernel/husk metaphor he uses the same language in his 1908 
Stone lectures in search for the truth regarding the ideal and real: ‘the kern (kernel) of our self-
consciousness is, as Schleiermacher perceived more correctly than Kant, not autonomy but a 
feeling of dependence’.101 
 
1.3. Concerning the Nature of Proof 
 
In chapter two, this study turns first to the historical and textual evidence of Bavinck’s early 
corpus to substantiate the importance of Schleiermacher for Bavinck and the revelation of 
Bavinck’s catholic approach to theological grammar. Such a foray demands some remarks 
regarding the nature of proof or a description of the characteristics of evidence. The proposal 
is that Herman Bavinck significantly appropriated ideas specific to Friedrich Schleiermacher 
into his own constructive corpus. Bavinck especially appropriated Schleiermacher’s concepts 
of immediate self-consciousness and the feeling of absolute dependence. These claims are 
based upon Bavinck’s pervasive adoption of these motifs, which were also present in the 
movement Bavinck titles ‘consciousness-theology’—a movement he directly attributed to 
                                                 
100 Bavinck, ‘Foreword’, 10. 
101 PoR, 66. 
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Schleiermacher as a new approach to theological method from the perspective of the fact of 
subjectivity and its use in theology. Such an emphasis gives rise to an increase in references to 
self-consciousness, feeling, relative and absolute dependence, and to the inner-self generally, 
as they relate to philosophical and theological loci. Bavinck, after Schleiermacher, adopted this 
turn to self within his own corpus insofar as Bavinck understood that Christian theology 
needed to give attention to the fact of subjectivity, an attention which arose most prominently 
in the philosophical milieu of the Enlightenment (after Descartes), but had its roots in 
Christian, Augustinian theology.  
 
In the following two chapters of part I, there are two significant points to establish regarding 
his early career that will aid in clarifying this appropriation: (i) that Bavinck’s adoption of the 
distinctive motifs present within consciousness theology is apparent from his earliest writings 
and consistent while in Kampen. There are also two further distinctions within this first point: 
(a) one must speak not only of Schleiermacher’s influence but also of the influences of 
‘consciousness theology’ taken together as a milieu. Bavinck’s adoption of this grammar is 
derivative of the context of mediation theology that developed in the Netherlands after 
Germany; (b) in claiming appropriation, one must distinguish between a weak and strong 
conceptual appropriation. The difference between these two ways of appropriating can be 
illustrated through Bavinck’s use of the kernel/husk metaphor.102 Weak appropriation is the 
adoption of, for example, the term ‘God-consciousness’ but used by the secondary author as a 
‘husk’ for a meaning that is idiosyncratic and pays little attention to the arguments present in 
its original source, Schleiermacher in this instance. One, in this example, would re-fill this husk 
                                                 
102 Bavinck uses the kernel and husk metaphor in a variety of ways. He uses it to speak of 
organic growth: the movement from seed to harvest, from being enclosed to full blossom. 
The most common example of the first instance is his representation of the movement of the 
Kingdom of God per this metaphor of growth. He also uses it to express the distinction 
between exterior and interior meaning, which is in view in the comments above. ‘The 
prophets unveil for us the mystery that Israel’s religion will not be restricted to national Israel. 
The universal kernel breaks out of the particular husk in which it is enclosed’. See ‘Catholicity 
of Christianity and the Church’, 223, fn. 4.  
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with an entirely new kernel (kern).103 The reader would first see the term ‘God-consciousness’ 
(and associate the term with Schleiermacher perhaps) and a close reading will unveil that at its 
kern the argument is absent of direct Schleiermacher appropriation but betrays a mere 
terminological borrowing with new intentions. There is no sharp transition between weak and 
strong and in both cases, appropriation exists and does so in degrees.  
 
The strong conceptual appropriation builds upon the former insofar as the argument and not 
only the term in the use of the second author is derivative of the original author’s argument. 
For example, if ‘God-consciousness’ in Bavinck’s texts is accompanied with a definition drawn 
from Schleiermacher’s argument that shares a significant degree of similarity then one can 
propose a strong (or stronger) conceptual appropriation.  
 
(ii) The second claim, consequently, is that there is a transition within Bavinck’s corpus from a 
weak appropriation of Schleiermacherian ‘consciousness’ grammar in his early career to a 
more robust, stronger conceptual appropriation of Schleiermacher’s arguments directly in the 
second half. Again, this heuristic of appropriation exists in degrees. There is a most obvious 
point of strong development, nevertheless, appearing in 1908. The fifty-four year old Bavinck, 
in his Stone lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary, adopts not only Schleiermacher’s 
grammar but also his arguments pertaining to immediate self-consciousness and feeling (see 
Ch. 4).104 The point in chapter two is to establish first the historical record of the relation 
between Schleiermacher’s work and its Dutch reception in order then to develop an early 
                                                 
103 The irony here is that Bavinck associates the kernel/husk metaphor with its use in Hegel, 
various neo-Hegelians, and Adolph von Harnack. In these authors, it refers to the relation 
between religious consciousness/absolute knowledge and the historical Jesus/biblical Jesus. 
There is then, perhaps, a modern/orthodox relation in Bavinck’s use of the metaphor itself. 
Bavinck reconstituted a metaphor used for separating religious/philosophical knowing and the 
historical/canonical Christ to reverse such claims. This adoption is present for example in RD 
1.167, 255. Bavinck’s citations: Hegel, Sämtliche Werke, XVI, 15ff; “Vorlesungen uber die 
Philosophie der Religion,” in Werke, XII, 15ff; D. F. Strauss, Die Christliche Glaubenslehre, 2 vols. 
(Tubingen: C. F. Osiander, 1840–41), I, 12. 
104 PoR, 55ff.  
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account of appropriation in Bavinck’s corpus, a reception that is weaker (or merely derivative 
of a general milieu) than in his later career (Ch. 3).  
 
Such import, whether weak or strong or something in between, is to be understood in this 
study according to Bavinck’s interpretation of the modern theologies. The intention is not to 
take contemporary scholarly interpretations of Schleiermacher’s (and his progeny’s) texts and 
use them to critique or commend Bavinck’s vision of Schleiermacher and the consciousness 
theology (particularly mediation theologies) that followed. This study is not intended to offer a 
new reading of Schleiermacher or a critique of Bavinck’s reading of Schleiermacher but an 
account of Bavinck’s appropriation of Bavinck’s Schleiermacher. To be sure, Bavinck reads 
Schleiermacher in some ways that will not satisfy the contemporary scholar. For instance, 
along with most of his Dutch contemporaries, he inaccurately renders Schleiermacher’s 
version of the Creator-creature relation as pantheism (the God-world correlate). He does so 
more carefully than most, however, in a culture prone to reductionism and philosophical 
caricature. Bavinck does indeed read Schleiermacher with nuance at times. He gives credence 
to the importance of Schleiermacher’s Dialektik for understanding the development of 
Schleiermacher’s dogmatic concepts (an insight that Schleiermacher scholars emphasized in 
the twentieth century).105 This study, regardless, allows Bavinck to speak as much as possible. 
The Schleiermacher of this study, while at times more filled out and developed in description 
than Bavinck offered, is Bavinck’s Schleiermacher. And following Bavinck’s lead, Bavinck’s 
Schleiermacher will also briefly be set alongside Bavinck’s Calvin and Augustine—the other 
prominent theologians in Bavinck’s development of his concept of self.   
 
                                                 
105  See, for example, Thandeka’s account of this narrative, The Embodied Self: Friedrich 
Schleiermacher’s Solution to Kant’s Problem of the Empirical Self (New York: NYU Press, 1995), 4-11. 
Also see, Christine Helmer, Christiane Kranich, and Birgit Rehme-Ieffert, eds., Schleiermachers 
Dialektik (Tübingen: Mohr, 2003); Brent W. Sockness, ‘The Forgotten Moralist: Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and the Science of Spirit’, Harvard Theological Review 96 (2003): 317–48. 
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Finally, how does one assess influence and appropriation? What is it that the reader must look 
for in Bavinck’s corpus to make such claims? As Anthony Lane posits in his study on Calvin 
and the patristic fathers, one may take a maximalist or minimalist approach to the question of 
influence.106 This study takes a relatively minimalist approach and this is especially so in the 
second half where the primary claims of appropriation are elucidated. That is, there is no 
proposition of appropriation unless it can be demonstrated from the texts either by citation or 
clear implication. The clarity of implication comes by looking for characteristics of Bavinck’s 
text that resemble Schleiermacher’s direct language, philosophical, or theological lexicon, key 
words, phrases, and arguments. These sometimes appear as un-cited allusion but, on occasion, 
as directly cited and extensive argument. Direct references to Schleiermacher do abound. Yet, 
it is no surprise to the initiated reader that Bavinck often opposes Schleiermacher’s re-
formulations of theological method and dogmatic contents. In fact, close to ninety percent of 
his references to Schleiermacher in the RD—about two hundred fifty—contain a negative 
spirit.107 To speak of interaction is one thing but to speak of constructive appropriation is 
another. One must embrace a hermeneutic of suspicion in approaching the texts where this 
constructive influence first appears to register its validity. The concern in this study, therefore, 
is not as much with what Bavinck says about Schleiermacher directly as with what he does 
with some of Schleiermacher’s central emphases, namely the concepts of the feeling of 
absolute dependence and immediate self-consciousness.  
 
Richard Muller, among others, has expressed a concern over comparative theological studies 
and especially those that span the centuries: ‘projects that compare Calvin and Barth or Calvin 
and Schleiermacher will not enlighten us particularly about Calvin – nor probably about Barth 
or Schleiermacher, for that matter’. Rather we ought to compare in Calvin’s case ‘actual 
partners in the ongoing sixteenth-century theological conversation’, or those of any other 
                                                 
106 Anthony Lane, John Calvin: Student of the Church Fathers, (Edinburgh: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 
1991) xiiff. 
107 See the index in RD 4 for a partial list. This percentage was culled by examining each 
instance of Schleiermacher citation in the RD. 
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century, one would suppose. 108  This study fulfills Muller’s wish in two ways. The first is 
obvious: although this study does indeed connect the eighteenth century to the twentieth, 
Bavinck and Schleiermacher are nineteenth century men, one at the beginning and the other at 
the end, with similar backgrounds in pietistic, peripheral environments, and both as ecclesial 
dogmaticians. Second, this is not a comparative study. It is, rather, recognition of 
appropriation and what that appropriation means for the relation between Bavinck the 
orthodox and Bavinck the modern theologian. The aim of any comparison between the two is 
to elucidate the appropriation, which is a task distinct from, for example, the comparison of 




Considering Reformed catholicity so defined, the two-Bavincks hypothesis, that Bavinck is a 
duality split between a theological modern/orthodox binary at various points in his writings 
and life, was not a result of fabricated evidence but a result of misreading the mandate of his 
catholicity: to be both a Dutch Reformed, orthodox pastor of the secession church and a 
modern theologian insofar as it is defined as one who ‘labors for the future’. Can Reformed 
catholic orthodoxy coinhere with modern dogmatic theology? For Bavinck, according to the 
concept of catholicity, it must converse and engage in the questions of the present in the light 
of the wisdom of the past and present.  
 
Bavinck’s catholicity, therein, drinks from the well of the fathers for the sake of reading the 
Scriptures in the whole communion of saints. This, for Bavinck, includes exploring the 
questions of theological modernity and modern Roman Catholicism. No tradition in history 
has the claim to the one structure of authority. Rather, in prudence, the catholic theologian 
listens to those who have come before but for the sake of the future and with an open mind 
                                                 
108 R. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: 
OUP, 2002), 187. 
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to clarification and expansion. To be catholic is to be informed by both ancient and modern. 
This modern-meet-catholic ressourcement in a culture of aggiornamento was vibrant in the neo-
Calvinist enterprise in the Netherlands decades before Karl Barth’s project of retrieval or that 
of la nouvelle théologie. Emil Brunner, in fact, suggested that because of Bavinck’s work one 
would be ‘unjust’ to claim that Barth alone is the progenitor of the revival of theological 
retrieval and renewal in the twentieth century.109 
 
It is possible now to turn to the claim that one of the primary ways Bavinck enacts his own 
principle as a Reformed catholic theologian is through appropriation of his primary modern 
interlocutor: Friedrich Schleiermacher. This also includes Schleiermacher’s broad progeny in 
Germany and the Netherlands, the Vermittlungstheologie, and the Dutch Ethical theologians.  
                                                 
109 Emil Brunner, Die christliche Lehre von Gott. Dog. I, 3rd ed. (Zwingli Verlag 1960), 103. Cited in 





What has Berlin to do with Kampen? 
 
What has the father of modern Protestant theology1 in Berlin to do with the nineteenth 
century codifier of gereformeerde theology in Kampen?2 This question first demands a turn to 
the historical, a turn that follows directly from the claims of the previous chapter. Chapter one 
unveiled the underlying structure of much of former Bavinck scholarship per its interest in 
Bavinck’s relation to both Dutch gereformeerde orthodoxy and the social/philosophic-
theological developments within his modern context. That there was a tension in Bavinck’s 
work between the modern and orthodox is a typical claim. Yet, corresponding to Eglinton’s 
signal, these tensions need not be taken as dualisms. Rather, Bavinck’s Reformed catholic 
theological method includes the subsumption of modern questions and conceptual 
frameworks within and under the boundaries of his confessional commitments. Chapter two 
turns toward the detail of the premier example of subsumption throughout Bavinck’s corpus: 
his use of Schleiermacher. Attention is first due to the historical account of the relation 
between Schleiermacher and Bavinck, between Schleiermacher’s texts and concepts and 
Bavinck’s reception of those texts and concepts. 
 
The primary question therefore is this: did Bavinck interact with Schleiermacher’s texts and 
adopt within his own corpus any of Schleiermacher’s concepts, especially in Bavinck’s early 
                                                 
1  The ‘father of modern protestant theology’ remains the common mark of identity for 
Schleiermacher. So, Tice: ‘Friedrich Schleiermacher is widely reputed to be the father of 
modern theology, somewhat on the analogy of the early church fathers’. Terrence Tice, 
Schleiermacher (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006), xiii. 
2 It is a Gereformeerde Dogmatiek rather than Hervormde thereby associating it with the history of 
the codification of the Reformation theology in the seventeenth century. See Jan de Bruijn, 
Abraham Kuyper: A Pictorial Biography (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 149. 
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career? Several secondary questions follow: did Schleiermacher’s blend of enlightenment, 
pietistic, and romantic influences reach the rural and secessionist-dominated town of Kampen 
in the Netherlands by the 1880s? If Schleiermacher’s influence is manifest in Bavinck’s 
writings where specifically does said influence lie? These are the questions of both this chapter 
and the next, which together form parts one and two of a historical-textual analysis of 
Bavinck’s early career. His early career is taken here from the time of his doctorate at the 
University of Leiden to the publication of the first edition of the RD, completed in 1901, and, 
shortly after, his acceptance of a professorship at the Vrije Universiteit in 1902.  
 
This chapter traces the historical relationship from (i) Berlin to Kampen—this phrase is 
shorthand for Schleiermacher’s writing of OR in 1799 onwards and the early Bavinck—but it 
does so by developing a picture of the Dutch theological context reaching back to the 
Reformation and forward to the early moments of Bavinck the lecturer in Kampen. 
Schleiermacher after 1799, to be distinguished from Schleiermacher’s earlier works focused, 
among other subjects, on philosophical ethics in Drossen and Berlin, is the Schleiermacher 
with whom Bavinck most regularly engaged (OR and CF foremost). This examination of the 
historical context and spread of Schleiermacher’s ideas will (a) unveil the fact of Bavinck’s 
early interactions with Schleiermacher, (b) show that while not all, much of Bavinck’s early 
adoption of Schleiermacher came initially through an indirect relationship by way of the 
traditions derivative of Schleiermacher, and (c) will set up a direct textual analysis of works 
from Bavinck’s early career in chapter three. Also in this chapter is a brief elucidation of (ii) 
Bavinck’s relation to Kuyper as it pertains only to Bavinck’s appropriation of the motifs of 
consciousness theology so-called.   
 




Schleiermacher, Bavinck argues, ‘was the most influential theologian of the nineteenth 
century’.3 ‘Since Schleiermacher the whole of theology has changed, mediating, confessional 
and liberal…into a theology of consciousness’. 4  ‘Schleiermacher’, therein, ‘has exerted 
incalculable influence. All subsequent theology is dependent on him. Though no one took 
over his dogmatics, he has made his influence felt on all theological orientations—liberal, 
mediating, and confessional—and in all churches—Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed’.5  
 
Bavinck’s high estimation of Schleiermacher in the preceding three quotes traverses the whole 
of his career. The first is from a twenty-seven-year-old Bavinck in 1881. The second and third 
appear in both the 1894 and 1906 editions of the Prolegomena. The gravity of position with 
which Bavinck estimates Schleiermacher’s worth was echoed throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. His biographer Martin Redeker summarized Schleiermacher’s bearing in 
the whole of theological history: ‘Schleiermacher’s theology and philosophy are amongst the 
most significant events within German, and especially Protestant, church history since the 
days of the Reformation’.6 Though, one need only consider Barth who, in his ‘song of praise’ 
for Schleiermacher—the theologian he did not concur with in ‘any fundamental sense 
whatsoever’—wrote: ‘as this particular man, thinker, preacher, teacher and writer, 
Schleiermacher determined the nineteenth century… his influence has survived… truly a great 
man and a great achievement’.7 Barth’s ‘song of praise’ multiplies the much-simplified yet 
similar assessment from Bavinck’s pen: ‘all subsequent theology is dependent upon him’.8 The 
‘all’, which comprises confessional theologies in addition to mediating and liberal, necessarily 
includes Bavinck himself. Schleiermacher’s imprint on the whole of theology does not pass by 
                                                 
3 Bavinck, ‘KGHG’, 134.  
4 RD 1.78. 
5 RD 1.166. 
6 Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1973), 34. 
7 Karl Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, ed. Dietrich Ritschl, trans. G. Bromiley (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1982), 274. Emphasis added. 
8 RD 1.166 
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Bavinck without impress. How did it come to him and in what way was this secessionist 
preacher and theologian formed by the theologian of the nineteenth century?  
 
Such ‘incalculable influence’ flowing from both the early nineteenth century’s 
Driefaltigkeitskirche Berlin (Trinity church) and the then recently formulated University of Berlin 
(of which Schleiermacher was co-founder) first penetrated the ranks of a stubborn Dutch 
theological mainline starting in the latter portions of the first half of the nineteenth century. In 
the early century, a leading Dutch theological journal protested the infiltration of such liberal 
German theology: ‘we consider it beneath the office of a Protestant…to translate such 
writings [of Schleiermacher] and publish them without corrective annotations’.9 Despite early 
barricades, by 1881, in the secessionist stronghold of Kampen, Bavinck opened one of his first 
professorial addresses by suggesting that Schleiermacher was ‘deeply misunderstood’.10  
 
In between, Dutch Protestantism had not remained as suspicious of German influence as its 
leading journal attempted to popularize in the first half of the century. The narrative of 
nineteenth century Dutch Protestantism can be summarized as the slow bifurcation of 
modernist-oriented schools and the subtle yet consistent penetration of German theologies 
into the mainline (Hervormde Kerk) creating a fragmented setting that was suspicious of the 
dogmatic enterprise classically understood. Thus, Vanderlaan’s history of Protestantism in 
Modern Holland concludes with this point: ‘No modernist produces a dogmatiek. Some felt that 
on a “modern” basis, with authority gone, no generally acceptable system of dogmatics could 
be written. And yet, if some new Schleiermacher should arise, to set all religious thought once 
again on a new foundation who knows whether the Dutch modernists may not yet enjoy a 
renaissance of systematic theology’.11 
                                                 
9Cited by Roessingh from the journal Godgeleerde Bijdragen (1830). K.H. Roessingh, De Moderne 
Theologie in Nederland; hare voorberieiding en eerste period (Groningen: Ervan B. van der Kamp, 
1914), 24. Also, Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 6.  
10 Bavinck, ‘KGHG’, 134. 




Vanderlaan’s comment was perhaps unintendedly prescient. Commenting on Vanderlaan, 
Eglinton concludes that ‘the “new Schleiermacher” was the son of a separatist manse, the 
student of Scholten but the theological mouthpiece of neo-Calvinism’, Herman Bavinck.12 
Bavinck, as the codifier of dogmatics in the neo-confessional, neo-Calvinist movement saw to 
the re-establishment of a robust dogmatiek in an impoverished dogmatic context. Yet, the title 
‘new Schleiermacher’ has a more vigorous connotation than even Eglinton infers. While 
Bavinck was the vehicle in which the resurrection of dogmatics took place, he was also the 
mouthpiece that brought Schleiermacher’s conceptual framework into the context of the 
confessional, separatist environment. 
 
Throughout his career, small chastisements were muttered under the breath of some of his 
reviewers for this fact. In his 1921 biography of Bavinck written shortly after Bavinck’s death, 
Valentijn Hepp records that some supposed that Bavinck’s 1881 address in Kampen, ‘The 
Kingdom of God, the Highest Good’, was too heavily influenced by Schleiermacher.13 B.B. 
Warfield implied something similar in his review on the first edition of Bavinck’s Zekerheid des 
Geloofs (The Certainty of Faith). Henk van den Belt originally made the point that Warfield traces 
a tendency in Kuyper and Bavinck that he also attributes to Schleiermacher and the 
Vermittlungstheologie. Warfield describes such ‘mystical theology’ in The Inspiration of the Bible as 
the belief that the ‘Christian man has something within himself—call it enlightened reason, 
spiritual insight, the Christian consciousness, the witness of the Spirit, or call it what you 
will—to the test of which every “external revelation” is subjected’. 14  Warfield expressed 
concern that Bavinck’s high estimation of subjective Christian conviction (a Christian 
                                                 
12 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 25. 
13 V. Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1921), 108. 
14 B.B. Warfield, The Inspiration of the Bible (1894) in Warfield, Works, I, pp. 51-74, 59. Cited in 
H. van den Belt, ‘An Alternative Approach to Apologetics’, 53. 
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consciousness) subordinated historical or traditional modes of apologetic argument and ‘made 
little’ of a ‘rational’ faith.15   
 
Warfield correctly recognized Bavinck’s emphasis on the inner-self across Bavinck’s corpus, 
which augments ‘traditional apologetics’. Twenty-two years prior to Warfield’s review and 
some forty years after Schleiermacher’s death, in one of his first publications in the 
secessionist church magazine (De Vrije Kerk) Bavinck introduced his exegetical work on the 
conscience (Het Geweten) as follows: in pre-lapsarian Adam there was no distinction between 
‘self-consciousness (zelfbewustzijn) and God-consciousness (Godsbewustzijn)’… [they] coincided 
at every point’. After sin, the conscience spoke due to ‘the shattering of our God-
consciousness and our self-consciousness’.16 Such a description of the sinless state as the 
harmony of God and self-consciousness accords with Schleiermacher’s description in his 
Christian ethics (Sittenlehre) regarding the eradication of sin and the harmony of consciousness 
as the end of redemption: ‘what should be attained through redemption is nothing other than 
the communion with God, an essentially universal Christian expression meaning that God-
consciousness is a constant companion to our consciousness, both together in harmony’.17 
 
With Bavinck’s use of self- and God-consciousness in 1881 is the first chronological 
manifestation of a translation error that hides an initial indication of the background of the 
terms ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘God-consciousness’ in Bavinck’s text—namely, 
Schleiermacher’s popularization of these terms in the domain of nineteenth century theology. 
                                                 
15 Warfield, ‘A Review of H. Bavinck’s Zekerheid des Geloofs’ in B.B. Warfield, Selected Shorter 
Writings, vol. 2, ed. J.E. Meeter (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1973), 106-123, 117. 
16 Herman Bavinck, ‘Het Geweten I’, De Vrije Kerk (Januari-Februari, 1881), 27-37, 30-31. ET: 
Bavinck, ‘Conscience’, trans. N. Kloosterman, TBR 6 (2015), 113-126, 116. 
17 F. Schleiermacher, Introduction to Christian Ethics, trans. John C. Shelley (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1989), 75. Cf. Schleiermacher on piety, CF §4.4: ‘The second expression includes God-
consciousness in self-consciousness at the same time, and it does so in such a way that the two 
cannot be separated from each other… The feeling of absolute dependence simply becomes a 
clear self-consciousness, in that this notion of it arises at the same time. To the extent that this 
happens, one can also well say that God is given to us in feeling in an originative fashion’. 
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Nelson Kloosterman’s otherwise excellent translation of Het Geweten renders the terms as ‘self-
awareness’ and ‘God-awareness’.18 While these terms may, in fact, capture something of the 
intent and are a correct translation from Dutch, they fail to evoke the striking evidence of 
translation between Schleiermacher’s Selbstbewusstsein and the Dutch rendition zelfbewustzijn. 
Both words have a direct meaning from a more precise lexicon in English: self-consciousness. 
This is an error on repeat throughout Anglophone translations of Bavinck’s corpus that has 
helped to hide the significant adoption of Schleiermacherian terms across Bavinck’s writings.  
 
2.1.a. Schleiermacher and the Development of a Theologian 
 
Bavinck interacts explicitly with six of Schleiermacher’s works across his corpus including the 
final editions of CF and OR, the Dialektik, Die Christliche Sitte, Brief Outline, and Gelegentliche 
Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn. The latter three are mentioned rarely. Dialektik has 
only six total references across the whole as far as surmised. The overwhelming majority, 
nearly two-hundred, are devoted to CF and most of those to the introduction. The central 
features of Schleiermacher’s conceptual framework which reached Kampen by the 1880s, 
therein, included an emphasis on human subjectivity, self-consciousness, God-consciousness, 
religion (piety) in general, and the feelings of relative and absolute dependence. Regardless of 
Schleiermacher’s intent, this was the primary locus of his reception.  
 
The development of Schleiermacher’s grammar regarding the motif of self-consciousness and 
its relationship to dogmatics culminating in CF is derivative of his own Sitz im Leben, especially 
in the first half of his life. One ought to imagine Schleiermacher’s theology forged in the 
crucible of three distinct ‘biographical backdrops’: pietism, enlightenment, and romanticism.19  
 
                                                 
18 Bavinck, ‘Conscience’, trans. N. Kloosterman, TBR 6 (2015), 116. 
19 Paul Nimmo, ‘Introduction to the Third Edition’, in F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 
3rd edition (Bloomsbury: T&T Clark, 2016), x.  
 
 77 
Gottlieb Schleiermacher, Friedrich’s father, experienced a conversion in 1778 through his 
interactions with a Moravian pietistic commune at Gnadenfrei. Previously, although a 
Reformed pastor, Gottlieb was a student of Enlightenment rationalism. He was an avid reader 
of Spinoza and Kant in his old age—that is, until 1778.20 In his newly found piety, Gottlieb 
prized an experiential relationship with Christ in the redemption purchased through the 
vicarious satisfaction of the cross. Although never joining a community, he determined to 
educate his children within the Moravian society, and so he did. Friedrich, after being 
admitted per the casting of lots, entered the Moravian school at Niesky at fourteen and later 
attended the Moravian seminary at Barby.21  
 
Although having a conversion experience of his own at Niesky, while at Barby, 
Schleiermacher consumed several taboo texts (Goethe, Kant) and decided to separate himself 
theologically from the Moravian community by denying the atonement, for which he was 
nearly expelled.22 He wrote to his father of his decision and after being informed his father 
cautiously denounced Friedrich. Gottlieb wrote: ‘O foolish son, who has bewitched you, that 
you do not obey the truth... Go then into the world whose approval you desire’.23 In 1787, 
Schleiermacher did just that. He left the Moravian society behind and moved to Halle to live 
with his uncle and study at the university. Although leaving pietism in Barby, in a letter to 
Georg Reimer written twenty years after he entered the Moravian school, he recounted in his 
pietistic experience that his ‘awareness of our relation to a higher world began…[and] first 
                                                 
20 Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, 8. 
21 Christine Helmer, ‘Schleiermacher’, in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth Century Theology, 
ed. David Fergusson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 31-57, 44. Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life 
and Thought, 9. Interestingly Bavinck’s father Jan also used lots to determine whether he would 
take a place at the Kampen Theological School. 
22 Schleiermacher’s argument, ‘I cannot believe that his death was a substitutionary atonement 
because he [Jesus] never said so himself’, was, at this stage, an underdeveloped and perhaps 
immature one. Jan 21, 1787. Wilhelm Dilthey, Aus Schleiermachers Leben in Briefen, 4 vols., vol. I 
(Berlin: Reimer, 1858-60) 42-43. Hereafter, Briefen. Cited in Albert Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s 
Early Philosophy of Life: Determinism, Freedom, and Phantasy (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982), 8.  




developed that basic mystical tendency… [now]’, he wrote, ‘I have again become a Moravian, 
only of a higher order’.24 The revelation of such higher pietism became central in his 1799 
work On Religion where he appealed to the concept of piety in relationship to religion as a 
human sensibility and taste for the infinite.25 
 
It was at Halle that Schleiermacher re-entered that rationalist context that his father left 
through the texts of Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant, among others, under the tutelage of Johann 
August Eberhard (1739-1809). Halle, while once a center of pietism, had become a place 
enamored with Kant’s herald, Sapere aude (‘dare to know’)!26  In fact, a common slogan amid 
the students was as follows: ‘So you are going to Halle? You will either return a pietist or an 
atheist!’27 But Schleiermacher’s own scholarly ambitions awakened when he left Halle after 
only two years and moved with his uncle to Drossen. At Drossen, Schleiermacher made 
attempts at various topics in philosophical ethics, which were responses to his interactions 
with Kant’s first two Critiques. His initial foray into scholarship unveiled a trajectory of 
idiosyncrasy. Tice comments on Schleiermacher’s early texts accordingly: ‘as for theology, he 
was getting his “critical”, non-Enlightenment, nonrationalist, nonsupernaturalist, nonbiblicist 
bearings [in Drossen]’.28 He had a consistent skeptical mindset in these early years. He later 
put it: ‘I had a peculiar affliction. It consisted in an amazing skepticism, the origin of which I 
can no longer recollect …’. 29  If anything was to come from him as a philosopher or 
theologian, it was bound to be both unique and vigorous. It was his doom, he suggested, that 
he had a passion for studying not by the clock but con amore, until his thinking was finished.30 
                                                 
24 Briefen, I. 294-5. Cited in Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, 9. 
25 OR, 23, 46.  
26 Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life, 8. 
27 Friedrich Paulsen, Geschichte des Gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten. 
Vom Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zur Gegenwart (3rd edn, Leipzig: Veit, 1919–21), i. 537–9. Cited 
in Zachary Purvis, Theology and the University in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 
112.  
28 Tice, Schleiermacher, 5. 
29 Briefen, I. 6. Cited in Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life, 15.  
30 Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life, 17.  
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He was, others remarked, idiosyncratic, private, not well kempt, and an independent thinker.31 
Such an ethic of free thought would position him suitably for his future life in the romantic 
circle of Berlin which prized individual formation and individuality (Bildung, Individualität). 
 
Over the next few years after Drossen, he spent much of his time in Berlin (from 1790-93 
intermittently) engaging with some of the Enlightenment philosophers he had read. By the 
end of this period, he had written three full works that remained unpublished in complete 
form until 1984: ‘On the Highest Good’ (1789), ‘On Freedom’ (1790-92) and ‘What Gives 
Value to Life?’ (1792-3). 32  Schleiermacher was a critical Kantian—Kantian insofar as he 
accepted limits to theoretical reason. His critique, nevertheless, concerned Kant’s concept of 
freedom. Schleiermacher wrote, Kant’s freedom ‘as a power of causality having no necessary 
connection with what precedes’ fails to account for the ‘unity of consciousness’ that Kant’s 
first Critique was constructed upon.33 With no intention of unveiling the arguments here, the 
point is that in Schleiermacher’s early interactions with Kant and other Enlightenment 
philosophers regarding the relations between freedom and determinism, subject and object, 
self and world, being and morality, as he expressed in OR, he adopted such emphases on the 
concepts of intuition (Anschauung) and consciousness (Bewusstsein) that would suit his 
development for his later theological constructions. 34  As Helmer states, a feature of 
Schleiermacher’s modern thought is his ‘propensity to take thinking as an object of itself’.35 
His development as a mature, Christo-centric and ‘consciousness-theologian’ was, Bavinck 
estimated, both adoptive of and contra to Kant: 
                                                 
31 Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life, 19.  
32 Tice, Schleiermacher, 7. 
33 Schleiermacher, On Freedom, trans. Albert Blackwell (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, 1992), 
295. Also see Schleiermacher, ‘Notizen zu Kant: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, KGA I/1, 132-
34. 
34 For a full treatment of the Kant-Schleiermacher relation see Thandeka, The Embodied Self; 
Kevin Hector, The Theological Project of Modernism: Faith and the Conditions of Mineness (Oxford: 
OUP, 2015), 30-122. Jacqueline Mariña, Transformation of Self in the Thought of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (Oxford, OUP, 2008).  
35 Christine Helmer, ‘Schleiermacher’, 31.  
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Another road was taken by Schleiermacher [than that of Kant]. Although he 
too rejected the church’s doctrine of Christ, he nevertheless sought to avoid 
the mistake of speculative philosophy, the mistake of looking for the essence 
of Christianity in an abstract idea and detaching it from the historical person of 
Christ. To that end, he based his view on the experience of the church, on the 
Christian consciousness, whose content is reconciliation and fellowship with 
God… Schleiermacher’s influence became perceptible, first, in that, in contrast 
to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, theologians tried to maintain that Christ was a 
most extraordinary and wholly unique revelation of God.36  
 
 Schleiermacher experienced within his early expedition into philosophical ethics an 
‘awakening’ which, he later described in the Monologen (Soliloquies) of 1800: ‘with a proud joy, 
I remember the first time I found the meaning of humanity and knew then that I could never 
again lose it’… ‘Thus, there dawned upon me what is my highest intuition (höchste Anschauung). 
I saw clearly that each [person] is meant to represent humanity in [one’s] own way, combining 
its elements uniquely’.37 Intuition for Schleiermacher denoted the passive, receptive aspect of 
human existence in a world of objects, a definition that originates from Kant but is later 
augmented by the concept of feeling.  
 
Enlightenment philosophies had beckoned him reject traditional views of Christ’s sacrifice at 
Barby, and, in Berlin and Drossen, Kant’s first and second Critique, among others, provoked 
him to retreat to philosophical ethics wherein he found the intuition and feeling of the unity 
of self and world through reflection on the concepts of determined individuality and freedom. 
Schleiermacher, while a student of Kant, at the same time, remained tethered in a way to a 
Moravian emphasis on the ‘consciousness and uniqueness of the individual’s experience’.38 
 
In 1796, Schleiermacher moved to Berlin and would serve for the next six years as chaplain at 
the Charity Hospital. This was his second pastorate after a two-year stay in Landsberg. Most 
                                                 
36 RD 3.262-63. 
37 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Soliloquies, trans. Horace Leiland Friess (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock, 2002), 29, 30-31. Cited in Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, 21; Tice, Schleiermacher, 
8. 
38 Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, 22. 
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significant in this move is the blossoming of his social circle amongst the elites of the Berlin 
salons. Through a relationship in one of his previous jobs as tutor to the Dohna family, he 
was introduced to Henriette Herz, the wife of Marcus Herz (Marcus, one of Kant’s most 
prized students), a master of eight languages and famed in Berlin for her beauty; she became 
Schleiermacher’s dearest friend.39 Henriette hosted one of the salons Schleiermacher attended 
within the developing cultural milieu of freie Geselligkeit (free sociability), a displacement of the 
elite from the courts to more public spaces. Although publicly criticized, Schleiermacher 
maintained that his relationship to Henriette was but ‘a close heart-felt friendship, having 
nothing to do with man and woman’ (it was, however, common for young men to be 
emotionally involved with married women amongst the Berlin romantic circle).40 Through her, 
Schleiermacher was enfolded into a particular Berlin elite including Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
the later founder of the University of Berlin. 
 
The romantics were the second, interdependent society of elites in Berlin in to which 
Schleiermacher was inducted, particularly through Friedrich Schlegel. Schleiermacher and 
Schlegel met in Henriette’s home. The close relationship lasted less than two years but 
Schlegel, being the center of the early German romantic circle, introduced Schleiermacher to a 
philosophical, political, and literary group through which Schleiermacher would gain fame. 
Heretofore, Schleiermacher’s coming of age occurred in the moral philosophies of Kant and 
Plato, but early Berlin romantics drew him into an idiosyncrasy that transcended the milieu of 
the late German Enlightenment.  
 
The romantic tendency of the early German romantics, it ought to be noted, was something 
other than mere, superficial subjectivism. As Hans Eichner, the German literary scholar 
remarks, the title ‘romantic’ like ‘enlightenment’ or ‘modern’ lacks any clear definition and 
                                                 
39 Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, 27-28. 
40 Briefen I. 261. Frederica Rowan, The Life of Schleiermacher as Unfolded in his Biography and Letters, 




resists myopic treatment. The term refers not to ‘romance’ but to the Roman, or novel. 
Accordingly, in ‘The Genesis of Romanticism’, he writes: ‘Romanticism is an unpleasantly 
vague term, whose meaning depends only too often on the preoccupations of the person who 
uses the word’.41 For Schleiermacher’s context, Schlegel, Novalis, and others, the concept 
‘romantic’ referred not to cheap sentiment or subjectivism,42 but to a particular coming of age, 
a passing through adolescence, a counter movement to aspects of Enlightenment, with less of 
an emphasis on reason and more on the freedoms of feeling and doing in the complexities of 
human experience and imagination. It was a movement open to the novel, mysterious, and 
emotive, inspired by the fall of the Bastille, and a despiser of rationalism. Romantics prized 
individual formation after Goethe’s popularizing of Bildung and glamorized ancient Greece, 
the works and culture of the classics. Bavinck characterizes German romanticism similarly and 
the reader will notice the aforementioned adoption of some of the described key emphases 
with a negative tone:  
Romanticism was… a reaction of the free unfettered life of the emotions to 
objective, all-obligating and all-regulating classicism. Human subjects raised 
themselves above the laws laid down to prohibit them from spontaneous 
expression in every area of life. The imagination again asserted its rights over 
against the intellect. The organic view came in the place of the mechanical. The idea of 
“becoming” suppressed that of “making.” In every sector of life, people 
opened their eyes to the free, to the natural, and to genius. Becoming, growth, 
development was the mode in which things came into being. Not the practical 
but the beautiful, not prose but poetry, not work but play, not manufactured 
things but art was supremely valuable. The affected mannerisms of an earlier 
day yielded to a superficial sentimentality.43 
 
Additionally, the Berlin romantics cannot be characterized as entirely resistant to the 
Enlightenment. ‘The young romantics’, Beiser argues, ‘never put themselves in self-conscious 
opposition against the Aufklärung in toto. If they strongly criticized it in some respects, they 
                                                 
41 Hans Eichner, ‘The Genesis of Romanticism’, Queen’s Quarterly 72 (1965), 213. Cited in 
Richard Crouter, Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism, 5. Also see 
Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth 
Millán-Zaibert (Albany: State of New York Press, 2004).  
42 Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, 32. 
43 RD 1.264.  
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also firmly identified themselves with it in others’. 44  Crouter describes Schleiermacher’s 
relationship ‘between Enlightenment and Romanticism’ per an affinity for Enlightenment 
rationality filtered through the form of romantic spirit:  
Without ceasing to honor [the boldness of discovery, the autonomy of self-
expression, and the demand to produce rational explanations] Schleiermacher 
became embued with the spirit of early German Romanticism. It provided the 
mental tools for a mode of rationality that sought to acknowledge fully the 
dimensions of unknowability and contingency within human experience. In his 
world both poetic and scientific experience were highly valued. By hindsight 
we can see that Schleiermacher’s work embraces what we see as a perennial 
tension between Enlightenment and Romanticist perspectives.45  
 
Present within his works is both a commitment to scientific rational exposition and a 
playfulness of Socratic dialogical form. In the Christmas Eve dialogue of 1806, for example, 
Schleiermacher offers a philosophical reflection in a fictitious scene on the meaning of the 
Christ-event, the festival of Christmas.46 The text displays the ripples of his romanticized 
sensibilities forged in the Berlin circle. The themes are clear: that music invokes religious 
feeling more so than speech; that childhood (becoming child-like) is a basic requisite for the 
Christian consciousness; that the feminine spirit (women in general) best express the true piety 
of religion; that the narrative of Scripture, of the incarnation of Christ, etc., are to be objects 
of love, and that Christmas is about the unity of peace above all antitheses.47 It is according to 
these motifs that Bavinck argues that Schleiermacher’s ‘view of religion’ ought to be 
understood ‘in light of this same romanticism’ which ‘[broke] with objectivity; where the 
subject became the absolute first principle’.48  
 
                                                 
44 Frederick Beiser, ‘Early Romanticism’, in What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth Century Answers and 
Twentieth-Century Questions, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 
318. Crouter, Between Enlightenment and Romanticism, 8.  
45 Crouter, Between Enlightenment and Romanticism, 8.  
46  Schleiermacher, Christmas Eve Celebration: A Dialogue, trans. Terrence Tice (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2010).  
47 Gerrish summarizes some of these themes, B.A. Gerrish, A Prince of the Church: Schleiermacher 
and the Beginnings of Modern Theology (London: Fortress Press, 1984), 13-18. 
48 RD 1.265.  
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The men in the dialogue (who appear as subtle antagonists) banter about the correct 
theological-propositional form for expressing the incarnation. The little girl (Sophie), in 
contrast, is the child heroine who uses her music to create peace. Other obvious contrasts 
appear: Edward warns that Sophie ought not be allowed to read the Bible on her own lest she 
succumb to the mythological ‘superstition’ which sends women to Roman convents and 
forms Moravian sects. 49  The proper study of theology, he adds, will cure children from 
believing such ‘fairy tales’. Contained within this dialogue are Schleiermacher’s vilification of 
rationalism and his portrayal of the beauty of child-like faith. It is a subtle defense of the best 
of Moravian piety but a piety diffused into the world rather than divided from it. 
 
And at the center of Schleiermacher’s dialogue is child-like, Christ-centered love—a more 
specific, Christian presentation of romantic motifs. ‘Love’, Schlegel proposed during 
Schleiermacher’s time in the circle, ‘is not simply the quiet longing for the Infinite; it is also 
the holy enjoyment of a beautiful present’.50 There was, in the realization of the romantic 
sensibility, an ‘idealism of humanity, belief in the power of the soul whose breath is creative 
love, faith in the inward god, in the eternal goodness of the inward being’.51  
 
Schlegel’s writings, at the same time, unveil the fact that the Berlin romantics were not only 
artists but also and most essentially philosophers whose works, as Walzel argued, are 
‘unthinkable without Kant, although the antithesis to Kant gives the movement its proper 
claim to existence’. 52  The Berlin romantics may be characterized then by the following 
emphases and pursuits: (i) the search for the reconciliation of humanity with the world; (ii) the 
                                                 
49 Schleiermacher, Christmas Eve Celebration, 23. 
50 Friedrich von Schlegel, Lucinde (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1907), 7. Translated by Richard Brandt, 
The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of his Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1968), 61 
51  Richard Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of his Theory of Scientific and 
Religious Knowledge, 61.  
52 O.F. Walzel, Deutsche Romantik, vol. 1(Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1918), 25. Brandt, The Philosophy 
of Schleiermacher, 62.  
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inwardness of the divine as expressed in the goodness of human nature in the fact of its 
existence; (iii) the ultimate harmony of nature, humanity, and divinity as expressed in the idea 
of organism; (iv) a longing for the Absolute; (v) an embrace of contradiction (vi) and an 
admiration for love, friendship, and art. 53  Their ideas were developed in the crucible of 
transcendental idealism with emphasis on the transcendental self, subjectivity and objectivity, 
and the Absolute, conjoined with longing, desire, and feeling for beauty and harmony. Beauty, 
Schlegel wrote, ‘is one of the primary modes of action of the human mind…an eternal 
transcendental [fact]’.54 Like the romantics, Schleiermacher emphasized the idea of unity or 
reconciliation with the world, individuality and creativity, friendship and love. 55  Yet, 
Schleiermacher attributes religion above all as the source of his romantic sensibility: in 
religion,  
my spirit breathed before it had discovered the world of external objects, 
experience, and scholarship. Religion helped me when I began… to purify my 
heart of the rubble of primitive times. It remained with me when God and 
immortality disappeared before my doubting eyes. It guided me into the active 
life. It taught me, with my virtues and defects to keep myself wholly in my 
undivided existence, and only through that have I learned friendship and 
love.56 
 
While working with Schlegel on the romantic journal Athenaeum, Schleiermacher published his 
                                                 
53 These are characterizations that appear across Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacher, 61-64. 
54  Friedrich Schlegel, Athenaeum: Eine Zeitschrift (Berlin: F. Vieweg, 1799) II. 69. Cited in 
Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacher, 65. Schleiermacher was especially drawn to the emphasis 
on individuality as expressed in the pursuit of friendship. ‘The highest moment is when two 
friends see their own holiest nature…in the souls of the other’. Athenaeum, II. 101. Brandt, The 
Philosophy of Schleiermacher, 67. Friendship expresses a reality of unity, that individuality is a form 
of membership in a particular unity of all mankind: ‘Only all men make up humanity’, 
Schleiermacher wrote, ‘and only all forms, taken together, the world’. Schleiermacher was 
known to exemplify the romantic ideal of friendship. Schlegel wrote to Schleiermacher that 
‘To me you are…for humanity what Fichte and Goethe are for philosophy and literature’. 
Briefen, III. 86. 
55 See Gerald N. Izenberg, Impossible Individuality: Romanticism, Revolution, and the Origins of Modern 
Selfhood, 1787–1802 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
56 OR, 84. The transitions between the Oman and Crouter translations are for the purpose of 
citing Schleiermacher’s original 1799 text of OR as Crouter has translated it and his 3rd edition, 
translated by Oman.  
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well-known On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers57 whose ethos and audience established 
him a writer within the bounds of Berlin romantics—even though much of its content was 
intended to persuade this circle, especially Schlegel who thought Schleiermacher’s Christianity 
unreasonable.58  OR is one of the texts that introduced the age so-categorized as modern 
Christian thought. Through its second speech Schleiermacher first expressed the fundamental 
motifs of what Bavinck would later call the catalyst of consciousness-theology. The work 
displays even in its earliest edition the two-fold relation between dependence and freedom in 
seed forms. The first speech beckons the romantic despisers to understand their 
misunderstanding. Schleiermacher appeals to the two ‘primal forces’, the two opposing forces 
of human nature: the ‘one strives to draw into itself everything that surrounds it…wholly 
absorbing it into its innermost being. The other longs to extend its own inner self even 
further’.59 No individual exists apart from the two—the relation to material nature that is 
fundamentally receptive, and the imparting to the outside something of the inner-self. In this 
relation, the human is determined: ‘he can be nothing other than what he must be’.60  
 
How shall these two forces be brought together? The answer depends on a second question 
presented in the second speech. ‘What is religion?’ is the most important query of the book. It 
is, he answers, neither acting (morality) nor ‘a particular way of contemplating the world’ in 
thinking (the theoretical, dogmatic), but piety. Piety is an ‘immediate consciousness of the 
universal existence of all finite things, in and through the infinite, and of all temporal things, in 
                                                 
57 Schleiermacher, Über die Religion: reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, KGA I/2.  
58 Crouter offers a taxonomy of on-going debates regarding the impact and influence of the 
Berlin romantic circle on Schleiermacher’s mature writings: ‘scholarly opinion on 
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romanticism, but stress his distinctive contribution to a movement that, from its inception, 
was always heterogeneous. Between Enlightenment and Romanticism, 7. Bavinck states, at least, that 
Schleiermacher’s theology from OR to CF in its final edition is essentially consistent. RD 
1.265.  
59 OR (C), 80.  
60 OR (C), 6.  
 
 87 
and through the Eternal…It is in itself an affection, a revelation of the infinite in the finite, 
God being seen in it and it in God’.61 Such immediate consciousness is predicated upon an 
‘original unity’ that is manifestly expressed in both thinking and acting.62  Piety is, in other 
words, the intuition (or by 1806 in the second edition, feeling) of unity in the self-world 
relation that senses and tastes the infinite from the standpoint of the finite. Herein, the unity 
of the two primal forces is the sense of religion, of a relation to the infinite, grounded in the 
unity of consciousness. So, Schleiermacher: ‘Thus to accept everything individual as a part of 
the whole and everything limited as a presentation (Darstellung) of the infinite is religion’.63 
 
The phrase ‘original unity’ is important for unveiling the sense of the infinite. Original unity is 
a consciousness present across all states and is directly connected to intuition or feeling, a 
feeling of both the unity of the self and the unity of self and the finite in which together there 
is a world (Weltall) or Universe (Universum).64 It could be called a primordial self-awareness 
wherein one pays attention to her own origin. When reflecting on the givenness of 
consciousness, one discovers, as Kalwaitis summarizes Schleiermacher, ‘that which is 
ontologically prior to any determination of thinking, willing, or perceiving, that which shows 
itself as the essential characteristic of “every act of… life itself”’. 65  Additionally, in the 
immediate consciousness of self, giving rise to the feeling of the dependent finite, one enters a 
                                                 
61 OR, 28.  
62 OR, 21-22.  
63 OR (Crouter), 25. 
64 For an extensive treatment of this concept, see Carl Kalwaitis, ‘The Meaning of Original 
Consciousness: A Philosophical Study of Schleiermacher’s Second Speech’, in The State of 
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65 Kalwaitis, ‘The Meaning of Original Consciousness’, 90. OR, 42.  
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form of knowing (an intuitive form of awareness) that is pre-inferential. To experience is to 
experience the finite but to do so in the intuition (the revelation) that the finite is not the 
infinite. Such a revelation expresses affection for, as he would come to say in CF, a Whence 
who is not finite (and therefore wholly outside of the finite world, contrary to many 
pantheistic interpretations of Schleiermacher’s original unity).66  
 
Encapsulated here is Schleiermacher’s way of subverting Kant’s religion as morality. Whereas 
Kant denies knowledge of God de facto marginalizing religion to the bounds of practical 
reason, Schleiermacher beckons the motifs of romantic philosophy to establish religion as the 
ground of knowing and doing. Not to be missed, additionally, is that the expression of religion 
as piety finds its source in his Moravian pietistic history. Central and consistent throughout his 
career (despite minor changes in grammar), is the idea that there is a feeling or sensibility of 
the unity of consciousness in relation to the world that gives rise to a taste for the infinite 
grounded on the self-world relation. Feeling, therein, as a religious element of self-
consciousness, is primary in the three-fold aspect of one’s consciousness (feeling, knowing, 
and doing): ‘the ground of [human] action and thought’.67 Due to the receptive or passive 
nature of this aspect of feeling, his conception of the unity of human consciousness is 
determined by its relation to the world and, therefore, in utter contrast to Fichte’s ego positing 
non-ego.68 By 1806, then, the emphasis on the intuition of 1799 had become ‘feeling’. Adams 
summarizes the point of the change: ‘Defining the essence of religion as a matter of feeling 
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Critics’, in Schleiermacher, the Study of Religion, and the Future of Theology, eds. Brent W. Sockness 
and Wilhelm Gräb (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 121-134, 122 
 
 89 
rather than intuition is… in line with the view that the primary religious consciousness is a 
sort of self–consciousness’, in distinction from the intuition of an external object.69  
 
Bavinck, similarly, characterizes the key features of Schleiermacher’s ‘religion’ in three moves. 
First, ‘religion is neither thinking nor acting, neither metaphysics nor morality, but feeling for 
the infinite. The object of that feeling is not a personal God with whom a human lives in 
fellowship but the universe, the world as a whole, conceived as a unity’. Second, the ‘faculty 
for the perception of that infinite is not the intellect, reason, or will but feeling, the focus of 
the mind on and capacity for intuiting the infinite’. And third, an ethic: ‘one must open his 
faculty of feeling as widely as possible to the world as a whole, view all things in the One and 
the One in all things, regard all that is particular as a revelation of the infinite, etc’.70 And 
because ‘religious’ feeling is regarded as the ‘faculty which reveals to us the highest unity’, 
religious feeling is not ‘clearly demarcated from the aesthetic’.71 
 
 In Berlin Schleiermacher’s maturation as theologian and pastor developed across most of the 
next thirty years. From 1817, Schleiermacher was a member of the United Protestant Church 
acting on his commitment to a project of unity between Lutheran and Reformed traditions, 
which reflected his strivings for unity in every aspect of his life and work—he intended the CF 
in part to be a dogmatics for a united church.  But his capacities extended over a plethora of 
fields per the ability of his genius—a Plato scholar, a Prussian statesman, a theologian of the 
academy and preacher in the local church, a catalyst and architect for a new university in 1810, 
a member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, a hermeneutical philosopher, an ethicist, a 
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biblical scholar—until his death in 1834.72 The ethos of his funeral in Berlin matched that of a 
king.    
 
Some basic distinctions within his corpus that play a prominent role in Bavinck’s 
appropriation may be summarized in the dialectic introduced between two related sets: feeling 
and thinking, and immediate and objective consciousness. These two distinctions find full 
expression in Schleiermacher’s elucidation of the Christian consciousness in speech from the 
standpoints of intellect (thinking) and will (doing) in his two later works, Die Christliche 
Sittenlehre and Glaubenslehre.73 Although his arguments are tedious and complex, the relation 
between the ‘consciousness-theology’ developing in his 1799 work and his mature theology is 
simply expressed. In Bavinck’s view, ‘in The Christian Faith we basically encounter the same’ as 
in OR but applied to distinct disciplines and with some distinct emphases.74 These distinctions 
are two-fold, Bavinck argues: 
In the Speeches God was the [cosmic] whole; in The Christian Faith he is the 
absolute causality of the world. Correspondingly, feeling in the former was an 
intuition of the infinite; in the latter it is immediate self-consciousness and 
absolute dependence. Hence here God tends more to acquire an existence of 
his own, one that is distinct from the world, and religion therefore also 
acquires its own content, one that is distinct from the intuition of the world.75  
 
                                                 
72 For a specific list of his accomplishments in the varied sciences, see Christine Helmer, 
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Schleiermacher’s concept of dogmatics (Glaubenslehre) is a result of reflection on the contents 
of the Christian consciousness, the affections, per the logic of divine causality applied to the 
consciousness of being in relation with God in Jesus the Redeemer, formed into a scientific, 
didactic system set in conversation with a community.76 According to CF §11, in Christianity 
‘everything is referred to the redemption accomplished through Jesus of Nazareth’. The object 
of doctrine is directly the Christian religious consciousness and then, indirectly, God per the 
consciousness of an absolutely dependent relation in Christ. Theological ethics (Sittenlehre) is 
the expression of the contents of the Christian consciousness in a system of action. It is 
thinking about acting according to the redeemed consciousness set forth in speech. These two 
forms of expression of the Christian consciousness are an objectification of the consciousness 
of the infinite precisely in the fact that the feeling of absolute dependence becomes a 
‘Christian’ consciousness—a consciousness of a historical referent of redemption through the 
person of Jesus Christ of Nazareth. 
 
Sections three and four of the Glaubenslehre (1830) are a distilled expression of his 
philosophical musing about religion in its relation to human subjectivity. Once again, in these 
passages Schleiermacher’s focus is on the concept of piety. Piety, as he now expresses it, is the 
‘feeling of absolute dependence’ (schlechthinige Abhangigkeitsgefu ̈hl), a feeling which must be 
constrained or elucidated by the concept of ‘immediate self-consciousness’.77 For Bavinck, 
Schleiermacher’s ‘immediacy’ of self-consciousness is a pre-discursive awareness of self that 
renders the possibility of all forms of thinking and doing. Adams likewise describes it as 
‘preconceptual’: ‘religious consciousness, in its most essential form, is preconceptual or 
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independent of concepts, in the sense of not being structured by concepts’.78 For Bavinck, the 
most important concepts in Schleiermacher’s corpus are in CF §4. 
 
Immediate self-consciousness grounds the awareness of self as precisely oneself 
(‘selfsameness’ in CF §4.1) in relation to a world of objects. In such consciousness, there is a 
constant dialectic between the receptivity and spontaneity (activity) of the self. Simply, the self 
exists in a relation of reciprocity with all ‘others’ wherein one can, on the one hand, express 
oneself actively. This activity is a moment of freedom. On the other hand, every interaction 
with the world and its objects requires a reciprocal receptivity. The one who acts must also 
receive and is, therefore, liable to change (conscious of a ‘changing determination of oneself’). 
A constant relation of reciprocity exists with the world as freedom and dependence, neither of 
which, in relation to the world, can be absolutized.79 In the former, ‘we’ feel ourselves free. In 
the later, ‘we’ feel ourselves dependent. The self, to put it in Bavinck’s grammar, is always 
being in becoming. Immediate self-consciousness, therefore, expresses the (1) being of a 
subject and (2) co-existence with others. ‘We’ can neither be who ‘we are’ without 
consciousness of a ‘selfsame’ self and consciousness of another, one who ‘we’ are not. 
Schleiermacher is sure of this basic presentation of self-consciousness: ‘assent to these 
statements can be expected without qualification’ (§4.1). 
 
Schleiermacher suggests that these two feelings of freedom and dependence can be one, truly 
a reciprocity. In other words, in the unity of self-consciousness, the fact of being and being in 
co-existence is evidenced by the consciousness of being a self, defined in relation to others. In 
this consciousness, the totality of the concept ‘world’ is where ‘we’ posit ourselves with ‘what 
lies outside’ as ‘one’. Self-consciousness in unity is a consciousness of ‘being in the world’ 
(Dasein), wherein there is no possibility of a feeling of either absolute dependence or freedom 
(§4.2). Necessarily, ‘no feeling of absolute freedom can have its locus in any temporal being’ 
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(§4.3). A feeling of absolute dependence, however, is not only possible but necessary for a 
temporal being, defined in consciousness by co-existence. ‘Co-posited in self-consciousness’, 
then, is a Whence of such dependence, and this consciousness of being absolutely dependent is 
a consciousness of ‘being in relation with God’ (§4.4). This whence, for Schleiermacher, is ‘not 
the world’, but the condition of the world. The feeling of absolute dependence is the nature 
(Wesen) of all piety. God as an existent object is not directly in view in this feeling. Rather, the 
feeling of absolute dependence signifies ‘simply that which is co-determinant in this feeling 
and that to which we push back our being’ (§4.4). In other words, the consciousness of a 
relation to God is a consciousness of the condition of our being because absolute dependence 
is the relation that must include all other relations. It is this delineation of immediate self-
consciousness that Bavinck uses in his later career as the grammar of the subjective aspect of 
God’s common gift, as a domain of general revelation, and as the subjective side of religion 
(pietas). For Schleiermacher, as well as for Bavinck, in this consciousness, ‘God is given to us 
in feeling’ (§4.4). In the harmony of piety, self-consciousness is directly akin to God-
consciousness.  
 
True piety, then, is the feeling of absolute dependence on God, the wholly other, the Whence 
of all activity and receptivity and the source of the original unity of self. Such consciousness is 
made Christian consciousness and, derivatively, Christian dependence, when it is objectified in 
relation to ‘the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth’.80 And so Bavinck conveys the 
significance of the most salient themes of Schleiermacher’s ‘consciousness-theology’ for all 
theology after:  
In his The Christian Faith the basic philosophical ideas are the same [as On 
Religion], but here feeling is further defined as absolute dependence, God is 
conceived as absolute causality, and Christianity is described as an ethical 
religion in which everything is related to redemption through Christ. Dogmas, 
therefore, are and remain descriptions of subjective states of consciousness, 
still of such subjective states as are determined by the Christian community 
and thus by the person of Christ. With these three ideas—the immediate 
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consciousness of the self as the source of religion, the community as the 
necessary form of its existence, and the person of Christ as the center of 
Christianity—Schleiermacher has exerted incalculable influence. All 
subsequent theology is dependent on him. Though no one took over his 
dogmatics, he has made his influence felt on all theological orientations—
liberal, mediating, and confessional—and in all churches—Catholic, Lutheran, 
and Reformed.81 
 
2.1.b. The Origins of Dutch Theological Division 
 
The narrative of how Schleiermacher’s ‘consciousness-theology’ forged its path to Kampen 
begins long before. The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 produced an Anglo-Dutch accord 
under William of Orange (William III) that would eventually bring the ‘golden age’82 of Dutch 
dominance in urbanization, trade, manufacturing, and a high standard of living to a steady 
decline into the early nineteenth century. 83 The Dutch alliance with England resulted in a 
French war that left a financial burden in the Netherlands. Alongside financial dissolution, the 
two-fold split in Dutch politics that developed during the Reformation increased throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.84 On the one hand, the political philosophy of Hugo 
Grotius (1583-1645) fueled the party of the urban regents, the lesser nobility who supported 
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the republic and the rights of spherical civil authority over religious authority (Grotius was 
also a distant Arminian supporter). On the other were those who esteemed the prince of 
Orange, promoted a constitutional monarchy and wanted the church free from state control 
for the sake of the protection of orthodoxy. The supporters of the House of Orange were 
generally Reformed Christians while those who favored the urban regents were largely non-
Calvinistic Protestants and Catholics.85 Some historians suppose that this narrative coincides 
with a polarization of Dutch culture per Erasmian humanism and Calvinist (gereformeerd) 
strains.86  
 
‘The country’s political division’ according to Bratt, ‘ran parallel to a theological divide dating 
back to the time of the original revolt against Spain’ which began in the 1560’s’.87 Revolt 
against the Spanish, and more specifically, against the Roman Catholic Philip II, was a 
‘Calvinist’ revolt in part against Catholic rule that would culminate in the Union of Utrecht 
and the founding of the Dutch republic under the House of Orange in 1579 (although the 
Spanish war did not officially end until 1648). While the union constituted the rights of the 
individual to choose their religion, the Reformed religion became the majority. The 
codification of Calvinism and its relation to the republic occurred after the death of Jacob 
Arminius at the suppression of the Remonstrants, which became a joint venture between the 
theologians at the Synod of Dort (1618-19) and Maurice, the prince of Orange.88 At the Great 
Convention of 1651, the Reformed Protestant tradition was established as the ‘preferred 
religion’. 89  In the coming generations, the theological and political division remained, 
nevertheless, in the battles between Cocceius and Voetius, throughout the Nadere Reformatie, 
and in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century development of a Dutch enlightenment. 
The subordination of the ecclesiastical authorities to the magistrates became a central issue for 
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the next two hundred years. ‘Although the Great Convention of 1651 gave the Reformed 
Church the privileged position in the Republic, the Church lacked the autonomy to direct its 
own spiritual, theological and political destiny…[resulting] in a tug-of-war between the 
ecclesiastical and civil centres of authority’.90 
 
In the nineteenth century, this theological and political duality that had existed since the 
seventeenth century was manifest in the post-Napoleonic Netherlands trying to sweep up 
after the financial and social crises it was left with after the 1813 Leipzig defeat of Napoleon. 
At the dethronement of Louis Napoleon, the re-constituted king from the House of Orange, 
William I, enacted the General Regulations (Algemeen Reglement) or centralization of the church 
in 1815-16. Effectively, church matters from liturgy to property ownership became the 
administrative purview of the king and a small synod of bourgeoisie advisers. The Reformed 
ecclesiology was turned upside down in a style of a centralized state government left over 
from French control. Yet, at the same time, the regulation was the climax of an evolution of 
tense ecclesial/political relations.91 The Dutch church was renamed the Nederlandse Hervormde 
Kerk (NHK) wherein the gereformeerd (reformed) as a signifier of a particular Calvinist tradition 
was replaced with the more generic hervormd. By 1834, the ecclesiastical and political 
bifurcation in the Netherlands that had been present since the seventeenth century, the ‘tug-
of-war’, was codified when two groups split from the state church and eventually unified in 
1869 (Gereformeerde Kerken). This seceded church, in which Bavinck was raised, was at 100,000 
members by 1870 just after the union.92  
 
The narrative of political and ecclesiastical tension proposed is coordinate in the development 
of the nineteenth century Dutch theologies with two Reformed churches each propositioning 
alternate theological models for the nation. On the one hand, the act of secession was a signal 
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for the re-establishment and maintenance of that which had been: the theology of the synod 
of Dordt (orthodoxy). On the other, the NHK was left to find its own theological identity in 
modernity. The result was a century-long series of opposing alternatives and reform 
movements. It is within these various theological movements and counter-movements that 
German thought slowly pervades a number of these schools. Although there are at least five 
significant theological schools that developed in response to the lack of a clear theological 
orientation in the NHK in the nineteenth century, the three most important for the purposes 




2.1.c. German Thought from Groningen to the Modern School 
 
The ‘Modern’ school, which is a title rather than a marker of era, is particularly associated with 
the theology of Johannes Scholten (1811-1885) who spent nearly forty years at Leiden 
University. Scholten’s prominence as a theologian arose after an 1840 lecture that polemicized 
against what he saw as the Groningen theology’s Christological Docetism.93 The Groninger 
School was the first prominent Dutch theology of the nineteenth century. Dutch theology 
had, prior to Groningen, ‘slept a deep supernaturalistic sleep’.94 Theology in the Netherlands 
‘came up from behind’ slowly finding its identity in a new Europe after Napoleon. The 
pietistic and Calvinistic theology of the pre-secession conservatives dominated the rural areas. 
Many mainline theologians in the cities remained uninterested in the theological creativity of 
Germany in the early century.95 Both shared a high view of the Scriptures as a revelatory text 
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resulting in forms of biblicism. Roessingh, accordingly, suggests that Kant, Fichte, Schelling 
and Hegel made little impact in the Netherlands in the first half of the nineteenth-century.96 
 
The narrative of the Groninger school begins with the modest entrance of German thought 
into the Netherlands through the first significant theologian of the century: Philip Willem van 
Heusde (1778-1839). Van Heusde became professor of theology at Utrecht in 1804. The 
Groninger School arose due to his popularity as a lecturer. Among the Heusdiaans, his student 
following, four were hired to professorships in Groningen in 1829 and 1830.97 De Groot, a 
Heusdiaan who studied at Groningen instead of Utrecht, was appointed head of the 
seminary.98 The two influences underlying the classifiably heterodox theological orientation at 
Groningen were (i) Erasmus, who they took to be their spiritual father, and (ii) van Heusde’s 
emphasis on Plato. Van Heusde found a commitment to education through Plato’s works and 
esteemed the Platonic dialogical method. The Groningen theologians clung to this manner of 
intellectual incitement and gained the sympathetic ear of the nationalistic elite. Yet, while van 
Heusde had moderately introduced a simplified Kant to the Netherlands, his Groningen 
progeny offered instead a ‘genuinely Dutch’ theology that opposed outside movements like 
‘Calvinism’ as a ‘foreign importation imposed on them in 1619 by the sword of Maurice’.99 
Instead, they sought a theology that came from and existed for their compatriots—from 
Erasmus, for the Netherlands. 
 
Their national theology was marked by anti-intellectualism, prizing ‘life’ over dogma. Yet, 
Mackay remarks, they were ‘forced to dogmatize’ to make clear their positions.100 From the 
formation of the journal Waarheid en Liefde in 1837, they expressed themselves in three 
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emphases: (i) the original Christ (a pre-Chalcedonian concept) is a pre-existent but not 
eternally equal person in the godhead; (ii) the church today is the ongoing realization of 
human potential as a community under the education of Christ; (iii) salvation is the education 
‘in heart and will and understanding’ within this community.101  
 
Their denial to address adequately the symbols of the patristic Christology led to an 1840 
lecture by Scholten, mentioned above, to label the Groningen school docetists. Their ideology 
expressed an empiricism that led away from doctrinal and philosophical intricacies and ‘back’ 
to the simple, original Christ for us. Accordingly, into the 1840s, while having a small 
readership, Kant, Hegel and the newer philosophies and theologies from Germany still had no 
prominent place in the Netherlands. Professor Nieuwenhuis, philosopher at Leiden, wrote 
that this was due to the fact that van Heusde was ‘unspeakably great… in literature and 
history, [but] he was not up to the mark—op de hoogte—in the philosophy of the nineteenth 
century’.102 The spirit of the movement was summarized accordingly: ‘It is not to the credit of 
our national Church that is should go for its spiritual milk and meat to Scotsmen and 
Englishmen, the French and the Swiss… And although there is no distinction before God 
between Jew and Gentile, let everyone remain as he is called: he who is called as a Dutchman, 
a Dutchman let him remain’.103 
 
At the same time, if there was a remnant of foreign influence in Groningen, it was 
Schleiermacher. Hofstede de Groot, Roessingh points out, especially understood ‘religion’ in 
the lineage of Schleiermacher. Groningen journal publications appropriated Schleiermacher’s 
concept of ‘feeling’ as a valued resource.104  While de Groot denies that Schleiermacher’s 
‘absolute dependence’ can exhaust the essence of religion, he formulates his own expression 
of the religious inner-life along these themes: the feeling of dependence, the feeling of 
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neediness, and the feeling of love (the additional two added to Schleiermacher’s ‘absolute 
dependence’ are ‘gevoel van behoefte’ and ‘gevoel van liefde’). 105  The Groningen theology, as 
Roessingh suggests, develops its ‘deeper understanding of the spiritual life’ as a ‘tribute to their 
knowledge of Schleiermacher’.106  
 
The importance of the Groninger School from the perspective of Bavinck’s development is 
two-fold. First, while relatively nationalistic, it also subtly introduced Schleiermacher and 
German philosophy into the Netherlands. Secondly, the Leiden or ‘Modern’ school of 
Scholten, in which Bavinck was directly educated, grew up in response to Groningen. Scholten 
was educated at Utrecht. He is the nephew of the progenitor of the Groninger School, van 
Heusde. He, in fact, lived with van Heusde in Utrecht. More than his uncle however, Scholten 
became comfortable traversing post-Kantian German texts and especially the German 
mediation theologians. Unlike the Groninger School, at the same time, he also identified with 
Genevan theology. In his novel approach, Reformed theology found its full coming of age in 
interaction with German idealism.107 
 
Between Utrecht and Leiden, Scholten was a minister in a rural Calvinistic setting to which his 
interest in Reformed theology is likely due. Although attracted to the Groninger theology 
through his reading of Waarheid in Liefde in his pastorate, he reacted to their apparent docetism 
and became a harsh critic. After a short lectureship at the University of Franeker (the state 
decided the institution would best serve as an asylum for mental illness) he left for Leiden in 
1844. The first edition of Scholten’s Doctrine of the Reformed Church was published only four 
years into his professorship at Leiden in 1848.108 Scholten’s doctrine was a hervormde theology 
whose self-proclaimed method was ‘reflection based on observation’ of the cosmos. 109  It 
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began methodologically with the concept of determinism and predestination, and was highly 
influenced by scientific discovery and empircism in order to form a doctrine of God.  
 
The central debate surrounding Scholten’s adaptation of the Reformed theological tradition 
concerned the formal and material principles of theology. 110  Scholten’s method was 
descriptive. He regarded the question of principles as an historical question. The Reformed 
confessions, he supposed, teach that the Bible is the formal principle of theology and God’s 
sovereignty the material in contrast to the material as justification by faith. His descriptive 
method and derivations had many critics. The Dutch Ethical school distinguished themselves 
from Scholten, for example, by removing principles from theology altogether. Upholding a 
two-principle system, it was proposed, concedes to the rationalistic-supernaturalistic 
disposition of old because these principles have little to do with the affections of the heart.111  
 
It is most significant nevertheless that Scholten’s Doctrine relied heavily on the work of 
Alexander Schweizer, the Swiss mediation theologian born in 1808 in Zurich. Schweizer, just a 
few years before Scholten in 1844 and 1847, published Die Glaubenslehre der evangelish-reformierten 
Kirche, a two-volume dogmatics in the spirit of his late teacher Schleiermacher.112 As Barth 
described him, ‘he was the type of theologian that approved of the union between traditional 
Christianity and modern culture’, a Vermittlung theologian.113 In his final work, Die christliche 
Glaubenslehere nach protestantischen Grundsatzen (1864-69), Schweizer declared his principal 
concern: to unveil the unity between the theological past and the modern mind as a natural 
development of thought.114 He rejected the inspiration of Scripture, the divinity of Christ, 
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amongst other doctrines. 115  But, in terms of influence, it was Schweizer’s declaration of 
predestination as Zentraldogma that Scholten appropriated.116 
 
In the spirit of Schweizer, Scholten reworked several similar doctrines. He, for example, 
introduced a distinction between the religious and historical work of the Spirit and denied the 
presence of any historical inspiration in the depiction of the events of Scripture. 117  He 
proposed, in the legacy of rationalism, that miracle stories, while acceptable on the grounds of 
religious import, must be natural occurrences mistaken as supernatural event per the scientific 
ignorance of previous generations. 118  Scholten separated fact from value with regard to 
Scripture, God’s acts from God’s word. Bavinck specifically criticized Scholten for this move:  
To apply the Kantian phraseology to a higher subject: without God’s acts the 
words would be empty, without his words the acts would be blind… Every 
attempt to explain the facts of revelation naturalistically has up until now 
therefore always ended with the acknowledgment that between the 
supernatural worldview of Scripture and that of naturalists there yawns an 
enormous gap and that reconciliation between them is impossible. Professor 
Scholten has produced a striking example of this reality.119  
 
In addition to Scholten’s adaptations of a number of Schweizer’s tendencies, he particularly 
adopted two unique moves: first, in his work, Reformed theology ‘[finds] its fulfillment in 
idealistic thought’. 120  Second, he developed a form of Calvinistic determinism which put 
sovereignty and election at the center and carries on, as Brouwer argues, a Spinozistic motif.121  
 
                                                 
115 Barth, Protestant Theology, 570. 
116 Rinse H. Reeling Brouwer, ‘Election’, in The Cambridge Companion to Reformed Theology, eds. 
Paul Nimmo, David Fergusson (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), 55. 
117  Hans Schwarz, Theology in a Global Context: The Last Two Hundred Years (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2005), 74. 
118 J. H. Scholten, Supranaturalisme in Verband met Bijbel, Christendom en Protestantisme (Leiden: P. 
Engels, 1867), 8ff. 
119 RD 1.366; Scholten, Het Evangelie naar Johannes (Leiden: P. Engels, 1864), III–VI. 
120 Berkhof, Two Hundred Years, 98. 
121 Brouwer, ‘Election’, 55. 
 
 103 
The publication of Scholten’s work signaled the entrance of the ‘Modern’ theology in the 
Netherlands which was derivative of the mediation theology movement in Germany ‘in which 
people heard the Latin modo (just now, today) or the late mediaeval via moderna (as opposed to 
the via antiqua)’. 122  The details regarding the content of both Schweizer’s and Scholten’s 
theology is not as important as is the fact that Schweizer was ‘arguably Schleiermacher’s most 
gifted student’.123 In searching for some rapprochement between Schleiermacher and Barth, in 
fact, McCormack turns to Schweizer as Schleiermacher’s representative in order to move 
‘beyond the impasse’ between Schleiermacher and Barth. Schweizer, he argues, is one 
Schleiermacherian who with Barth was ‘chewing on two ends of the same bone’ regarding the 
doctrine of election.124 
 
It is important to understand therefore that Scholten’s dependence on Schweizer is one of the 
initial indirect connections between Schleiermacher and Bavinck.125 It is the case, in other 
words, that the mediation theologies of Germany were one of the significant vehicles for 
bringing Schleiermacher into a Dutch context and then through the ‘Modern’ (Scholten) 
school at Leiden, Bavinck first came to significant study of Schleiermacher.  
 
2.1.d. A Foray into Vermittlungstheologie 
 
                                                 
122 Berkhof, Two Hundred Years, 98. 
123 Bruce McCormack, ‘The Sum of the Gospel: The Doctrine of Election in the Theologies of 
Alexander Schweizer and Karl Barth’, Toward the Future of Reformed Theology: Tasks, Topics, 
Traditions, eds. David Willis-Watkins and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 
470. Cited in Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 15. 
124 McCormack, ‘The Sum of the Gospel’, 493. 
125 In one instance, after stating that Schleiermacher subjected the doctrine of the Trinity to 
severe criticism, Bavinck in RD 2.295, fn. 82 cites Schleiermacher, Schweizer, and Scholten 
side by side to support his description of this critical lineage: F. Schleiermacher, The Christian 
Faith, §§170–72; cf. A. Schweizer, Die christliche Glaubenslehre nach protestantischen Grundsätzen 
dargestellt, §§103ff.; J. H. Scholten, De Leer der Hervormde Kerk in Hare Grondbeginselen, II, 238. 
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As much as Schleiermacher, Hegel, and German theology and philosophy in general 
dominated the nineteenth-century, German mediation theologians (Vermittlungstheologen) were 
some of the most widely read theologians in the first half of the century.126 In the midst of the 
Romantic movement, the defeat of Napoleon, theology’s participation in the turn to 
Wissenschaft, the mediation trend promoted a ‘living’ theology rather than mere static dogma, a 
solution to breaking down the dividing trench between supernature/nature (revelation and 
reason). In the second half of the nineteenth-century, their influence extended across the 
Western hemisphere even into the United States, as one 1884 magazine wrote: ‘It is 
undoubtedly true that German books and German ideas are influencing powerfully our 
schools of thought. … So, the works of Dorner, and of other younger Biblical and theological 
teachers in Germany, must be read by our students and clergy who would understand modern 
theology’.127  
 
Isaak Dorner was one of the most widely read mediation theologians alongside Richard Rothe, 
Auguste Twesten, C.I. Nitzsch, Schweizer, and Karl Ullmann—Ulmann was a co-founder of 
the journal in which the trajectory of mediation theology was first encapsulated in the 
described mission: ‘wahre Vermittlung’ (true mediation) between Christianity and modern 
science in Theologische Studien und Kritiken founded in 1828.128  
 
                                                 
126 Bavinck offers a list of primary text sources he used, RD 1.397: C. E. Nitzsch, System of 
Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1849); August Twesten, Vorlesungen über die 
Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 2 vols. (Hamburg: F. Perthes, 1834, 1837); L. 
Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, trans. William Urwick (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871); J. P. 
Lange, Christliche Dogmatik, 3 vols. (Heidelberg: K. Winter, 1852); I. A. Dorner, A System of 
Christian Doctrine, trans. Rev. Alfred Cave and Rev. J. S. Banks, rev. ed., 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1888). Also see Annette G. Aubert, German Roots of Nineteenth Century American 
Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 15. 
127 Newman Smyth, ‘The Late Dr. Dorner and the “New Theology”’, The Century Illustrated 
Monthly Magazine 28 (May 1884 to October 1884): 779. Cited in A. Aubert, German Roots, 15. 
128 The journal was devoted to the reconciliation of Christianity and culture. Claude Welch, 
Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. I (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 1972), 269. 
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‘Mediation theology’, while interested in the reconciliation of Christ and culture, was so 
diverse that the title is simply a multi-faceted boundary marker.129 First among these marks is 
that most mediation theologians were appreciative students of Schleiermacher and Hegel who 
adapted the broad contours of their thought. Not one mediation theologian wholly adopted 
Schleiermacher and all were distinct from the so-called ‘confessionalists’. John Williamson 
Nevin at Mercersburg put it succinctly: ‘Schleiermacher, it is well known, left no school 
behind him, in the strict sense of the word. But he left behind him a vast number of prolific 
ideas, which have taken root in other minds’.130 Second, the consistent mediation-theological 
distinctive derivative of Schleiermacher is the adoption of idiosyncratic forms of 
Christocentrism. The doctrine of Christ is, in this case and for dogmatic rationality, a 
Zentraldogma, a principle from which all other doctrines must be deduced. 131  This 
Christocentrism is distinct from the Christocentric soteriological emphasis of earlier Reformed 
thought where Christ, while the center of theology, occupies a locus of theology amongst 
other loci. Christology, in this earlier form, is, perhaps, a central locus but not a central dogma. 
Muller explains the distinction between the Christocentrism of mediation theology and Christ-
centered Reformation theology:  
Neither the theology of the Reformers nor the theology of their successors 
was “christocentric” in the modern sense of identifying Christ as the 
fundamental cognitive principle for all doctrine—nor was their theology 
centered on the divine decree as a deductive principle—nor, indeed, did their 
doctrine of God provide a deductive basis for the other topics of theological 
system. The very method of their theology, the gathering of topics or loci 
                                                 
129 For a full treatment of the movement see Knut Ragnar Holte, Die Vermittlungstheologie: Ihre 
theologischen Grundbegriffe kritisch untersucht, trans. Björn Kommer (Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells, 
1965). John E. Wilson, Introduction to Modern Theology: Trajectories in the German Tradition 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 101–22; Matthias Gockel, “Mediating 
Theology in Germany,” in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology, ed. David 
Fergusson (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 301–18. 
130 John W. Nevin, preface to Antichrist; Or the Spirit of Sect and Schism (New York: John S. 
Taylor, 1848), 4. Cited in Aubert, German Roots, 36. 
131 A. Aubert, German Roots, 63, 66.  
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drawn out of their exegetical work, stands in the way of such models for 
theological system.132  
 
Third, mediation theologians are participants by degrees in a new epoch of progressive 
doctrine that is willing to do more than merely accommodate aspects of dogmatics to 
scientific development and a changing modern culture but also willing to re-write traditional 
Protestant doctrines. Such attempts are closely associated with the Romantic notion of the 
organic development of ideas in the progressive nature of the history of a developing human 
and spiritual consciousness as well as a longing for order, to put things into an ‘organic 
system’.133 Johannes August Wilhelm Neander, for instance, was widely known for the idea of 
the progressing, organic Geschichte.134  
 
Fourth, the mediation theologians are participants in the continuation of a pietistic trend that 
developed into a form of religious, experiential réveil (revival),135 which proclaimed the dictum: 
Nicht Lehre, sondern Leben (not doctrine, but life). 136  Even in some of the most dogmatic-
oriented mediation theologians like Schweizer, for example, dogmatics ought not be a static, 
cold presentation but ‘express living piety’, after the living piety of the late Schleiermacher.137 
Therein, they also embraced the culture of historical-critical studies, Wissenschaften, the 
developing authority of the hard sciences, a willingness to yield doctrine to other disciplines, 
as well as the need for an awakening of the feeling of dependence in Christ the redeemer and 
                                                 
132 Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed 
Orthodoxy;  Volume 1: Prolegomena to Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2003), 39. Also, Richard A. Muller, ‘A Note on “Christocentrism” and the Imprudent Use of 
Such Terminology’, WTJ 68, no. 2 (2006): 253–54. 
133 Aubert, German Roots, 63ff. 
134 Aubert, German Roots, 63, fn. 14. Also, Horst Stephan and Martin Schmidt, Geschichte der 
evangelischen Theologie in Deutschland seit dem Idealismus (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 
134–36. 
135 The ‘revival’ was a broad movement across Europe that included conservative, confessional 
groups like the one Kuyper participated in as well as mediation and liberal groups.  
136 Aubert, German Roots, 65. 
137 Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre, I.12. Cited in Barth, Protestant Theology, 571. 
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transformation of the heart. They were, as Barth put it, ‘standing in the middle’.138 Finally, the 
mediation theologians, like Schleiermacher, were not interested in emphasizing differences 
(unlike ‘confessionalists’) but offering a theology that drew together the Lutheran and 
Reformed, for example, in an eclectic, catholic consciousness.139  
 
Bavinck, the son of a secession pastor, entered his studies at Leiden under Scholten, the 
‘father of Modernism’ in the Netherlands. Although Scholten was past his prime when 
Bavinck arrived at Leiden, Bavinck nonetheless was encouraged by Scholten to read his 
Doctrine of the Reformed Church and Bavinck interacted with Scholten’s works considerably when 
he began to write the RD. Scholten exhibited many mediation characteristics but particularly a 
willingness to draw together disciplines in an eclectic theological method. As Berkhof 
suggests, in Scholten’s theology are the ‘echoes of classic German idealism… a strong sense of 
freedom reminiscent of Fichte is in the foreground; in the background is a determinism of 
spirit, a combination of Calvinistic predestination and Hegelian dialectic’.140  
 
It is, therefore, while studying at Ledien that under Scholten’s supervision Bavinck came to 
read the writings of the German mediation theology as primary sources. This deduction is 
evidenced in the fact that by the earliest days of his doctoral career (from 1880), the mediation 
theologians played an overwhelming role as Bavinck’s interlocutors in his earliest 
publications.141 It was under Scholten also, to be sure, that he engaged with Schleiermacher’s 
texts at the level of close, careful primary readings.  The central evidence for this fact is that 
Bavinck’s doctoral scriptie under the supervision of Scholten was entitled ‘A Succinct 
Demonstration of the Influence of Schleiermacher upon the Exposition of Holy Scripture’.142 
                                                 
138 Barth, Protestant Theology, 571. 
139 Aubert, German Roots, 65-66.  
140 Berkhof, Two Hundred Years, 99. 
141 This is particularly so in ‘The Conscience’, and ‘The Kingdom of God, the Highest Good’. 
Both articles were published within a year of his graduation from Leiden.  
142 R. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten (Kampen: Kok, 1921), 23. 
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A brief series of notes taken on the subject remains in the Bavinck archive at the Vrije 
Universiteit in Amsterdam. While the scriptie itself is not available, the notes are likely provoked 
by a doctoral module Bavinck took at Leiden under a Prof. Prinse. He marks this occasion 
where he studied the ‘influence of Schleiermacher on the interpretation of H. Scripture’ in his 
journal on 28 March 1879. 143  Additionally, his doctoral dissertation uses Schleiermacher’s 
work on Christian ethics as a modern framework that introduced the revitalization of ethics 
and the need for re-visiting Zwingli’s ethics in the modern ‘today’.144 There, in one of his 
earliest works, he writes: ‘Schleiermacher’s powerful influence on the whole field of 
theological science is remarkable’.145  
 
Bavinck’s relationship to Scholten, further, reflects the duality that existed in nineteenth-
century Dutch life between the theologies in the NHK and Gereformeerde Kerken—a duality 
whose ancestry can be regressively traced into the Dutch Reformation. Prior to 1816 (at the 
pronouncement of the General Regulations), a theological formula produced by the Synod of 
Dordt (1619) mandated and demanded adherence to the Three Forms of Unity. ‘Future 
ministers had to promise by their signature that they “will diligently teach and faithfully 
advocate” this doctrine’ contained therein.146 In 1816, however, the vow changed: the new 
proponents’ formula required ministers to profess that ‘the doctrine, which, in agreement with 
God’s Holy Word, is contained in the accepted formulae of unity of the Netherlands 
Reformed Church’.147 The subtle shift from promising to teach with diligence to professing a 
generalized ‘agreement’ led to an 1841 synod wherein the NHK articulated more clearly that 
confessional writings do not necessarily agree with God’s Word per se and that ministers only 
need subscribe to a confessional ‘essence’. In addition to the bifurcation between the state and 
                                                 
143 H. Bavinck Archive, ‘Eene beknopte aanwijzing van den invloed van Schleiermacher op de uitlegging 
van der H. Schrift’, Historisch Documentatiecentrum, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, #346/298. 
144 Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli (Kampen: G.Ph. Zalsman, 1880), 1.  
145 Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli, 1.  
146  Karel Blei, The Netherlands Reformed Church: 1571-2005, trans. Allan J. Janssen (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 61-62. 
147 Blei, Netherlands Reformed Church, 62. 
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secession church, the NHK itself was divided, at least from 1841, in such a way that Blei 
describes the nineteenth-century situation of the Dutch churches as one of ‘emerging conflict’ 
between multiple schools of ‘moderns and [the] orthodox’.148 
 
Bavinck’s decision to study at Leiden in 1874 and under Scholten by 1876, rather than at the 
secessionist church seminary in Kampen where he had been for the previous year, locates him 
as a premier example of the modern/orthodox conflict embodied in a singular person. The 
orthodoxy of the secession church had come to study under ‘The Modern School’ of 
Scholten, a school forged in the crucible of van Heusde and German mediation theology, and 
therefore, students of Schleiermacher. Bavinck’s explanation to his family and secession 
society was that he desired ‘to become acquainted with modern theology firsthand’ and to receive 
‘a more scientific training than the Theological School [at Kampen] is presently able to 
provide’.149 Bavinck’s studies at Leiden were the first evidence, as Bolt rightly suggests, of ‘his 
willingness as a theologian to engage modern thought and science seriously’.150 They were, 
additionally, the location of significant engagements with Schleiermacher in the life of the 
young theologian. Significant they must have been, for he decided to write on Schleiermacher 
in his doctoral scriptie and to use him to frame his doctoral dissertation on Zwingli. 
 
The narrative, however, is made more complex when attention is given to his father, Jan 
Bavinck. There is evidence that it was not simply at Leiden that Bavinck was exposed to a 
positive adoption of theological modernities and their emphases but already in his secessionist 
home. While the traditional narrative of Jan and Herman is that between a ‘secessionist 
pietism’ that hated modernity and a boy slowly breaking from the mold of his father, Jan 
diversifies the picture of secessionist pastors and complicates the narrative of a modern-
                                                 
148 Blei, Netherlands Reformed Church, 61. 
149 R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten, 20; cf. V. Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck, 30. 
Cited in Bolt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, RD 1.12. Emphasis added. 
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orthodox duality in his 1868 article for De Getuigenis (The Witness magazine) on the concept of 
God drawn from Scripture. Jan argues:  
It is undeniable that a fiery desire is present in the human spirit (geest) to know 
who and what God is. We are of God’s lineage and, therefore, no thoughts are 
nearer to us than the thoughts of God. God-consciousness is ours as is self-
consciousness. As soon as the latter in us begins to awaken the former is felt too. And that 
consciousness is so deeply printed in our spirits (geest) that no one is able to 
fully pluck it out and eradicate it. Therefore we are especially distinguished 
from the irrational creatures and we are driven again and again to search for 
God or we also might grope and find him… God is thus an infinite essence, 
an Absolute Spirit, gifted with self-consciousness and freedom.151  
 
Bavinck was fourteen years old when his father wrote this piece which implicitly draws from 
Hegel (Absolute Spirit) and, more significantly, from Schleiermacher’s joint concepts of God- 
and self-consciousness for developing a doctrine of God. The point is, perhaps, that Bavinck’s 
departure for Leiden and his attraction to the scientific, liberal environment that would 
develop into a fascination with Schleiermacher was precipitated in his childhood home. This 
detail disturbs the biographical narrative offered in Hepp’s biography of a father and secession 
environment that was dominated by an ‘anti-cultureele strooming’ (anti-cultural current).152 
 
Additionally, in affirmation of Bavinck’s growing relation to Schleiermacher during his time at 
Leiden, he once returned to Kampen in 1875 to listen to his self-proclaimed favorite lecturer, 
Adriaan Steketee. Bavinck was twenty-one years old when Steketee gave a lecture entitled ‘De 
Studie van Plato, met het Oog op de Theologische Vorming’ (‘The Study of Plato with an Eye to 
                                                 
151 Jan Bavinck, ‘Iets over het Godsbegrip volgens de Heilige Schrift’, De Getuigenis (1868-69), 
7-28, 7, 15. Original: ‘Ook valt het niet te ontkennen, dat een vurig verlangen in den 
menschelijken geest aanwezig is, om te weten, wie en wat God is. Wij zijn van Gods geslacht 
en daarom ligt ons geene gedachte nader, dan de gedachte aan God. Het Godsbewustzijn is 
ons zoo eigen, als het zelfbewustzijn; zoodra het laatste in ons begint te ontwaken, laat het 
eerste zich ook gevoelen, en dat besef is zoo diep in onzen geest gedrukt, dat niemand in staat 
is dien trek volkomen uit te wisschen en uit te roeien. Daardoor vooral zijn wij onderscheiden 
van de redelooze schepselen, en worden wij telkens aangedreven om God te zoeken, of wij 
Hem ook mogen tasten en vinden… God is alzoo een oneindig Wezen, een absolute Geest, 
met zelfbewustzijn en vrijheid begaafd’. 
152 Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck, 14.  
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Theological Formation’).153 Later, in 1914, Bavinck recounts in his foreword to Steketee’s 
Contemplations of a Christian Thinker his relationship to Steketee in some detail. He states that in 
1873-74 after his time at the gymnasium in Zwolle, he wanted to go to Leiden immediately to 
study modern theology but his parents wanted him to stay home for one year in Kampen 
since they had just moved there. But when Bavinck arrived at Leiden, he needed help in some 
of his courses at Leiden so he turned to Steketee at Kampen who had been appointed lecturer 
in classical languages in 1872. Bavinck recounts getting lost in conversation on many nights 
with Steketee and that he found the highest joy in those days in Steketee’s company. For that 
reason, he, like he did often, went to Kampen in 1875 to hear his favorite teacher.154 
 
In his lecture, Steketee was critical of the overwhelming use of Aristotle’s philosophy as the 
primary grammar of Christian theology in history. In contrast, Steketee argues, ‘we will do well 
then if we are willing to learn from a most famous Platonist and theologian of Germany… we 
mean Schleiermacher’. 155  Schleiermacher re-applied Plato’s ‘neglected method’ 
(veronachtzaamde). Bavinck, in a journal entry on Dec. 15, 1875, recounts that he went to 
                                                 
153 It was then published: De Studie van Plato, met het Oog op de Theologische Vorming (Kampen: G. 
Ph. Zalsmen, 1875); thanks to James Eglinton for discovering this resource.  
154 H. Bavinck, ‘Ter Gedachtenis’, in A. Steketee, Beschouwingen van een Christen-Denker (Kampen: 
J.H. Kok, 1914), v-ix. ‘‘Het was in de jaren 1873, '74. ‘Ik had den gymnasialen leertijd achter 
den rug, en koesterde eene sterke begeerte, om in Leiden mijne studie voort te zetten en met 
de moderne theologie van nabij kennis te maken. Maar mijne ouders waren toen pas naar 
Kampen verhuisd, en drongen erop aan, dat ik althans voor een jaar thuis zou komen en mij 
als student aan de Theol. School zou laten inschrijven… In mijne verlegenheid wendde ik mij 
toen om raad tot Doe. Steketee, die door de Synode van 1872 tot docent in de klassieke talen 
aan de Theol. School was benoemd, en hier al spoedig door zijne breede ontwikkeling, rijke 
kennis en vriendelijke welwillendheideen uitstekenden naam hadverworven… en als ik de 
vacanties in Kampen doorbracht, bestond er voor mij al geen grooter genot, dan om een 
avond in Steketee's gezelschap door te brengen en te genieten van zijn rijken geest.’ 
155 Steketee, De Studie van Plato, 21. The full quote: ‘Gaarne zullen wij dan willen leeren van een 
der beroemdste Platonisten en theologen van Duitschland, die de veronachtzaamde methode 
op Plato toepassend, door een gelukkig geslaagde indeeling der boeken, de studie er van een 
reuzenschrede vooruit hielp, wij bedoelen van Schleiermacher; alsmede van andere geleerden, 
die zijn spoor volgden’. 
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Kampen to listen to a ‘schoone rede’ (beautiful lecture) by Steketee. 156  While engaging with 
Schleiermacher at Leiden, Bavinck came to Kampen to hear his favorite lecturer engage with 
Schleiermacher appreciatively. Steketee complicates the sharp seceder-modern theological 
antithesis. He, like Jan Bavinck, was a forerunner to H. Bavinck, adopting Schleiermacher in 
mild form but, more notably, pushing against aspects of his tradition in affirmation of 
Schleiermacher’s sensibilities.  
 
2.1.e. Mediation Theology and the Ethical 
 
Although in opposition to Scholten, Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye, a French-Dutch 
Reformed pastor and theologian in the Netherlands, also returned to Reformed theology. He 
argued that the Reformation was a Levensrichting, a living religious and ethical movement that 
offered a ‘life’ persuasion (the term ethical is derivative of ethische and the conceptual range 
extends both to the moral and existential nature of religion as ‘living’, a movement of the 
heart). Questions of authority and principles come second. God-consciousness comes first.157 
The language echoes its source: the Ethical theology in the Netherlands found its inspiration 
in the German Vermittlungstheologie generally with its roots in the theology of Schleiermacher 
foremost.158 Chantepie de la Saussaye, Bavinck writes, ‘counts himself among the great party 
(groote partij) of the so-called mediation theologians’. 159  His theology grew in prominence 
between 1850-1870 and Johannes Hermanus Gunning, his pupil, was a popular lecturer in The 
Hague, Amsterdam, and Leiden up to the twentieth century.  
 
                                                 
156 H. Bavinck Archive, ‘Ex animo et corpore. H. Bavinck. Theol. stud. 1874-79’, Vrije Universteit 
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157 Mackay, Religious Thought, 95. 
158 Berkhof, Two Hundred Years, 105. 




The famed Swiss professor Alexander Vinet (1797-1847) who was responsible, Bavinck 
argues, for a theological method Bavinck labeled the ‘ethical-psychological’, a method 
particularly associated with an existential apologetic, influenced Chantepie de la Saussaye in 
the Netherlands foremost. So, Bavinck describes Vinet: ‘though Vinet for his part did not 
spurn the historical proofs, he attaches greater value to the internal evidence [of Christ]. He 
wants the apologist to take the ethical road, commending Christianity to the human 
conscience from the side of its ethics as embodying true humanity’. 160  Vinet, the ‘living 
example of spiritual Christianity’, was exceedingly popular and well admired by figures like 
Victor Hugo.161 He, among others, took over Vinet’s method but ‘with the neglect of and 
sometimes even disdain for the historical proofs’.162 The most important point, however, is 
that Vinet’s interests especially and consistently pertained to the concept of the human 
conscience. He wrote Essai sur la conscience in 1829 emphasizing human action and the process 
of perfection: ‘in morality man cannot comprehend anything short of perfection and in the 
conscience every incomplete sense [of perfection] is non-sense… The only possible perfection 
is progress—progress which knows neither limit nor cessation’.163 He emphasized both the 
freedom of conscience from political tyranny and the possibility of a renewed, righteous 
conscience in the unity of humanity with God in Christ.164 
 
The Ethical theology in the Netherlands first went public in direct response to Scholten’s 
1848 publication of Doctrine. That was, however, after Chantepie de la Saussaye had been 
educated by Groningen influenced theologians who were working at Leiden. Most 
importantly, through van Oordt, he came to know something of the organic knowing of 
                                                 
160 RD 1.537. Vinet, L’Evangile compris par le coeur, Discours, 6th ed. (Paris: Ches Les Èditeurs, 
1862), 29–41; ‘Le regard’, Etudes Evangéliques (1847); J. Cramer, Alex. Vinet (Leiden: Brill, 1883), 
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161 Laura M. Lane, The Life and Writings of Alexander Vinet (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1890), v. 
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Writings of Alexander Vinet, 221. 
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theological science (het organisme kennen der theologische wetenschap).165 Chantepie de la Saussaye, 
who became the French Reformed pastor in Leiden, published a series of articles titled 
‘Appraisal of Scholten’s Doctrine of the Reformed Church’. His thesis, ‘the truth is ethical’, 
was rarely understood (Scholten included amongst the guilty), usually being associated with an 
attempt to totalize morality in a post-Kantian form.166 He, however, was committed to the 
project of mediation between confessionalist orthodoxy and the modernism of both 
Groningen and Leiden with an emphasis on the relation between Christ and the conscience. 
In response to Leiden, he wanted to maintain a willingness to be confessional. Against 
Groningen, he wanted to assert that the modern, personal consciousness demands the same 
existential needs that human nature always has had, but whose arousal extends beyond the 
possibility of education: the satisfaction of the human heart.167  
 
The needs of the human heart are first to be identified in the speech of conscience, which 
asserts the demands of the ‘ought’ upon the ethically impaired ‘is’ of this world. Jesus Christ is 
the mediation of the crises of fact and value, ‘is’ and ‘ought’. In Him, is the reconciliation of 
Sollen und Sein. 168  Chantepie de la Saussaye’s indebtedness to Schleiermacher and the 
Vermittlungstheologie is most apparent in the organization of his existential-theological emphasis 
entirely through the Christocentric union between God and humanity and his development of 
the concept God-consciousness as the ethical (existential) appropriation of Christ’s 
reconciliation of God and the ethical order (moral). 
 
It is not a coincidence that Bavinck’s first publication after his doctorate was an article on the 
conscience (Het Geweten) published in De Vrije Kerk in 1881. Although he does not directly 
reference Chantepie de la Saussaye, the footnotes reveal his source. His interlocutors include 
Richard Rothe (also interested in the conscience), Heinrich Friedrich Theodor Ludwig Ernesti 
                                                 
165 Bavinck, De theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye, 2.  
166 Berkhof, Two Hundred Years, 106. 
167 Berkhof, Two Hundred Years, 107.  
168 Berkhof, Two Hundred Years, 107. 
 
 115 
and Jacob Isaak Doedes, amid others. Rothe studied directly under Schleiermacher at Berlin 
and was a leading mediation theologian in Germany. Ernesti was a pastor and student of 
Friedrich Lücke, Schleiermacher’s colleague at Berlin. Schleiermacher’s Letters to Dr. Lücke 
remain an important hermeneutical tool for reading both OR and CF through 
Schleiermacher’s own comments regarding his work.169 Lücke was also a leading mediation 
theologian in Germany after Schleiermacher’s death. Doedes was an Utrecht theologian from 
1859 who, in Bavinck’s own words, was especially influenced by post-Kantian critical 
epistemology: Doedes judged ‘that in reference to God and divine things, strictly speaking, 
knowledge is not possible; and consequently, he made a sharp distinction between believing 
and knowing’.170 
 
The Ethical theology of Chantepie de la Saussaye exposed Dutch theology to the German 
mediation tradition in a more substantial way than had been present in the Netherlands prior. 
This is due, per Bavinck’s assessment of him, to his dissatisfaction with the Dutch theological 
scene: 
De la Saussaye was an amiable personality, a deep thinker, a powerful 
preacher. None of the existing schools could fully satisfy him. The Réveil was 
not sufficiently theological, the Groningen School had too little of philosophy, 
the orthodox tendency was lacking in scientific spirit, the Modern Theology 
saturated with unbelief. He looked about for something different and better, 
which finally he discovered in the German Vermittelungstheologie of Nitzsch, 
Twesten, Müller, Dorner, Rothe and others.171 
 
Bavinck graduated from Leiden with his doctorate in 1880. He began a lectureship at the 
Kampen Theological School a little more than a year later. Besides his dissertation on Zwingli, 
his first book length treatment came in 1884 as a short work on Chantepie de la Saussaye: De 
theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye: Bijdrage tot de kennis der Ethische Theologie. 
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Although it was ultimately a critique of Chantepie de la Saussaye foremost, the text was an 
appreciative description. Bavinck’s critical remarks were measured and his estimation of 
Chantepie de la Saussaye high. As he would later write: 
De la Saussaye’s significance for the history of Dutch theology should not be 
underestimated. For many he has become a rich blessing by his powerful and 
attractive preaching. He opposed intellectualism and empiricism with all his 
might, set forth clearly the darkening influence of sin, and emphatically argued 
the necessity of regeneration for attaining to knowledge of the truth. He had 
the advantage of the Utrecht Theology in this, that he felt absolved from the 
duty of demonstrating the claims of his faith on the basis of a broad and 
unstable Apologetics, and could appeal directly to conscience in man over against the 
Moderns also.172 
 
Herein, Bavinck unveiled his own appreciation for the emphasis on the reality of conscience 
that helped break the tradition of what he called ‘dead conservatism’ built upon an ‘unstable 
apologetic’. In his introduction, Bavinck proposes that his reason for writing a book on 
Chantepie de la Saussaye and the Ethical school is that amongst the ‘normal/standard-
reformed’ (geijkt-gereformeerde), or the confessionalists, there exist ‘strange images’ (vreemde 
voorstellingen) of him which must be ‘set clearly in the light’.173  
 
Throughout Bavinck’s dogmatic corpus, additionally, Chantepie de la Saussaye is used for 
constructive purposes on numerous occasions. Bavinck expresses the fact that Chantepie de la 
Saussaye was his teacher, especially as it pertains to reflection on religion in his Lehrbuch der 
Religionsgeschichte.174 He, in addition to Adolf von Harnack, was one of Bavinck’s chief sources 
for re-constructing the history of religion. In his reflections on revelation and world religions, 
for example, he borrows the following observations, which are more constructive assessment 
than historical fact. Regarding idolatry Bavinck adopts Chantepie de la Saussaye’s definition: 
‘idolatry, taken in its broadest sense, is born of the human need for a God who is near’.175 But, 
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apart from his historical work, in the most appreciative of quotes, Bavinck offers his gratitude 
for what Chantepie de la Saussaye and the Ethicals have reminded Dutch theology:  
This whole ethical trend in religion and theology deserves our appreciation to 
the degree that, over against all intellectualistic and mystical underestimation of 
the moral life, it again pointed out the intimate connection that exists between 
religion and morality. That connection is immediately evident from the fact 
that religion itself is a moral relationship. Religion is indeed based on a 
mystical union between God and humanity; however, it is not itself a 
substantial but an ethical union between human beings and their God.176 
 
Nevertheless, while Bavinck was sympathetic to the mediatorial attempts by Chantepie de la 
Saussaye and the German mediation theologies in general at the reconciliation of orthodoxy 
and modernity, faith and science, confession and creativity, morality and religion, he situates 
himself in an alternative ‘school’ in his essay on ‘Recent Dogmatic Thought in the 
Netherlands’. The ‘Reformed Tendency’, so-called, is found in those who remained steadfast 
to the ‘spirit’ of the Reformed faith of old. These include on the one hand the ministers and 
people of the secession and on the other Kuyper’s Doleantie with whom he fought for a merger 
accomplished in 1892. He critiqued Chantepie de la Saussaye’s attempts to do precisely what 
he perceived as common amongst attempts at mediation: to re-write dogmatic formulations 
under the guise of simplification, development, or update in such a way that undermines the 
power and catholicity of Christianity.  
 
Bavinck, for example, argues that Chantepie de la Saussaye undermined the work of Scripture 
through his argument that biblical authority pertains to the moral-existential register alone 
against the historical and its status as unique means of grace. This however, Bavinck argued, 
separates being (Divine authorship) from action (its power to change the subject). Authority, 
Bavinck replies, cannot merely be asserted through the power of the text to move or awaken 
the consciousness toward action. It must precede such subjective-oriented power and reside in 
the authority of the being of the speaker. The first question is ‘who is the Christ’?177 Rather 
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than promoting Scripture, Chantepie de la Saussaye has contributed to what Bavinck called 
elsewhere the ‘non-necessity of Scripture’ that he first associates with Roman Catholicism on 
the one hand and Schleiermacher on the other.178 But above all, theologically, Bavinck argues, 
the Ethical theology’s reductionistic tendency forces an alternative definition of deity: 
Following in the footsteps of Schleiermacher and Rothe, they elevate morality—
as the triumph of the human mind over nature—to the level of an absolute 
power and as a result base dogmatics on ethics. In the Netherlands de la 
Saussaye was the talented representative of this trend and in virtue of this 
principle posed the demand that Christian dogmas should not be further 
developed metaphysically but be revised and deepened ethically… [and later 
‘ethical theologians’] started to describe religion as dedication to the moral ideal, 
as pure morality. Here God was not just reduced to the good, but the good was 
elevated to the rank of deity so that there was not only talk of an ethical 
pantheism but also for a time of an atheistic nuance among the modernists.179 
 
Chantepie de la Saussaye de-emphasized the dogmatic enterprise as propositional knowledge 
about God for the sake of expanding what might be called the practical-existential telos of 
religion. This resulted in, Bavinck argues, not an anti-metaphysical form of theologizing but a 
new metaphysic—yet a metaphysic at the expense of classical conceptions of God. With 
Schleiermacher, he shared the emphasis that the end of the disciplines of theology is to enable 
the practical.  
 
The historical development, nevertheless, is here to prepare the reader for the demonstration 
that in his early career Bavinck’s texts consistently exhibit an appropriation of the most salient 
themes of mediation theological trends. First, is Bavinck’s idiosyncratic ‘turn to the subject’. 
And in accompaniment is an emphasis on consciousness, feeling, conscience, and dependence. 
Such themes were first introduced to Bavinck through the works of German- (and Swiss) 
influenced Dutch theologians like Scholten and Chantepie de la Saussaye. By the time of his 
graduation from Leiden, Bavinck interacted most consistently with German sources from the 
mediation tradition directly and, therefore, the motifs of a Schleiermacherian lineage became 
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embedded in Bavinck’s early texts (Ch. 3). Van Deursen also suggests that ‘Bavinck was not 
averse to consulting ethicalist theology and garnering there whatever suited him… [He] had 
always had an aversion to that word [conservative], at times that must have made his life as a 
Reformed theologian difficult’.180 In addition to his work on Schleiermacher at Leiden in both 
his doctoral scriptie, dissertation, and his interest in the mediation theology of the Ethicals, 
Bavinck’s article in Kampen on the conscience was likely provoked by a course he took at 
Leiden that examined the theme of conscience, De leer het van het geweten, dated to 1878. He 
makes basic notes on the history of the concept, moving from its use in the canonical and 
apocryphal Old Testament, in Greek and Roman contexts, in the New Testament, from the 
church fathers to the scholastic theologies, in the Reformers, in modern philosophy, and in 
the ‘science’ of ethics. His essay follows a similar historical development pattern (see Ch. 3).181  
 
2.2. Bavinck and Kuyper 
 
One has yet to acquire a complete picture of the context of Bavinck’s development and the 
context of his early encounters with modern thought without consideration of his relationship 
to Abraham Kuyper. A central argument of Eglinton’s examination of Bavinck’s organic motif 
is, in fact, to show that the relationship between Kuyper and Bavinck is the focal point of 
Bavinck’s derivation and development of the motif.182 One cannot speak of the neo-Calvinist 
context without naming both Kuyper and Bavinck, but Kuyper’s name is to be spoken first. 
He was the personality of the neo-Confessional movement and the catalyst of the union of the 
Gereformeerde Kerken and the Doleantie in 1892. He was the leader of the anti-Revolutionary 
party, the Dutch parliamentarian, the prime minister, and the public face of what came to be 
known as the neo-Calvinist movement. He was also seventeen years older than Bavinck and 
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the founder of the institution in which Bavinck would finish his career, the Vrije Universiteit.  
 
Yet, despite Mackay, who referred to Bavinck as ‘Kuyper’s loyal and learned henchman’, their 
differences must not be ignored and have recently begun to gain attention. 183  The most 
considerable examination of Bavinck’s independence from Kuyper is found in Bolt’s 
published dissertation, The Imitation of the Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman 
Bavinck, although Bolt’s treatment is largely with regard to the subject matter of his study. Syd 
Hielema’s conclusion from his 1998 dissertation remains true: ‘no consensus exists concerning 
how Bavinck’s theology differs from that of Kuyper… partly because careful, in-depth 
analysis remains to be done’.184 Jon Stanley attempted to overcome the ‘overshadowing’ of 
Bavinck by addressing his and Kuyper’s distinctive constructions of the relation between 
nature and grace, a reading that he drew from Hielema. The difference, he argues, is that 
Bavinck’s idea of ‘restoration’ includes an eschatological element that is not present in the 
‘creational’ accounts of Kuyper and later neo-Calvinists. The eschatological pertains to a 
‘spiral’ upwards, the elevation of nature in its relationship to the vertical. Stanley’s point, 
however, is not to give close attention to this reading but to recommend that one ask ‘whose 
neo-Calvinism?’ in stepping into the future of Bavinck, Kuyper, and neo-Calvinist studies.185 
The recognition of diversity has been inadequate thus far, he supposes.  
 
And this study will not aid the project of assessing differences. The point here is that Kuyper 
and Bavinck both adopt the grammar of consciousness theologies and an emphasis on the fact 
of subjectivity from the German, romantic-idealistic philosophical motifs present in the 
nineteenth-century. Yet, Bavinck’s early corpus exhibits little direct interaction with Kuyper’s 
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works in general and conclusions cannot be drawn regarding the extent that Kuyper himself 
was key for Bavinck’s developments regarding this topic in his early career. As it pertains to 
the motifs surrounding the grammars of consciousness theologies, there is no published 
interaction with Kuyper until the mid to late 1890s after Bavinck’s own concepts had been 
developed and expressed at least in initial forms. Bolt classifies Bavinck’s early intellectual 
career as ‘relatively independent of Kuyper’ from 1880 until the merger in 1892.186 However, 
this is not to say Bavinck had little interaction with Kuyper in general and the exact nature of 
their early relationship remains unclear. Bavinck did have a Kuyper poster on his wall as a 
student. Yet, regarding the current motif, Kuyper’s most significant treatment of the relation 
of faith to self-consciousness appears in 1893-4 in his three-volume Encyclopedia of Sacred 
Theology.187 This publication is a decade after Bavinck’s earliest expressions of the relation 
between theology and subjectivity in the early 1880s.  
 
Before examining Bavinck’s corpus more closely, a brief foray into some of the most 
significant treatments of ‘self-consciousness’ in Kuyper is relevant. Much of Bavinck’s later 
expression of the relation between thinking and feeling as a type of certainty arising from 
religious feeling in immediate self-consciousness is indeed like Kuyper’s work in the 
Encyclopedia. While Bavinck does not make explicit dependence on Kuyper as his source on 
this point, it may simply be unstated. Kuyper and Bavinck consistently share frameworks and 
themes: the correspondence between subject and object, the search for the infinite, a radical 
emphasis on revelation as the key to unlocking the mysteries of existence, the ‘inner-self’, the 
ego (Ik), the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’, subjectivity and its relation to a general, inner revelation of 
God within the human consciousness. So, Kuyper: 
From the finite no conclusion can be drawn to the infinite, neither can a Divine 
reality be known from external or internal phenomena, unless that real God 
reveals Himself in my consciousness to my ego; reveals Himself as God; and 
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thereby moves and impels me to see in these finite phenomena a brightness of 
His glory. Formaliter, neither observation nor reasoning would ever have 
rendered service here as the principium of knowing. Without sin, this self-
revelation of the Divine Ego to my personal ego would never have been, even in 
part, the fruit of Theophany, or of incarnation, but would have taken place 
normally in my personal being...188 
 
Another way of expressing this idea is that God-consciousness and self-consciousness are one 
and the same in the prelapsarian life. Kuyper, Bavinck, and Johann Herman Bavinck (the 
nephew of H. Bavinck) regularly express an aspect of general revelation in the terms of a 
subjective, personal activity of God in the inner self that is, for the human agent, pre-
cognitive, a ‘knowledge’ of God as feeling that arises ‘in my personal being’ or ‘consciousness’ 
by nature. A detailed explanation of Bavinck’s account adapting both Calvin and 
Schleiermacher is found in Ch. 5. Regarding the human subject, it is only the concept ‘faith’ 
for Kuyper that can account for the union between the objective and immediate locales of 
consciousness. Only by faith, can one claim that the objective, daily experience of knowing 
oneself is based on a unity between ‘my’ mind and the world, including the body and its 
experiences. And it is noteworthy that neither God nor the ‘I’ in essence is approachable by 
observation. Thus, confidence in both God ans self is procured in a faith that arises naturally 
or according to a passive receptivity in relation to God’s activity. In other words, for Kuyper, 
God-consciousness and self-consciousness are given as gifts.   
 
Kuyper’s relation between self and the theological locus of revelation is derivative of his study 
of the problems within modern philosophies. Self-consciousness, Kuyper argues, is the 
recognition of the who by whom we say ‘I’. But the problem he perceived in modern 
epistemology is that a gap existed between the ‘I am thinking’ and the ‘I’ who thinks, between 
the representational life of the ‘I’ and the essence of the self. The perceived gap, in other 
words, is that there is no obvious mechanism for accounting for the fact that the Ik is not the 
                                                 
188  Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles, translated by J. Hendrick 
Devries (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898), 343–344. This translation includes aspects 
of all three volumes in one and is therefore a fragment.  
 
 123 
same as the activity and contents of thinking. This is to say, the self is not equal in identity to 
its representations. His definition and polemical account of the ‘inner ego’, therefore, is 
pointed directly to his reading of Descartes: ‘in the cogito ergo sum the logical fault has indeed 
long since been shown. The ego, which is to be proved in the sum, is already assumed in the 
premise by the cogito’.189 Kuyper’s central proposition is that one cannot account for the ego 
through any attempt at a logical discovery of its conditions, by discursive thinking, or in the 
desire to will the self—transcendental logic must give the bulwark of certainty to a simple faith 
in self. In other words, being precedes thinking; thinking does not produce being. 
Nothing but faith can ever give you certainty in your consciousness of the 
existence of your ego; and every proof to the sum, which you might endeavor to 
furnish by the exhibition of your will, or if need be by the revelation of your ill 
will, etc., will have no force of demonstration, except before all things else, on 
the ground of faith, the knowledge of your ego is established for yourself.190  
 
The ego is the reality that allows us to differentiate ‘ourselves’ from all others and stands, 
therefore, as the ground of the possibility of all investigation. Yet, it remains an 
‘unaccountable’ reality: ‘Self-consciousness, therefore, is an entirely unaccountable 
phenomenon in the life of the soul… On this self-consciousness hangs the subject that 
investigates, and without that subject no investigation is conceivable’. Therefore, ‘from this it 
also follows, that without faith you miss the starting-point of all knowledge’. 191  Self-
consciousness here does not refer to an objective self-consciousness, wherein one objectifies 
the self as an object of knowledge. Rather, Kuyper is speaking of an immediate self-
consciousness, an ever-present awareness of the ‘Ik’ that grounds all action. Faith, as a natural 
disposition, offers certainty in the mysterious reality of selfhood. Without such differentiation 
of self from others the subject who investigates cannot proceed in the life of individuation, 
conceptualization, judgment, or basic conversation. Faith is the bridge from phenomena to 
the noumenon: ‘This is even so true that we actually owe all our convictions of the reality of the 
                                                 
189 Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology, 131. 
190 Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology, 131.  
191 Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology, 130. 
 
 124 
object exclusively to faith’.192 
 
This faith is not ‘acquired faith’ according to inference and assent, akin to a knowledge of the 
history of redemption. It is, rather, a ‘given’. It is always present because God has granted it 
so. It is, therefore, that from which ‘we’ live and move and have our being and the locale by 
which we first ‘know’ God as the Absolute Being in differentiation from all other egos:  
Since we did not manufacture this faith ourselves, but God created it in our 
human nature, this faith is but the opening of our spiritual eye and the 
consequent perception of another Being, excelling us in everything, that 
manifests itself in our own being. Thus it does not originate after the Cartesian 
style from an imprinted idea of God, but from the manifestation of God in 
our own being to that spiritual eye which has been formed in order, as soon as 
it opens, to perceive Him and in ecstasy of admiration to be bound to Him. By 
faith we perceive that an eternal Being manifests Himself in us, in order to 
place Himself over against our ego, in the same way in which we discover the 
presence of light by our eye; but what this eternal Being is and what it 
demands of us, is not told us by faith, but by the innate knowledge of God, 
presently enriched by the acquired.193 
 
The faith or certainty of self is a gift of God arising in the immediate self-consciousness and 
with it, a correlate, faith arises in that which gives the self, an eternal Being. God is no object 
to be observed with respect to this type of faith, but there arises in self-consciousness an 
objectless certainty of the Absolute, which is an original work of God and a subjective aspect 
of God’s general revelation.  
 
Due to the association of self-consciousness and faith, Kuyper makes the perceptive 
distinction between self-knowledge and self-consciousness. One is supported in ‘the self-
knowledge of [their] own person by the self-consciousness of [their] ego’.194 Notice that these 
two ways of knowing the self are distinct. Self-knowledge refers to a type of self-examination 
that objectifies the contents of the self to the self in a reflective process. Self-knowledge 
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examines the experiences and potentiality of self. But this is only possible because of a prior 
‘knowledge’ (a given awareness) of the fact of being as ego in self-consciousness.  
 
Further, self-consciousness of one’s ego is the conceptualization of the subjective locale that is 
also immediately aware of God, in which one awakes to the non-autonomous starting point 
that conditions existence. And, in turn, self-consciousness of this conditional relation plays the 
primary role in the possibility of religion:  
The discovery, the perception of a mightier Ego, which is above and distinct 
from our own ego, is therefore the starting-point of all religion and of all 
knowledge of God. If we were not created after God’s image, this 
manifestation would affect us strangely and cause us fear; but since in virtue of 
our creation there is an affinity between our own ego and that other Ego 
revealing itself to us, the manifestation of that mighty Ego affects us 
pleasantly, it fascinates and satisfies us with a feeling of infinite rest. It appeals to 
us. And as all revelation finds its completion only in this, this appeal becomes 
at length a speaking to us.195 
 
Kuyper’s logic of conditional self-consciousness as that awareness of being in relation with 
God, or of a ‘mightier Ego’, is strikingly similar to Schleiermacher’s logic in CF §4 as 
explained previously in 2.1.a. Bavinck’s development of the relation of general revelation, self-
consciousness, and faith follows a similar logic. It is a logic that first appears however in the 
1880s throughout several articles and then in the RD of the 90s. The earliest texts suggest that 
Kuyper and Bavinck developed their theological-philosophy of subjectivity and revelation 
largely independent of one another in the 1880s. This claim is, admittedly, speculative. At 
least, it is unclear that there is any definitive correspondence. There is rare interaction with 
Kuyper in Bavinck’s early writing prior to the RD, which first appears in 1894, shortly after 
Kuyper’s Encyclopedia. In the RD, Bavinck gives credence to this independent supposition in a 
footnote. The subject matter in this quote pertains to the relation of faith and the certainty of 
the unity of self and world that is present, Bavinck proclaims, consistently in philosophies of 
the ‘modern times’:  
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Since then, these same ideas keep recurring among Christian theologians, also in 
modern times. The term faith is then applied to immediate knowledge of the first 
principles: to reliance on self, our perception and our thinking; to the 
recognition of the objective existence of the external world; to the mutual trust 
on which all of human society is built; to all that is known and done by intuition. 
In such a faith Schiller saw the guarantee of the existence of the new world that 
Columbus sought: “If it didn’t yet exist, it would now rise up from the waves.”196 
 
This quote is a brief example of a similar logic to that of Kuyper. But, the point regarding its 
origins is present in Bavinck’s footnote ten, which was originally included in the quote above 
and is reproduced here:  
I. Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, trans. Alfred Cave and J. S. Banks, rev. 
ed., 4 vols (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1888), I, 3, 33–168. J. P. Lange, 
Christliche Dogmatik, 3 vols. (Heidelberg: K. Winter, 1852), I, 342ff.; J. J. van 
Oosterzee, Voor Kerk en Theologie (Utrecht: Kemink, 1875–79), I, 94; A. 
Kuyper, Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: J. A. 
Wormser, 1894), II, 71ff.  
 
Bavinck, in referring to the presence of the logic of faith and self in ‘modern times’ provides 
citations of the writers to whom he is referring. They include Isaak Dorner (whose German 
publication date for Glaubenslehre is 1879), P. Lange, J.J. van Oosterzee, and Kuyper. Dorner, 
one of the most prominent of mediation theologians already treated in this chapter; Lange, a 
student of Schleiermacher and successor to Dorner as theologian at Bonn; Oosterzee, a Dutch 
professor at Utrecht and well-known preacher who studied Schleiermacher and, as Bavinck 
puts it, learned to include ‘the Christian consciousness among the sources of dogmatics’,197 all 
published their works on theology, self, and faith decades prior to the 1893-4 publications of 
the Encyclopaedie and Bavinck’s Prolegomena. The implication is that both Bavinck and Kuyper 
drew particularly from theologians in the tradition of Schleiermacher to develop the logic of 
faith, self, and revelation so-presented—a conclusion supportive of the previous claim that 
Bavinck especially learned Schleiermacher both indirectly and directly in his early career at 
Leiden.  
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What has the father of modern protestant theology in Berlin to do with the nineteenth-century 
codifier of gereformeerd theology in Kampen? The answer: much, in every way—at least per 
their relationship in the nineteenth-century Dutch academy. Schleiermacher’s impact upon the 
Netherlands, while slow to start, was consistent. It is especially noteworthy that despite the 
multiple bifurcations of modernist-oriented hervormde schools, the thread that unites them is 
their relationship to at least one of the emphases first inaugurated by Schleiermacher 
(Groningen: the feeling of dependence; the Modern school: Christocentrism as Zentraldogma; 
the Ethical: piety and practical theology). The German mediation theologies were the medium 
of travel between Schleiermacher and the Netherlands. And, in turn, Leiden was the context 
where the crucible of mediation theologies (the Groningen influenced professor van Oordt, 
Scholten, and Chantepie de la Saussaye) forged distinct mediation theologies for the 
Netherlands. After writing on Schleiermacher for his doctoral scriptie and contextualizing 
ethics according to Schleiermacher’s revitalization of the field in the modern era, Bavinck 
immediately turned to mediation theologians and the grammar of consciousness and 





The Kingdom, Conscience, and Consciousness: The Early 
Years 
 
According to the previous chapter, various modern theological schools in the Netherlands in 
the second half of the nineteenth-century mediated much of Bavinck’s indirect interaction 
with Schleiermacher’s motifs. Schleiermacher was a primary influence on both the Dutch 
Modern and Ethical schools after their interactions with the German mediation theologies. 
They became, in their own form, Dutch Vermittlungstheologen. Bavinck, while a committed 
student (and critic) of these schools, also became a student of Schleiermacher’s texts directly. 
During his doctorate, he paid special attention to Schleiermacher’s use of Scripture and his 
revitalization of theological ethics, and an openness to modern theologies is evidenced in 
Bavinck’s prior home life through his father, Jan, and in his favorite lecturer in Kampen, 
Adriaan Steketee. Consequently, apparent throughout Bavinck’s early career is the 
transmission of many of the emphases of the so-called ‘consciousness theology’ lineage into 
his own corpus.1  
 
                                                 
1  Bavinck, it must be said, was critical of the general dogmatic method amongst the 
theologians of consciousness, as he understood them. This quote epitomizes his reading of 
this tradition containing both agreement and disagreement: ‘Hence for dogmatic work 
personal faith is imperative. In that respect, the statement that every dogmatics is a confession 
of one’s own faith is perfectly true. But this is something very different from what, since 
Schleiermacher, has been understood by the theology of consciousness. For this theology denies 
that in nature or in Scripture there is a revelation that provides knowledge of God. It thus severs theology, 
and particularly dogmatics, from all its objective connections, robs it of its own object, and 
then tries nevertheless to build up a kind of dogmatics from the material of one’s own 
consciousness (mind, feelings, heart, conscience) without this being bound to anything 
objective’. RD 1.91. Emphasis added. 
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In consanguinity with the previous chapter’s establishment of that historical relation between 
Schleiermacher and Bavinck, this chapter completes part I of this study by examining 
selections of the textual evidence of his early corpus regarding the adoption of the 
centralization of the subject in his theological-philosophical discourse. As expressed 
historically in chapter two, the evidence of Bavinck’s early writings also suggests that Bavinck 
gave broad and consistent attention to the human subject, which is a tendency derived from 
the milieu of consciousness theologians first catalyzed in his time at Leiden and extended 
throughout the 1880s and 1890s. While interacting with the disciplines of dogmatics and 
theological ethics, his articles in the 1880s particularly are centered on the fact of self-
consciousness, the concept of ‘personality’ applied to both God and humans, the relation 
between sin and God-consciousness, the conscience and the inner-self, self-knowledge, the 
empirical/transcendental ego relation, and the epistemic modesty or self-understanding of the 
culturally situated dogmatician. Also, a turn to the subject is manifest more generally in (i) 
Bavinck’s categorizing the entirety of his thought-world into subjects and objects, (ii) 
emphatic proclamations of the subjectivity of each interpreter and the failure of 
‘presuppositionless’ science,2 (iii) and a corresponding emphasis on the ‘whole person’.3 This 
chapter, more specifically focuses on the adoption of consciousness-theological motifs, 
                                                 
2 See RD 1.37-46, 49-51, 69-70, 170-4, 421-2, 541-5. 
3 For example, points (ii) and (iii) combined in RD 1.43: ‘For it is impossible, just to mention 
an example, to base the sciences in general… on facts that are accepted as certain by all 
without distinction. It is precisely the facts about which there is immediately a difference of 
opinion; everyone observes them through his own eyes and his own pair of lenses. To the 
degree that the sciences lie closer to the center and cease to be merely formal, the subjectivity 
and personality of the scientific investigator play a larger role. It is totally futile to silence this 
subjectivity, to deny to faith, religious and moral convictions, to metaphysics and philosophy 
their influence on scientific study. One may attempt it but will never succeed because the 
scholar can never be separated from the human being. And therefore it is much better to see 
to it that the scientific investigator can be as much as possible a normal human being, that he 
not bring false presuppositions into his work but be a man of God completely equipped for 
every good work. To that end the knowledge that God has revealed of himself in his Word is 
serviceable; it does not hinder but rather advances scientific study and research’. 
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unfolding this fact in two movements to show only that Bavinck made his own, idiosyncratic 
‘turn to the subject’ in his early career.4 
 
(i) In interpreting the texts of his early corpus three specific claims arise pertaining to 
Bavinck’s use of Schleiermacher (first delivered through Schleiermacher’s progeny) and his 
adoption of consciousness emphases: (a) he consistently approaches Schleiermacher with an 
attitude of critical appreciation rather than mere demonization or exaltation; (b) his early 
theology adopts the conceptual grammar of modern theologies in its emphasis on the human 
subject; (c) his arguments betray an imprecise and more generalized adaptation of said 
conceptual framework of subjectivity rather than a precise interest in Schleiermacher’s direct 
arguments in particular. The final point, derivative from the content in claim (b), is the ground 
for the argument previewed briefly at the end of chapter one: that Bavinck’s early career, while 
influenced by Schleiermacher, contains a weaker degree of specific appropriation than does his 
later career corpus. His early corpus does indeed contain a ‘turn to the subject’ especially in 
the early 80s. It is not one, however, that offers an appropriation of Schleiermacher’s 
arguments directly but discloses an atmosphere effected by Schleiermacher’s progeny and his 
conceptual lineage. 
 
(ii) In second place is a subsequent and brief examination of Bavinck’s critique of 
Schleiermacher. And while launching from his early corpus, the critique need not remain 
limited to his early career due to the fact of its consistent form from the first to final editions 
of the RD amid his wider corpus. Entering into part II of this thesis, this brief elucidation will 
offer an interesting possibility achieved by way of negation—namely, that Bavinck’s interest in 
Schleiermacher lay in the centralization of the subject in theology/philosophy far more than in 
                                                 
4  The verb ‘turn’ does not indicate a reversal of a previous perspective but simply the 
development of an emphasis on subjectivity, as was the case in his broad philosophical milieu.  
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Schleiermacher’s material dogmatics.5 As previewed in the introduction, scientific theology 
arises when theological rationality develops a grammar derived from various philosophies. 
Bavinck appropriated Schleiermacher’s philosophical grammar most especially in his later 
corpus, but his early corpus does indeed contain a prophetic voice unto that end.  
 
3.1. The Subject and the Early Years 
 
In June of 1880, Bavinck defended his thesis on Zwingli’s ethics and remained in Kampen, 
where he had spent his final year as a student at home, to prepare for his theological 
examinations in the Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk. In the very same year, his early publications 
revealed a propensity for a vast engagement with modern theology and philosophy.  
 
While preparing for ordination, he published his first periodicals in the De Vrije Kerk including 
‘Het Geweten’ (The Conscience, 1881) and ‘Het Rijk Gods, het hoogste goed’ (The Kingdom of 
                                                 
5  Bavinck’s critique of Schleiermacher’s dogmas is extensive (see section 3.2 for the 
fundamentals). Brief examples include his complaints that Schleiermacher determines dogma 
to be above all else a ‘pronouncement and determination of the church’ (RD 1.30) rather than 
true speech about God, that ‘dogmas for him became accounts of subjective mental states’ 
(1.35), that he separates ‘dogmatics from apologetics’ (1.47), treats angels like ‘fairies and elves’ 
(2.446), subjects ‘the dogma of Trinity to severe criticism’ (2.195), treats original sin very 
differently ‘from what Scripture and the church says’ (3.116), thinks that the doctrine of 
Christ’s two natures ‘has lost all religious value’ (3.259), encourages the idea that ‘Christianity 
is no longer dependent’ on its founder (3.284), argues that ‘Jesus only appeared to be dead’ 
(3.440), confuses the Holy Spirit with a ‘community spirit’ (4.90), makes justification 
‘dependent on the new life in communion with Christ’ turning the act of God into a work 
(4.199), claims atomistically and without reference to the means of grace that ‘the church takes 
shape through “the coming together of regenerate individuals”’ (CF §115, RD 4.331), denies 
the ‘special calling to the apostolic office by Jesus’ (4.333), and ambiguously leaves ‘undecided 
what is primary and most important in the sacraments’ (4.471).  Further, Bavinck critiques 
Schleiermacher’s concept of redemption here: ‘though Schleiermacher adopted the 
terminology of the church’s theology and also took over the doctrine of the three offices, it 
soon became clear that at many points he deviated from the teaching of Scripture and the 
church, did not do sufficient justice to sin and the sense of guilt, and viewed redemption too 
one-sidedly from the aesthetic perspective as harmony with the world’ (3.354).  
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God, the Highest Good, 1881). 6  As constructive works, both engaged primarily with 
theologians like Rothe, Vinet, Chantepie de la Saussaye, and Dorner. These two essays, in 
addition to De Katholiciteit van Christendom en Kerk (The Catholicity of Christianity and the 
Church, 1888) and De Algeemene Genade (Common Grace, 1894), form the conceptual norms 
of Bavinck’s theology that remained consistent throughout his career. 7  Those theological 
concepts include much of what is presented directly in the titles: The Kingdom of God, 
common grace, conscience, and catholicity. He regularly attends, amid his theological 
construction, to the epistemic and the metaphysical. His early theology gives primary place to 
exploring the subjective implications determined by the fact of the objective kingdom.  
 
Accordingly, from the moment of his Leiden departure, he filters the logic of his constructive 
theology through the lens of a subject/object duality thereby consistently mapping his 
thoughts permitting the representational relation between self and world. He does so self-
consciously seeking conceptual unity as a theologian post-Kant.8 How does, for example, the 
Kingdom relate to the human self in its activity of unification? The logic of his argument is 
that a redeemed self is an organic microcosm and prime example of the objective, unified 
                                                 
6 Bavinck, ‘Het Geweten I-II’, De Vrije Kerk (Januari-Februari 1881), 1. 27-37; 2. 49-58. ET: 
‘Conscience’, trans. Nelson Kloosterman, TBR 6 (2015), 113-126. ‘Het Rijks Gods, het hoogste 
goed I-V’, De Vrije Kerk (April-Augustus 1881) 4.185-192; 5. 224-234; 6.271-277; 7.305-314; 
8.353-360. The English translation will be cited normally except when the translation needs 
alteration. In these instances, the citation will include both the original and English. 
7 Bavinck, De Katholiciteit van Christendom en Kerk: Rede bij de overdracht van het rectoraat aan de Theol. 
School te Kampen (Kampen: G.Ph. Zalsman, 1888). ET: ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the 
Church’, trans. John Bolt, CTJ 27 (1992): 220-251. Bavinck, De Algeemene Genade: Rede gehouden 
bij de overdracht van het rectoraat aan de Theol. School te Kampen op 6 December 1894 (Kampen: G.Ph. 
Zalsman, 1894). ET: ‘Common Grace’, trans. Raymond C. van Leeuwen, CTJ 24, no. 1 (1989): 
35–65. 
8 As he would later put it: ‘All that is objective can be approached only from the vantage point 
of the subject: the “thing in itself” is unknowable and does not exist for us. The world of 
sounds has reality only to those who hear; the world of ideas is real only to the thinking mind. 
It is futile to attempt to prove the objective existence of colors to the blind. All life and all 
knowledge is based on a kind of agreement between subject and object’. RD 1.586. This 
comment previews his argument for the centrality of faith in any account of the unity of self 
and world, which is part of the argument of chapter four. 
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Kingdom to come. Where is common grace? Common grace is first found in the fact of 
consciousness, where the self is the substratum of the possibility of all knowing and willing, of 
science, art, and ethics. How is Christianity catholic in scope? The catholicity of Christianity 
first penetrates, he argues, the human personality in its power to affect everything it touches 
before moving out from self to world.  
 
The persistent filtering of major theological concepts through the subject reflects the fact of 
his education in the idiosyncratic mediation theologies.9 The argument is not that these essays 
betray a particular adoption of Schleiermacherian theology or any particular mediation 
theology per se, but an appropriation of the key emphases of modern theologies (as he 
interpreted it), which were transmitted especially from Schleiermacher to his Dutch 
theological context—namely, a centralization of the human subject in a world-view of subject 
and objects, self and world. And, accordingly, one finds a surprising (for his secessionist 
context) repetition of interaction with Schleiermacher particularly in addition to the 
theologians of the mediation tradition throughout his early corpus. This fact leads to the first 
claim of this section. 
 
(a) He esteems Schleiermacher with critical appreciation without mere demonization or exaltation. The 
second periodical in his first year after the completion of his doctorate, ‘The Kingdom of 
God, the Highest Good’ was originally an oration to the Student Corps at Kampen in 
                                                 
9 Other scholars have made this point yet in a more limited form: Cornelius van der Kooi, 
‘The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit, Especially in H. Bavinck’, 107-108. Henk 
van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust, 294-8; ‘Religion as 
Revelation? The Development of Herman Bavinck’s View from a Reformed Orthodox to a 
Neo-Calvinist Approach’, TBR 4 (2013): 9-31. See also George Harinck, ‘The Religious 
Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion’, 62. S. Meijers also argues 
that Bavinck’s sensitivity to the role of the subject is distinct from other Reformed theologies 
in his tradition and derivative of the Ethical theology. S. Meijers, Objectiviteit en Existentialiteit: 
Een onderzoek naar hun verhouding in de theologie van Herman Bavinck en in door hem beinvloede 
concepties, 440-1, 446-7. 
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February of 1881 and published in multiple editions of De Vrije Kerk that summer. There are 
two points to highlight from that article that provide a starting point for this claim.  
 
The first is that Bavinck begins with the same observation regarding the discipline of ethics 
with which he began his dissertation on the ethics of Zwingli released just a year prior: ‘It is 
undoubtedly a heartening phenomenon that the science identified as Ethics seems to be 
enjoying an unheralded resurgence of interest, compared to former times’.10 In its earlier form 
in his dissertation, Bavinck adds an explanation for such resurgence:  ‘Schleiermacher, whose 
powerful influence on the whole field of theological science is remarkable, also gave moral 
theology a new direction and a higher path’.11 
 
This ‘higher path’, refers to the very point that Bavinck is building upon in this later essay: that 
ethics cannot be merely an account of the ought of human action, a description of duties per 
authoritative command (divine-command), but must include law and duty within a framework 
that recognizes a final cause, an ultimate good, and a corresponding character of virtue. This 
ethic moves the subject above the register of statutory law. Virtue is virtuous in the light of a 
clear conception of the (ultimate) good, the summum bonum. To treat ethics as reflection on 
obligation, duty, and action is to miss the purpose of human action. One must understand 
‘moral goods’ in their essence, he argues, and situate the science of thinking about right action 
within the given purpose of the moral—the realization of the Kingdom of God.12 It is to 
Schleiermacher, again, in this essay that he turns to as the modern foundation for the recovery 
of ‘moral goods’ and a corresponding doctrine of virtues:  
                                                 
10 Bavinck, ‘KGHG’, 133.  
11 In the second sentence of his dissertation on Zwingli he writes, ‘En Schleiermacher, wiens 
machtige invloed op het gehele gebied der theologische wetenschap merkbaar is, gaf ook aan 
de theologische Moraal eene nieuwe richting en eene hoogere vlucht’. Bavinck, De ethiek van 
Ulrich Zwingli, 1. 
12  The thesis of ‘KGHG’ glimpses the conceptual motifs which remain consistent for 
Bavinck’s theology throughout his career: ‘I shall proceed to share with you a glimpse of the 
glory of our catholic, Christian faith, as I speak to you about the Kingdom of God as the 




Perhaps the most influential theologian of the nineteenth century was 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, who was both deeply misunderstood and too highly 
esteemed. Yet it was he who identified that above-mentioned flaw in the 
earlier view of Ethics and ensured a fixed place in this discipline for the 
“doctrine of virtues” (Güterlehre). In this way he contributed a complete 
revision and an enduring benefit to the discipline of Ethics.13   
 
Yet even more important for the first claim is that Bavinck places Schleiermacher’s deserved 
reception within a dialectic of worth (‘deeply misunderstood and too highly esteemed’) that 
seeks balance between the two nineteenth-century extremes: demonization and exaltation. His 
polarizing construal and choice of a third way is derivative of the second point to be drawn 
from this essay. He offers a precise account of his estimation of Schleiermacher’s value 
through the citation of a secondary source. He writes: ‘For evaluating our perspective 
regarding Schleiermacher, one might find the article written about him by Nesselmann in Der 
Beweis des Glaubens 5 to be helpful’.14 Bavinck concedes basic agreement with R. Nesselmann, a 
German pastor at a St. Mary’s Church in an undisclosed German locale, and his 
‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung. Vorgetragen bei Schleiermachers Jubelfeier in der Aula des 
Elbinger Gymnasiums’ (Schleiermacher’s Appraisal/Valuation: Presented at Schleiermacher’s 
                                                 
13 Bavinck, ‘KGHG’, 134. Bavinck’s perception of the significance of Schleiermacher’s ethics 
anticipates contemporary scholarship. So, Hans-Joachim Birkner: ‘without a doubt, 
Schleiermacher’s philosophical ethics represents his most important achievement, and in the 
history of ethics constitutes a completely original project’. And Bavinck’s own adaptation of 
the history of summum bonum in correspondence to the modern emphasis on duty and 
command is central in Schleiermacher’s work: ‘One of Schleiermacher’s main goals as an 
ethical theorist is to integrate what he regards as the one-sided approaches of ancient and 
modern ethics—to bring together the teleological doctrines of good and virtue on the one 
hand with a deontological doctrine of duty on the other. As he notes in his Introduction to 
the Brouillon zur Ethik (1805/6): “With the ancients, the highest good and virtue; with the 
moderns, virtue and duty. These [latter] two are in opposition: if virtue is given, duty stops; as 
long as one must inculcate duty, virtue is not yet there” (WA II, 84; see also 256, 555)’. 
Birkner is cited in Robert Louden, ‘Introduction’, in Friedrich Schleiermacher, Lectures on 
Philosophical Ethics, ed. Robert Louden, trans. Louise Adey Huish (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), vii, 
ix.  
14 Bavinck, ‘KGHG’, 134, fn. 1.  
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Jubilee in the Auditorium of Elbinger Gymnasium), published in 1869. 15  Bavinck uses 
Nesselmann’s article to affirm a third way beyond demonization or exaltation. Nesselmann 
argues first that Schleiermacher, ‘a truly great man’, has taught ‘so much to so many’. Yet, 
‘because lesser people always assess a great man only in a small portion (because their horizon 
does not extend far enough) they judge the whole man subsequently per this small portion 
and, therefore, always judge him one-sidedly’. But, he argues, ‘Schleiermacher was so rare a 
talent that he protruded off the procrustean bed of every theological party like King Saul 
above his people, namely, by the height of his whole head’.16  
 
Nevertheless, he goes on, ‘we find [today] on the one hand a blind worship [of 
Schleiermacher]; on the other hand a thoroughgoing disrespect and in the middle a level-
headed, moderate appraisal’.17 He is recognized as a ‘gift from above’ (als Gabe von oben), as 
positively Christian, and yet an overly subjectivist ‘dowry of his age’ (Mitgift seines Zeitalters).18 
There is indeed an ‘excessive worship of him… [which] has gone too far, [in] that someone 
has proposed even a church service, a service of worship for him’.19 So Nesselmann urges: ‘I 
would like to allow myself to recall the words of Scripture: “You shall worship the Lord your 
                                                 
15  R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung. Vorgetragen bei Schleiermachers 
Jubelfeier in der Aula des Elbinger Gymnasiums’ in Der Beweis des Glaubens: Monatsschrift zur 
Begründung und Verteidigung der Christlichen Wahrheit fur Gebildete 5, eds. O. Andreae and C. 
Brachmann (January-December 1869), 103-115. 
16  R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung’, 104. Original: ‘Denn von einem wirklich 
großen Mann übersehen kleine Leute immer nur ein klein Stück, weil ihr gesichtkreis nicht 
weit genug reicht; aus diesem kleinen Stück beurteilen sie aber nachträglich den ganzen Mann, 
und beurtheilen ihn daher immer einseitig. Schleiermacher war von so seltner Begabung, daß 
er über das prokrustesbett einer theologischen parteistellung ebensomeit hervorragte wie 
König Saul über sein Volk, nämlich um seines ganzen Hauptes länge’. The comparison to 
King Saul is perhaps a pun pertaining to Schleiermacher’s intellectual stature in juxtaposition 
to his actual height, which is thought to be less than that of Saul. 
17 R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung’, 110. Original: ‘Wir finden auf der einen Seite 
eine blinde Verehrung, auf der entgegengesetzten vollständige Mißachtung und in der Mitte 
besonnene, maßvolle Werthschätzung’. 
18 R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung’, 110. 
19 R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung’, 111. Original: ‘Die maßlose Verehrung für 
ihn ist in dieser letzten Zeit so weit gegangen, daß man sogar eine kirchliche Feier, einen 
Gottesdienst für ihn beantragt hat’. 
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God and Him only will you serve’’. The house of God opened to honor a man—this 
excitement must not be desired’.20  
 
Yet, on the other hand: ‘in addition to the blind worship of Schleiermacherian theology, we 
encounter, but in more recent times, a more thorough disregard’.21 He characterizes F.C. Baur 
as the one with the grandest contempt for Schleiermacher. Nesselmann proclaims that both 
blind worship and the failure to see Schleiermacher’s value are equally myopic: ‘Baur is a 
biased historian who brings his preconceived opinion into the work of history… he speaks of 
all modern theologians contemptuously except for himself… this rejection of Schleiermacher 
has no sound, solid foundation’.22 
 
But for Nesselmann, there was a third way, a via media, which he called ‘moderate valuation’—
a ‘sober-minded prudence about Schleiermacher’. This agreement is found ‘amongst nearly all 
believing theologians’: 
That we are in grateful recognition of [Schleiermacher’s] highest spiritual gifts, 
of his deep Christian sense, that with his theology a new epoch has arisen, that 
he defeated the vulgar rationalism, and added to the recent strengthening of 
the consciousness of faith giving the first great encouragement; except that we, 
however, regarding the full appreciation of the essence and work of Christ do 
not agree with him and, therefore, must leave his idea behind necessarily.23 
                                                 
20  R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung’, 111. Original: ‘Da möchte ich mir doch 
erlauben, an das Wort der Schrift zu erinnern: “Du sollst Gott deinen Herrn anbeten und ihm 
allein dienen”’. 
21 R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermacher's Werthschätzung’, 111. Original: ‘Neben der blinden Verehrung 
der Schleiermacher'schen Theologie begegnen wir aber in neuerer Zeit auch einer 
vollständigen Mißachtung’. 
22  R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermacher's Werthschätzung’, 111-112. Original: ‘Baur ist 
Tendenzhistoriker, der eine vorgefasste Meinung in die Geschichte hineinträgt… Hier spricht 
er von allen neueren Theologen verächtlich außer von sich… daß diese Verwerfung 
Schleiermachers keine gesunde, solide Basis hat’. 
23  R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermacher's Werthschätzung’, 112. Original: ‘… die in dankbarer 
Anerkennung wie seiner hohen Geistesgaben, so seines tief christlichen Sinnes, eingeständig 
sind, daß in der Theologie mit ihm eine neue Epoche an hebt, daß er den vulgären 
Rationalismus besiegt und zu der neueren Kräftigung des Glaubensbewußtseins die erste 




Nevertheless, because of Schleiermacher’s deep commitment to Christ, even that which 
departed from the faith ‘has returned many to the faith’. ‘Schleiermacher’, he argues, ‘enjoyed 
a rich spiritual posterity. But many have departed from him, who, after, follow a different 
direction’.24 Even in finding a new route, however, they would ‘rarely lament’ his work and his 
deep piety because he led the people ‘to piety’. Most of all: ‘But this we may be permitted to 
say with full confidence: that no theology of such importance has arisen in recent decades. If 
he had not exercised his mental powers, then we would not have gotten from his studies such 
wide and expansive rays of hope’.25  
 
From Nesselmann’s comments and Bavinck’s affirmation of them, one is reminded of 
Bavinck’s fellow Reformed confessional dogmatician at Princeton, Charles Hodge (d. 1878), 
and his similar estimation of Schleiermacher’s value. In the second volume of Hodge’s 
Systematic Theology he comments on the ‘man of piety’: 
When in Berlin the writer often attended Schleiermacher’s church. The hymns 
to be sung were printed on slips of paper and distributed at the doors. They 
were always evangelical and spiritual in an eminent degree, filled with praise 
and gratitude to our Redeemer. Tholuck said that Schleiermacher, when sitting 
in the evening with his family, would often say, “Hush, children: let us sing a hymn 
of praise to Christ.” Can we doubt that he is singing those praises now? To 
whomsoever Christ is God, St. John assures us, Christ is a Savior.26 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Christi bei ihm noch nicht antreffen und daher über seine Anschauung nothwendig noch 
haben hinausgehen müssen’. 
24 R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung’, 113. Original: ‘Schleiermacher erfreute sich 
geistig einer reichen Nachkommenschaft. Viele sind aber von ihm ausgegangen, die nachher 
einer andern Richtung folgten’. 
25 R. Nesselmann, ‘Schleiermachers Werthschätzung’, 113. Original: ‘Aber das dürfen wir wohl mit 
Zuversicht sagen, daß kein Theolog von Bedeutung in den letzten Jahrzehnten aufgetreten ist, 
der nicht seine Denkkraft an Schleiermacher geübt, nicht aus seinem Studium weite und große 
Lichtblicke gewonnen hätte’. 
26 Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. II (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 440. His final 




Schleiermacher, Hodge argues, was the most ‘interesting’ and ‘important’ theologian of the 
nineteenth-century and, yet, ‘was not and could not be self-consistent… [but] reverence for 
Christ he maintained all his life’.27 Bavinck’s estimation of Schleiermacher in his all too brief 
comment ‘deeply misunderstood and too highly esteemed’, is an encapsulation of 
Nesselmann’s third way. Schleiermacher is neither to be demonized nor disregarded nor 
wholly adopted but something else: esteemed, appreciated, and carefully examined—a 
requirement of a Reformed catholic methodology. Bavinck, the chief dogmatician of the 
modern Dutch Reformed context therein, shared the same opinion regarding Schleiermacher 
as Hodge, the chief dogmatician of the Princetonians.  
 
Bavinck echoed this estimation throughout his early career. In 1883 in his address on the 
science of theology Bavinck offered a typical presentation of his appreciation for 
Schleiermacher’s attack on what Bavinck calls the ‘cold contemplative intellect’ of rationalism 
and supernaturalism and his apt offer, in response, of an ‘organic unity’ in the theological 
endeavor: the re-discovery of the praxis of theology. 28 He spoke of Schleiermacher using 
referents like ‘thankful’ and ‘original thinker’, and, in addition, that ‘we even want to gladly 
acknowledge’ (Wij willen zelfs gaarne erkennen) the ‘truth’ (waarheid) of Schleiermacher. He praises 
him for re-awakening the necessity of the work of the Spirit on the heart of the dogmatician.29 
While critical of both Schleiermacher and Kant, Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling’, Bavinck argued in 
                                                 
27 Hodge, Systematic Theology, II. 372.  
28 Bavinck, De wetenschap der H. Godgeleerheid (Kampen: G.Ph. Zalsman, 1883), 42: ‘… de koude 
verstandbeschouwing van Rationalisten en Supranaturalisten…’.  
29 Bavinck, De wetenschap der H. Godgeleerheid, 15. And a decade later, in addressing the attempt 
to suppress the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit by making it an argument of the intellect, 
Bavinck argues that ‘various factors have contributed, however, to a partial rehabilitation of 
this doctrine. Kant’s critique of rationalism, “the proof of the spirit and of power” to which 
Lessing appealed, the romanticism of Jacobi and Schleiermacher, plus the sterility of 
apologetics, generated the conviction that the validation of the Christian religion must be 
grounded in the faith of the church’. RD 1.585.  
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1887, understood better than Kant that religious life is not a ‘cold moralism’ (koude moralisme). 
Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling’ transformed religion instead to a ‘warm hearth’ (warmen haard).30  
 
In a journal entry during his studies at Leiden, in fact, Bavinck turns to the certainty of feeling 
(gevoel) on one occasion when he claims that while ‘overcome by doubt’ he maintained faith 
because of ‘a gevoel of inner truth revealed through Christ’.31 While there is no indication of a 
specific relation to Schleiermacher in this episode, his turn to a ‘feeling of inner truth’ amid 
doubts portends the explicit commendations he offers regarding Schleiermacher throughout 
the next decade.  
 
Most striking amongst these later commendations is that Bavinck compared his estimation of 
Schleiermacher’s value to his esteem for Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin. Schleiermacher led, he 
wrote, to a ‘reformation’ by ‘taking a stand in the living faith of the Redeemer’ and, in doing 
so, ‘revived the principle of reformation’ by rising above ‘the opposition of rationalism and 
supernaturalism’. 32  Even with Schleiermacher’s errors, one is not to disregard but learn: 
‘[Schleiermacher and the Vermittlungstheologen] have taught us by their example to avoid the 
errors’ they committed. ‘We come after them and stand upon their shoulders to see further 
than they could see’.33 So, his method:  
 
                                                 
30 Bavinck, ‘Het dualisme in de Theologie’, De Vrije Kerk 13 (Januari 1887) 1. 11-39, 17. 
31  H. Bavinck Archive, ‘Dagboekjes’, Historisch Documentatiecentrum, Vrije Universiteit, 
Amsterdam, #346/16: ‘… een gevoel van de innige waarheid, door Christus geopenbaard’. 
32 Bavinck, ‘De hedendaagsche wereldbeschouwing’, De Vrije Kerk 9 (Oktober 1883) 10.435-
461, 458. ‘Dat was het reformatorische in Schleiermacher, dat hij, positie nemende in het 
levend geloof aan den Verlosser, weer het beginsel der Hervorming herleven deed en daarin 
ver boven de tegenstelling van rationalisme en supranaturalisme zich verhief’.  His comments 
are also guarded. He, in the same section, suggests that Schleiermacher made ‘grievous errors’ 
and argues that his influence would have been greater if he had not set aside so much of the 
principles of Luther and Calvin’s reformation. He evokes an attitude of lament over 
Schleiermacher. Bavinck is unable to stand as close to Schleiermacher’s ‘reformation’ as he 
desires.  
33 Bavinck, ‘De hedendaagsche wereldbeschouwing’, 458.  
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With Calvin, Luther, and Zwingli we differentiate that which is essential and 
truly reformed, from that of the spirit of the age. We do not return to them 
after the fact, to repristinate them and their work as much as to respect their 
value in general… but through their teaching, better than even they, to hold 
fast to and speak out a reformation principle… not to return to them but to go 
forward from them is our motto.34 
 
Encapsulated here is a precise example of Bavinck’s Reformed irenic, historical methodology.  
For Schleiermacher has shoulders upon which the Reformed dogmatician must stand in order 
to see a further, clearer (‘truly Reformed’) path—but stand on his shoulders one must. 
Accordingly, it is with both the estimation of Schleiermacher’s value as a fact in the 
nineteenth-century and a personal, critical esteem that Bavinck, in his Prolegomena, argues that 
Schleiermacher’s influence upon theology is incalculable and unavoidable: 
With [Schleiermacher’s] three ideas—the immediate consciousness of the self 
as the source of religion, the community as the necessary form of its existence, 
and the person of Christ as the center of Christianity—Schleiermacher has 
exerted incalculable influence. All subsequent theology is dependent on him. 
Though no one took over his dogmatics, he has made his influence felt on all 
theological orientations—liberal, mediating, and confessional—and in all 
churches—Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed.35 
 
(b) Bavinck’s early theology especially adopts the grammar and emphasis derived from the modern philosophical 
and theological traditions he studied—namely, theology’s centralization of the human subject. Bavinck’s early 
theology gives primary place to exploring the subjective implications of the fact of the 
objective Kingdom of God. As he puts it in RD 1, modern philosophy directs theologians to 
                                                 
34 Bavinck, ‘De hedendaagsche wereldbeschouwing’, 458-459. Original: ‘Zooals bij Calvijn en 
Luther en Zwingli, onderscheiden wij ook bij hen tusschen het wezenlijke, het eeuwige en dus 
reformatorische, en den tijdgeest, die door hen sprak. Niet dus om tot achter hen terug te 
gaan, te repristineeren en hen en hun arbeid als van geenerlei waarde te achten, maar 
integendeel, om door hen geleerd, beter dan zij nog, het reformatorisch beginsel uit te spreken 
en vast te houden en toe te passen dat is het wat ons van hen scheidt. Niet tot achter hen 
terug, maar boven hen vooruit is onze leuze’. Also, RD 4.560: ‘Through Schleiermacher, who 
not only rejected the doctrine of Roman Catholics but also that of Socinians and so forth, and 
recognized the teachings of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin as all being orthodox, there sprang up 
a movement to maintain the Lord’s Supper as an objective means of grace and to ascribe to it 
a strengthening of the believer’s life-fellowship with Christ’. 
35 RD 1.165-66.  
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‘view salvation more from the side of the subject’.36 This emphasis segments throughout his 
work in the treatment of at least three relations: (1) the conscience and consciousness; (2) the 
Kingdom of God and self-consciousness; (3) and the relation between objective and 
subjective catholicity.  
 
Before briefly exampling these three relations, it is worth saying more about Bavinck’s view of 
the history of the turn to the subject in philosophy and religion to see precisely where his own 
adaptation lies. Before Schleiermacher and mediation theologies, Bavinck traces this turn first 
in historical order to rationalism and its simultaneous counterpart pietism: ‘running along 
parallel lines with pietism was rationalism. Both—each in its own way—undermined the 
authority of orthodoxy, by transferring the point of gravity to the human subject’.37 Bavinck 
argues, instead, for a balancing of perspectives in the unity of subject and object but even this 
is derivative of his modern philosophical milieu. In Bavinck’s historiography, both rationalism 
and pietism are precursors to what he calls the ‘triumph of philosophy’ over dogmatics in the 
‘turn to the subject’. 
 
Lutheran dogmatics, for example, ‘had entirely fallen under’ the influence of rational 
philosophy. Yet, it is Kant he suggests that ‘totally undermined’ rationalism and its use in 
dogmatics. After Kant, theology turns away from intellectualism (reason) and toward 
subjective ‘feeling’ and ‘consciousness’—an alternative ‘turn’ to the subject than that of 
rationalism. He traces the origins of this fact to figures like Jacobi and Shaftesbury where 
immediate feeling is the path to a non-sensible world. But, in this same section, he asserts that 
Schleiermacher above all has ‘exerted incalculable influence’ and that ‘his influence is felt in all 
theological orientations’ including confessionalism.38 The point, therefore, is not simply to 
                                                 
36 RD 1.107.  
37 RD 1.162.  
38 RD 1.166. 
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highlight the presence of a turn to the subject in general in Bavinck’s early corpus (which is 
also a fact of rationalism, pietism, romanticism, and modern philosophy, per Bavinck’s 
historical interpretation). Rather, it is to highlight a more specific emphasis on feeling and the 
immediate consciousness derivative of Schleiermacher and his influence on the Dutch Ethical 
theologians. Bavinck defends this specific turn here in direct association to Schleiermacher:  
And through and after Schleiermacher most theologians have arrived at the 
insight that religion is unique and can be known only in a manner 
corresponding to that uniqueness. While epistemology is always the same, it is 
nevertheless adapted to the object that is being considered in every science, 
and so in religion as well. By making this statement Christian theology indeed 
takes its starting point in the human subject. The accusation of subjectivism 
immediately launched against this position, however, is unwarranted and in any 
case premature. For, in the first place, in no area of knowledge and science is 
there any other starting point.39 
 
(1) Conscience as an aspect of the consciousness of self as dependent self. Bavinck’s earliest constructive 
theological publication, Het Geweten, focuses on moral theology and specifically on the moral 
consciousness through interaction with the primary theme of the Ethical school, the 
conscience, adopted from Vinet and Chantepie de la Saussaye. This text includes interaction 
with texts like Rothe’s Theologische Ethik.40 Bavinck makes his argument by situating the moral 
consciousness in league with a larger, grander vision of the ultimate good, the Kingdom. The 
Kingdom of God is the realization of the purpose of God’s self-manifestation and a telos for 
the human moral consciousness.   
 
Bavinck’s publication of ‘The Conscience’ comes just before his first sustained reflection on 
the Ethical Theology. In an addition to the contents of the previous chapter, he describes 
Ethisch Theology accordingly:  
The foundation, the essence of church and theology both, of the whole of 
Christendom is, therefore, ethical. But what is that? What is the criterion and 
standard of what ethical is? The ethical movement answers: there is such a 
                                                 
39 RD 1.563.  




criterion in the possession of mankind. The human has an organ in order to 
know the truth, in order to distinguish what is and is not revealed… that organ 
is the human himself in his essence, in the conscience. The conscience is the root of 
human personality, the self-consciousness in its inseparable dependence on the God-
consciousness. As the human self he belongs to another than this transitory 
world; the power, therefore, of eternal, metaphysical truths with the innate 
categories of good and evil, eternity and temporality, true and false, fact and 
shadow. The conscience is the supernatural become natural. Therefore, the 
human is connected to the supernatural. All revelation must, therefore, be 
tested not according to something alien… but according to something 
whereby the connection [to the supernatural] is [present]. The supernatural in 
humanity is connected to the supernatural outside of humanity. The 
conscience is, briefly and concisely “le critère de la vérité”. Ethics is that which 
corresponds with, meets the demands, needs, and aspirations of the 
conscience.41 
 
Much of this description is reflected precisely in his own constructive theology of the moral 
consciousness. Conscience, as a moral consciousness dependent upon being in relation with 
God, is the root of the human personality, the center, and the location of the revelation of 
both the self to the self and the developing God-consciousness, a conceptual derivative of 
general revelation. To establish this line, he begins with the literal ‘knowing-with’ definition of 
conscience. Conscience (from the Greek suneidos) first appeared in history as a terminological 
indicator of a communal awareness of the moral order (a becoming aware together), which the 
French language reflects in the fact that the term conscience continues to retain the broader 
meaning of general ‘consciousness’, he argues. In this wide connotation, conscience is yet to 
refer specifically to individual moral conscience (as an inner voice), and this latter use of the 
term is a late development. Reflecting on the idea of the conscience reveals a consistent reality 
of a mere moral awareness developing in the wider communal consciousness as creatures of a 
moral order interacting with one another in the world.42 And further, knowing-with, is an 
indication of the relation by nature between Creator (God-consciousness) and creaturely self-
consciousness. 
 
                                                 
41 Bavinck, ‘Gereformeerde Theologie’ De Vrije Kerk 7 (November 1881): 497-509, 504.  
42 Bavinck, ‘Conscience’, 113-114.  
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Conscience, he argues, first emerged in the rupture of God-consciousness (Godsbewustzijn) and 
self-consciousness (Zelfbewustzijn).43 Prior to the Fall, self-consciousness was not dissociated 
from God-consciousness, neither of which could dissociate from the corporate consciousness 
normed by the fact of creation. To be aware of self is to be aware of a created, dependent self 
in communion with the rest of creation as God’s possession, a porous self. The reality of the 
primacy of the notion of an individualized conscience is the result of the power of sin 
rupturing the self-consciousness from a consciousness of God as creator and Lord. The space 
for conscience is opened in the crevice of the Creator-creature relation. 
 
In this bifurcation, the primacy of individual, rebellious desire gives rise to its need for such 
individualized moral guidance through that ‘inner voice’, which had no presence prior as an 
agent of conviction. A tendency develops in time, therefore, toward a particular, personal 
conscience that would first find expression through a communal ‘guilt-consciousness’.44 In the 
                                                 
43 Bavinck, Het Geweten, 30. ‘Conscience’, 115.  
44 Bavinck’s emphasis on the communal nature of the development of moral consciousness 
has mild bearings on the recent debate regarding Bavinck’s position in relation to the 
Reformed Two-Kingdoms thesis advocated especially by David VanDrunen. This debate has 
largely taken place amongst North American theologians and particularly between VanDrunen 
and Nelson Kloosterman. Bavinck questions the possibility of a static moral consciousness 
that corresponds clearly to a universal, natural law (‘universal’ refers to the scope of the 
content of the moral conscience as a consistent manifestation across all populations, places, 
and times in the human subject as rational, invariable understanding of an objective universal, 
God-given moral law). ‘The content of our conscience’, he writes, ‘is derived mostly from 
outside and, therefore, differs amongst different peoples. And even if the conscience does 
contain something ‘common’ or universal ‘by nature’… ‘it is very difficult to identify which 
duties are specifically necessary pronouncements of the conscience entailed innately and not 
received from the outside’. He adds: ‘We always know the conscience only concretely, as it is 
historically formed within the family, state, and society, through religion, art, and science by all 
the moral authorities of a people’. Bavinck, to be sure, affirms the fact of nature and its 
revelation of the moral order even as an intuition but limits (while not wholly excluding) the 
epistemic possibilities for the human conscience to receive said moral order correctly due to 
the complexity of the embodied self in distinct histories under the curse of God. This move is 
first set in antithesis to a Kantian-framed religion that appeals to a rational universal access to 
moral imperatives as duty. Per Bavinck, the moral consciousness develops more in the 
experience of cultures, in relation to the contemporary movements of science and art, in the 
generalized rules of discourse and language, and grows up within specific communities like the 
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prior pre-lapsarian state, he argues, ‘no voice arose within the person, which as it were, stood 
over against the person and could accuse the person. The possibility of conscience thus 
coincides with the possibility of sin…. For conscience is a consciousness of having acted, not 
uprightly, but wrongly, and is thus first and foremost negative, presupposing sin’.45 Conscience 
is, therefore, a ‘Symptom der Erkrankung’ (symptom of the disease).46  
 
Bavinck’s description of the Fall as the rupture in ‘God- and self-consciousness’ (Gods-en 
zelfbewustzijn) is a grammar adapted from his interactions with Schleiermacher, Vinet, and 
Chantepie de la Saussaye, and localized in his understanding of a particularly historical Adam 
and Eve. This manner of describing the origination of conscience is directly present in his 
description of the Ethical theology above. And it is a grammar re-constituted to his 
confessionalist context. He also uses as a synonym of the moral consciousness, the term 
‘personality’, which he expresses directly in RD 2 is derived from modern theology (see Ch. 
1).47  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
church. Thus, it operates according to a plethora of situated logics. ‘Conscience’, 122. Also, 
troubling to VanDrunen’s attempt to co-opt Bavinck for his version of ‘Reformed Two 
Kingdoms’ theology is Bavinck’s synthetic desires for Christ and culture and consistent 
denouncement of a bifurcated ethic. For example: ‘The hope is not unfounded that one day 
with Christianity and culture, however much they are at odds now, a synthesis is possible. If 
God has truly come to us through Christ and in this century is the Provider and ruler of all 
things, then it is not only possible but also inevitable and it will appear in due time’. Bavinck, 
Het Christendom, 60. Original: ‘de hoop niet ongegrond, dat er van Christendom en cultuur, 
hoezeer ze thans veelszins vijandig tegenover elkander staan, eene synthèse mogelijk is. Als 
God in Christus waarachtig tot ons is gekomen en Hij ook in deze eeuw de Onderhouder en 
regeerder aller dingen is, is ze niet alleen mogelijk, maar ook noodwendig en zal ze te harer tijd 
zeker aan het licht treden’. See David VanDrunen, ‘The Kingship of Christ is Twofold: 
Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms in the Thought of Herman Bavinck’, CTJ 1:45 (April 
2010): 147-64; N. Kloosterman, ‘A Response to “The Kingdom of God is Twofold”’, CTJ  
1:45 (April 2010): 174-5.  
45 Het Geweten, 31. ‘Conscience’, 116. 
46 Het Geweten, 31. ‘Conscience’, 116.  
47  ‘Or to put it in modern theological language, in Scripture the personality and the 
absoluteness of God go hand in hand’. RD 2.34. 
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He describes Chantepie de la Saussaye’s position on the account of Genesis three in his book 
on Chantepie de la Saussaye’s theology just two years later: ‘In regard to the first man…the 
old dogmatics, thought de la Saussaye…could not explain the origin of sin. Already, the tree 
of knowledge in itself did [provide] this feeling as it were. Yet a consciousness of the 
shattering of God, world, and self, brought him to distinguish God and world, and awoke in 
him an infinite desire’.48 Chantepie de la Saussaye’s point is that the disruption of ‘God- and 
self-consciousness’ in the activity of the Fall provides a necessary rupture in the history of the 
movement of humanity toward perfection. In tandem, the rupture of the consciousness of self 
and God, God and self, is also the rupture of self- and world-consciousness. For it is only in 
consciousness of the world that one can have consciousness of self and God. A dismembering 
of one relation is true, derivatively, of all relations. Such disruption is necessary for the 
possibility of moral action. The possibility of moral consciousness unto perfection assumes 
the activity of free will in the reality of moral choice, a reality not possible when God-, world-, 
and self-consciousness are unified and the human consciousness is unable to clearly 
distinguish the holiness of God from the human personality in its world (finite) context.  
 
Chantepie de la Saussaye’s account echoes Schleiermacher’s account of ‘losing the might of 
the human God-consciousness’. 49  As he does here, Schleiermacher first argued against a 
classical conception of the Fall and that human sinful nature preceded any original act of sin.50 
                                                 
48 Bavinck, De theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye, 28. ‘Bij den eersten mensch 
moet daarom onderscheiden worden tusschen onschuld en heiligheid; de oude dogmatiek, 
meende De la Saussaye, verwarde dit en kon daarom het ontstaan der zonde niet verklaren. 
Adam was wel onschuldig, maar niet heilig. Wat hem vooral ontbrak, was de kennis, de 
bewustheid zijner zaligheid. Reeds de boom der kennis op zichzelf deed bij den mensch de als 
’t ware in het gevoel nog ééne bewustheid uiteenvallen in Gods-, wereld- en zelfbewustzijn, 
bracht hem tot onderscheiding van God en wereld, en wekte in hem op eene oneindige 
begeerte’. 
49 CF §72.3. 
50  CF §72.3: ‘However one might also think of the first sin, one would always have to 
presuppose something of a sinful nature to be sinful in advance… Hence, it is necessary to 
adhere to the following: the notion that an alteration of human nature that has arisen by 
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As Nimmo summarizes Schleiermacher’s concept of redemption, ‘redemption is a 
continuation of the act of creation’ thereby necessitating a model where the original sinful 
nature is derivative of the fact of creaturliness.51 And Schleiermacher also suggests in OR that 
the account of the first man and woman is representative of the movement of humanity into 
the state of human consciousness itself.52  But most important is Schleiermacher’s Christology 
for the expression of the Adamic Fall.  If Christ is the expression of the full unity of God- and 
self-consciousness, then the first humans are also representative of a rupture in that 
consciousness, assuming something of an original perfection that cannot be demonstrated in a 
historical account.53 Sin, therein, is the capacity of the sensual nature to subvert the original 
God-consciousness. Bavinck understood Schleiermacher in this way: ‘[for Schleiermacher] 
sensuality is… regarded as the occasion and stimulus to sin’. 54  Both, original God-
consciousness and the sensual subversion, are universal realities of human nature. The fact of 
God-consciousness/forgetfulness, therefore, has always existed in relation to the fact of the 
lower nature. As the former develops so the latter subverts. Bavinck, while condemning 
Schleiermacher’s treatment of original sin, also uses Schleiermacher, citing CF §71-72, for his 
account of the unity of a sinful realm: ‘As people are interconnected, so also are their sinful 
inclinations and deeds. Penetrating the infinite riches of all creation, sin also forms a realm 
that, animated by a single life principle, organizes itself in multiple forms and appearances’.55 
The point, nevertheless, is that Bavinck’s expression that the Fall as the event of the rupture 
of God and self-consciousness betrays a Schleiermacherian lineage while maintaining his 
tradition’s commitment to the historical Fall. 
                                                                                                                                                    
means of a first sin committed by the first human beings does not belong in the series of 
those propositions, which are expressions of our Christian self-consciousness’. 
51 Paul Nimmo, ‘The Mediation of Redemption in Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre’, IJST 5:2 
(2003): 187-199, 188.  
52 OR, 119-120. See Katherine Faull, ‘Schleiermacher and Transcendentalist Truth-Telling’ in 
Schleiermacher’s Influences on American Thought and Religious Life (1835-1920), eds. Jeffrey A. 
Wilcox, Terrence Tice, Catherine Kelsey (Eugene: Pickwick, 2013), 293-321.  
53 CF §61.5. 
54 RD 3.51. Cf. 3.88.  




In the Hebrew Scriptures, returning to Bavinck’s argument, this consciousness of the moral 
condition is the revelation of ‘the heart’ to the human consciousness. In which the text refers 
to the fact, he argues, that conscience (the heart) is ‘that domain within the person where self-
consciousness occurs’, conceptually arrived at by ‘self-reflection’ (zichzelven inkeer). 56  Self-
consciousness, in other words, is made a conceptual reality when the self is objectified in the 
activity of self-reflection, a cognitive judgment (beoordeeling) about the human essence. It is 
discovered in a reflection on the contents of the inner-self, its representations, virtues and 
vices, and its moral condition or law, conscience. But, self-consciousness also refers to an 
unknown essence, an unprocessed awareness of a self that stands at the back of all human 
action. And conscience is an aspect of that consciousness that governs the human self. One 
does not create it, nor reflect on it originally, but is governed by it as moral consciousness.  
 
Conscience is more, therefore, than what is commonly meant by the ‘inner voice’. It is a self-
consciousness (conceptually known by cognitive objectification or representation) of the 
unifying center of self (the heart), unveiling the essence of the human personality in its moral 
inferiority against one’s consciousness of God. This does, indeed, include moral reflection on 
the contents of the self, obtained in the activities of imagination, representation, and action (as 
objects giving rise to either purity or ‘guilt-consciousness’) but it is also reflection on the seat 
‘of the original knowledge of God’, he argues.57 It is a consciousness of subject and object—a 
self-reflection that uncovers the distinction between an awareness of the truly good essence 
(God-consciousness) and the character of ‘my’ ego.  
 
The combination of Bavinck’s early moral psychology with his brief reflection on self-
consciousness as an act of ‘judgment’, therefore, suggests that in the act of self-reflection one 
can discover through inference grounded on the fact of self (the heart/conscience) the 
                                                 
56 Het Geweten, 32. ‘Conscience’, 116.  
57 Het Geweten, 32, ‘Conscience’, 117.  
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revealed knowledge of God—a turn inward as objectification of self is a turn toward the 
subjective locale of the revelation of an objective, infinite reality. This assertion mimics his 
later description of the Ethical theology—that ‘the supernatural in humanity is connected to 
the supernatural outside of humanity’—but is also filtered through the theology of Calvin in 
the opening claim of the Institutes.58  
 
In order to make sense of Bavinck’s idea that one discovers the ‘original knowledge of God’ in 
the self-consciousness attention must be paid to a second adoption of the grammar of the 
Schleiermacherian legacy: dependence. Bavinck argues that in the awakening of the moral 
consciousness as the center of self-consciousness, or the unity of the human personality, one 
realizes the fact of dependence. For example:  
With awareness [or consciousness, (bewustzijn)] spiteful sinning and thinking 
with premeditation, manifesting therein the person’s greatest freedom, one 
learns thereby to know best one’s deep dependence (afhankelijkheid) … In the 
conscience we learn that we are not nostris juris (a law unto ourselves) but are 
dependent (afhankelijk) on a higher authority. In this way it is not an awareness 
[or consciousness, (bewustzijn)] that is merely moral but also religious. The 
conscience is mine, my property, it is the most individual feature, indeed, it is 
the person within the person. And yet the conscience is not my fabrication.59  
 
The activity of the conscience therefore is a revelation, he argues, of the divine through a 
consciousness of being dependent, which first arises as religious consciousness. Its existence 
reveals the ‘absolute’. It is a subjective manifestation of the divine to ‘my self’ wherein the law 
of one’s personality ‘points back to the divine’ as its condition. ‘At its deepest core the 
                                                 
58 With this argument that in self-consciousness one discovers the essence of the human 
personality and the original knowledge of God, Bavinck locates himself in the conversation of 
modern theology (Vinet, Suassaye) and simultaneously in the trajectory set forth by Augustine 
and Calvin in their reflection upon Scripture, and the knowledge of God and self. So, Bavinck 
summarizes them elsewhere: ‘Augustine desired to know nothing other and more than God 
and himself. “I desire to know God and the soul. Nothing more? No: nothing at all.” For that 
reason, too, Calvin began his Institutes with the knowledge of God and the knowledge of 
ourselves, and for that reason the Genevan catechism, answering the first question, “What is 
the chief end of human life?” stated, “That human beings may know the God by whom they 
were created’. RD 2.29-30. 
59 Het Geweten, 55-56. 
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conscience is a knowledge shared not only with our selves but also with God; a consciousness 
that we live outside of him…’. 60  Conscience as consciousness of a unified self that is 
simultaneously moral, religious, and in relation with both God and world, therein, plays a 
transcendental role uncovering the fact of the higher law upon which the ‘law of our 
personality’ is dependent. This argument is strikingly like Schleiermacher’s concept of the 
‘revelation’ of God in CF §4 as an insight in the human consciousness of being in relation 
with God as Whence, or as the condition of self and world-consciousness. Yet, it is of note that 
Bavinck’s presentation thus far is absent of the fundamental notion of gevoel (feeling) in direct 
relation to the revelation of the Absolute in the passivity of dependence. Bavinck describes a 
realization or a process of ‘learning’ and discovery about one’s dependence here, rather than in 
the grammar of feeling that will arise and govern in 1902 (Magnalia Dei) and 1908. It is not so 
much that conceptually his early and later descriptions of the relation between self- and God-
consciousness are opposed, but that the latter emphasizes feeling as a specific philosophical 
concept more so than the former.  
 
A foray into Bavinck’s psychology of the human psyche is necessary to parse his ever-
developing terminology clearly. In this same article, he describes three capacities of the human 
mind or soul: ‘thinking, feeling, and willing’ (denken, gevoelen, willen). Later, in PoR in 1908/9 he 
will usually refer to thinking, feeling, and doing (handelen), which aligns well with 
Schleiermacer’s trichotomy of consciousness. In this article, the conscience is neither within 
nor separate to any of these powers of consciousness, because one’s consciousness is not a 
capacity, but an aspect of the unity of personality. Conscience is the natural standard of the 
human personality, given by God, that makes demands, governs, and critiques the use of the 
capacities. It enters as the law of the personality when the empirical self is not identical to the 
true person, when there is a rift between objective and essential self.61 Yet, this rift is not 
merely derivative of human agency. Thinking, feeling, and willing are only under the control 
                                                 
60 ‘Conscience’, 125.  
61 Bavinck, ‘Conscience’, 124-5. 
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of human agency in part. Bavinck, therefore, divides the faculties into an active and passive 
element in this article, by implication.  
 
Later, in 1897, in the same year of the second volume of his dogmatics, he produces a book 
on the psyche itself, Beginselen der Psychologie.62 Bavinck argues there that neither materialism nor 
pantheism can satisfy the inquirer regarding the nature of the psyche (ziel). Rather, the essence 
of the soul is the ‘Ik’ as the gift of God, a spiritual principle (geestelijke principe), an impenetrable 
mystery, an unknowable nature. One has no knowledge (kennis) of the essence of self. The 
essence of self (the Ik) is only known mediately, being no object of perception.63 In contrast to 
Descartes, as Bavinck describes him, as well as to the Aufklärung, the essence of the self is 
neither denken (thinking), or verstand (understanding). In God, knowing, thinking, 
understanding, desiring, willing, etc. are identical with God’s essence. But for the human spirit, 
this is not so at least because the human capacities can grow, be disciplined, refined, and 
educated.  
 
Among these faculties, in the modern world, Aristotle’s taxonomy of the soul was discarded 
by Descartes who located the essence of the self in denken. Thereby, Bavinck argues, Descartes 
registerd human nature as a capacity. For the Aufklärung, in its rationalistic tendency, the 
‘understanding’ was regarded as the essence of the human being (het verstand dus het wezen van 
den mensch). As a result, ‘feeling, consciousness, intuition, imagination, heart, desire… [these 
were] suppressed and made anathema’ for the sake of invididual, reasonable Bildung 
(formation).64 The immediate, mystical, and contemplative aspects of the self were hated, he 
records.  
 
                                                 
62 He offers an extended and edited second edition but only just before his death. The second 
edition is not published until after Bavinck dies, in 1923.  
63 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (1897), 31, 33.  
64 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (1897), 49. Original: ‘Gevoel, besef, intuïtie, verbeelding, 
hart, gemoed, aandoening, hartstocht — het werd onderdrukt en in den ban gedaan’. 
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But then, the new age arose: Retournons à la nature. Kant, Jacobi, Hamann, Claudius, 
Schleiermacher and others, in distinct forms, returned to the practical, to the heart, to the 
‘immediate’, to the feeling and warmth, allowing art to arise from innate genius. In this age, 
the doctrine of the faculty of feeling ascends and takes it place among the trichotomy of 
psychological powers sometimes expressed as gevoel, verstand, en wil;65 other times expressed as 
gevoel, denken, en handelen (or doen). This trichotomy Bavinck associates with a late eighteenth 
century development, and it is precisely the one with some critique that he affirms.  
 
Yet, this same age of feeling and sentimentality resulted in an emancipation of the flesh (citing 
Schlegel’s Lucinde for example), and forced theology to retreat into a gevoelsheerschappij (mastery 
of feeling), referring to Schleiermacher.66 After surveying the wide-ranging opinions on the 
gevoelvermogen (feeling faculty), Bavinck summarizes the two basic definitions: (1) feeling is an 
immediate consciousness of pleasure and unpleasure, occuring prior to reflection; (2) the 
states wherein the soul is wholly passive, being acted on by an external object. Bavinck largely 
rejects the latter definition as describing the totality of the feeling capacity. In regard to the 
former, it is apparent, Bavinck argues that ‘feeling’ is not actually its own distinct power but an 
aspect of the kenvermogen (knowing faculty). It is not a special ability but arises in relation to 
sensations, impressions, and observation, which all depend on the knowing faculty. 
Additionally, ‘we’ commonly use the term feeling, he argues, not only referring to an 
immediate consciousness of pleasure or pain, but also as a sensation or instict for the good, 
the true, and the beautiful, or, with Jacobi, ‘as an organ for the supernatural’.67 Before or 
distinct from the activity of thinking and reflection (as distinct aspects of the knowing faculty), 
Bavinck argues, we ‘feel instinctively (voelen wij instinctief)’ whether something is ‘true or untrue 
(waar of unwaar)’.68 Feeling, as it depends on sensation, is a particular aspect of the knowing 
faculty, distinct from thinking or the reasoning process, and in this particular way, can be ‘pre-
                                                 
65 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (1897), 50-1. 
66 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (1897), 53.  
67 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (1897), 56. 
68 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (1897), 58. 
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cognitive’ as pre-denken. 
 
He divides the psyche therefore between two faculties, knowing and desiring. The most 
remarkable aspect of the knowing faculty is, he argues, self-consciousness. Self-consciousness 
arises within the activity of being a self in a world where the self makes the ‘Ik’ known to the 
self. To speak of self-consciousness in relation to discursive judgment is to speak of mediate 
self-consciousness or self-knowledge. Another way to distinguish the different concepts, using 
Schleiermacher’s language, is between objective self-consciousness (as self-knowledge) and 
immediate self-consciousness. Immediate self-consciousness is originally felt precisely because 
it is an object that stands outwith perception and is only reflected upon (self-knowledge) when 
one objectifies the contents of the imagination and understanding, its representations and 
history.  
 
For Bavinck then, a most important distinction is that feeling is not the activity of thinking 
(feelings do not arise as the type of knowledge derived from judgment, reasoning, or 
reflection). Feeling does not produce objective knowledge. Yet, feeling is an aspect of the 
knowing capacity. Already in the ‘Conscience’, at its deepest core, the conscience ‘is a 
knowledge’ that both we and God share. 69 And while he does not associate this type of 
knowledge with the language of gevoel, he will come to do so. As he argues in 1897, in the 
feeling capacity, there is a type of knowing. In this form of knowing regarding the conscience, 
one feels the reality of a law that cannot be perceived as an object. One might call this a ‘faith-
knowledge’, or merely a certainty. Feeling is distinguished, therefore, with denken, but is not set 
in opposition to kennen. And for Bavinck, the ‘immediate’, when associated with feeling refers 
to the unseen, to that which presents itself to the self. This feeling for the unseen is an aspect 
of a type of knowing which, Bavinck argues, is ‘of paramount importance. It is distinguished 
from and antecedent to the process of reasoning or thinking. Regarding certainty, it is not less 
                                                 
69 Bavinck, ‘Conscience’, 125. 
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than these but it rises far above them. But indeed [feeling] is less clear and percipient, precisely 
because it is not a knowledge in concepts and is not the product of purposeful reflection or 
reason’.70 
 
Bavinck, therefore, uses the term feeling at times71 in the same manner as the functions given 
it by Jacobi, Fichte, and Schleiermacher, who Bavinck himself describes: Jacobi regards feeling 
as ‘an organ for the supernatural (or the unseen)’; for Fichte, ‘as the junction-point of being 
and consciousness, subject and object’; ‘with Schleiermacher (who agreed with Fichte), as 
immediate self-consciousness’. Here, in 1897, Bavinck directly defines his understanding of 
Schleiermacher’s ‘immediate self-consciousness’ as a gevoel: where one ‘before all thinking 
(denken) and willing (willen), is [conscious] of his own being, and therein at the same time is 
conscious of his absolute dependence on God’.72 
 
In his earliest corpus however, Bavinck is yet to make a precise and consistent distinction 
between the objectification of the self in the activity of self-reflection and the awareness of 
self, world, and God in the immediate experience of being, or specifically as feeling. This 
distinction and emphasis on the immediate is at the core of Schleiermacher’s discovery of 
Gefühl. What is clear is that Bavinck places the self in a primary role in his early theology, but 
                                                 
70 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (1897), 57-8. Original: ‘Deze wijze van kennisneming is van 
het hoogste belang; zij is onderscheiden van en voorafgaande aan die door redeneering en 
denken; zij is niet minder zeker dan deze, maar gaat ze in zekerheid ver te boven. Maar ze is 
wel minder helder en bewust, juist omdat zij geen kennis in begrippen is en geen vrucht van 
opzettelijk nadenken en redeneeren’. 
71 See especially PoR, Ch. 3.  
72Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (1897), 53-4. Original: ‘Schleiermacher sloot zich hierbij aan 
en omschreef het gevoel als het onmiddellijke zelfbewustzijn, waarin de mensch vóór alle 
denken en willen zichzelf, zijn eigen zijn, en daarin tegelijk zijne volstrekte afhankelijkheid van 
God bewust wordt’. 
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he does so in the 1880s without adoption of the emphasis on the immediacy of self-
consciousness or the feeling of absolute dependence he would come to emphasize in time.73 
 
(2) The Kingdom of God and self-consciousness. Another of Bavinck’s important early articles is his 
constructive reflection on the self in relation to the Kingdom of God. ‘KGHG’ is the 
manifestation of the union of two central motifs that Bavinck would maintain through his 
entire corpus: self-consciousness and organism. Of interest here is the fact that, like many of 
his other early articles, the primary themes include the inner self, its organic essence, and the 
incorporation of psychological reflection into a theology of the reign of Christ. 
 
The article argues that the realization of the moral good in human action (as both thinking and 
doing) requires more than the acquisition of the statutory law. One must, rather, ‘understand 
the moral goods themselves according to their nature and essence, in their unity and 
interconnectedness’ to become a wholly righteous agent—a highest good only possible within 
the Kingdom of God.74  
 
The Kingdom of God is the fulfillment of the unity of all things in Christ. Unity, for Bavinck, 
is the original goal (doel) of creation and the activity of re-creation is the denial of all unnatural 
division between substances and their intended ends. Such unification forms a kingdom 
                                                 
73 Schleiermacher, CF §3.2: ‘In turn, when the qualifier “immediate” is to be attached to the 
expression “self-consciousness,” no one would think of this as referring to anything but 
feeling. That is, if one were also to use “self-consciousness” for a consciousness of oneself, 
this phenomenon would be more like an objective consciousness, and it would be a notion 
regarding oneself, which, as such, would be mediated by observation of oneself. If such a 
notion of our-selves as we find ourselves at a particular element—thinking, for example, or 
choosing—were to come quite close to or even flash through the particular features of a given 
state, then this self-consciousness would actually appear as something that accompanies the 
state itself. In contrast, one would not ever consider that other, actually unmediated self-
consciousness—which is not a notion but is feeling, in the proper sense—to be a mere 
accompaniment, in any way. Rather, in this regard a twofold experience is to be expected of 
each person.’  
74 ‘KGHG’, 134. 
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insofar as the disparate poles of various organisms are denied the power to be set at enmity 
any longer. The communal and individual are distinguished but inseparable. The flesh and 
spirit become unity in diversity. The head and heart can no longer war. A person becomes 
fully a person when everything within that person submits to its essential unity. There are two 
derivative arguments within this article that support the formative claim above, that Bavinck 
adopts the grammar of the traditions that developed from Schleiermacher and centralizes the 
subject in his early corpus through the relation between self-consciousness and Kingdom.  
 
First, he argues, human consciousness is the premier location and analogous microcosm of 
the ideal Kingdom of God. Reality is not a ‘world’ without the fact of consciousness. 
Consciousness, or the human personality, is the ‘spiritual’ that ‘rises above the world and 
bestows upon it the rays of enlightenment’.75 And, this consciousness is embodied: ‘he [a 
human] does not stand in relation to this world as a stranger’, but is ‘most intimately bound to 
the world…by means of his own organism’.76 The organic unity of humanity is most present 
when all conflict between matter and spirit is undone. This realization is a fact of the 
Kingdom of God to come.  
 
The establishment of the Kingdom of God in Christ from the outset of the Gospels is a 
catholicizing project. Jesus is the king and his kingdom extends first into the heart of his 
disciples. The catholicity of Christ’s kingdom manifests itself, therefore, in its power of re-
union in the various parts of the human personality. Its unity is established not at the expense 
of diversity but at the death and ever-so-slow decay of sin. ‘A person is fully a person’ when 
sin, which has torn everything apart, is denied its power within the human consciousness. The 
‘understanding and the heart, consciousness and will, feeling and imagination, flesh and spirit’ 
were at enmity and, in Christ, are no more. The good, in other words, constitutes a unity 
                                                 
75 ‘KGHG’, 140.  
76 ‘KGHG’, 140. 
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‘automatically’.77 By contrast, ‘sin cannot. Sin dissolves. Sin moves from forged unity into 
diversity’.78 Sin is without purpose and forms little more than a social contract (rather than a 
kingdom) in order to momentarily unite to destroy the good. Sin, for Bavinck, is the power 
that sets parts against each other first corrupting the human consciousness or personality.  
 
But, the reverse is true in the activity of redemption. The human ‘consciousness’ is the first 
manifestation of the kingdom of God’s activity, an awareness of the fact that in one’s self 
‘there is no lifeless, petrified atomism’.79 The unified (or ‘full’) self-consciousness is a temporal 
representation of the wider catholic structure of the Kingdom of God in its eschatological 
fullness: ‘a unity that includes and harmoniously incorporates an infinite multitude. Exactly for 
that reason the Kingdom of God is the highest, the most perfect community, because it 
guarantees to each one’s personality the most completely well-rounded and richest 
development’.80  
 
Second, the fact of the redeemed human personality as the witness to the future ideal 
Kingdom is presupposed by the fact of the human consciousness in general as a micro-cosmos of 
the cosmos. Bavinck’s clearest presentation of his point that the harmony of reality is first 
manifest in the microcosmic organism of the embodied consciousness is here:  
The entire world is recapitulated and represented within a human being. A 
human being is truly a microcosm. And yet that entire plethora of phenomena is 
harmoniously bound together and organically arranged in the personality, which 
itself is eternal and far surpasses that entire plethora, as it knows that wonderful 
organism by means of its consciousness and rules it by means of its 
Will…[Thus] the human being is for the world [and] that is what the Kingdom 
of God is for the human being.81  
 
The human being is a microcosm of the whole world and the world is given to the human 
                                                 
77 ‘KGHG’, 141. 
78 ‘KGHG’, 141.  
79 ‘KGHG’, 141. 
80 ‘KGHG’, 141. 
81 ‘KGHG’, 145. 
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being as a context of righteous rule. Analogously, as the world is given to the human being as 
a context of righteous rule (the human serves/stewards the world), so the Kingdom of God is 
for the human being. The Kingdom of God is not first for the service of the world but for the 
human (the micro-cosmos) and, subsequently because of the human being, the cosmos. And so, 
the Kingdom of God displays itself temporally in the activity of the redeemed consciousness. 
The human is the unifying agent for the world and the work of the Kingdom of God is the re-
unifying agent for the human being before all else—the guarantee of the ‘richest harmony’ and 
the ‘most glorious and perfect unity’, which ‘reigns among the most inscrutable wealth and the 
most incalculable diversity’.82 
 
(3) Objective and subjective catholicity. Derivative of the first two points regarding the relation 
between self and Kingdom is Bavinck’s later systematic expression of the relation between 
objective and subjective catholicity. Bavinck’s concept of catholicity, first presented 
systematically in 1888, describes a powerful act of God to re-create and moves from the 
human subject outward in its application. This point is present in seed-form in ‘KGHG’ and 
needs only brief exposition as it relates to catholicity explicitly.  
 
Catholicity, for Bavinck, is a descriptor of the scope of the application of the Kingdom of 
God, which first works on the human consciousness. This power of the catholic religion that 
is Christianity and its subjective emphasis is what he calls ‘inner catholicity’.83 Inner catholicity 
is the re-creation of the human consciousness as an act of redemption, creating in its work a 
subjective norm for theological activity through the presence of the Spirit of God and the 
                                                 
82 ‘KGHG’, 144-45. 
83 ‘In Israel itself revelation dominates everything. A separation between the cult (godsdienst) 
and the rest of life is altogether impossible. All dualism is eschewed in the unity of God’s 
theocratic rule. The law of YHWH regulates everything even to the smallest minutiae. Not 
only the priests but also the kings; not only the cultic and the moral but also the civil and 
social and political dimensions of life are governed by the one law of God. Here we encounter 
an inner catholicity, a religion that encompasses the whole person in the wholeness of life’. 
Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,’ 222.  
 
 160 
unity of the human subject.  As described already, this concept of the catholic work of 
redemption on the human subject is present in seed form from his earliest work. It merely 
describes what was presented in the previous points. 
 
 First, the catholicity of Christ’s kingdom manifests itself in its power to re-unite the various 
parts of the human personality that have been divided by sin. Catholicity in general, to put it 
another way, describes the power of redemption in its movement to bring all things unto the 
state of organism, or perfect unity in diversity. The sub-concept of inner catholicity 
introduced above, like the sensibility of Reformed catholicity popular in contemporary 
Reformed theological method, is a narrower subjective aspect that exists within a vision of a 
broader objective catholicity.84 While Reformed catholicity is primarily an active exercise in 
judgment, inner catholicity describes a passive (on the part of the human) work of God’s 
objective revelation in the human consciousness that makes possible a particular way of 
cognizing (theological rationality). The dogmatic categories used to describe this subjective 
catholic work occur on opposite ends of the logic of the ordo salutis: regeneration and 
glorification.  
 
Second, the application of the work of the Kingdom of God to the human consciousness 
forms a particular self-consciousness of freedom. ‘Sin desires no self-consciousness and no 
freedom; sin hates both of these with a perfect hatred… For that reason sin hides us from 
ourselves… Knowing oneself is… the first step on the road to conversion’. 85  Full self-
consciousness, in contrast, is the subjective aspect of living ‘eternal life’, as he puts it. Full self-
consciousness is an ever-present awareness of the unity of the self under the law of the 
                                                 
84 J. Todd Billings, ‘Catholic and Reformed: Rediscovering a Tradition’, Pro Ecclesia 23 (2014): 
132-46; Idem., ‘The Catholic Calvin’, Pro Ecclesia 20 (2011): 120-34; Michael Allen and Scott 
Swain, Reformed Catholicity: The Promise of Retrieval for Theology and Biblical Interpretation (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015); Micahel Allen and Scott Swain, eds., Christian Dogmatics: 
Reformed Theology for the Church Catholic (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016). 
85 ‘KGHG’, 150. 
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personality. It is to do (think and act) according to an awareness of what one is (dependent on 
God). Thus, ‘we all receive the demand that we always be fully self-conscious and genuinely 
free… in order that we be ruled by nothing else than the law of our own spiritual being which 
makes all the rest an instrument of our personality’.86  
 
The language of reception and demand is particularly important and makes a direct 
connection to his previous article on the conscience. While the conscience itself is not an 
infallible law, its existence corresponds to an infallible law that has been given and received. Full 
self-consciousness is awareness of self in correspondence with the law that stands first without 
the self, but then becomes the law of the self in the reception of a gift. This is to say, Bavinck 
conceives of the law of the personality, which one realizes in reflective self-consciousness, as 
an act of grace. In turn, ‘full self-consciousness’, as he puts it, requires no statutory law, which 
is the realization of the logic of New Testament ethics.  
 
The result of full self-consciousness is an enactment of eternal life—acting according to the 
rightness of actions that are fitting for living with God. In this realization, statutory law as an 
objectively given divine command is entirely unnecessary precisely because one’s being is in 
full correspondence with its God-dependent nature.  In this manifestation of the rule of the 
‘inner’ kingdom, ‘our entire being and essence [is] reflected in the mirror of our consciousness, 
and that we thus become like God, who is nothing but light and in whom is no darkness (1 
John 1:5)’.87 He summarizes the rule of self-consciousness accordingly alluding to the same 
trichotomy of consciousness as that of Schleiermacher: ‘making our personality the only cause 
of all our thinking and doing. We are called to embed our entire personality in every deed, in 
every thought, in order to do nothing un-self-consciously and arbitrarily, but to do everything 
with full consciousness and will, freely and morally’.88  
                                                 
86 ‘KGHG’, 150. 
87 ‘KGHG’, 150. 




3.2. On the Glaubenslehre: Defining Appropriation through Critique 
 
‘Are you better able to conceive of God as a person than as natura naturans?... 
Anthropomorphism, or let me say rather, ideomorphism is… unavoidable in regard to the 
interpretation of the religious feeling… [but] we cannot form any real conception of the 
highest Being’.89 ‘For the entire span of his career, this was Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher’s 
basic response to unrelenting charges that his doctrine of God was not Christian but 
Spinozistic and pantheistic’. 90  His superior Fr. S.G. Sack said after reading OR, ‘I can 
acknowledge the book, now that I have read it through with deliberation, as nothing more 
than a spirited apology for pantheism, a rhetorical presentation of the Spinozistic system’.91 
And so it was the same for Schleiermacher’s reputation in the world of Dutch neo-Calvinism. 
In summarizing Schleiermacher’s OR, Bavinck writes ‘one must open his faculty of feeling as 
widely as possible to the world as a whole, view all things in the One and the One in all things, 
regard all that is particular as a revelation of the infinite, etc’—in all this feeling is ‘so 
pantheistically construed’.92 Additionally: ‘Schleiermacher displayed even greater resemblance 
to Spinoza. God and the universe are correlates’. 93  Bavinck regularly associates 
Schleiermacher’s ‘pantheism’ with Schleiermacher’s dogmatic method, constructing doctrines 
from an indirect view of the divine by a causal logic: 
In pantheism God has no distinct being, no life of his own apart from the 
world. His attributes are identical with the laws of the universe. 
Schleiermacher, accordingly, describes them in purely subjective terms as 
                                                 
89  Schleiermacher to F.H. Jacobi, 30 March 1818, Rowan, Letters, II. 283. Cited in B.A. 
Gerrish, Tradition and Modern World: Reformed Theology in the Ninteenth Century (Eugene, OR: Wipf 
& Stock, 2007), 104.  
90 Julia Lamm, The Living God: Schleiermacher’s Theological Appropriation of Spinoza (University Park: 
Penn State Univeristy Press, 1996), 1. 
91  Briefen, III.276. Cited in Lamm, The Living God, 1. Trans. in Albert L. Blackwell, ‘The 
Antagonistic Correspondence of 1801 between Chaplin Sack and His Protégé Schleiermacher’, 
Harvard Theological Review 74:1 (1981): 113.  
92 RD 1.267, 242. 
93 RD 2.114.   
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“something special in the way we relate the feeling of absolute dependence to 
God.” Their origin lies in religious-poetic invention and are devoid of 
speculative content. They express neither God’s essence (which is 
unknowable) nor his relations to the world, since this would imply that God 
sustained many different relations to the world. They are simply subjective 
ideas without any objective basis. Schleiermacher, therefore, did not deal with 
the doctrine of the attributes of God separately but interspersed it throughout 
his dogmatics.94 
 
By pantheism, Bavinck does not mean to attribute a literal ‘all-is-god’ to Schleiermacher but 
something akin to panentheism. Schleiermacher, he argues, ‘rejected the distinction between 
creation and providence and considered the question concerning whether the world was 
temporal or eternal a matter of indifference, provided the absolute dependence of all things on 
God was upheld’.95 Bavinck’s principal critique is that in Schleiermacher is a corruption of the 
Creator-creature distinction, but he gives attention to numerous others.  
 
After documenting evidence of Bavinck’s appreciation, dependence, and appropriation of the 
tradition derivative of Schleiermacher in the first part of this chapter, it is appropriate now to 
balance the scales. Bavinck’s direct citations of Schleiermacher are, as stated previously, critical 
some ninety percent of the time.96 One must understand precisely the object of these critiques 
to perceive the development of a more apparent and stronger appropriation in the second part 
of this study. That Bavinck enveloped something of the terminological and conceptual 
emphasis of Schleiermacher already in his early career is manifest in his adoption of the 
grammar of self-consciousness, God-consciousness, and dependence, amid others. That he 
treated Schleiermacher and the mediation theologies with appreciation and a willingness to 
learn at their feet in order to stand on their shoulders, wary of their mistakes and affirming of 
their ‘reformation’, is also apparent. What remains is to untie the material dogmatics from the 
adoption of the broadly philosophical and grammatical. This is to say, Bavinck is a consistent 
                                                 
94 RD 2.125. Also, 2.129: ‘Schleiermacher, disapproving of the way of negation and eminence, 
retained only the way of causality’. Cf. 2.132, 2.161. 
95 RD 2.411.  
96 This figure is derived from documenting each instance of Schleiermacher citation in the 
Reformed Dogmatics from the second edition forward.  
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and sharp critic of Schleiermacher’s material dogmatics. He does not adopt Schleiermacher’s 
doctrinal method or make consistent use of Schleiermacher’s material dogmatic formulations, 
as he interprets them, from CF.  
 
To suppose that the appropriation claimed is primarily derivative of dogmatic propositions in 
CF is to miss the point and risk conflation. To be sure, the adoption of Schleiermacher’s 
philosophical framework has implications for the logic of Bavinck’s dogmatic construction—
to be explored in part II. Briefly, Bavinck does use Schleiermacher’s doctrinal content at 
moments to construct, for example, a doctrine of sin, praises his return to the person of 
Christ as the center of Christianity,97 suggests that Schleiermacher restored the doctrine of 
regeneration to theology, 98  and lists him among the Reformed theologians that uphold a 
doctrine of election providing an adequate assurance of faith. 99  Yet, Bavinck remained a 
steadfast critic, especially constructing his own doctrine of Christ and defense of Christ’s two-
natures in response to Schleiermacher.100 There are three primary locales of critique, each 
derivative of a philosophical catalyst. The catalyst is Schleiermacher’s reception (as perceived 
by Bavinck) of Kant’s rigid epistemic separation between the illusory necessities of practical 
reason from synthetic knowledge, the latter of which comes only through the unity of 
experience and the categories of the understanding. Bavinck summarizes the epistemology 
accordingly: 
In the sensuous world, science is possible; with respect to the super-sensuous, 
we have to be satisfied with faith. So in Kant dogma was given the status of a 
personal conviction of faith grounded in moral motives. On the basis of other 
                                                 
97 RD 3.265. After Schleiermacher, the Christology of the nineteenth century ‘was generally 
characterized by the fact that, in reaction to rationalism and moralism, it returned to the 
person of Christ and attempted to assign to his appearance in history permanent significance 
for the religious life’. 
98 RD 4.60.  
99 RD 4.266-67.  
100 RD 3.406ff. RD 3.454. Aspects of Schleiermacher’s Christology are, he writes, ‘certainly 
true’. But, Schleiermacher’s Christology in toto ‘is certainly not in harmony with the teaching of 
Holy Scripture. It is a misconstrual of the person of Christ and a diminution of his work. 
Christ is not just a divinely inspired human being (ἀνθρωπος ἐνθεος) …’.  
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considerations, Schleiermacher arrived at a similar conclusion. It is true that he 
opposed Kant when he defined religion not as knowing or doing but as a 
certain kind of feeling. Nevertheless, precisely for that reason dogmas became 
for him accounts of subjective mental states, formulations of religious 
emotions, reflections in the mind of subjective piety.101  
 
The three locales of Bavinck’s critique include Schleiermacher’s failure to identify the proper 
object of dogmatics, the failure to identify the source of dogmatics, and the failure to maintain 
a robust Creator-creature distinction (i.e. pantheism). These critiques are interdependent. 
What the reader will find in Bavinck’s critique is a well-rehearsed litany, a common set of 
mistakes attributed to Schleiermacher. These critiques result in part from a view of 
Schleiermacher’s dogmatic structure: that the introduction is a philosophical foundation for 
the material dogmatic theology of parts I and II in CF, fueling an improper method.102   
 
However, like Barth, Bavinck could not elude Schleiermacher into Bavinck’s later career. A 
brief exposition of these critiques will prepare the entryway for the central thesis of part II, 
that Bavinck learned from Schleiermacher a particular logic for conceptualizing the principle 
of subjectivity in order to overcome the duality of being and thinking and to describe the 
subjective aspect of religion in general. In turn, this logic lead to his development of the fact 
of the self as a gift of grace, immediate self-consciousness as an organon of general revelation, 
and to conceiving the reality of the absolutely dependent self as the essence of religion in 
general.  
 
Prior to Enlightenment, Romanticism, and especially Schleiermacher, dogmatic theology in 
the Reformed tradition functioned largely as propositional deductions derived by good and 
                                                 
101 RD 1.35. 
102 Christine Helmer places the relation between the introduction and parts I and II as an 
interpretative choice between two options: ‘Is [the status of the introduction] that of a 
philosophical foundation for the theology contained in parts I and II? Or is it a preliminary 
contextualization of theology’s task and method in the non-theological disciplines that 
Schleiermacher outlines in the introduction as ethics, philosophy of religion, and apologetics’? 
Helmer, ‘Schleiermacher’, 33. 
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necessary consequence from Scripture with the application of philosophical grammar. To 
review, Schleiermacher takes a different approach. By starting with the religious self-
consciousness and especially Christian consciousness, which arises in relation to the 
experience of Jesus of Nazareth the Redeemer, Schleiermacher developed doctrine according 
to the good consequences of experience within a community of believers. Dogmatic theology 
is critical reflection on the experience of the Christian consciousness as expressed in the 
church. It unveils the unity of the consciousness of the Christian community at any ‘given 
time’.103 It is scientific insofar as its statements are ‘descriptively didactic’ and systematized 
offering a religious self-understanding of the Christian community in relation to God, the 
Woher (Whence) of absolute dependence.104 
 
Bavinck, like many nineteenth-century critics, argued that Schleiermacher’s centralizing of 
religious self-consciousness in its affections for the Redeemer as a descriptive, positive 
enterprise undermined dogmatic theology’s ability to set forth cognitive content, or knowledge 
of God. For Bavinck, more specifically, Schleiermacher’s problem was not emphasis on the 
religious self-consciousness as a starting point (principium) or norm, but its perceived isolation 
from the external, objective grounds of dogmatic authority. Schleiermacher’s descriptive use 
of other disciplines in the introduction of the CF, he argues, established philosophy as the 
starting point of dogmatics—thereby undermining the true foundation of dogmatics, 
inscripturated revelation, and its material content derived from exegetical reflection. In one 
instance Bavinck reveals his ja but nee regarding Schleiermacher’s method: ‘against [the] 
rationalization of theology [as natural theology] one has to maintain (alongside 
Schleiermacher, Rothe, Frank, Ritschl, etc.) the positive character of dogmatics… Dogmatics 
                                                 
103 CF §19: ‘Dogmatic theology is the science concerned with the interconnection of whatever 
doctrine has currency in a given social organization called a Christian church at a given time’. 
104 CF §16.1, §4.  
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is from start to finish the work of a believer who is confessing and giving an account of the 
ground and content of his faith’. The final sentence suggests an affinity with Schleiermacher’s 
positive dogmatics as an account of Christian belief through history. Yet, in between and after 
these two affirmations, he adds: ‘The foundations of faith (principia fidei) are themselves articles 
of faith (articuli fidei), based not on human arguments and proofs but on divine authority. The 
recognition of revelation, of Scripture as the Word of God, is an act of faith as well as its 
fruit… In the introductory section of dogmatics, therefore, only the foundations of faith are 
set forth and developed’. 105  In other words, while he agrees with Schleiermacher that 
dogmatics must be positive (pursuing an historical object toward a practical end), the object of 
dogmatics is God in his self-revelation rather than the historical-cultural Christian affections 
of a church community of the present-day with practical theology as its primary purpose. As 
Theodore Vial describes Schleiermacher’s positive method, ‘worship is theology’s raison d’être’, 
by which he is referring to the ‘minister’s role’ in public church leadership.106 More specifically, 
dogmatics in Schleiermacher’s theological taxonomy is, with exegetical theology and church 
history, a historical-theological enterprise situated in a three-fold study of the contents of 
original Christian faith, the faith of the centuries, and present-day faith. Dogmatics, for 
Bavinck, is Wissenschaft because God has revealed God in history and its end is supremely the 
knowledge of God that is eternal life (John 17:3). Bavinck’s conclusion in response to 
Schleiermacher is that the contents of faith must be derived from the ground of faith, 
objective revelation, and not from the self that has faith, because the end of dogma as an 
                                                 
105 RD 1.109.  
106 Theodore Vial, ‘Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Central Place of Worship in Theology’, 
Harvard Theological Review 91:1 (January 1998): 59-73, 60.  
 
 168 
enterprise is the glory of the Triune God, not church leadership.107 Thereby, revelation is 
distinctly and primarly an event of the past, preserved as written Word, and applied by the 
Spirit making alive the human consciousness.  
 
Bavinck’s critical remarks about Schleiermacher are exceedingly repetitive along these same 
paths. This is especially the case in the Prolegomena. He describes Schleiermacher’s theological 
method on numerous occasions using nearly the same syntax. These arguments begin with 
Schleiermacher’s philosophical commitments, which developed Bavinck argues prior to CF 
and deprived Schleiermacher of the true object of dogmatics, God himself: 
The philosophical viewpoint [Schleiermacher] assumed, as is evident from his 
Dialektik, prevented him from conceiving theology as a “science concerning 
God” (scientia de Deo) and naturally had to lead him into asserting a rigorous 
separation between theology and philosophy (a science). God, as the unity of 
the ideal and the real, is still unknowable to the intellect (which always thinks 
in terms of opposites) and can be experienced only in the heart; religion, 
therefore, is not cognition or action but a certain [state of affection].108  
 
Because Schleiermacher’s theology transferred the object of dogmatics to the religious mind 
directly and God only indirectly, it replaced God with the self-understanding of the Christian 
community. 109  The derivative, Bavinck argues, is that Scripture became a non-necessity. 
Bavinck presents a distinction, therein, between what he calls the ‘norm’ and ‘source’ of 
science to explain Schleiermacher’s method. Scripture becomes a non-necessity when it is only 
a norm and not a source of dogmatic content, speech about God. The reconstitution of an 
alternative source for dogmatic theology is derivative, Bavinck argues, of Schleiermacher’s 
epistemic modesty concerning the possibility of knowledge about God in the fact of trans-
                                                 
107 Derivatively, Bavinck disagrees then with Schleiermacher’s statement in CF §1.1 as it relates 
to dogmatics: ‘After all, since what precedes a science by way of defining it cannot belong to 
the science itself’. 
108 RD 1.47.  
109  For example, Schleiermacher writes in OR, 108: ‘it can rightly be said that in religion 
everything is immediately true, since nothing at all is expressed in its individual moments 
except the religious person’s own state of mind’. 
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phenomenal being. This, in turn, led to a reconstruction of the idea of revelation away from 
God’s self-manifestation of himself.  
For Schleiermacher Scripture and confession could no longer carry authority 
on the ground that they contained divine revelation but were entitled to a 
measure of authority only insofar as they were more or less accurate accounts 
of religious experience or of Christian piety. Theology and dogmatics could 
therefore retain a kind of scientific authority only if they found their content in 
a given object, viz., the church, and their purpose in serving the leadership of 
that church. Both disciplines were thus given a subjective starting point and a 
practical aim.110 
 
The turn to religious experience in contrast to reliance on the ‘authority’ of Scripture and 
confession is derivative of Schleiermacher’s alternative definition of revelation from that of his 
tradition: that revelation consists in imparting new, unique life to the human consciousness, 
not knowledge of God. Bavinck records: ‘this is the definition Schleiermacher gave of 
revelation in his Speeches on Religion: just as for the religious person everything is a miracle, so 
for that person also “every original and new communication of the universe and of that 
person’s inmost life” is a revelation’. And this is also the case for CF:  
[For Schleiermacher] the uniqueness of a revelation does not consist in its 
natural or supernatural character but in the newness or originality with which it 
appears in history, in “the originality of a fact which underlies a religious 
community.” But in the Christian Faith, more clearly than in the Speeches, it 
emerged that in Christianity the person of Christ has such original 
significance… So, while revelation is typically marked by its own inherent 
originality, its effect and aim consist in the new life it imparts. By these assertions, 
Schleiermacher paved the way for the view of revelation that defined it in terms of the 
communication not of doctrine but of life.111 
 
Bavinck indeed places value in Schleiermacher’s concept of revelation and its communication 
of ‘life’ instead of a mere propositional knowing. However, the outcome, Bavinck argues, is 
that Schleiermacher’s dogmatics, in an ironic turn, fails to satisfy fully the religious needs of 
human nature: the need for the truth about God. Its mode of description and fixation on the 
community consciousness ‘at a given time’ precludes prescription. The dogmatic task, for 
                                                 
110 RD 1.48. 
111 RD 1.289–290. Cf. Schleiermacher’s discussion in CF §10. 
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Schleiermacher, ‘was not and could not be to mark this Christian piety as the only true and 
correct one but was limited to the obligation of making this Christian piety known in its 
essential elements. Therefore, according to Schleiermacher, the scientific nature of dogmatics 
lay solely in the didactic character of its language and in its systematic arrangement, i.e., in 
something purely formal’.112 Material dogmatics could no longer claim to be speech about 
God, but only reflection on the causal relation between God and the Christian consciousness 
at any given moment in space-time. ‘The question of whether Christianity was the true religion 
lay outside the reach of dogmatics; its sole task was to set forth positively the elements of 
Christian piety’.113 And Bavinck reflects on the consequences for modern theology after: ‘So, 
the separation Schleiermacher intended ended in a complete fusion [of philosophy and 
theology]... there is a tendency [now] to replace all transcendent-metaphysical statements 
about God, his essence and attributes, his words and works, with descriptions of Christian 
experience and its content’.114   
 
Bavinck, accordingly, offers an alternative solution in direct response to his reflections on 
Schleiermacher:  
For theology, as an independent scientific enterprise, has its own first principles 
and does not borrow them from philosophy. Placing apologetics at the head of 
all the other theological disciplines, as this occurs in Schleiermacher and others, 
is explicable only from the fact that these theologians no longer recognized 
theology’s own principles and were forced to look elsewhere for a foundation 
on which the building of theology could rest. If, however, theology is deduced 
from its own source, i.e., from revelation, it has its own certainty and does not 
need the corroboration of philosophical reasoning. Accordingly, apologetics 
cannot and may not precede dogmatics but presupposes dogma and now gets 
the modest but still splendid task of maintaining and defending this dogma 
against all opposition.115 
 
                                                 
112 RD 1.48.  
113 RD 1.48.  
114 RD 1.47–48. 
115 RD 1.55–56. 
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However, Schleiermacher’s response to this all too common charge was that it is necessary to 
consider the religious self-consciousness first because of the universal fact that it arises in 
human nature.116 It presents itself to the consciousness and is not given as a philosophical 
foundation for the substance of theology—he was not trying to argue for such. The 
philosophical foundations of the introduction are not grounds for material dogmatics but an 
attempt to uncover piety descriptively, and particularly its Christian instantiation in history. 
The editor’s note in CF §1.3, note 11, helpfully explains: ‘lemmas [the initial propositions in 
the early portions of CF] do not belong to the substance of dogmatics itself. They simply 
serve… to carve out what the territory of dogmatics is’. Religious self-consciousness as the 
feeling of absolute dependence is a fact for both the philosopher and theologian.117  
 
By 1908, Bavinck will come to agree with Schleiermacher on precisely this point, that religious 
self-consciousness as the feeling of absolute dependence is a given of a universal human 
nature. This aspect of what Bavinck calls ‘subjective religion’ is what he especially learned 
from Schleiermacher.118 Additionally by 1908, Schleiermacher’s exposition and grammar of the 
human personality according to the fact of religious self-consciousness in CF §4 becomes 
central to Bavinck’s epistemic and anthropological musings, and is the grammar Bavinck uses 
to express his doctrine of general revelation in relation to religion. To say it another way, 
Bavinck learns from Schleiermacher that fundamental to human nature is the consciousness of 
God, revealed in a feeling of absolute dependence on the infinite essence. To be a human self 
is to be given a consciousness of both self and God arising in the dialectic of activity and 
receptivity with and in the world (finite) relating to the Absolute (infinite), a relation which is 
                                                 
116 James Duke and Francis Fiorenza, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, On the Glaubenslehre, 5. 
117 James Duke and Francis Fiorenza, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, On the Glaubenslehre, 5. 
118 This aspect of Schleiermacher’s ‘reformation’ was in consanguinity with the history of 
Reformed theology and Augustinian theology before it: ‘The Reformation’, already, Bavinck 
argues ‘deliberately and freely took its position in the religious subject, in the faith of the 
Christian, in the testimony of the Holy Spirit’. RD 1.583.  
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felt, not discursively known. Bavinck’s concepts of self-consciousness and world-
consciousness, therefore, are correlates.  
 
Consequently, Bavinck’s critique of Schleiermacher pertains not to Schleiermacher’s 
centralization of the religious subject per se, but to what Bavinck considered to be an 
absolutizing of the religious subject at the expense of the proper object of dogmatic 
construction: 
The distance between God and us is the gulf between the Infinite and the 
finite, between eternity and time, between being and becoming, between the 
All and the nothing. However little we know of God, even the faintest notion 
implies that he is a being who is infinitely exalted above every creature. While 
Holy Scripture affirms this truth in the strongest terms, it nevertheless sets 
forth a doctrine of God that fully upholds his knowability.119 
 
Bavinck affirms in theory a Kantian modesty regarding knowledge of the trans-phenomenal. 
The gulf is real and the bridge is impossible to build from below. Reason will not make its way 
across the chasm of being and becoming. Yet, this short passage presented at the beginning of 
RD 2 unfolds the key distinction, which is encapsulated in the word ‘nevertheless’. The 
knowability of God is derivative not of the possibility of humanity laying a bridge across the 
gulf but through God’s decision to set forth a witness to himself, and this unfolding witness is 
to be regarded as both event and text. Bavinck’s solution is to maintain with his predecessors 
that the text of Scripture is the Word of God set forth as revelation of God—a revelation pro 
nobis. If the text of Scripture is regarded in faith as the Word, and if God himself in the 
inspiration of that Word speaks of himself as he is, then theology’s task is defined by the fact 
of the Word set forth. It is knowledge of God by the fact of his self-manifestation received by 
the organon of the Christian consciousness.  
 
Dogmatics, in this case, need not set forth Christian religious affections in speech through the 
paradigm of causal logic. Rather, it ought to adjust its reasoning to the logic of the Scriptures 
                                                 
119 RD 2.30. 
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as primary authority discerning the material content of its science and doing so with respect to 
the catholic hermeneutic derived from the commonality of the saints.  
 
To be sure, he argues, while this is a ‘reliable knowledge of God, [it is] not a knowledge that 
exhaustively corresponds to his being’.120 One may apprehend God in his self-revelation, but 
can never comprehend God. Bavinck too, with Schleiermacher, is deeply suspicious of natural 
theology (when, for Bavinck, it is introduced logically prior to the speech of revealed 
theology). But Bavinck’s faith in the Scriptures as the objective, authoritative revelation of 
God is the distinguishing mark that he considered undercut Schleiermacher’s methodology 
and places Bavinck firmly within the bounds of his own Reformed, post-Reformation 
orthodox tradition. 121  Taking the Scripture as God’s Word at God’s word (affirming the 
circularity in the doctrine of the autopistos as he does) distinguishes Schleiermacher’s 
theological methodology from his own.122 
                                                 
120 RD 2.33. He also affirms the inadequacy, the impossibility even, of speech about God as he 
is in himself: ‘Although [God] reveals himself in his names, no name is adequate to the 
purpose. He is nameless’. Also: ‘It is the incontrovertible teaching of Scripture, however, that 
in God’s secret being he is unknowable and unnamable, and that all God’s names presuppose 
his self-revelation, that is, his creation. Of God’s being and life apart from creation we know 
nothing for the simple reason that we ourselves are creatures and therefore always bound to 
creation’. RD 2.133.  
121 Central to Bavinck’s affirmation of both Kant and Schleiermacher’s epistemic modesty is 
the shared emphasis on ‘certainty’, as Bavinck interprets them. He affirms with Kant, he 
writes, that ‘concerning invisible things we have a very different certainty than concerning the 
things we can perceive with our senses or prove with our logical faculties’. And this faith in 
things unseen does not function ‘apart from our will, moral disposition, or spiritual 
experience’. With this, he combines the distinction he wants to make between he and Kant: 
‘still, it is not advisable for us to exchange the religious certainty of Holy Scripture, the church, 
and Christian theology for Kant’s brand of moral certainty’. RD 1.576. Faith, given by God 
through the means of the Word of God, is a particular faith-knowledge.  
122 ‘Scripture brings with it its own authority; it is self-based and self-attested as trustworthy 
(αὐτοπιστος). Just as light is distinguished from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter, 
so Scripture is recognized by its own truth’. RD 1.583. Bavinck does, however, suggest that 
Schleiermacher has contributed to a rehabilitation of this doctrine: ‘Various factors have 
contributed, however, to a partial rehabilitation of this doctrine. Kant’s critique of rationalism, 
“the proof of the spirit and of power” to which Lessing appealed, the romanticism of Jacobi 






This foray into Bavinck’s critique of Schleiermacher offers, therefore, a more precise account 
of appropriation by way of negation. This is to say, Bavinck neither affirms Schleiermacher’s 
dogmatic method nor much of the material content of his theology due to the perceived 
failure of that method to listen to God’s Word as the Word of authority. In turn, 
Schleiermacher, Bavinck supposes, confused the distinction between source and norm by 
taking the believing consciousness as a source to derive statements about what must be true of 
God’s being and action as given in the consciousness of the contemporary Christian 
community. Bavinck’s counterproposal is that God has already set forth his attributes and 
actions in the witness of revelation in history. Such witness, the Scriptures, is also Revelation 
in the fact of its origin as the breath of God. The Word on paper is indeed divine discourse. 
Therefore: ‘here too the activity of the human spirit consists in nothing else than in bearing 
witness to the truth, in thinking God’s thoughts after him’.123 
 
Nevertheless, the ongoing nature of Bavinck’s claim that Schleiermacher is a ‘reformation’ 
theologian is striking. It is evident in his early writings and then restated a decade later in the 
Dogmatics. While Bavinck was critical of Schleiermacher in the broadest of ways for ‘departing 
from the church’s confession and even from Scripture’, 124  he also acknowledged that 
Schleiermacher ‘in the name of the authentic Luther…opposed the doctrine and practice 
generally in vogue’. 125  Although he dismissed Schleiermacher’s dogmatic content, 
                                                                                                                                                    
validation of the Christian religion must be grounded in the faith of the church. Religious 
truth must be proven in a way that differs from proving a proposition in mathematics’. RD 
1.585.  
123 RD 1.588.  
124 RD 1. 171. 
125RD 1.171. Also: ‘Against this mistaken direction in apologetics, the criticism of Kant and 
Schleiermacher was appropriate. For, in the first place, inherent in this approach was a denial 
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Schleiermacher was, Bavinck argued, ‘reformationally minded… and sought to restore the 
original gospel as well as relating it to the entire culture’.126  
 
Amid Bavinck’s criticism, it is his affirmation that Schleiermacher was a figure of reformation, 
a restorer of the original gospel,127 that one finds a peculiar esteem (a middle way).128 As he 
moves into the second half of his career, Bavinck’s appropriation does not submit to 
Schleiermacher’s dogmatic theology in method or content. However, he does appropriate 
Schleiermacher’s philosophic-religious taxonomy of the human subject in its immediate 
awareness of self, world, and God. It is to this appropriation that the study turns in part II. It 
is the case already in his early career that Bavinck turned toward the subject insofar as an 
emphasis on the subjective aspect of the objective kingdom plays a prominent role in his 
corpus of the 1880s and 1890s. This conclusion offered in the introduction is worth restating: 
because, for Bavinck, the essential principles of contemporary theology cannot be understood 
without knowledge of philosophical movements, the fact of subjectivity became a locus in his 
work even in his earliest career. It was after facing the ‘challenges posed by modernity’ in his 
                                                                                                                                                    
of the essence of religion, objectively of the character and content of religious truth, 
subjectively of religious faith’. RD 1.516. 
126 RD 1.171. Emphasis added. He includes also the Vermittlungstheologen as the subject of this 
sentence. 
127 In antithesis to his affirmation of Schleiermacher’s original gospel, he later argues Ritschl 
and Harnack’s gospels to be the opposite: ‘Yet, Harnack and Ritschl did oppose the original 
Gospel by making dogmatic statements nothing but religious-ethical value judgments: What 
the essence of Christianity is, in what things the revelation or word of God consists, who the 
person of Christ is, is not decided by the apostles; everyone settles these matters in accordance 
with his or her own insights. The result is that all these schools not only have to oppose the 
church, the confession, and theology but even the apostles to Jesus and the original gospel’. 
RD 1.606.  
128 He especially praised Schleiermacher, amongst others, for his fight against rationalism: ‘It 
took real courage to go back to the church and its dogmas, as Schleiermacher and Hegel did, 
and to discover there, be it only in a certain sense, deep religious truth. It was a manifestation 
of moral strength to break with the rationalistic demand for lucidity, to take up the cudgels for 
the despised religion of the church and again to assert the validity and value of the Christian 
faith’. RD 1.520. 
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Leiden context, as it has been put, that his own constructive efforts reflected precisely the 
































Concerning the Unity of Being and Thinking 
 
Within the corpus of his early years through both the modern Dutch theological schools and 
direct interaction with the texts of Schleiermacher, Bavinck adopted an emphasis on the 
human subject and its place in theology. He did so with attention to theological ethics and 
specifically to human moral agency in relation to the fact of the Kingdom of God. His work 
included an emphasis on the conscience, accompanied by the deduction of the original 
knowledge of God. Such a path to knowledge of the Divine through the moral consciousness 
is a necessary derivative after the rupture between God- and self-consciousness.  
 
His later corpus marks not deviation but development on these emphases and, specifically, a 
robust adoption of the grammar of Schleiermacher’s account of human subjectivity. And this 
is the case most clearly in his Stone lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1908, the 
Philosophy of Revelation. Within, he delivers an argument that situates the ‘reality’ of both the 
human self and world within a subjective certainty revealed as gevoel (feeling)—doing so within 
a ‘world-view’ of subjects and objects made intelligible by theism. PoR is Bavinck’s adjustment 
of modern accounts of the relation between self and world to the fact of God’s revelation.  
 
It participates partly in what now has become common in contemporary scholarship: 
competing origination narratives for the ‘invention’ of the modern self.1 For most of these 
                                                 
1 In view is less the aspect of modern selfhood that pertains to an investigation of modern 
cultural identity (expressive individualism, consumerism, etc.). Rather, the term refers to 
modern philosophical expressions of the ‘inner-self’, its psychology, and its relation to 
questions of epistemology and metaphysics. One might say, the modern self here is referring 
to the context of Kant more than Weber. Yet, these aspects of ‘modern selfhood’ are 
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theses, the constitution of a unique, modern inner-self began with the early ruminations of 
Enlightenment in Descartes.2 As Bavinck puts it in 1908 as he had done before, Descartes 
mistakenly associated the essence of the soul with thinking.3 But the catalyst that led to the 
Enlightenment terminus point of modern selfhood is highly contested.4 Such contests, which 
locate the early beginnings of a modern obsession with subjectivity in as diverse figures as 
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Scotus, and Descartes have created a particular field of research 
regarding the ‘saga of selfhood’.5  
 
Despite the disagreements, Bavinck agrees with many that the saga of inner-self was birthed 
long before Descartes, albeit in an entirely different expression. In Augustine, one finds a turn 
to an inner-self that is a theologically fresh expansion of the philosophical motifs of 
inwardness in the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Plotinian philosophies. Augustine is the first to 
offer a robust Christian theological conception of personal subjectivity.6 But conceptions of 
self, modern or otherwise, were birthed he supposes from a reality of an essential selfhood 
that the Scriptures call the ‘heart’ or ‘spirit’, the totality of consciousness consisting of the 
organic unity between the temporal affections, knowledge, and desires with the individual 
                                                                                                                                                    
interrelated. The social trajectories of a communal consciousness of identity are not 
independent of philosophical theories of the constitution of the thinking ‘I’ in modern 
philosophy. This unity is central to Charles Taylor’s work in Sources of the Self: The Making of 
Modern Identity (Cambridge: CUP, 1989).  
2 Bavinck argued as much in 1903: ‘After the middle of the eighteenth century this situation 
[regarding pre-modern certainty] gradually changed. The subject came into its own. It became 
aware of its true or presumed rights and slowly broke all the ties binding it to the past. In an 
unlimited sense of freedom, it emancipated itself from everything the past held sacred’. The 
Certainty of Faith, 8. 
3 PoR, 63. 
4 Cary tells one version of the narrative which begins with Plato’s invention of inwardness 
leading to Augustine’s invention (inventio) of the inner-self. Invention does not signify the 
making of something new but the discovery and problem-solving assertion related to what is. 
Philip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: OUP, 
2000).  
5 This phrase is from Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), 34. 
6 See Michael Hanby, Augustine and Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2003).  
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essence, the ego—this fact of unified individuality expresses itself already in the event of 
Ancient Near Eastern re-naming ceremonies concerning the relation between name (as an 
identity) and a vocation.7 
 
A name designates the boundary of a person or thing distinct from any other object. ‘To be a 
self is to possess and be possessed by a name’.8 And that name signifies the unity of the Ik (I) 
with its temporal identity formed within its representational life. Also, to use Schleiermacher’s 
grammar, the identification that occurs in the activity of naming points to the consistent and 
necessary relation between the sensible, mediate self-consciousness (arising from the 
Anschauungen, or intuitions, and Gefühle, or feelings, that are due to direct relation with the 
objective world) and the immediate (the feeling related to an original unity of self, and that 
which exists across all states of temporal experience).9 In the experience of the sensible or 
lower self-consciousness the givenness of the immediate self stands before (or even behind) 
‘us’ as both distinct from the world and as a presupposition of all relations in the world. The 
immediate self-consciousness which accompanies and retreats behind the feelings of co-
determinate freedom and dependence offers ‘us’ a unity that is outwith all discursive 
cognition.  
 
                                                 
7  RD 2.97: ‘A name is a sign of the person bearing it, a designation referring to some 
characteristic in which a person reveals himself or herself and becomes knowable. There is a 
connection between a name and its bearer, and that connection, so far from being arbitrary, is 
rooted in that bearer. Even among us [moderns], now that names have for the most part 
become mere sounds without meaning, that connection is still felt. A name is something 
personal and very different from a number or a member of a species. It always feels more or 
less unpleasant when others misspell or garble our name: it stands for our honor, our worth, 
our person and individuality. But that linkage was much more vital in earlier times when 
names still had a transparent meaning and actually revealed the identity of a person or thing’. 
8 Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology, 34. 
9 CF §4.1-2, 5.1. Bavinck critiques pragmatism for absolutizing chaos and taming it with an 
interposed assertion of human autonomy consequently losing claim to the realities of God, 
humanity, and world. Pragmatism sacrifices ‘not only God, but all ideas and names’. PoR, 68. 
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Schleiermacher’s philosophical anthropology presented briefly in CF §2-5 contains a 
significant aspect of the grammar Bavinck adopted to describe the unity of the self-world 
relation as given (gegeven) or dependent, emphasizing the faith that undergirds all living, moving, 
and being. Because the finite is dependent even its spontaneous activity (freedom), being in 
the world requires absolute dependence on something outwith the finite world. After 
Schleiermacher, Bavinck argues that the self as well as the world cannot be accounted for or 
its essence discovered by the activity of denken (thinking). Rather, by the fact of the feeling of 
absolute dependence, all knowing and doing begins from a certainty of faith in a given, 
dependent self and world. By ‘given’ therefore, he means that which one accepts with certainty 
by the fact of its apparent reality—that unity between self and world (an organism) is a gift. In 
other words, ‘given’ does not refer to the epistemological theory that the self-world relation is 
un-interpreted and non-representational. Rather, ‘given’, for Bavinck, simply means an 
immediate consciousness of finitude, a certainty of self and world, which is felt. Everyone, he 
supposes, is fully secure in their consciousness of the self-world unity even within 
representational life. Such unity is certain not because of an account derived from ‘thinking or 
willing’ but simply because one ‘feels assured’—which is only accounted for by means of faith 
(theism) alone.10 
 
In the previous unit, chapter two traced the history of Schleiermacher (and his progeny) in 
Bavinck’s Netherlands establishing the fact that Bavinck especially learned Schleiermacher 
through mediation-theological movements. In chapter three, Bavinck’s early texts displayed a 
clear pattern of consistent rumination on the major motifs of what he called ‘consciousness-
theology’. In this chapter, one turns now to Bavinck’s later career from 1902 but with special 
focus on 1908-9. It is in his lectures on the PoR that evidences Bavinck’s strongest conceptual 
appropriation of Schleiermacher directly. He turns here to the adoption of Schleiermacher’s 
                                                 
10 PoR, 69.  
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grammar to answer two questions: (i) how does one account for the certainty of reality; (ii) 
what is religion? 
 
At the methodological center of both of these questions is self-consciousness and immediate 
certainty: ‘the only possible way of demonstrating the [fact of reality] is by briefly inquiring 
how we discover its content… [and] the only path by which we are able to attain reality is that 
of self-consciousness’.11 Later in his argument, he directly relates the concept and experience 
of self-consciousness to the feelings of relative and absolute dependence. Bavinck’s assertion 
delivers the reader at the doorstep of this question: how did Bavinck appropriate 
Schleiermacher’s Selbstbewusstsein (self-consciousness) and Abhängigkeitsgefühl (feeling of 
dependence) into his zelfbewustzijn and afhankelijkheidsgevoel? 12  In broader query then is the 
balance between the modern and orthodox in Bavinck’s writings per the definitions offered in 
the introduction. Is the concept of immediate self-consciousness in PoR an appropriation of a 
modern (Schleiermacher) philosophical and religious emphasis under the conditions of 
Bavinck’s confessional Dutch Reformed heritage? The same proposition that Crouter imposes 
on Schleiermacher interpreters is appropriate here: ‘an interpreter must decide whether a 
Calvin or a Tillich is the proper model to have in mind when reading Schleiermacher’.13 For 
Bavinck, in a similar way, must one decide between Calvin and Schleiermacher? The answer in 
this chapter is ‘no’ insofar as the fact of Bavinck’s reading of Schleiermacher determines a 
significant aspect of Bavinck’s account of the unity of self as well as its religious element. 
Immediate self-consciousness as the feeling of absolute dependence is the linchpin for 
Bavinck’s construction of the relationships within the synonymous pairs self/world, 
subject/object, ideal/real, and thinking/being. To be sure, Bavinck’s presentation is 
idiosyncratic. Yet, he uses Schleiermacher’s basic, introductory grammar from CF in his own 
                                                 
11 PoR, 55-56.  
12 Bavinck’s use of afhankelijkheidsgevoel as a German translation is a secondary argument for 
dependence on Schleiermacher.   
13 Richard Crouter, Between Enlightenment and Romanticism, 226. 
 
 183 
construction as an expression of the lineage of Augustine in his reflection on God and the 
soul, re-framed and made precise within the modern philosophical milieu.  
 
In demonstration of the significance of Schleiermacher’s concepts and arguments for 
Bavinck’s PoR, this chapter focuses on the philosophical question Bavinck posed—that 
between reality and self—before turning in chapter five to the question of religion. His 
conclusion per his philosophical account is that, despite the distinction between 
representation and idea, the certainty of reality is established pre-discursively in the given unity 
of thinking (self) and being (world) as an aspect of the feeling of dependence in immediate self-
consciousness. This organic unity is the gift of God, a common grace.   
 
To prove this appropriation the chapter works in four steps: (i) it first offers an overview of 
the argument of PoR to set Bavinck’s adoption in context; (ii) section two narrows in on this 
context through his dichotomization of Kant and Schleiermacher; (iii) section three outlines 
Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacherian concepts in his own argument for the certainty 
of reality; (iv) section four nuances Bavinck’s argument by setting it between Augustine and 
Schleiermacher. 
 
4.1. Understanding the Philosophy of Revelation  
 
Every human being, Bavinck suggests, is confronted in life with a specific set of questions. 
‘The problems that confront the human mind always return to these: what is the relation 
between thinking and being, between being and becoming, and between becoming and acting? 
What am I? What is the world and what is my place and task within this world’?14 These are 
the questions of both philosophy and theology. And at the head of these questions is the 
                                                 
14 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 11. ‘De problemen, waarvoor de menschelijke geest 
altijd weer te staan komt, zijn deze: wat is de verhouding van denken en zijn, van zijn en 
worden, van worden en handelen? Wat ben ik, wat is de wereld en wat is in die wereldmijne 
plaats en mijn taak'? 
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relation between human consciousness/essential identity as well as thinking/embodied real. 
Here begins the questions of a world and life orientation.15 Both philosophy and theology 
offer answers to this series using different and, for Bavinck, interdependent systems of 
classification.16  
 
Hence, he delivers in 1908 at the same time, a philosophy of revelation and a philosophy of 
revelation.17 One can understand the genitive in either subjective or objective form.18 In the 
former, a philosophy of revelation is a ‘revelational philosophy’ where the affirmation of 
revelation, the theism of Scripture, controls the method and contents of philosophical 
investigation. The latter is a philosophical study of revelation. The PoR is something of both. 
It is from the perspective of the fact of revelation (treated in dogmatics) from which Bavinck 
embarks on a philosophical investigation of the ‘how’ of revelation in its relation to the human 
subject and nature. As he investigates aspects of reality, he explains why the reality of the 
theism of Scripture is necessary to give an adequate account. Any philosophy of revelation, for 
                                                 
15 PoR, 1. Bavinck situates PoR as a determination of world-view according to the answers one 
gives to these questions.  
16 This language is original to Nick Adams, ‘Hegel’, Theology and Philosophy, eds.  Oliver Crisp, 
Gavin D’Costa, Mervyn Davies, and Peter Hampson (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark), 129-
142.  
17 The activity of the philosophy of revelation in general is a modern enterprise. Bavinck 
associates the development of the field to a post-Kantian need for philosophical treatments of 
revelation in antithesis to rationalism: ‘yet it soon became evident that the theorists [of 
Enlightenment] had too swiftly dismissed revelation. Upon deeper historical and philosophical 
investigation, religion and revelation evinced a much closer kinship than they had thought 
under the sway of rationalism. Thus, in more modern theology and philosophy, the concept of 
revelation again regained some respectability, and various attempts at reconstruction were 
made. The critical philosophy of Kant led Fichte to undertake an inquiry into all revelation, 
which, though it modified the concept, nevertheless maintained its possibility’. RD 1.288. 
18  Although a peculiar distinction in Dutch, Bavinck makes it himself in his 1918 essay 
‘Philosophie des Geloofs’. He describes the possible distinctions present within the title based on 
how one ‘understands the genitive’ as ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’. ET: ‘Philosophy of Religion 
(Faith)’, in Essays on Religion, Science, and Society, trans. Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres, ed. 
John Bolt (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 25-32, 25.  
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Bavinck, must be to some degree a ‘revelational philosophy’ due to the necessity of assuming 
revelation when embarking.19 
 
PoR is also an apologetic but its task is not to set forth a detailed defense of the ‘secret’ of 
existence (revelation). Apologetics for Bavinck can also take form in assuming faith and 
accepting the fact of revelation in the activity of disciplined thinking. Such an attempt is a 
pronouncement that ‘with their faith [Christians] do not stand as isolated aliens in the midst of 
the world but find support for it in nature and history, in science and art, in society and state, 
in the heart and conscience of every human being. The Christian worldview alone’, Bavinck 
argues, ‘is one that fits the reality of the world and of life’.20 The basic point is this: thinking 
disciplined by attention to revelation makes intelligible many of the answers philosophy seeks. 
PoR is participation in an assumed God-ward reality insofar as it examines revelation in and 
through its relation to the various arenas of human life. Those areas include the basic 
questions of philosophy, nature, history, religion, religious experience, and time.  
 
Revelation here, in review, refers first to the act of God ad extra to create and, in time, redeem. 
Such action is God’s Word or speech set forth, Deus dixit. It is the concept that God has 
‘come forward out of his hiddenness’.21 Revelation includes, for Bavinck, both the Scriptures 
(principium cognoscendi externum) and God’s self-manifestation in the created order, in nature and 
conscience. But PoR is written for the sake of a two-fold task that includes first the conceptual 
expansion of the domain of revelation. This project stems, he suggests, from the fact that ‘the 
                                                 
19 The fact that Bavinck engaged in the project of PoR is a testimony to his relation to modern 
theology, as glimpsed in the previous footnote. Philosophies of revelation were an enterprise 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and, in contradistinction to pre-modern 
theology, such a focus on revelation as a locus of philosophy was novel. Such justification for 
revelation and its relation to philosophical investigation is absent from the earlier Reformed 
tradition.  
20 RD 1.515. 
21 RD 1.286.  
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old theology construed revelation after a quite external and mechanical fashion’.22 They too 
readily associated revelation solely with the written text or with an object in general. An 
expansion, rather, includes the recognition of ‘revelation as a disclosure of the musterion tou 
theou. What neither nature nor history, neither mind nor heart, neither science nor art can 
teach us, [revelation] makes known to us (the fixed, unalterable will of God) … a will at 
variance with well-nigh the whole appearance of things’.23 It is, in other words, that ‘the secret 
of the universe’ lays beyond the self-evident (as appearances) in ‘the secret of revelation’, the 
will of God made manifest to the human consciousness.24 Revelation, in other words, is the 
key to a significant query of the whole nineteenth-century: is there a unity to existence, an 
organism to be found, and how can one justify such a claim? 
 
Yet, Bavinck also unveils the fact of the self-evidence of revelation. At the center of PoR is his 
argument that the self is given by God as a gift, arising as immediate consciousness, which is 
simultaneously a revelation of God as the Whence of absolute dependence. The unity of the 
human agent (organism) is a grace that makes possible the ‘world’ or ‘universe’ because only 
consciousness beholds such unity called ‘world’.  His first intention though is to universalize 
the search for revelation as the fulcrum of unity—to take it up to the monstrosity of the 
universe in all its diversity and bring it down into the primacy of the inner-self. Modern 
natural sciences and psychology have offered the opportunity of expanding the dimensions of 
existence and so the theologian must coordinate this expansion to the concept of God’s 
immanent presence. The basic premise is this: ‘the world itself rests on revelation; revelation is 
the presupposition, the foundation, [and] secret of all that exists in all its forms. The deeper 
                                                 
22 PoR, 22. 
23 PoR, 25. 
24  For Bavinck, the self-evident is not simply self-evident: ‘there are few things we 
comprehend ... I comprehend, or think I comprehend, the things that are self-evident and 
perfectly natural. Often comprehension ceases to the degree that a person digs deeper into a 
subject. That which seemed self-evident proves to be absolutely extraordinary and amazing. 
The farther a science penetrates its object, the more it approaches mystery. Even if on its 
journey it encountered no other object it would still always be faced with the mystery of 
being’. RD 1.619.  
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science pushes its investigations, the more clearly will it discover that revelation underlies all 
created being. In every moment of time beats the pulse of eternity; every point in space is 
filled with the omnipresence of God’.25 Revelation is the answer to the ‘how’ of all unified 
relations.  
 
Revelation comes ‘to us’, from everywhere to consciousness, shining by its own light and ‘tells 
us’ both its content and form. It is the ‘how’ of revelation’s movement that occupies the 
second purpose of PoR. He ‘trace[s] the idea of revelation both in its form and content and 
correlate[s] it with the rest of our knowledge and life’.26 The task is to associate the wisdom 
gained in the various fields of philosophy and science with the wisdom unveiled in revelation 
within those arenas of being. How does revelation matter in all ‘our’ knowing, feeling, and 
doing? It is an investigation of both how it comes ‘to us’ (awakening the consciousness) and 
how it relates to all of human existence. But first, how does revelation speak to the relation 
between consciousness and world, thinking and being? The answer to this question is found at 
the crossroads of the activity of revelation and the fact of the self.  
 
This path to an account of the real begins through consideration of the many problems of 
modern philosophy. He polemicizes against all philosophies that fail to satisfy the needs 
represented by the human heart in both its affective and intellectual demands.27 These include 
all philosophies that set themselves against religion and, by co-extension, revelation. 
The history of philosophy has been a history of systems that broke each other 
down and ended among the Greeks, in skepticism, in the Middle Ages in 
nominalism, and today among many in agnosticism. The truths most necessary 
to religion (the existence and essence of God; the origin and destiny of 
humanity and the world; sin and forgiveness; reward and punishment) have 
alternately been taught and combated. On all these issues no adequate certainty 
                                                 
25 PoR, 27.  
26 PoR, 24. 
27 Per its Scriptural use and as shown in chapter three, Bavinck regularly uses the heart and 
subsequently both personality and consciousness as synonyms to describe the entire faculty 
range of the human ‘mind’. 
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can be obtained in philosophy. Cicero, therefore, correctly asks the question: 
“Does not every eminently competent and serious philosopher confess himself 
to be ignorant of many things and that—even more—there are still many 
things to be learned by him”?28 
 
While there had been a day where philosophy and science had blunted the sword of revelation 
with the rock of reason and scientism seemed to have prophesied the future fall of religion, at 
the turn of the twentieth century Bavinck saw a renewed interest in things unseen.29 Both the 
academic and social imaginary were recovering from the materialisms of the late nineteenth-
century and they were, he supposed, re-discovering revelation and Hegel. Revelation holds a 
central place in the world. This the ancients knew and this was the content of the awakening 
from the disenchanted death of the post-Darwinian nineteenth-century as Bavinck read his 
times. 
 
After the in-breaking of autonomy as a social order in the tenets of Enlightenment, revolution, 
and the Darwinian turn, the expanding search for both the fact of revelation and how it comes 
to ‘us’ is a mark of the spirit of a renewed religious curiosity. The romantic recovery of the 
inexhaustible ‘fullness of life’ in Goethe and Herder was followed by a romantic evolution in 
Hegel that proved ‘too organic and teleological for the nineteenth-century’.30 After Marx and 
Darwin ‘revelation could no longer be a possibility’.31 ‘Nevertheless, the transition from the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century witnessed an important change in this respect. The 
                                                 
28 RD 1.313.  
29 In 1904, he wrote: ‘a new generation has appeared, which has exchanged the insight that we 
have become so glorious with the insight that the unknowable and unrecognizable surrounds 
us on all sides. Besides, on the one hand, the pursued idolization of science and culture, there 
is on the other hand a reaching out to return to mystical idealism, to a vague belief in things 
unseen, which is influential in every field’. Original: ‘Er is eene nieuwe generatie opgetreden, 
die het inzicht, dat wij het zoo heerlijk ver gebracht hebben, heeft ingeruild voor de 
erkentenis, dat het ongekende en onkenbare ons van alle zijden omringt. Naast het aan den 
eenen kant voortgezette dweepen met wetenschap en cultuur, valt er aan de andere zijde een 
terugkeer waar te nemen tot een mystiek idealisme, tot een vaag geloof aan onzienlijke dingen, 
dat op ieder terrein zijn invloed doet gelden’. Bavinck, Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing, 7.   
30 PoR, 10-11. 
31 PoR, 13. 
 
 189 
foremost investigators in the field of science have abandoned the attempt to explain all 
phenomena and events by mechanico-chemico causes’.32 Modern theology has even helped 
‘us’ see, he argues, that one can no longer draw from Scripture in a mechanical fashion 
without recognizing the historical and psychological mediation of its authors in their own 
milieu. The twentieth century is awoken to the God-world relation: ‘God is not far from 
everyone of us’.33 There is, therefore, an ever-blossoming emphasis on the immanence of 
God.  
 
It is in this precise biblical concept of God’s closeness to his creation in the reality of 
revelation that Bavinck proceeds in his task to ‘trace the idea of revelation…to several spheres 
of the created universe’. He begins, accordingly, with the relations of God, humanity, and 
revelation by reflecting on the human awareness of self as a self. Other commentators have 
suggested that this turn to self is a movement that started as early as 1892 on his first reis naar 
Amerika (trip to America). The second half of Bavinck’s life consisted of, Harinck suggests, a 
movement ‘van buiten naar binnen’  (from without to within).34 For Bavinck, PoR ‘registers the 
maturation of that approach’, argues Bratt, ‘and documents its time in that “from without to 
within” was the trademark of a revolution in elite culture that was underway across the North 
Atlantic world in the first decade of the twentieth century’. 35  In Bavinck’s second reis at 
Princeton, his turn to self participates in what Bratt calls the ‘new modernism’. This 
modernism stood in relative antithesis to the modernities of positivism and efficient industrial 
                                                 
32 PoR, 15. 
33 PoR, 21. 
34 George Harinck, Bavinck’s Mijne reis naar Amerika (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 1998). English 
translation: ‘My Journey to America’, trans. James Eglinton, George Harinck, Dutch Crossing: 
Journal of Low Country Studies (2017), 1-14. See also George Harinck, ‘“Land dat ons verwondert 
en ons betoove”: Bavinck en Amerika’, in George Harinck & Gerrit Neven, eds., Ontmoetingen 
met Herman Bavinck (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2006). 
35 James Bratt, ‘The Context of Herman Bavinck’s Stone Lectures: Culture and Politics in 
1908’, TBR 1 (2010), 4-24, 4. 
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development. These people of the ‘old modernism’, Bavinck suggests, were ‘professionals 
without spirit’.36 
 
New modernism, however, fragmented itself from the accepted trajectories and developed 
various fields in creative fashion. Beginning in 1900 examples include Picasso, T.S. Elliot, the 
invisible world of Planck, the death of metaphysics at the hands of Bertrand Russell in 1901, 
Husserl’s idealism in 1903, and Einstein’s discovery of the relativity of time in 1905.37 The 
spirit of this age was a participant in the creative sense of the romantic movements of the 
previous century. Bavinck enjoined aspects of this creative movement in repudiation of 
materialistic evolutionism, forms of monism, and scientific positivism that engendered an 
alternate romanticism of the early twentieth century. He, nevertheless, wrote PoR to point the 
intellectual imagination toward a different origin and telos than the fragmented ends of the new 
moderns could offer. As Bratt summarizes: 
Bavinck’s typical cultural-modernist turn away from the masses toward peer 
professionals, fellow cognoscenti, gave him some margin for open exploration. 
But he would not stay open all the way. At the end, no matter how fragmented 
reality seemed to be, and how illuminating it could be to explore it as such in 
this vale of human relativity, Bavinck was sure that it all cohered in God’s absolute 
unity—and that human life could proceed only under that assurance.38 
 
The changing social milieu, therefore, allowed Bavinck to mount a polemic on all mechanistic 
and positivistic conceptions of science and philosophy to offer the intellectual imagination a 
solution to the problems philosophy had suffered throughout the nineteenth-century—not 
simply a new telos, but an eschatology. He began with the hermeneutical re-assertion in the 
                                                 
36 PoR, 348. Bavinck quotes Max Weber here. Also, cited in Bratt, ‘The Context of Herman 
Bavinck’s Stone Lectures’, 14. He concludes his important survey by asking whether culture is 
to issue in this, that men become ‘professionals without spirit, pleasure-seekers without heart; 
non-entities of this sort pride themselves on having mounted to a previously unattained stage 
of culture’. 
37 Bratt offers a broader list from 1900 to 1915, ‘The Context of Herman Bavinck’s Stone 
Lectures’, 14-16. 
38 Bratt, ‘The Context of Herman Bavinck’s Stone Lectures’, 21. Emphasis added.  
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face of all positivistic methods that cognition includes representation as well as contextualized 
interpretation: 
The directions in which it is possible for our thinking to move are not nearly 
so numerous as we suppose or imagine. We are all determined in our thought 
and action by the peculiarity of our human nature, and then again by each 
one’s own past and present, his character and environment. And it is not rare 
that those who seem to lead others are rather themselves led by them.39  
 
All humans, accordingly, view the horizon of reality from one of three basic dispositions, he 
argued: materialism, humanism, or theism. And in the modern philosophies these are reflected 
in movements like evolutionary monism (materialism), idealism/pragmatism (humanism), and 
the philosophy of revelation (theism). As he describes in RD 1 per theism: ‘the worldview of 
Scripture and of all of Christian theology is a very different one. Its name is theism, not 
monism; its orientation is supernatural, not naturalistic’.40 Any ‘world-view’ outside of theism 
fails to account for ‘the unity of thinking and being’ (the relation between representation and 
other) and, therefore, loses access to the real. The myopic inwardness of especially Fichte, for 
example, ‘is like the she-bear which draws all her nourishment from her own breasts and thus 
eats herself up, ipsa alimenta sibi’.41 
 
In chapter three of PoR, Bavinck turns specifically to a re-conception of a solution to the 
problem of reality and in doing so, an explicit turn to the self. One might suppose that 
Bavinck’s own solution would fall within his reductionist taxonomy as a form of ‘humanism’. 
Self-consciousness, Bavinck argues, is the only path to reality. It is the solution to the problem 
of the self’s relation to world after Descartes—namely, that the thinking self and the 
embodied self, the mind and the sensible consciousness, are manifest as inexplicable duality. 
 
The question of the relation between mind and body only exacerbates the duality of subject 
and object and the possibility of a certain knowledge of nature. If such a dualism exists 
                                                 
39 PoR, 33. 
40 RD 1.368. 
41 PoR, 60. 
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between the two selves, the self as intellect and as extension, then by what mechanism can ‘I’ 
become certain that the sensate objects and the object of representation are unified? For 
Bavinck, that accounting mechanism is an immediate self-consciousness of unity, which he 
argues is the ground42 for positing both ‘the unity of real and ideal being’ and ‘the unity of 
thinking and being’.43 Self-consciousness is, therefore, the principle of a two-fold unity and, 
correspondingly, a two-fold problem. Yet, it is precisely in the turn to self-consciousness as a 
method for answering the question of the real that Bavinck turns away from Descartes and 
Kant and toward Schleiermacher.  
 
As displayed above, the concept self-consciousness is, for Bavinck, when associated with 
theism, a starting point for the path to reality within an epistemic account or justification for 
knowledge. To explain this connection, one must revisit one of the controlling quotes of this 
study that has had an important presence since chapter one and is found at the climax of 
chapter three in PoR. It unveils for the reader the specific nature of Bavinck’s idea of self-
consciousness amid a conversation dominated by various and competing conceptions of self: 
‘the core (kern) of our self-consciousness is, as Schleiermacher perceived much more clearly 
than Kant, not autonomy but a feeling of dependence’. Before examining the details of the 
text, it is important to recall the fact that the Vos and company translation of PoR renders 
afhankelijkheidsgevoel as ‘sense of dependence’. Yet, ‘sense’ doesn’t connote the relation between 
Schleiermacher and this phrase as usually rendered in English. ‘Feeling’ most closely captures 
Bavinck’s use of gevoel regarding its association to Gefühl. Once more, English translation 
choices mask the identity of Bavinck’s terms.44 
 
                                                 
42 The term ground must not be understood here as the same thing as principium as it appears 
in RD 1.  
43 PoR, 61, 68. 
44 PoR, 66. ‘De kern van ons zelfbesef is, gelijk Schleiermacher veel beter dan Kant inzag, geen 
autonomie maar afhankelijkheidsgevoel’, WO, 54. 
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In the extensive epoch of selfhood amid the broader saga of competing philosophies, from 
Augustine forward, Bavinck draws the reader into an investigation of a Kant-Schleiermacher 
dichotomy as it pertains to how self-consciousness provides a solution to the problem of 
‘being and thinking, the real and ideal’. It is in this dichotomization that Bavinck’s 
appropriation is so apparent. Manfred Frank describes Schleiermacher’s philosophy of identity 
as a theory of the conditions of knowledge turned into a doctrine of faith.45 And Bavinck’s 
argument follows exactly this relation of epistemology and faith. A doctrine of faith is essential 
for a theory of the conditions of knowledge. Faith in the fact of self is faith in the fact of the 
world and their unified relation. Amid this consistent gevoel one is conscious of their 
dependent, derived reality on the infinite, Absolute wezen.   
 
4.2. Kant’s Autonomy and Schleiermacher’s Dependence 
 
In PoR, Bavinck invites the reader into his distinction between Kant’s autonomous and 
Schleiermacher’s dependent selves. He does so, however, without ever offering any details of 
its history or its texts. Thandeka describes one way of reading this history: Kant lost the self 
and Schleiermacher found it.46 Thandeka argues that Kant’s method for accounting for the 
self according to the inference of the transcendental unity of apperception (self-
consciousness) left a rupture between the empirical self that is embodied and the I that thinks 
(pure self-consciousness) in similar manner to Descartes’ dualism. As Bavinck expressed more 
simply, Kant’s account left the possibility of a thinking self that stands in isolation both from 
God and the world, an autonomous agent: ‘Kant made human beings not only 
epistemologically but also morally autonomous’.47 To say it another way, Kant lost the self that 
is ‘an inextricable part of the natural world because of a gap… between the noumenal and 
                                                 
45  Manfred Frank, ‘Metaphysical Foundations: a look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, ed. Jacqueline Mariña (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 
33. 
46 Thandeka, The Embodied Self (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 1.     
47 RD 1.57. 
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empirical self in Kant’s theory of self-consciousness’.48 The consequence of this is a failure to 
account for the continuity of identity across time as an identity developed in relation to the 
material, embodied world.49   
 
Despite Schleiermacher’s adoption of Kant’s epistemic reservations about God from the first 
Critique, Bavinck nonetheless believed that Schleiermacher had identified a problematic 
rupture between self, world and God, and had located a solution to this in feeling. Thandeka 
also argues that Schleiermacher ‘rejected intellectual intuition as the absolute principle of 
philosophy because he had discovered something reason could not grasp: feeling (Gefühl)’.50 
Bavinck offers his conclusion in simple form: with Schleiermacher ‘the kern of self-
consciousness’ is not autonomy, but dependence—a feeling of dependence on both the world 
of objects and their ultimate cause. As a result, the necessary conditions in accounting for the 
possibility of knowledge, or a sure relation to the world, are not discovered in thinking but 
only accounted for in the immediate consciousness of a given self and world. This latter way of 
accounting for the real is a matter of faith, not inference.   
 
The dichotomy that Bavinck cites between Kant and Schleiermacher was first built upon a 
longstanding esteem that Schleiermacher maintained for Kant. It was, ‘in Kant’, Dilthey 
suggests, that ‘Schleiermacher learned how to think’. 51  After Schleiermacher went to the 
Moravian school at Barby in 1785, he illegally smuggled in Goethe’s Werther and Kant’s 
Prolegomena for his small circle of friends. He was sixteen years old and reading Kant four years 
after the publication of the first Critique. At Halle, Schleiermacher especially attached himself 
to Kant through the lectures of Eberhard, a student of Christian Wolff. 52 Schleiermacher 
                                                 
48 Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 1.  
49 The purpose here is not to defend such a reading of Kant. Rather, Bavinck in presenting 
this reading chose to adopt Schleiermacher instead of Kant regarding the self-world relation.  
50 Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 2.  
51 Cited by Richard Crouter, ‘Introduction’, in OR (C), 19.  
52 Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, 12-13, 15ff.  
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loved Kant’s philosophy because ‘it return[ed] reason from the metaphysical wasteland back 
to the fields that properly belong to it’.53 During his studies at Halle he wrote to a friend, 
Gustav von Brinkmann, that his ‘belief in [Kant’s] philosophy increases day by day, and this all 
the more, the more I compare it with that of Leibniz’.54 
 
Schleiermacher, while a student of Kant, nevertheless, grew to become a sharp critic even in 
his earliest writings including On the Highest Good (1789), On What Gives Value to Life (1792-3) 
and On Freedom (1790-3). These works critiqued Kant’s ethics especially and gave rise, in part, 
to Schleiermacher’s Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethical Theory in 1803. It was, nevertheless, a 
critique of Kant forged amid his intellectual dependence on Kant above all other 
philosophers. So Mariña comments: 
It took many years for Schleiermacher to arrive at the contours of his own 
system. Crucial to his philosophical development was his encounter with 
Spinoza, Kant, Leibniz, Jacobi, and Fichte. Kant’s influence was the most 
decisive; even as he moved beyond him to develop his own original system, 
the ideas he took from Kant continued to shape his philosophical outlook.55 
 
Bavinck’s reading of Kant is a somewhat commonplace analysis. His sharp, terse commentary 
on Kant’s works reduce to his criticism of Kant’s dualisms: between knowing and believing, 
and knowing and thinking. In his first Critique, Kant argues that things as they exist in 
themselves are distant and inapproachable. One’s experience of the manifold of things is 
mediated by the human consciousness, the intuition and understanding, which excludes direct 
perception. 56  The result is that because of the activity of the human mind in discursive 
cognition, although things in themselves are the source of objects of knowledge they are not 
direct objects of knowledge. Kant, therefore, offers a sharp distinction between knowing and 
                                                 
53 Schleiermacher, Briefe, I.66, in Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, 15.  
54 KGA V/1, no. 134, 191.  
55 Mariña, Transformation of Self, 8. Mariña offers a detailed presentation of Schleiermacher’s 
reception and critique of Kant throughout this work.  
56 Immanuel Kant, CPR, A67-8/B92-3. Concepts of the understanding are functions: ‘by a 
function… I understand the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a 
common one’.  
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thinking. Knowing involves judgment where intuition is combined with the categories of the 
understanding to provide a coherence of manifold perceptions.57 Knowledge requires a unity 
of both sensible content and a priori concepts. Knowledge is synthetic. As he famously states: 
‘thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’. 58  Knowledge 
demands both content from without and concepts from within.  
 
Thinking, in contrast, is an activity that pertains solely to concepts without content—that is, 
pure reason. His most famous examples of objects of thinking without content include God, 
the world, freedom, and the essence of self, all of which are illusory postulates of pure reason. 
Effectively, the possibility of knowledge does not extend beyond the field of sensible 
experience. The activity by which one brings together the given representations under ‘one 
apperception’ or self-consciousness, ‘is the logical function of judgment’.59 The result is that ‘I’ 
make knowledge possible, the end of which Bavinck calls the autonomous self-consciousness.  
 
The self as noumenon in Kant’s account is a necessary inference (as he would go on to develop 
in his second Critique) one must make when accounting for the possibility of experience—
although outside the possibility of knowledge. He writes that the concept of the self 
[comes] about by my accompanying each representation with consciousness, 
but rather by my adding one representation to the other and being conscious 
of their synthesis. Therefore, it is only because I can combine a manifold of 
given representations in one consciousness that it is possible for me to 
represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations itself...60 
 
The possibility, therefore, of consistent self-identity across the manifold of representations (in 
the empirical consciousness) depends on the ability to represent the self to the self. The essential 
                                                 
57  For example: ‘[time and space] both taken together are, namely, the pure forms of all 
sensible intuition, and thereby make possible synthetic a priori propositions. But these a 
priori sources of cognition determine their own boundaries by that very fact (that they are 
merely conditions of sensibility), namely that they apply to objects only so far as they are 
considered as appearances, but do not present things in themselves. CPR, A38-39/B46.  
58 CPR, A51/B76. 
59 CPR, B 143. 
60 CPR, B 133.  
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consciousness, the ‘I’ that thinks, is a postulate based on inference from the fact of the 
representative or empirical consciousness. The self is a discovery of thinking.61  
 
In the second Critique, these transcendental postulates are necessary because they make 
possible ‘our’ moral experience. The postulates God, infinity, and freedom are necessary if one 
is to act for the sake of a summum bonum, in a moral order. Additionally, without the 
supposition of the noumenal self, human beings would have no claim on identity and, therefore, 
there would be no possibility for consistent moral action. Bavinck expresses the result in brief 
form as he reflected upon the relation between the first and second Critiques as that between 
knowing and believing:  
In his critical examination of the human faculty of cognition this philosopher 
came to the conclusion that the supernatural is unattainable for us human 
beings, since our capacity for knowledge is bound to its innate forms and 
therefore limited to the circle of experience. But next to this form of knowing 
there is room for a faith that, based on moral freedom and under warrant of 
the categorical imperative, postulates the existence of God, and the soul and its 
immortality. However, these postulates are not scientific theses capable of 
rigorous proof but rest on personal, practical motives. Accordingly, believing 
and knowing are separated in principle, each having its own domain.62 
 
Bavinck’s conclusion is that the first Critique creates an autonomous agent that makes 
knowledge possible only through its own constructive faculties and cannot account for human 
certainty of the natural, embodied world because the noumenal self remains gapped from the 
world by the representations of the empirical consciousness. Kant’s subsequent works, while 
trying to recover religion through moral experience, create an autonomous agent that legislates 
morality by reason and subsequently legitimates religion only through thinking—failing therein 
to move beyond Descartes’ mistake: ‘Kant’, Bavinck concludes, ‘made human beings not only 
epistemologically but also morally autonomous’.63 Further, this autonomy not only led to a 
duality of thinking (as subject) and being (as object) but to a duality of pure self-consciousness 
                                                 
61  This is a conclusion in Kevin Hector, The Theological Project of Modernism: Faith and the 
Conditions of Mineness, 45-53. 
62 RD 1.35. 
63 RD 1.57. 
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and the empirical self, the representational consciousness. Michalson, likewise, suggests that a 
‘rigid dualism’ as a derivative of ‘the absence of any principle of integration between the 
noumenal-moral world and the phenomenal-temporal’ explains how Kant split the self into 
selves: ‘empirical’, ‘noumenal’, and ‘transcendental ego’.64 
 
Bavinck used Schleiermacher’s mature work on religion and human experience because he 
understood its emphasis to be, in antithesis, on the fact of human experience as a struggle 
between freedom and dependence and, therefore, a real, certain relationship of organism with 
the external.65 Schleiermacher himself argues that Kant’s work is ‘not anthropology but the 
negation of all anthropology…a proof that something of this sort is not possible according to 
the idea set forth by Kant and in his manner of thinking’.66 It is not the intent here to analyze 
Schleiermacher’s critiques of Kant. Yet, in summarizing Schleiermacher’s position in contrast 
to Kant, Crouter writes: ‘A concurrent polemical view of Kant’s anthropology argues that by 
considering the “practical” and rational dimensions of human experience apart from the realm 
of desire and human sensuality, Kant neglected the very possibility of attaining an adequate 
understanding of human nature’.67 And Bavinck argues similarly:   
In [Kant’s] critique of practical reason, he sought to regain what he lost as a 
result of pure reason. The categorical imperative—our moral consciousness—
gives us the right to postulate the existence of God, freedom, and immortality. 
Dogmatics is built on a foundation of morality; religion becomes a means of 
achieving virtue, and God an emergency relief worker for human beings. The 
content of religion and dogmatics, as Kant develops it in his Religion within the 
Limits of Reason Alone, is purely rationalistic. Kant is still situated completely in 
the eighteenth century. The historical and positive has no value for him, and he 
isolates human beings from all [external] influences. For Kant, only the religion of 
autonomous reason is the true religion.68 
                                                 
64 Gordon Michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1990), 78-79. Cited in Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 120-121. 
65 For a full discussion of Schleiermacher’s critiques of Kant see Mariña, Transformation of the 
Self, 8-25.  
66 In Schleiermacher’s Soliloquies, KGA I/2, 366. Cited in Crouter, ‘Introduction’, in OR (C), 
16, fn. 50.  
67 Crouter, ‘Introduction’, in OR (C), 16.  





Kant’s religious foundation also, Schleiermacher argues, postulated the concept of God in the 
activity of the will. And this religious foundation is a product of reason, which offers an 
‘appearance of atheism’.69 The idea of God is always, Schleiermacher argued, a human idea, an 
idea developed in the standpoint of finitude, in the human consciousness. Yet, Kant’s ‘idea of 
God’ became ‘associated with that to which the idea refers’.70 Kant’s religious claims are 
nothing but speculative postulates built on trying to justify the experience of a moral identity 
that cannot be justified with respect to the first Critique, Schleiermacher suggests in the 
Sittenlehre.71  
 
Bavinck’s juxtaposition of Kant and Schleiermacher in PoR is determined by his interpretation 
of Kant’s agent as one freed from ‘external influences’ while Schleiermacher’s agent, 
discovered particularly in CF §4, is determined by its relation with God and the world. For 
Bavinck, the former chose a rigorous autonomy, and the latter (while not free from Kant’s 
mistakes) chose a dependent agent.  
 
This brief elucidation of Bavinck’s critique of Kant is only cursory and necessarily so. Between 
Kant and Schleiermacher is, Bavinck supposes, the simple distinction of emphasis on an 
autonomous and dependent self.72 The former fails to account for the certainty of the real. It 
is, for Bavinck, Schleiermacher’s philosophical grammar of self, situated within a robust 
doctrine of faith in revelation, that he adopts to his own account of the certainty of reality. 
                                                 
69 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dialektik, aus Schleiermachers handschriftlichem Nachlasse herausgegeben 
von Ludwig Jonas, in sämmtliche Werke (1852), III. 4, 428. Original publication: (Berlin: Reimer, 
1839). Translated in Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 3. 
70 Schleiermacher, Dialektik, von Ludwig Jonas, 436. Translated in Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 
22. 
71  Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s 
Sämmtliche Werke, III, 1. Translated in Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 18.  
72 Kant’s critique of the Enlightenment, Bavinck writes, ‘was discouraging, even devastating, 
for the rationalism and eudemonism of the Enlightenment’. RD 1.164.  
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That it is a Schleiermacherian adoption is evidenced in three ways in addition to the content of 
the argument itself (section 4.3).  
 
First, Bavinck’s definitions of immediate self-consciousness stand on both sides of the 
Schleiermacher/Kant dichotomy: (i) self-consciousness is a consciousness of our own being, 
(ii) of ‘being something definite’, and (iii) ‘feel[ing] totally dependent on some absolute power 
who is the one, infinite essence (wezen)’. 73  Like Schleiermacher, the immediate self-
consciousness is the feeling of absolute dependence. In context, Bavinck refers not to the 
temporal or objective self-consciousness but to the Ik that persists in all states, the immediate 
self-consciousness. Clear references to Schleiermacher’s CF (particularly §3-4) are evident in 
Bavinck’s construction of ‘being aware’ as a consciousness of a being, a self, beyond the 
determining self and the ‘total [absolute] feeling of dependence’. The third element of 
Bavinck’s aforementioned definition, which regards a revelation of human nature as 
dependent, is nearly identical to Schleiermacher’s concept of universal piety, which is also 
regarded as a fact of human nature: ‘that we are conscious of ourselves as being absolutely 
dependent, or, which intends the same meaning, as being in relation with God’—and God 
who is ‘one, supreme infinite being’.74 This appropriation is especially clear when considering 
its location next to the explicit dichotomization of Kant and Schleiermacher and Bavinck’s 
resolute choice of the latter. This point alone is a definitive, self-proclaimed appropriation.  
  
Second, nevertheless, is noteworthy proof that indeed Schleiermacher’s CF was a primary 
source for Bavinck’s grammar in the argument for reality in PoR. Amid his argument, while 
                                                 
73 PoR, 66; ‘voelen wij ons met alle schepselen volstrekt afhankelijk van eene absolute macht, die het eeuwige, 
oneindige wezen is’. WO, 55. 
74 CF §4, 8. Also, in OR, 77: ‘The contemplation of religious persons is simply the immediate 
consciousness of the universal being of all finite things in and through the infinite, of all 
temporal things in and through the eternal. To seek and to find this infinite and eternal factor 
in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all action and passion, and to have and 
to know life itself only in immediate feeling—that is religion’. 
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describing ‘dependence’, Bavinck inserts the German modifier schlechthinige:75 ‘[Consciousness 
of dependence] becomes a felt, conscious, voluntary dependence, a dependence of man as a 
rational and moral being, and for this very reason it becomes a sense of absolute dependence, 
schlechthinige dependence’.76 The term, which translates as ‘absolute’ in German, is a definitive 
marker pointing to a single source. It is, according to Schleiermacher, a relatively rare word. 
Again, in §4 of CF Schleiermacher writes: ‘I am indebted to Professor Delbrück for the word 
schlechthinig, which often appears in explanations that follow. At first, I was not inclined to use 
it, and I have no knowledge of its already having been employed elsewhere, but now that he 
has offered this adjective, I am very pleased to follow him in its use’.77 The point is that 
Bavinck’s appropriation of the philosophical exposition of self, particularly in CF §4, is clearly 
marked by his adoption of schlechthinig, an adoption of an exclusively Schleiermacherian use. 
Schleiermacher there elucidates das Gefühl schlechtinninger Abhängigkeit (the feeling of absolute 
dependence). 
 
Third, while a speculative connection, Bavinck’s most common expression for his own goal in 
his account of self-consciousness and the real in PoR chapter three is the ‘unity of being and 
thinking’, which he elsewhere associates directly with Schleiermacher and particularly with the 
Dialektik. CF does not apply self-consciousness or the feeling of dependence directly to the 
epistemic quandaries of the conditions of approaching reality in any detail, which is the 
primary way Bavinck is using them in PoR. In CF, this is assumed. Schleiermacher previews 
the necessity of the awareness of the questions of the knowing self for his dogmatic readers in 
§4.1. There he maps the terrain of the elements of the self.78 There is that aspect of the self, he 
suggests, that expresses a condition of receptivity and that element that expresses sheer 
activity. ‘To these propositions, assent can be unconditionally demanded; and no one will deny 
                                                 
75  Bavinck’s reference is spelled with a slight difference in Bavinck’s original text than 
Schleiermacher’s.  
76 PoR, 78. 
77 CF §4. 
78 This point was first made in Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 11.  
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[these two elements of the self] who is capable of a little introspection and can find interest in 
the real subject of our present inquiries’.79 Schleiermacher’s present inquiry, being dogmatics, 
would require the reader interested in the activity and receptivity of the self (or, freedom and 
dependence) in relative relation to the world to turn either to psychological examination or to 
Schleiermacher’s previous writings. One must be aware at least that in the self-consciousness 
there are two elements: ‘the one expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the other its 
co-existence with another’. 80  The point is that the development of self-consciousness in 
relation to the problem of reality is present only by implication in CF. Attention is paid to the 
relation between self-consciousness and reality or for the conditions of knowing things, 
however, in Schleiermacher’s other writings, especially in the Dialektik and also in OR. 
 
Dialektik is a posthumous publication of Schleiermacher’s lectures on philosophy given in 
1811,81 1814, 1818, 1822, 1828 and 1831, which has seen various publications. Bavinck too 
was familiar with these lectures (although he uses them rarely, only six citations in the whole 
corpus), and read the edition by Ludwig Jonas, Schleiermacher’s student. Schleiermacher 
commissioned Jonas to prepare both his and Jonas’ lecture notes for publication after 
Schleiermacher had prepared only part of the introduction and realized his health was failing.82 
The Jonas’ edition was later published in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke in 1839.83 
                                                 
79 CF §4.1, 13. 
80 CF §4.1, 13. 
81 Andreas Arndt, Friedrich Schleiermacher: Dialektik (1811) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986). 
82 See John Thiel, God and World in Schleiermacher’s Dialektik and Glaubenslehre: Criticism and the 
Methodology of Dogmatics. Basler und Berner Studien zur historischen und systematischen Theologie, Band 43 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 1981), 10. 
83 Schleiermacher, Dialektik, von Ludwig Jonas, in sämmtliche Werke (1852), III. 4. Bavinck cites 
the 1839 edition. The 1814 and 1818 lectures are the foundation of Jonas’ text and include the 
other lectures as appendices and notes. He also supplies Schleiermacher’s original introduction 
as Appendix F. Schleiermacher summarized the form of the Dialektik best in his address to 
Jonas before his death: ‘as you know, I wanted to give my Dialektik and my Christian Morals the 
form that the dogmatics has. But I have abandoned that project. I will hasten to bring them 
somewhat into the form that the Theological Encyclopedia possesses’. Quoted in Bruno Weiss, 
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Central to Dialektik is the modern philosophical dilemma, how can one justify the relation 
between reality and the concepts of human cognition as knowledge? For the purpose here, 
while Bavinck never quotes from the Dialektik, he did adopt Schleiermacher’s recurring way of 
expressing the problem of reality: between Sein und Denken (Being and Thinking).84 Although 
this binary is common in the philosophical milieu, Bavinck directly associates this phrase with 
Schleiermacher’s Dialektik in RD 1 and then uses it commonly throughout his corpus and 
especially in PoR.  
 
The purpose of Schleiermacher’s Dialektik is, in part, to unfold the conditions for knowledge. 
First, he argues, knowledge requires ‘correspondence with reality’. Yet, because one cannot 
determine in the intellect whether such correspondence has been successful, he provides two 
other conditions that serve as proofs. The second: any aspect of knowledge of a thing requires 
coherence with all knowledge. The third: that there is a general universal agreement about a 
determination amongst other people. There is a realist conception of knowing behind these 
conditions that is alternative to the idealisms of Kant and especially Fichte. But, for 
Schleiermacher, ‘genuine knowledge’ always remains just beyond the grasp.85 His realism is an 
ethic to strive for rather than a consistent determination to be achieved.86 It is, in other words, 
a critical account searching for a transcendental, which Schleiermacher calls the ‘transcendent’.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Untersuchungen über Friedrich Schleiermachers Dialektik (Halle: Heynemann, 1878), 13. Cited in 
Theil, God and World in Schleiermacher’s Dialektik and Glaubenslehre, 11. 
84 For example, in Dialektik, Aufzeichnungen zum Kolleg 1831, KGA II/10, 321: Of the question 
where and how is our being and thinking given as one, we answer… ‘Die Frage Wo und Wie 
uns Sein und Denken als eins gegeben ist beantworten wir daß uns das Wissenwollen vor dem 
Denken nicht als Denken sondern als Sein gegeben ist, daß uns ab er dasselbe in unserem 
Verfahren Denken wird’. 
85 Schleiermacher, Dialectic, Or, The Art of Doing Philosophy: A Study Edition of the 1811 Notes, 
translated and introduced by Terrence Tice (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 1, fn.6. This point is made 
in Mariña, ‘Schleiermacher, Realism, and Epistemic Modesty: A Reply to my Critics’, 122. 
86 Mariña, ‘Schleiermacher, Realism, and Epistemic Modesty’, 122.  
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Anticipating Schleiermacher’s work in the Dialektik are brief presentations of realist 
philosophy that are subtle critiques of transcendental and Fichtean idealisms. In OR already a 
subtle epistemology is attached jointly with a doctrine of faith:  
If man is not one with the Eternal in the unity of intuition and feeling which is 
immediate, he remains, in the unity of consciousness, which is derived, forever 
apart. What then shall become of the highest utterance of the speculation of 
our days, complete rounded idealism, if it does not sink again into this unity, if 
the humility of religion does not suggest to its pride another realism…87  
 
Such an arrogant idealism, he suggests, ‘annihilates the Universe while it seems to aim at 
constructing it’.88  
 
Fichte had rid his philosophy of Kant’s thing-in-itself and relegated all being (the non-ego) to 
the self.89 In knowledge, the self knows only itself in positing the object in its own subject. 
Bavinck picked up Schleiermacher’s commitment to dependence and freedom at work in the 
conditions of knowledge because at the highest level of self-consciousness it posits the 
converse: dependence on that which is not the self. The Absolute, the Eternal, is transcendent 
in relation to the finite subject. While the Absolute is present in Fichte’s ‘I’, for Bavinck’s 
Schleiermacher the original unity of consciousness is an unapproachable fact of faith in that 
which is not finite as the ground of the unity of being.90 Accordingly, when Schleiermacher 
first began his lectures on Dialektik in 1811, he did so at the precise time Fichte was also 
lecturing in display of opposition. Students, Purvis notes, sometimes had to choose between 
the two lecturers.91 Schleiermacher subtly referenced his lack of esteem for the ‘circle of a 
certain school’ or Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre in his second lecture: ‘the term “dialectic” is chosen 
in part because use of another term could easily have inspired the opinion that this 
presentation belongs within the circle of a certain school that would have selected this term, 
                                                 
87 OR, 39.  
88 OR, 39.  
89 Mariña, ‘Schleiermacher, Realism, and Epistemic Modesty’, 122.  
90 See Mariña, ‘Schleiermacher, Realism, and Epistemic Modesty’.  
91 Zachary Purvis, Theology and the University in Nineteenth-Century Germany, 158-9.  
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and in part to designate what is distinctive about this presentation’. 92  The conditions of 
knowledge are presented more as an art, a way of understanding, in the mode of a dialogical-
dialectic.  
 
The point for this thesis is that Bavinck at least understood the project of the Dialektik as an 
epistemic one in some unity with Schleiermacher’s thought in CF, the religious and 
theological. It has already been established that PoR shows Bavinck adopting the conceptual 
grammar provided by Schleiermacher in CF. Bavinck’s reading of the Dialektik alongside CF 
shows that in PoR, he also subtly adopted Schleiermacher’s way of construing the ‘problem of 
reality’ via the immediate self-consciousness. While the evidence in PoR points resolutely to 
the early pages of CF as his primary tool per the use of the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ in 
association with the ‘immediate self-consciousness’, the untranslated ‘schlechthinig’, and the logic 
of the argument by comparison to CF §4, Bavinck’s broader corpus does convey a cursory 
familiarity with Schleiermacher’s philosophy and its importance for Schleiermacher’s 
dogmatics. If this is the case, Bavinck saw something of what Schleiermacher scholars have 
especially emphasized in the twentieth century. Mariña describes this hermeneutical key 
accordingly: ‘Behind Schleiermacher’s theological achievement lay a rigorous grappling with 
fundamental metaphysical problems. As such his theology cannot be adequately understood 
aside from his philosophy’.93 Hans-Richard Reuter claimed that any attempt to understand CF 
is incomplete without the basic assertions of the Dialektik in hindsight.94 The same conclusion 
was reached by Paul Frederick Mehl in 1961, and John Thiel in 1981.95 Thandeka’s work on 
Schleiermacher’s unity of self agrees and extends this argument to suggest that ‘our ongoing 
                                                 
92 Schleiermacher, Dialectic, or the Art of Doing Philosophy, 3. 
93 Jacqueline Mariña, Transformation of the Self, 4.  
94  Hans-Richard Reuter, Die Einheit der Dialektik Friedrich Schleiermachers: Eine systematische 
Interpretation (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1979). Cited in Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 15.  
95 Paul Frederick Mehl, Schleiermacher’s Mature Doctrine of God as Found in the Dialektik of 1822 and 
Second Edition of the Christian Faith (1830-31), (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1961); 




failure to understand Schleiermacher’s own solution [to Kant’s philosophy] has resulted in the 
reduction of his insights to the confines of modernity and turned him merely into the 
progenitor of and enigmatic father figure of modern protestant theology’.96 Mariña, Reuter, 
Thiel, Mehl, and Thandeka’s claims agree in theory, as well, with Hirsch’s contention that 
Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God is based on ‘new principles’ that are found outwith CF.97 
 
 It is not important here to defend these claims by entering a historical-philosophical study of 
Schleiermacher’s major texts in relation. That is neither the point nor a claim of this study. 
Rather, it is to say that Bavinck did recognize the importance of the two texts together to the 
degree that he at least read the obscure Dialektik and established a relation of ‘basic assertions’ 
between the Dialektik and the introduction to CF. While there is no evidence in Bavinck’s 
writings that he adopted any of the major arguments of the Dialektik per se, 98  especially 
considering its sparse appearance in Bavinck’s works, he did adopt Schleiermacher’s grammar 
of immediate self-consciousness, feeling, and dependence (relative and absolute) from CF 
alongside the problem of the ‘unity of being and thinking’ to combine the conditions of 
knowledge with a doctrine of faith—and he did so in his own, idiosyncratic way. In other 
words, while the question of the Dialektik concerned the human desire for knowledge (das 
Wissenwollen) and its transcendental ground, CF unveiled the ground of religion in the feeling 
of absolute dependence. Bavinck’s project in PoR, is to take the question of the former (the 
modern question) and answer it using the grammar of the latter: the revelation of self, world, 
and God in the immediate self-consciousness and feelings of relative and absolute dependence 
are the ground that provides the certainty for a correspondence between the real (being) and 
                                                 
96 Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 4. 
97  Emanuel Hirsch, Geschichte der Neuern Evangelischen Theologie, vol. 5 (Gütersloh: C. 
Bertelsmann Verlag, 1949), 298-99. Cited in Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 5.  
98 For example, Bavinck’s philosophy is framed, in distinction from Schleiermacher, with the 
Christian concept of revelation derived from his dogmatics as that which makes intelligible the 
unity of real and ideal, self and world. Bavinck’s work in PoR is only possible after reflecting 
on Jesus Christ because by revelation, he means a Christian concept. See PoR and especially 
Ch. 7, 170. 
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the ideal (thinking). Again, as Manfred Frank suggests of Schleiermacher, there was ‘a turning 
point’ in his philosophy of identity ‘at which a theory of the conditions of knowledge turn[ed] 
into a doctrine of faith’.99 Bavinck did something similar using Schleiermacher’s concepts.  
 
Bavinck’s citations of the Dialektik, while very occasional, are insightful and help secure the 
point that Bavinck, while not dependent on Dialektik, supposed the early portions of CF to be 
in consanguinity with Schleiermacher’s basic philosophy. In the first edition of volume II of 
Bavinck’s RD published in 1897 as well as the subsequent editions (which remain nearly the 
same) Bavinck does, as typical, charge Schleiermacher with a tendency toward pantheism. He 
summarizes his reading of Schleiermacher’s Dialektik: ‘God and world are correlates; they give 
expression to the same being, first as unity and then as totality’.100 But he adds this qualifier to 
his assessment of the Dialektik as well as to Hegel’s Logic and collected works: ‘this remains 
pantheism… but, [it should be remembered] the underlying explanation is difficult to grasp’.101 
A more important reference, however, is found in Bavinck’s reflections on the 
incomprehensibility of God and its relation to modern philosophy: 
Also Schleiermacher, though diverging in many respects from Kant and Fichte 
and aligning himself more closely with Spinoza, agreed with the former in the 
doctrine of the unknowability of God. While the idea of the unity of being and 
thinking, of the real and the ideal, that is, the idea of God, is the assumption of all our 
knowledge, the ground of our thinking, this idea cannot be captured in thought and 
remains hidden “behind an [epistemological] curtain” (Dialektik, 60ff). The 
moment we try to bring the Absolute closer to us, it is finitized in our thinking 
and we begin to speak in images. In a word, the Absolute is not accessible to 
human knowledge. In his Christian Faith, Schleiermacher proposed the same ideas, 
                                                 
99 Manfred Frank, ‘Metaphysical Foundations: a look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic’, 33. 
100 Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek II (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1897), 154. Original: God en wereld 
zijn correlate, zij drukken hetzelfde zijn uit, eerst als eenheid dan als totaliteit. From Schleiermacher, 
Dialektik (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1839), 162. Bavinck typically misunderstands Schleiermacher’s 
use of the concepts ‘God’ and ‘world’ as correlates. He takes the correlate to be an ontological 
claim rather than establishing a merely epistemic relation. Schleiermacher’s intention, it seems, 
is to suggest that it is impossible to think of ‘God’ without the ‘world’ precisely because of the 
embodied situation. This is not meant to assert an ontological unity between God and world. 
The claim that Schleiermacher is a pantheist is a common mistake, Bavinck included.  




though in a more religious and less elaborate form. God is the “whence” of 
our existence; and as such an absolute causality, he cannot be the object of our 
knowing but only the content of the feeling of absolute dependence.102 
 
The important point here is that as early as 1897 Bavinck grasped from both the Dialektik and 
CF that the central tenets of Schleiermacher’s concept of self-consciousness pertained to God 
as the ground of ‘the unity of being and thought, of the real and ideal’ and that the idea is the 
‘assumption of all of our knowledge’. This idea possesses no content and it, accordingly, is neit 
in gedachte te vaten (is not found in thinking). Notice especially that in the above quote Bavinck 
read CF in the continuum of the Dialektik. CF provides an exposition on the religious element 
building upon the ‘same’ ideas of the Dialektik, Bavinck recognizes, and it does so in a ‘less 
elaborate way’. Thus, it is from CF (based on the adoption of schlechtinnig dependence and the 
focus on the feeling of absolute dependence) but as a brief distillation of an epistemological 
query in the Dialektik that Bavinck argues immediate self-consciousness and gevoel are crucial 
in any account of the certainty of the unity of real and ideal, the conditions of giving an 
account of how one knows. Helmer’s summary of Dialektik makes this distinction clear: 
‘Dialektik is not a metaphysic that grounds claims of correspondence, but is a progressive 
teasing out of the processes by which thinking—oriented to knowing—occurs’. 103  The 
‘transcendent ground’ of the Dialektik is ‘cast exclusively in metaphysical, not religious 
terms’. 104  Bavinck’s PoR does ground claims of correspondence and the certainty of 
correspondence but does so by appealing to Schleiermacher’s religious element rather than 
teasing out the process of knowing in detail or in merely metaphysical terms. Excluded from 
Bavinck’s account is detail. In Schleiermacher’s philosophical account in contrast, he considers 
by example the relations between thinking and hermeneutics, author, text, and language in 
detail.  
 
                                                 
102 RD 2.43. 
103 Christine Helmer, ‘Schleiermacher’, 37.  
104 Christine Helmer, ‘Schleiermacher’, 37. 
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Additionally, Bavinck later identifies the epistemic problem of Dialektik in the second edition 
of volume I (1906), which was not present in the first edition of 1895. He writes: 
The philosophical viewpoint [Schleiermacher] assumed, as is evident from his 
Dialektik, prevented him from conceiving theology as a “science concerning 
God” (scientia de Deo) and naturally had to lead him into asserting a rigorous 
separation between theology and philosophy (a science). God, as the unity of the 
ideal and the real, is still unknowable to the intellect (which always thinks in 
terms of opposites) and can be experienced only in the heart; religion, 
therefore, is not cognition or action but a certain emotional state.105 
 
While Bavinck does not want to collapse philosophy into theology, the point of PoR is that 
only theism, by which he means a doctrine of Christian revelation, satisfies modern 
philosophical dilemmas. Thereby, Bavinck adopts the conclusions of CF §2-5 into his account 
of the correspondence of self and world. Additionally, in the 1897 publication, he offers direct 
citations from the 1839 Jonas edition of the Dialektik.106 Bavinck, consequently, adopts the 
epistemic question between real and ideal, being and thinking, as well as the method of ‘self-
consciousness’ in the third chapter of PoR. ‘In self-consciousness we have not to deal with a 
mere phenomenon but with a noumenon… self-consciousness is the unity of real and ideal being’. 
And here: 
The world of perception is given to us in our consciousness, not as dream or 
hallucination, but as phenomenon and representation, involving, according to 
universal belief, the existence of an objective world. This empirical and 
undeniable fact is recognized, and to some degree explained, only when self-
consciousness is conceived in the sense above defined as the unity of real and ideal 
being… for in this case the gulf between reality and representation, being and 
thinking, is bridged over.107 
 
And lastly, he ties it directly to his Schleiermacher citation: 
Although the attempt to recover after this fashion [of idealism’s use of the 
Absolute] the lost unity of thought and being deserves appreciation, it is impossible 
to regard it as a true solution to the problem. Here it is again the testimony of 
self-consciousness that enters a protest. It has already been observed that 
Schleiermacher better than Kant apprehended the essence of self-
                                                 
105 RD 1.47–48. 
106 This includes pages 397, 60, 163, 78, 79, 69, 78, 87, and in that order. 
107 PoR, 68.  
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consciousness when he defined it as an absolute sense [feeling] of 
dependence.108 
 
Kant postulated the transcendental ego per a necessary deduction of pure reason, thereby 
cutting the ego off from the thing, creating an autonomous agent. Autonomy, unlike 
dependence, is a pronouncement of self-determination and self-governance. Kant, in other 
words, separated the human individual from God and the world, Bavinck argues.109 And while 
a turn to the self is indeed Bavinck’s solution, he uses Schleiermacher’s dependent agent 
revealed to the self in the fact of the lower and higher aspects of self-consciousness. In other 
words, Bavinck turns to the self to explain God’s agency in the activity of human knowing. 
Only in the affirmation of dependence can one describe a revelational philosophy. It is now 
appropriate to turn to the details of Bavinck’s account of the unity of being and thinking given 
to the immediate self-consciousness as the feeling of absolute dependence. 
 
4.3. Self, World, and God 
 
Bavinck’s argument in short begins from the middle or the human consciousness yet also 
takes its stand in a committed supernatural world-view.110 Theism, Bavinck argues, is the only 
‘philosophy’ that can provide an adequate account of the conditions of knowledge with 
respect to the fact of subjectivity because the certainty of reality requires a doctrine of faith, a 
felt dependence on the infinite, Absolute essence (wezen). The religious experience of 
‘dependence’ therein is directly connected to an account of the conditions of knowledge: on 
the ‘given’ self, on the ‘given’ world, and on the giving God. Reflection on the certainty of 
                                                 
108 PoR, 61, 68, 76. 
109 ‘Kant, “the philosopher of Protestantism,” [has] taught us that it is only the moral will 
whose activity unlocks the way to God and the knowledge of him. The intellect, after all, is 
confined to the world of the senses and does not extend to the origin, essence, and end of 
things’. RD 1.52.  
110 Aspects of the next two sections were argued for in brief in Cory Brock and Nathaniel 
Gray Sutanto, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Eclecticism: On Catholicty, Consciousness, and 
Theological Epistemology’, SJT no. 3 (2017), 310-32 
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immediate experience unveils nothing other than the ‘fact’ of belief present in human 
nature—namely, that the concept of God, as the transcendent object of dependence, makes 
intelligible the unifed experience of self and world. His argument for reality, accordingly, is 
one of analogy: the unity of the ego with the embodied self of which each human feels certain 
in immediate self-consciousness is analogous to and reveals the unity of the finite world with 
the human agent (the unity of subject and object) even within representational life. Self-
consciousness in this schema is rendered an organism, combining two aspects of 
consciousness, the immediate and the temporal. In other words, the dissolution of 
subject/object in immediate self-consciousness, as that between one’s mind and body, is the 
presupposition of all self-world relations. Self-consciousness reveals the organic unity of self 
and world. As Bavinck puts it, in self-consciousness ‘our own being is revealed to us’, and that 
being is the unity of one’s identity, of the determined aspects of self standing upon the essence 
of self.111 Likewise, as ‘our own being is revealed to us in self-consciousness’ as an immediate 
unity of subject and object, so similarly the unity of representation and idea is revealed to us as 
a certainty in thinking. In another place, he describes it accordingly: ‘in the phenomena of 
consciousness [or temporal consciousness] our own ego [Ik] always presents itself to us’. 
Similarly, ‘our perception does not have for its object the representation, but in and through 
the representation the things themselves.’ 112  This finite unity of subject and object, 
additionally, being upheld by God offers a faint analogy (a vestige) to the Absolute unity of 
God given in the fact of creaturely dependence on the infinite.   
 
The argument begins by commending idealism in part. The ‘mind of man’, Bavinck writes, ‘is 
the basis and principle of all knowing. If there be an objective reality, a world of matter and 
force…it can only reach me through my consciousness alone... Apart from consciousness, I 
know nothing of myself or of reality’.113 And it is this, he argues, that idealism generally 
                                                 
111 PoR, 61. 
112 PoR, 60.  
113 PoR, 56.  
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considered got right in comparison with naïve realisms that miss the ‘middle’ or the 
representative nature of one’s relation to the world. This claim alone is sufficient to separate 
Bavinck from common sense realisms.  
 
Yet, the gap, he argued, between being and thinking persists in modern accounts of the real 
that begin from an orientation of humanism. That is, humanism is a reductionist term for 
describing an epistemological over-emphasis on the conceptual categories provided by the 
intellect for the sake of perceiving the sensible. He associates this mistake with idealism and 
pragmatism. Both, he suggests, lack attention to the given. They prioritize chaos and human 
autonomy over faith in what is.  
 
And on each side of these twin pillars one fails to satisfy ‘the needs of the intellect’ and the 
‘needs of the heart’.114 It is peculiar to Bavinck’s conception of right philosophy, that any 
world orientation requires attention to the ‘needs’ of the whole human. He expresses this view 
in the tired point: that ‘only theism…[or] revelation alone is capable of solving the problem 
[of reality]. The only path by which we are able to attain reality is that of self-consciousness’.115 
And so he enters into an exposition of this truth with a critique of modern rationalisms.116 
 
Being (the thing) precedes thinking (the representation).117 This dictum was critical, Bavinck 
argued, for accounting for the formation of knowledge. 
 
                                                 
114 PoR, 53. 
115 PoR, 56.  
116  While using Schleiermacher to develop his argument, he also, at times, suggests that 
Schleiermacher’s philosophy succumbed to the same problem as Hegel, according to his 
reading of Hegel. He is rather inconsistent in that way. In some instances, he appears to 
understand just the realist Schleiermacher was, and at others, supposes that Schleiermacher 
lost ‘being’ in ‘thinking’: ‘But Hegel and Schleiermacher were not content with the thesis that 
thinking and being correspond to each other; they equated the two. This equation of thinking 
and being is the basic error of speculative philosophy’. RD 1.521.  
117 RD 1.217.  
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A thing does not arise in me like a dream and does not follow logically from 
antecedent impressions but often comes to me abruptly from without, 
breaking down the train of earlier impressions. Such things are not dependent 
on me but have existence apart from me and possess properties that cannot be 
attributed to the representation I have of them.118 
 
Such correspondence with the real was lost in modern rationalism (including idealism), he 
argued. The unity of being and thinking is realized only within the recognition that being is 
not collapsed into thinking.  
In more recent philosophy this rationalistic trend again surfaced in Descartes 
who, casting all tradition aside, finally found his fixed starting point in thought 
and from it inferred being: cogito ergo sum. With that move logical necessity and 
coherence, the mathematical order of ground and consequence in the work of 
Spinoza, became the standard of truth. The world of sense perception is at 
most the occasion for, not the source of, our knowledge; the human mind is 
able to produce all knowledge from within itself, with its own means, by 
means of thought. Said Leibniz: “Our ideas, even those of perceptible things, 
come from within ourselves.119 
 
Idealism, in turn, also ‘lost the unity of thinking and being’. 120 ‘To this end [of idealism], 
thinking brings with it from within itself the origins (principia), the seeds (semina) of all 
knowledge. Thinking creates the form of our conceptual world (Kant), and also its matter and 
content (Fichte); indeed, it creates and constructs the entire world, not only the world of 
thought, but also the being itself’.121 It was both Schleiermacher and Hegel, he writes, who 
recovered something of the true nature of humanity: 
Inherent in Hegel’s and Schleiermacher’s starting point, there was a splendid 
truth. Thinking and being are most intimately related and correspond to each other. 
Rationalism attempts to justify religion before the unqualified court of 
common sense. But Hegel and Schleiermacher both understood that religion 
occupies a place of its own in human life, that it is a unique phenomenon and 
therefore also requires a uniquely appropriate organ in human nature… both 
rose above the vulgar rationalism of the day, and both pointed to the harmony 
between subject and object… The objective [world], after all, exists for us only 
to the extent that it comes to our consciousness. It can be approached in no 
other way than through our consciousness. Similarly, religion is not a reality 
                                                 
118 RD 1.217.  
119 RD 1.215.  
120 PoR, 76.  
121 RD 1.215.  
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for me except insofar as I have absorbed it in feeling or reason, or whatever its 
organ may be.122 
 
But between the two, in his association of the conditions of knowledge with a concept of 
religion, Bavinck in PoR chooses the organon gevoel as the path for approaching reality with 
certainty. His argument proceeds in four primary movements. First, that the certainty of self in 
self-consciousness is immediate, given, and pre-thinking (denken), or pre-cognitive (as is 
commonly used in Schleiermacher discourse). Second, he argues that self-consciousness 
reveals a definite, essential self that has a peculiar nature in the feeling of dependence. Third, 
in immediate self-consciousness is a two-fold dependence in relation to the finite and infinite. 
Fourth, in immediate self-consciousness is also revealed a freedom that is not only in 
antithesis to dependence but inclusive of dependence. 
 
(i) Self-consciousness is immediately given and always present. Instead of proceeding in an account of 
the unity of thought and being from the activity of thinking, Bavinck proposes that one start 
from cogito (I think). He argues, in a rather enigmatic way, for an emphasis on the first-person 
subject contained in the Latin verb. When starting from the activity of cogitare (or reflecting on 
the activity of thinking), one is forced to either infer the unity of being and thought or 
recognize the real to be a derivative of an act of the will (which he supposes is the 
consequence of Kant’s first Critique presented in the argument of the second Critique). 123 
Beginning with thinking to account for unity, one is stuck in a web of representations, being 
forced to perpetually think about what one can only think about and never know. One 
therefore cannot approach reality due to the incitement of perpetual representations of the 
mere noumenal. He concludes: ‘Satan cannot cast out Satan’—an allusion to Matthew’s Gospel 
translatable to: ‘there is no escape from representations by means of representations’.124 Using, 
                                                 
122 RD 1.520–521. 
123 PoR, 60.  
124 PoR, 59.   
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he supposes, the activity of thinking to account for the unity of reality and the essence of 
things, as did Descartes, leaves one without any justification for the experience of reality. 
 
In contrast, he draws an analogy: ‘as self-consciousness presupposes the self not outside but in 
the content of consciousness, so by the same law and with the same certainty the 
representation, which does not operate outside of self-consciousness but is the product and 
content of it, points back to an object’. 125  He also states the point accordingly: ‘in 
consciousness, our own being, and the being of the world, are disclosed to us antecedently to 
our thought or volition; that is, they are revealed to us in the strictest sense of the word’.126 
For Bavinck, there is a distinction between representation and the thing in itself. Yet, his point 
is that in and through the representation is offered the thing, an organic unity of thing and 
representation in the life of the mind, which can only be accounted for in a certainty of faith 
rather than in account that begins its justification from reason. It is by faith that everyone 
approaches reality, the existence of other minds, and even their own identity. Immediate self-
consciousness is certain of the self in the activity of consciousness as a presupposition and 
accepts the pre-conceptual certainty of all unity. Likewise, the thing is given to ‘us’ with 
certainty in the representation prior to any discursive reasoning. In other words, the self and 
world and the unity of self and world are a gift to the consciousness and ought be approached 
according to a certainty of faith rather than a critique of reason. To operate in the spirit of the 
latter is to suppose oneself judge rather than creature. 
 
In the activity of thinking, therefore, one presupposes being and does not attempt to account 
for being from the activity of thinking. In the activity of thinking, there is an antecedent 
‘revelation’ of self and world without which, thinking would not be possible. His conclusion, 
therefore, is that thinking is no guarantor of being. It is, rather, that being (both self and 
world) is revealed, ‘given for nothing (geschonken om niet)’, to the consciousness before all 
                                                 
125 PoR, 71.  
126 PoR, 75.  
 
 216 
reason, desire, or will.127 ‘Belief in the objective world is a fact’ no one can deny.128 Thereby, he 
associates the givenness of the self in the ever-accompanying immediate self-consciousness 
with the concept of grace or gift. This unity of self is ‘known’ in feeling. Notice, already, the 
language of grace and faith is the key to epistemic certainty.  
 
And this pre-cognitive awareness of the self to the self is the foundation, he argues, for all 
other knowledge. The ego is not established in the activity of thinking but it is simply ‘given’ 
in ‘feeling’ (gevoel) and as ‘belief’.129 He suggests similarly in RD: ‘Even now [in modernity] 
human originality is greater to the degree that human beings live by intuition rather than 
reflection… They have in common with religious faith that knowledge is acquired 
immediately, not by reflection, and that in degree of certainty they are in no way inferior to 
that which is based on proofs’.130 
 
(ii) Immediate self-consciousness also reveals to the self a peculiar, definite nature in the feeling of dependence. 
When one pulls back the curtain of the contents of representational life in self-reflection, one 
finds a more definite being in the consciousness of self. Ego is not, as he just suggested, 
approached in a mode of comprehension or a discovery of essence through investigation, but 
makes itself known in and through the contents and activities of consciousness. This is to say, 
Bavinck recognizes the basic distinction and inter-relation of immediate and objective self-
consciousness. But the self that is revealed to ‘us’, rather than a bald substance or monad is 
‘full of life’, likely an allusion to Goethe.131 This life is more clearly expressed in being ‘for’ and 
from another. In other words, the unity of self is felt in relation to both the finite and infinite 
as soon as one is awoken to their own existence. When reflecting on the ‘core’ of self-
consciousness, he suggests, its nature is dependence, which describes the subjective-feeling 
                                                 
127 PoR, 62.  
128 PoR, 67.  
129 PoR, 66-7.  
130 RD 1.568. 
131 PoR, 63.  
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aspect of the fact of religiosity, a feeling of absolute dependence. This dependence oscillates, 
Bavinck argues, between the absolute and relative, adopting Schleiermacher’s distinction in CF 
§4.3. 
 
In general, the consciousness of being ‘what we are’ is a consciousness of finitude, and, 
therefore, necessarily a ‘feeling of dependence’. 132 Or, as he also describes it: ‘in our self-
consciousness we are not only conscious of being, but also of being something definite, of 
being the very thing we are. And this definite mode of being, most generally described, 
consists in a dependent, limited, finite, created being’.133 For Bavinck, this consciousness is the 
revelation of creaturliness—a universal intuition or feeling peculiar to humanity and at the 
core of its selfhood. And at the kern of what it means to have religiosity (which is, to be 
human) is the core of our self-consciousness: as Schleiermacher perceived much more clearly 
than Kant, not autonomy, but a feeling of dependence.134  
 
Gevoel, for Bavinck, is coordinate with immediate self-consciousness as an awareness of unity 
between the active states of thinking and willing. 135 This is to say, feeling is not another faculty 
alongside knowing and willing, but part of the essence of human understanding, a knowing 
making identity and cognizance possible. Immediate feeling depends not upon a 
representation of a given object but arises as a mode of intuition in the activities of 
representation for an unseen reality. As Schleiermacher puts it, pious feeling is ‘the original 
                                                 
132 PoR, 66.  
133 PoR, 66.  
134 PoR, 66. It is important to remember again the fact that Vos translates gevoel (feeling) as 
‘sense’ possibly connoting the idea of ‘perception’, which while possible with respect to 
relative dependence is not conceptually present in Bavinck’s quote regarding the feeling of 
dependence in relation to God, who is Absolute.  
135 He makes this clear in Beginselen der Psychologie. For example, ‘this way of taking cognizance [in 
feeling] is of the highest significance… it is not less certain than [reasoning and thinking], but 
exceeds far above them in certainty. But it is indeed less clear and conscious, precisely because it is 
not a knowledge in concepts, and is not the fruit of deliberate reflection and reasoning’. Also, the term 
‘feeling’ can be easily used to signify ‘immediate perception’. 57-8. Emphasis added.  
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expression of an immediate existential relationship’ and ‘is not derived from a 
representation’.136  
 
The feeling of relative and absolute dependency arises in relation to the sensible consciousness 
in the necessary dialectic of freedom and dependence. And for Bavinck, this two-fold feeling 
of dependence is no optional account amongst others (he does not set Kant and 
Schleiermacher alongside each other to offer an arbitrary choice). Rather, the feeling of 
dependence is a fact of human life spoken out of necessity. For Schleiermacher, ‘human 
experience involves a struggle between freedom and necessity’.137 And for Bavinck,  
To ignore this fact of self-consciousness, this primary fact, this foundation of 
all knowledge and activity, to make it dependent on our own affirmation, to 
undermine it by doubt, is to commit against ourselves and against others not 
merely a logical but also an ethical sin. It is to shake not only the foundation of 
science, but also the indispensable basis of all human conduct to weaken all 
confidence, spontaneity, volitional energy and courage. And no effort of the 
will can repair afterwards the injury, which has been wrought by thought.138 
 
(iii) In immediate self-consciousness is a two-fold dependence in relation to the finite and infinite which gives rise 
to a religious feeling. First, ‘we feel ourselves dependent on everything around us’. Second, ‘we 
feel ourselves with all creatures totally dependent on some Absolute… on a being which is 
cause and ground of all being’.139 In this fact of a two-fold dependence between the finite and 
infinite is the certainty of both the world and God. It is here, in other words, that the concepts 
are given to us—both concepts that cannot be, in the domain of self-consciousness, sensibly 
experienced. The world, as the unity of all finitude, is a reality beyond sensible experience—no 
creature can experience the world. And the Absolute, as the infinite, cannot be perceived by the 
finite. Yet, both are given in the feeling of relative and absolute dependence as necessarily 
revealed universals, a feeling that arises in co-extension with sensible consciousness. This 
relation between freedom and dependency gives rise to belief.  And this ‘belief’ in ‘God and 
                                                 
136 Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 40.  
137 Crouter, ‘Introduction’, OR (C), 16.  
138 PoR, 62.  
139 PoR, 66.  
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the world is a fact that no one can deny’.140  It is a certainty as sure as any of natural science, 
Bavinck argues, albeit one of a different genus—of feeling rather than discursive cognition. 
One must train oneself to deny absolute dependence as one must ‘learn to be an atheist’. 
Intuitively, by the universal nature of gevoel, no one supposes themselves autonomous except 
through the slow development of a self-absorbed philosophy. 
 
(iv) In immediate self-consciousness is also revealed a freedom that is not in antithesis to dependence but 
inclusive of dependence. Here, Bavinck makes specific reference that he is going beyond 
Schleiermacher by addressing what Schleiermacher ‘overlooked’—which is more proof of his 
prior dependence on Schleiermacher. Self-consciousness, he argues, reveals even more than 
the unity of the finite, relative and absolute dependence (on an infinite essence), the unity of 
thinking and being, and the being of self and world. The attainment of ‘true unity’ depends 
upon another aspect of the revelation given to feeling as immediate self-consciousness: that 
God is personal and that freedom is dependence.    
 
After idealism ‘felt the seriousness of the objection(s)’ listed, he suggests, it had to ‘seek in 
some way or another in the Absolute the ground for the reality and objectivity of our 
knowledge’.141 After idealism(s) ‘broke down the bridge between thinking and being’ it became 
necessary that ‘the absolute guarantee the truth of human thought’, even if the claim remain 
illusion.142 Yet, he argues, the testimony of self-consciousness protests. Schleiermacher rightly 
conceived that the ‘essence’ of self-consciousness (as Bavinck interprets him) in its religious 
element is the feeling of absolute dependence on an infinite other. And now it must be added 
that self-consciousness posits also the freedom of humanity in addition to dependence and 
that ‘these two testimonies of self-consciousness are not exclusive but inclusive’.143 Given in 
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142 PoR, 76.  
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self-consciousness with the reality of a self that depends is the self that chooses/judges, 
exercises freedom, a temporal self: ‘we draw conclusions… we deliberate… we act.’144 
 
Schleiermacher perceived the relation between self-consciousness, dependence, and freedom 
(or activity). Nevertheless, Bavinck argues, Schleiermacher overlooked a more important point 
and it is here that Bavinck is adding to/constructing upon the base that Schleiermacher had 
laid for him in two ways. First, it is not merely the Whence of our dependence that is given in 
the reality of absolute dependence but that our relative freedom which suggests to ‘us’ the 
being of our own personalities, also indicates that this Whence is nothing other than a personal 
God by analogy. In other words, he draws again on an analogy between finite/infinite 
pertaining now to human and Absolute personality—an argument however that, Bavinck 
thinks, is not an aspect of reflection on the nature of God, but revealed in the feeling of 
absolute dependence. The personality of God for Schleiermacher would only be a conclusion 
per the causal logic of Christian experience.  
 
‘Just as confidently as man is convinced in his self-consciousness of his own existence and of 
the reality of the world, does he believe also in the reality and personality of God’.145 Bavinck 
proposes that Schleiermacher’s presentation of freedom/dependence in a relation of antithesis 
failed to perceive the ‘double testimony’ that the Absolute is given to self-consciousness, 
particularly in feeling, indeed but also as a personality.146 It is a personal self that is absolutely 
dependent on the personal Absolute.  
 
                                                 
144 PoR, 77.  
145 PoR, 77.  
146 Bavinck is responding, perhaps, to statements like this from Schleiermacher: ‘religion does 
not depend upon whether or not in abstract thought a person attributes to the infinite, 
supersensual Cause of the world the predicate of personality’. Jonas and Dilthey, 3:283. Cited 
in Paul Capetz, Christian Faith as Religion: A Study in the Theologies of Calvin and Schleiermacher 
(Oxford: University Press of America, 1998), 122. From Albert Blackwell, ‘The Antagonistic 
Correspondence of 1801 between Chaplain Sack and His Protégé Schleiermacher’, HTR 74 
(1981), 118.  
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Second, while the ‘feeling of dependence is the core of our self-consciousness and the essence 
of religion… it is not a mere de facto dependence as the unconscious and irrational creation is 
dependent on God’.147 His point is that the guarantee of the reality of human freedom testified 
in self-consciousness is a freedom that includes choice in relation to its dependent nature. As 
soon as the feeling of absolute dependence is reflected upon, the feeling of absolute 
dependence (a fact of human nature) becomes conscious and voluntary, ‘a dependence of man 
as a rational and moral being’.148 And it is here that he especially qualifies Schleiermacher’s 
point regarding schlechthinnige dependence. For Bavinck, the dependence does not become fully 
Absolute until the point of reflection on the feeling of dependence. That is, in the voluntary 
consciousness of choice, of assent and action toward that Absolute, infinite, personal essence, 
one turns toward a dependence that is not just feeling but truly absolute in its embrace of the 
whole human personality. ‘If the feeling of dependence did not include this element, if it did 
not know itself as a conscious and voluntary dependence, it would cease to be absolute, because 
the most important factors in man, consciousness [or intellect] and will would fall outside of it 
or stand opposed to it’.149  
 
Bavinck, at the same time, recognizes the reality that even in a voluntary rejection of one’s 
dependence on the Absolute, no one becomes non-dependent. It is merely that their 
consciousness and will have resolutely declared themselves to be so—a declaration in 
opposition to reality but one that disqualifies the term absolute by nature of its exclusion of a 
particular aspect of one’s being, the will.150 Therefore, he concludes, the feeling of dependence 
                                                 
147 PoR, 77.  
148 PoR, 78.  
149 PoR, 78. It is not the intention of this study to evaluate Bavinck’s argument here that 
Schleiermacher fails to understand the true sense of ‘absolute’ or that God’s personality is a 
direct conclusion derivative of the feeling of absolute dependence. There are aspects of the 
‘adding to’ what Schleiermacher ‘failed to see’ that may be, in fact, misunderstandings of 
Schleiermacher.  
150 However, Bavinck’s logic here moves outside of Schleiermacher’s purpose in the term 
‘Absolute’ as a referent to causality. The denial of dependence upon God still requires a reality 
where intellect and will are entirely dependent upon God even in their resolute denial of the 
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includes the freedom of human consciousness. Its moral character depends upon a concept of 
choice and in such freedom is the choice to be less than absolutely dependent. One of the few 
scholars to comment on Bavinck’s use of Schleiermacher, van den Belt, offers a conclusion 
regarding this final point that requires a response:  
[Bavinck] develops his apologetic argument for revelation from self-
consciousness apprehended as an absolute sense of dependence. That self-
consciousness, paradoxically, at the same time posits human independence and 
freedom. Bavinck thus combines Schleiermacher’s concept of religion with Kant’s concept of 
human autonomy. Bavinck seeks the solution for the seeming antinomy of 
dependence and autonomy in the fact that of all creatures only human beings 
are aware of their dependence. This testimony of self-consciousness is the 
basis of religion and morality.151 
 
Yet, Bavinck’s point is that the unity of freedom and dependence is a freedom set within the 
bounds of absolute dependence. Admittedly, Bavinck himself does use the unity of 
Schleiermacher and Kant as a shorthand in relation to the doctrine of the covenant of works: 
‘The covenant of works, accordingly, does justice to both the sovereignty of God… and to the 
grace and generosity of God… It maintains both the dependence as well as the freedom of 
mankind. It combines Schleiermacher [dependence] and Kant [freedom]’.152And perhaps, like 
Bavinck, van den Belt is using the pairing as a pithy short-hand for the unity of freedom and 
dependence. Bavinck’s dependence in this instance, however, re-registers the concept of 
freedom not as autonomy at all but as a freedom that is imprisoned and false unless it denies 
all autonomy. Bavinck’s point is that Kant’s autonomous agent is the opposite of true freedom 
and that Schleiermacher’s agent of absolute dependence on the infinite other better captures 
(although not entirely) the reality revealed in gevoel. Related is one instance where Bavinck, 
quoting from OR (pg. 101, Oman) and CF §158.1,  affirms Schleiermacher’s concept of 
agency against rationalism: ‘Over against the self-centered wishes of rationalism, 
                                                                                                                                                    
fact. Yet, Bavinck has in view here the idea of obedience rather than causal being. This point 
reflects the fact that much of this discussion is derivative of his reading of Romans 1:18-32.  
151 Henk van den Belt, ‘Religion as Revelation: The Development of Herman Bavinck’s View 
from a Reformed Orthodox to a Neo-Calvinist Approach’, TBR 4 (2013): 9-31, 23.  Emphasis 
added.   
152 RD 2.572.  
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Schleiermacher made the statement “Whosoever has learned to be more than himself knows 
that he loses little when he loses himself” and knew no other and higher immortality than “in 
the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal in the 
immortality of religion.”’153 
 
In review, it is a fact, Bavinck argues, that both the moral (human action) and scientific 
(natural sciences, empirical investigations) assume the givenness of self and world (the unity of 
reality) revealed in immediate self-consciousness insofar as the unveiled unity of the self 
provides the possibility of knowing (between the ‘I’ and world), the context of action (world), 
and the freedom of the human personality (the possibility of moral reason and action). And it 
is only in theism, particularly the fact of dependence upon the personal God, that one may 
find satisfaction in the true unity between self and world.  
 
To be sure, this account of the relation of the unity of being and thinking, which is grounded 
in the experience of self and God in immediate self-consciousness as a gift of God is not 
identical to Schleiermacher’s brief exposition in CF. It also has no precise, cited 
correspondence with any of Schleiermacher’s philosophical texts throughout. His brief 
reference to the victory of Schleiermacher over Kant at the climax of his account is suggestive 
of just how he used Schleiermacher as modern theologian/philosopher. Bavinck, after 
Schleiermacher and the turn to the subject in general,154 understood that Christian theology 
and a philosophy of revelation derivative of dogmatics required detailed attention to the fact 
of subjectivity. The fact of subjectivity demanded treatment for the sake of the resolution of 
the dualism he recognized flowing from the rationalisms of Descartes and Kant, between self 
and world. He saw an alternative in Schleiermacher. The embrace of such a goal could only 
exist within a vision of existence divided between consciousness and objective realities and the 
                                                 
153 RD 4.592.  
154 Recall that the use of heuristics like ‘the turn to the subject’ is derivative of Bavinck’s own 
categorization of the relation between modern philosophy and theology.  
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overcoming of any harsh division between them. That is, he wanted to provide an account of 
reality that gave an answer to modern philosophy and it was to one contour of modern 
philosophy that he turned to do so, a philosophy that was also a doctrine of faith.  
 
Bavinck, however, as displayed in his critiques of Schleiermacher, draws resolute distinctions 
between the conclusions he and Schleiermacher come to as it pertains to knowing. Bavinck’s 
interpretation of Schleiermacher is that Schleiermacher turned to self-consciousness and to 
the believing Christian consciousness in response to his assumption of Kant’s basic distinction 
between knowing and thinking, the necessity of antinomy in any attempt to ‘know’ the Whence 
of absolute dependence. It is the feeling of dependence that provides an alternative to an 
epistemic quandary that assumes the impossibility of knowledge of the transcendent.155 It was 
in ‘Kant and Schleiermacher’s own teaching’, Bavinck writes, that one learns ‘to see the 
limitations of our cognitive powers and [to] consign all invisible things, scientifically speaking, 
to an unknowable world’. 156  Bavinck’s use of Schleiermacher’s basic construction of 
immediate self-consciousness and feeling, however, provides a grammar for what Bavinck 
takes to be the surety of one’s knowledge of the transcendent by coupling the concept of 
immediate self-consciousness with revelation, a most sure form of knowledge guaranteed in the 
certainty of faith even in the derivative formation of dogma quoad nos. In doing so, faith as the 
certainty of the real becomes the guarantee of the real insofar as that certainty is the product 
of a universal revelation which is an active self-manifestation of God to the self. This 
‘revelation’ finds its home in Bavinck’s concept of ‘general revelation’ which includes God’s 
pronouncement of God in nature, in providence, in history objectively and, subjectively, in the 
feeling of absolute dependence. As a gift, offered with God’s self-manifestation is the 
givenness of self and world to the human consciousness, a logic Bavinck derives from 
Romans 1-2 (see Ch. 5). To summarize, Bavinck supposes the feeling of dependence and 
                                                 
155  Jacqueline Mariña work subtly suggests otherwise, see ‘Schleiermacher, Realism, and 
Epistemic Modesty’. 
156 RD 1.524. 
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absolute dependence, and the possibility of knowledge and action guaranteed in the immediate 
self-consciousness, a gift of God’s common grace to humanity. For Bavinck, this feeling is a 
‘universal fact’ and to dis-believe in the fact of the unity of thinking and being, self and world, 
is to sin against God. For this reason, it was necessary that Bavinck write a philosophy of 
revelation only after dogmatics (which he saw as sharply distinct from Schleiermacher’s 
approach). All knowledge, therein, becomes a faith-knowledge in this strict sense.  
 
He makes a similar argument in RD 1 regarding the relation between faith, certainty, and an 
immediate form of knowledge. Faith is the principle of knowledge insofar as it is dependence, 
a consciousness of receptivity, on that which has been given: ‘the term faith’, he writes, 
‘deserves preference as the designation of this [epistemic] principle... not only because faith is 
most prominently featured as such in Scripture but especially because the term faith situates us 
in the area of consciousness and so preserves the link with the way we gain knowledge in 
other areas as well’.157 Faith, in other words, in the relation between thinking and being/real 
and ideal, is the foundation for the possibility of knowing, which is given in the activity and 
receptivity of immediate self-consciousness. Both being the product of immediate certainty, a 
certainty of self and the objective world is a unitary act of faith distinct from belief in 
religious-historical truths. So, Bavinck argues: 
In religion and theology we arrive at knowledge in no other way than in other 
sciences. Faith is not a new organ implanted in human beings, not a sixth 
sense, or “superadded gift.” However much it disagrees with the “natural” 
[unspiritual] human, it is nevertheless completely natural, normal, and human. 
Both objectively and subjectively revelation connects with nature, re-creation 
with creation. Believing in general is a very common way in which people gain knowledge 
and certainty. In all areas of life we start by believing. Our natural inclination is to believe. 
It is only acquired knowledge and experience that teaches us skepticism. Faith is the 
foundation of society and the basis of science. Ultimately all certainty is rooted in faith.158 
                                                 
157 RD 1.565.  
158 RD 1.566. Rather than taking the term ‘faith’ as an opposite of ‘knowledge’, he suggests 
that ‘the word faith or belief has this original meaning of devotion, trust, certainty: ֶהאמין, 
 πειθω, πιστις; fido, fides; foi; “faith” and “belief’. Bavinck’s account, one might say, is ;אמּונה
more oriented toward understanding than explanation. As Thiselton describes ‘understanding’, 




4.4. Between Augustine and Schleiermacher 
 
As commented prior, it is noteworthy as it pertains to the relation between the modern and 
orthodox that writing a ‘philosophy of revelation’ is an entirely modern enterprise. Some have 
asked, ‘why a philosophy of revelation’? 159 And Bavinck makes clear in his reflections on 
modern philosophies of revelation how the discipline is itself a new development. Yet, in his 
defense of the project, he also situates what he recognizes as a modern discipline within the 
history of pre-modern theological scholarship unfolding for his readers a disruption of a sharp 
modern/orthodox way of going about theological reasoning. While the philosophy of 
revelation, assuming first the biblical form and content of revelation, explores how revelation 
is a correlate of the domains of knowledge, he writes in defense of the project: ‘theological 
thought has always felt the need of such a science. Not only Origen and the Gnostics, but also 
Augustine and the Scholastics, made it their conscious aim both to maintain Christianity in its 
specific character and to vindicate for it a central place in the conception of the world as a 
whole’.160 And so he does the same with his adaptation of Schleiermacher’s argument by 
situating his reflection on being, thinking, and absolute dependence, between Schleiermacher 
and Augustine.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 8. So, Bavinck is clear here: ‘By 
far the greatest part of our knowledge, not only in religion and morality but also in ordinary 
life, is gotten not by reasoning, but by faith and observation’. Original: ‘Want verreweg de 
meeste kennis, niet alleen in religie en zedelijkheid, maar ook in het gewone leven, krijgen wij 
juist niet door redeneering, maar door geloof en aanschouwen’. Bavinck, Beginselen der 
Psychologie, 111.   
159 George Harinck, ‘Why was Bavinck in Need of a Philosophy of Revelation?’ in The Kuyper 
Center Review: Revelation and Common Grace, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 27-42. 
Harinck, using Rauwenhoff’s philosophy of religion, helpfully makes clear the prior 
antithetical context catalyzing Bavinck’s idea of a philosophy of revelation. However, more 
broadly, the enterprise ‘philosophies of revelation’ were already present in the nineteenth 
century in German thought before Dutch, and particularly with Schelling. See RD 1.292ff.     
160 PoR, 24.  
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In other words, Bavinck makes a subtle declaration in his adoption of an argument built upon 
the immediate self-consciousness and the feeling of dependence that this project is 
inaugurated first in Augustine before taken up by Schleiermacher. For his discovery of 
immediate self-consciousness, he was indebted to Schleiermacher in the modern era above all 
for unveiling the fact that consciousness of oneself in its highest expression is also 
consciousness of the unity of the finite world, and for showing derivatively that immediate 
self-consciousness is correlated with the feeling of absolute dependence on God. But it is 
‘Augustine’, he writes, that ‘was the first who so understood self-consciousness’.161Augustine, 
in his turn inward discovered ‘a new metaphysics’. Bavinck does not suppose Schleiermacher’s 
work to be entirely new but a modern account situated within a legacy of theologians of the 
self that include Augustine (and Calvin), a foremost theological authority for the Dutch 
orthodox.162  
 
His point does not suggest some anachronism, that Augustine’s turn inward is the same as 
Schleiermacher’s—both Descartes and Kant stand between—but that Schleiermacher’s focus 
on the self as a dependent self is a modernized grammar situated within the legacy of 
Augustine. Bavinck, working from Augustine’s Enchiridion, argues, ‘Augustine’s firm point of 
departure was the human being, his self-consciousness, his ineradicable yearning and need for 
truth, happiness, and goodness, all of which are one. This starting point is certain and reliable 
(against the skeptics), since doubt itself still assumes belief in truth and self-consciousness is 
                                                 
161 PoR, 63.  
162 Augustine had been translated by Erasmus and was distributed as a primary source for the 
sake of the philosophia Christi in the Dutch Reformation. The later struggle with the 
Remonstrants was previewed by Jacob Arminius dissociating himself ‘from the Augustinian 
interpretation’ of predestination. The Reformed scholastic environment had defined itself in 
part according to multiple readings that were considered ‘Augustinian’. Further, ‘Calvinism’ is 
the term by which the Dutch Reformed church of the late nineteenth century is mainly 
identified and often augmented by the broader ‘Augustinian’. Van Asselt and Abels, ‘The 
Seventeenth Century’, in Handbook of Dutch History, 299. 
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the final ground of truth’. 163  Set alongside Augustine’s dialectic of belief and doubt, for 
Bavinck, is Schleiermacher’s grammar of dependence and freedom—the latter assumes the 
former in both cases. The affinity Bavinck recognizes between Schleiermacher and 
Augustine’s grammars is grounded in a practical theology, a specific disposition in the ethics 
of theology he locates in Augustine. For Augustine, Bavinck recounts, philosophy is useful but 
‘not the true road to salvation. It can only teach the few and these few it can only teach a 
little… [because it] is handicapped by its own pride in acquiring the knowledge of the truth…’. 
And therefore, here is the most important aspect of the conceptual relation between 
Augustine’s self-consciousness and Schleiermacher’s feeling of absolute dependence: ‘for only 
humility is the road to life. Hence another road to truth is needed, viz., that of authority’.164 
 
Yet, while Bavinck suggests that Augustine is the hinge of historical theology, the unity of 
East and West embodied who first penetrated the problems of the psyche, and approached 
theology with the habitus of deep dependence, he was a man of irresolvable contradictions. It 
is Augustine’s legacy that he finds in Schleiermacher’s grammar but Bavinck does not turn to 
the adoption of Augustine’s details. He rejects, for example, that ‘Augustine accepted two 
cognitive organs, sense and intellect’, thereby subordinating knowledge of nature wholly at 
times to reason and creating space for a dualistic epistemology built on Platonic intelligibility 
and denying the groundwork of faith. What Augustine offers, nevertheless, is an awakening to 
the fact that ‘the knowledge of self and the knowledge of God are the two poles between 
which all human thought oscillates’.165 And such knowledge is only possible in humility, a 
habitus of depending. Interestingly, he draws the same conclusion in nearly the precise 
language as above in alternative section in RD 1: ‘Humility alone is the way to life. Hence 
                                                 
163 RD 1.137. 
164 RD 1.312. Bavinck draws on Augustine from On Christian Doctrine, A Select Library of Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (NPNF), vol. II, 14 vols., ed. Philip Schaff (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), II.60; On the Trinity, NPNF III,  XIII.12, 24; City of God, NPNF II,  
II.7, IX, 20, X.29, XII.20; Confessions, NPNF I,  V.4-5; VII.21. 
165 RD 1.137. 
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there is another way to the truth, the way of authority, the way of faith. On the one hand, faith 
assumes a measure of knowledge, but, on the other, it seeks to know, strives after 
knowledge’.166 Here is where, for Bavinck, Augustine’s legacy of humble interiority meets 
Schleiermacher’s dependent self. 
 
The self, Bavinck argues, as ‘a fullness of life, a totality of gifts’ is the soul that Augustine 
discovered in his turn inward. The activity of psychical life, the act and contents of the 
objective self-consciousness in modern grammar, is the context of the revelation of the 
fullness of ‘our’ own being. Unlike Descartes’ corruption of self who posited thinking as the 
essence of the soul, ‘Augustine went deeper… He discovered reality within himself’.167 The 
argument is that Augustine like Schleiermacher would later, by investigating the contents of 
the consciousness, found a reality not visible before him with the sensible eye. He found with 
the ‘inner eye’ the soul that reveals itself in the activities of thinking while avoiding a reduction 
of the soul ‘to its activity’. He found ‘our being’ beyond appearance, Bavinck argues. He found 
thought but ‘beneath thought he penetrated to the essence of the soul’—dependence.168 
 
The central distinction between Augustine and Descartes is what Bavinck, using 
Schleiermacher’s emphases, levels against Kant: that the turn inward is not an assertion of the 
autonomous self, but the affirmation of exteriority. For Bavinck’s Augustine, the turn inward 
is the pronouncement that the ‘truth is not in me. I see truth in God’. If Bavinck’s practical 
account of the Augustinian interiority is correct, then his point is that Augustine was coming 
at the inner self from the opposite side of what the later Descartes would do. Instead of cogito, 
ergo sum, Bavinck supposes Augustine and Schleiermacher to teach something more akin to 
sum, ergo cogito. Immediate self-consciousness is the concept that best accounts for a radical 
emphasis on the fact of being prior to thinking and on the fact of being a particular something 
                                                 
166 RD 1.137. 
167 PoR, 63. 
168 PoR, 64.  
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in a particular place—a finite image of the infinite God. And in the modern grammar, it is 
Schleiermacher’s concept of immediate self-consciousness and its coordinate concept of the 
feeling of absolute dependence that seizes, for Bavinck, a humanistic or inward turn which can 
ensure the priority of being without collapsing it into thinking—to do otherwise it so make 




As Hanby suggests of Augustine, therefore, so it is for Bavinck: selfhood is doxological.169 
While in Kant one only needs an idea of God rather than the love, mercy, and gifts of God, 
for Bavinck, God is the Creator and Redeemer and the Whence who makes intelligible the 
conundrums of human philosophy. Theism, therefore, is the only world and life orientation 
(Anschauung/wereldbeschouwing) that can make intelligible the relation of self and world. It is only 
faith in the revelation or givenness of the self and world in the fact of its finitude that can offer 
an account that does not collapse being or thinking into the other. Such a supposition is a 
philosophy after dogmatics and a philosophy forged in the legacy of both Augustine and 
Schleiermacher.  
 
Bavinck argues, therefore, that Christianity as the religion that points to the ‘greatness of 
God’s heart’ in the revelation of his will in Christ Jesus, is that which awoke Augustine to the 
consciousness of the self beneath all thinking. It is the self-manifestation of God that registers 
a consciousness of the fullness of being that is the human soul in its dependent relation. 
Revelation, he suggests, restored the certainty of both self and world, by first manifesting God 
to the heart.  The certainty of God as God revealed is the guarantee to the consciousness of 
the certainty of self and world. Augustine awoke to this ‘new certainty’ (a certainty of faith) 
                                                 
169 Michael Hanby, Augustine and Modernity, 91.  
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and could turn inward and discover even more of the revelation of God in the unified being 
of the self (the revelation of the Trinity in his psychological analogy, for instance).  
 
Herein, Bavinck combines Augustine’s inward turn (a turn awoken by his external encounter 
with God) with a concept of certainty and search for the conditions of knowledge derivative 
of his nineteenth-century context. His nineteenth-century ‘turn to the subject’ was, like van 
der Kooi noted, derivative of a theological world of rationality after Descartes and Kant—a 
modern theology that could have never been present for Calvin. Bavinck, in total, develops a 
mixed grammar between Augustine and Schleiermacher. ‘Augustine… made it [his] aim to 
vindicate a central place for Christianity in the conception of the world’. 170  Any 
conceptualization of the whole first requires an account of the revelation of the self (spirit) 
that offers a certainty of the consciousness of world—both of which are given gratis (freely) by 
the Giver of gifts. Bavinck’s modernity consists in a dependence upon the philosophical 
categories and grammars used within dogmatics that were of the ethos of his era. The 
certainty of the reality of self and world in immediate self-consciousness is a certainty of 
faith—a modern Schleiermacherian grammar applied to a consistent Reformed orthodox 
source, Bavinck’s ‘Augustinianism’. 
                                                 





True Religion as Absolute Dependence 
 
Chapter five narrows in on Bavinck’s concept of religion (religio, godsdienst) and makes explicit 
what was implicit in the previous chapter. Chapter four focused on the philosophical, an 
account of unity between self and world. The unity of self and world is made certain, for 
Bavinck, in the experience of immediate self-consciousness, which is an original unity of the 
self, revealed (in the strictest sense) prior to all thinking and willing. For Bavinck, Augustine 
was the father who inaugurated the turn to the inner self as a method for delineating the 
knowledge of self and God. But, it is ‘now’ Schleiermacher’s modern grammar that best makes 
intelligible the reality that is prior to all self-knowledge and discursive God-knowledge, the 
revelation of self, world, and God in immediate consciousness available as gevoel. Per Manfred 
Frank, for Schleiermacher, accounting for the conditions of knowledge became a doctrine of 
faith.1 For Bavinck after Schleiermacher, it is only a doctrine of faith that can account for the 
conditions of knowledge. ‘Certainty’ of experience, therefore, is correlative with the fact of 
human religiosity, the certainty of faith that grounds knowing and doing in toto.    
 
One is left then to conclude this study with the second question, ‘what is religion’? With many 
nineteenth-century theologians, Bavinck often spoke of religion in romantic style:  
[Religion] is the foundation of the true, the good, and the beautiful. It 
introduces unity, coherence, and life into the world and its history. From it 
science, morality, and art derive their origin; to it they return and find rest. “All 
the higher elements of human life first surfaced in alliance with religion”. It is 
the beginning and the end, the soul of everything, that which is highest and 
deepest in life. What God is to the world, religion is to humanity.2  
 
                                                 
1 Manfred Frank, ‘Metaphysical Foundations: a look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic’, 33.  
2 RD 1.269.  
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His logic is as follows: if God is the foundation of existence as pure act, and if religion is the 
fact of ‘our’ relation to God, then that relation is the ground of every other relation. In being 
in relation with God, ‘[religion] encompasses the whole person in his or her thinking, feeling, 
and action, in the whole of his or her life, everywhere and at all times. Nothing falls outside of 
its scope’.3 Because of the denial of personal religion in the modern age, he argues, ‘there 
exists a disharmony between our thinking and feeling, our will and doing’.4 Religion is the 
solution to such cacophony. Religion satisfies the feeling of the discordant relation between 
thinking and being, between being and becoming, between becoming and acting.5 
 
The answer to this query (what is religion?), and particularly in its narrow subjective form, is 
the second locus of Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s conceptual framework. This 
fact was established in the last chapter. There, exegesis of Bavinck’s PoR made available that 
he defines religion or piety as the feeling of absolute dependence on the infinite other. 
Bavinck agrees in PoR with Schleiermacher’s CF: religion is ‘a feeling of absolute 
dependence’.6 Yet, in asking ‘what is religion’, this chapter does not set out to define Bavinck’s 
‘religion’ in toto. Rather, the point is to establish the significance of Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling’ 
for Bavinck’s ‘religion’. To be sure, when Bavinck states that the essence of religion is the 
feeling of absolute dependence as he does in PoR, much remains to be said about the totality 
of religion as knowing and doing. Religion is also knowledge and action, but for Bavinck 
religion in general begins as the feeling of absolute dependence and finds its completion in 
knowing and doing. The ‘subjective’ aspect of religion here refers to the inner-life, the 
conscious life, and specifically to feeling which always manifests in knowing and acting.   
 
                                                 
3 RD 1.268.   
4  Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 8. Original: ‘Er is eene disharmonie tusschen ons 
denken en gevoelen, tusschen ons willen en handelen.’ 
5 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 14.  
6 PoR, 77; CF §3-4.  
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There are three aspects of this Schleiermacherian adoption to elucidate. First, this 
appropriation is not only significant in relation to the fact of Bavinck’s appropriation of 
Schleiermacher but also because the adoption of Schleiermacher’s definition of religion is part 
of Bavinck’s dogmatic speech, disciplined by the logic of biblical revelation. Second, Bavinck’s 
definition of religion is like and unlike his understanding of Schleiermacher’s definition of 
religion because religion is defined per a dogmatic-biblical deduction, set in the grammar of an 
objective and subjective relational correspondence, and in antithesis to definitions drawn 
‘from philosophy’. Religion is only true religion, for Bavinck, when the objective, revealed fact 
of God’s manifesation disciplines the totality of consciousness. Third, according to Bavinck’s 
argument, narrowing in on this definition of religion also unveils the consanguinity between 
Calvin and Schleiermacher in addition to that of Augustine and Schleiermacher, from chapter 
four. While the fact of the relationship between Calvin and Schleiermacher (both 
Schleiermacher’s use of and historical relation to Calvin’s lineage) is now well-established in 
contemporary scholarship, 7 it must be remembered that Bavinck worked in a context that 
repudiated Schleiermacher. Before Bavinck’s birth, as noted in Ch. 2, Schleiermacher’s works 
were published in Dutch only under corrective annotations.8 And Bavinck himself consistently 
maintained a moderate distaste for Schleiermacher’s dogmatic methodology and its material 
content (Ch. 3). In his adoption of Schleiermacher’s definition of religion, therefore, there is 
both a ja and nee. In summary, on the one hand, he is critical of Schleiermacher for taking his 
definition of religion ‘from philosophy’. On the other, he argues that Schleiermacher’s 
‘concept of dependence deserves primary consideration’ and is ‘most qualified’ amid the 
history of the search for the essence of religion.9  
 
Bavinck, therefore, offers a nuanced definition of religion with one foot planted in Geneva 
and one in Berlin. Like his construction of the unity of thinking and being, Bavinck’s 
                                                 
7 For example, see Paul Capetz’s monograph on the relationship: Christian Faith as Religion: A 
Study in the Theologies of Calvin and Schleiermacher.  
8 K.H. Roessingh, De Moderne Theologie in Nederland; hare voorberieiding en eerste period, 24.  
9 RD 1.242.  
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definition of religion is idiosyncratic. While dependent on Schleiermacher’s ‘dependence’ and 
affirmative of his ‘religion in general’, he simultaneously argues that Schleiermacher’s 
definition of religion ‘cannot be allowed to go unchallenged’.10 
 
It is necessary in this chapter then to offer some detailed consideration of Bavinck’s 
appropriation of Schleiermacher’s ‘piety’ (i) in order to unveil how, using religion, Bavinck does 
include Schleiermacher’s concepts in his own material, dogmatic propositions. The first 
question, for Bavinck, is this: ‘what is the ground for defining religion’? (ii) Then, regarding 
Bavinck, one must ask ‘what is religion in general?’ The answer explains Bavinck’s 
appropriation of the feeling of absolute dependence in light of his broadest definition of 
religion. (iii) Finally, to establish more conclusively Bavinck’s association of a broad 
conceptual unity between Calvin and Schleiermacher regarding the subjective aspect of 
religion in general, from whom does Bavinck’s concept of religion derive? In view in this final 
section is a more detailed examination of Bavinck’s appropriation of both Calvin and 
Schleiermacher on religion that reinforces with clear evidence Bavinck’s appropriation of 
Schleiermacher within his Dutch tradition’s dogmatic theology. 
 
5.1. Religion as Dogmatics 
 
Although the primary location of Schleiermacherian appropriation in Bavinck’s mature career 
is the philosophy in PoR, Bavinck’s dogmatics and wider corpus do indeed manifest 
Schleiermacherian categories within its dogmatic rationality. This is necessarily so because the 
fact of his adoption of Schleiermacher’s coterminous relation between the immediate self-
consciousness and the feeling of dependence demands not only a philosophical appropriation 
but includes an appropriation of the concept of human piety or religion.  
 
                                                 
10 RD 1.242.  
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By adopting the definition of religion popularised by Schleiermacher, in both PoR and RD 1 
(the feeling of absolute dependence) Bavinck might have been charged alongside 
Schleiermacher with the anthropocentrist indictment that Barth and Brunner famously 
appropriated to liberal theology’s concept of ‘religion in general’.11 In Mysticism and the Word in 
1924, Brunner contrasted ‘the modern concept of religion and Christian faith’, where 
Schleiermacher played the role of the modern mystic.12 In Brunner’s account, one must choose 
Jesus Christ or the modern religion of Schleiermacher who is charged with replacing the 
Christian faith for a more basic religion in general.13 Brunner echoes this reading later in The 
Mediator sharpening the distinction between general and special revelation and stating that 
Schleiermacher remains an adherent to the lineage of rationalism, not an objector to it. 14 
Schleiermacher, he argues, did not turn from general to special revelation but merely deepened 
the natural religion he gained through mysticism and a neo-Platonic rationality.  
 
Barth was somewhat measured and, as noted in chapter two, esteemed Schleiermacher amid 
the highest order of theologians. Yet, Barth claimed, Schleiermacher’s ‘religionism’ and its 
wide influence was anti-Reformation: ‘Neo-Protestantism means “religionism”’. And,  ‘even 
the conservative theology of these centuries, the supra-naturalistic of the 18th and the 
confessional, biblicistic and “positive” of the 19th and 20th, has, on the whole, co-operated, 
making such concessions to the prevailing outlook that in spite of the immanent resistance 
which it has put up it cannot be regarded as a renewal of the Reformation tradition’.15 Human 
religion is, Barth states, ‘the realm of man’s attempts to justify and to sanctify himself before a 
                                                 
11  Capetz recounts this history without reference to Bavinck in Capetz, Christian Faith as 
Religion, 4ff. 
12 Emil Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort: Der Gegensatz zwischen moderner Religionsauffassung und 
christilichem Glauben dargestellt an der Theologie Schleiermachers (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1924).  
13 E. Brunner, Die Mystik und das Wort, 10. Cited in P. Capetz, Christian Faith as Religion, 5.  
14 Emil Brunner, The Mediator, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1934), 48ff. 
15 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part 2. Vol. 1, (CD I/2) eds.  
Geoffrey William Bromiley, and Thomas F. Torrance (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 305.  
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capricious and arbitrary picture of God’. 16  For both Brunner and Barth, Schleiermacher’s 
version of religion is a subversion of the Reformation’s emphasis on the Word and antithetical 
to revelation.  
 
Bavinck was amid the ‘confessional’ theologians Barth describes who did indeed conceptualize 
a ‘religion in general’ which is a universal response to a common, ubiquitous revelation of 
God, in which Christianity is counted as one religion among many.17 Bavinck even ascribed to 
all religions, including various paganisms, a measure of value.18 Further, in his unfolding of the 
‘essence’ (wezen) of religio, Bavinck places his definition of religion within the section titled 
‘principia in general’ in RD 1. In both PoR and RD, he gives space to investigating the word 
‘religion’ (religio) itself and offers in brief a phenomenology of religion to assert the fact of a 
universal religiosity as a common good. Across his corpus, he appeals to religious studies in 
support of dogmatic arguments. In one simple instance, he concludes: ‘The bare fact that 
religion exists already means much’.19  
 
                                                 
16 Barth, CD I/2, 264. Also, Sven Ensminger, Karl Barth’s Theology as a Resource for a Christian 
Theology of Religions (Edinburgh: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014). Cited in Capetz, 5.  
17 RD 1.51-52. In his examination of the science of religion, for example, he commends some 
of the correct assumptions of that developing science: ‘such study also presupposes that 
religions are interrelated, that they all possess a common component, and that in an ascending order they 
produce and develop “religion” proper. Fundamental is the conviction that religion is not an 
illusion but a reality—in a word, the premise that in religion God makes himself known and 
enters into fellowship with human beings’. Emphasis added.   
18 Accordingly, Bavinck understands his theology of religions to be more nuanced than past 
Reformed treatments: ‘But, however severely Scripture judges the character of paganism, it is 
precisely the general revelation it teaches that enables and authorizes us to recognize all the 
elements of truth that are present also in pagan religions. In the past the study of religions was 
pursued exclusively in the interest of dogmatics and apologetics. The founders of [non-
Christian] religions, like Mohammad, were simply considered imposters, enemies of God, 
accomplices of the devil’. GD 1.238; cf. GD 1.290; RD 1.318. Cited in Henk van den Belt, 
‘Religion as Revelation: The Development of Herman Bavinck’s View from a Reformed 
Orthodox to a Neo-Calvinist Approach’, 22.  
19 PoR, 142.  
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Nevertheless, one must consider how Bavinck relates the concept of religion in general or the 
genus of religion (Christianity included) to his constructive dogmatics to understand that these 
affirmations of a universal aspect of religion manifest in various forms can only be defined 
after or within the science of Christian theology. Because of his perceived distinction from 
Schleiermacher in dogmatic method (as he describes it, see Ch. 3), he distances himself from 
Schleiermacher’s religion while simultaneously affirming Schleiermacher’s religion. This 
section focuses on the former. Yet, because Bavinck subsumes Schleiermacher’s definition of 
religion into his dogmatic theology, Bavinck’s dogmatic framework does indeed adopt 
Schleiermacherian concepts, which remain consistent throughout the RD. For Bavinck, 
religion is the feeling of absolute dependence on the absolute essence. This definition is a 
dogmatic-philosophical claim, not mere philosophy, but derived from philosophical reflection 
on biblical logic, which is the very activity of dogmatics. While affirming the universality of 
this same experience in all religions, he rejects the idea that a positive study of religions or 
reflection on human experience can provide the ground for such a subjective definition.  
 
To define religion is to speak dogmatics. In 1876, the Higher Education Act situated the study of 
theology within the field of religious studies in the Dutch university. Theology, therein, was 
officially registered as an historical and psychological science.20 While the outworking of the 
Act largely failed and both theology and specifically dogmatics was allowed space in the 
modern Dutch university, the Act pointed to an atmosphere of growing appreciation for 
religious studies on the one hand and for emphasizing the practical aspects of theology over 
                                                 
20 See A. J. Rasker, De Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk vanaf 1795, 2nd ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1981), 
179ff. Bavinck proposes that the movement toward religious studies in the university is a 
symptom of the general ‘agnosticism’ concerning speech about God in theological modernity. 
Thereby, religious studies is derivative of the ‘turn to philosophy’. RD 2.44: ‘Theology has so 
far fallen victim to the dread of this agnosticism that it hardly any longer dares to speak of a 
knowledge of God. It tries as much as possible to exclude all metaphysics (although of late we 
can see some reaction to this trend) and to restrict itself to the realm of the religious. It has 
become ashamed of its own name and has allowed itself to be re-baptized into a science of 
religion. For although agnosticism is in fact the death of theology, many theologians have 
nevertheless maintained it in another form’.  
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the theoretical on the other. While the Higher Education Acts was relatively unsuccessful in 
practice, for Bavinck, this attempted relegation of dogmatics to the science of religion was 
tragic. He confessed his desire for the opposite relation by arguing that religion ought to be 
understood as a necessary response to the fact of the universal, covenantal human relationship 
with the one true God, even if falsified by sin. For true religion over against false, he argues, 
‘no more beautiful description of religion is conceivable than that offered in the Heidelberg 
Catechism…: “That I, not wanting to endanger my salvation, avoid and shun all idolatry, 
magic, superstitious rites, and prayer to saints or to other creatures. That I sincerely 
acknowledge the only true God’.21 While the true God has revealed God to every human 
subject according to the doctrine of general revelation (hence religion as a universal piety or 
ubiquitous religious affection), every human subject necessarily rejects the true God (hence 
religions as varied external expressions and institutions, including the faith of atheism) except 
in the agency of the Spirit to regenerate the consciousness. The science of religion, therefore, 
has no ability to locate the essence of religion. In accordance with his usual writing style, he 
critiques the logic behind the Education Act in a satirical presentation:  
Dogmatics [rests] on an unprovable foundation, and cannot be a science in the 
true sense of the word. Therefore, if theology, and specifically dogmatics, 
wants to become a genuine science, it must put aside all prejudices and 
proceed only on the basis of the indisputable fact—which is an established 
certainty for all—that religions exist. These religions are the object of theology; 
and if it studies them historically, psychologically, and comparatively, it may 
foster the hope that it will in the end break through to the essence of religion.22 
 
However, he suggests, Christian theology cannot proceed from a positive science of religious 
experience nor can the Christian religion as a positive religion be defined in essence by its 
relation to religions in general. The unique treatment of religion ‘in theology consists in the 
fact that [it is] viewed in [its] relation to God as [its] source and end’. 23 The object of a 
theology department, therefore, is not the study of religion or even reflection on religious 
                                                 
21 RD 1.244-45. 
22 RD 1.36.  
23 RD 1.36.  
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affections. Rather, theology’s object is God, through the lens of his objective self-
manifestation and from the disposition of religion (pietas). Pietas and religio he argues, must be 
defined by dogmatic, biblical rationality before theology makes use of any positive study of 
religions and religious experience. This definition of piety as an inward response to the 
revelation of the true God, derived from Christian dogmatic science, is the definition of the 
subjective disposition for all religions, the knowledge of the revealed God, the taste for the 
infinite. Arguing in accordance with Polanus (as well as Zwingli and Zanchi) on the idea of a 
subjective religious disposition which includes the feeling for and knowledge of the divine, he 
writes: ‘Religion, [therefore] (religio) or piety (pietas) is the internal cause of the worship of God 
(cultus Dei)’.24 While Holy Scripture does not provide an explicit definition of this general 
subjective essence of religion, it does ‘stamp the religious disposition that the Christian feels 
toward God and his revelation with the name faith’.25  
 
Bavinck proposes that Schleiermacher’s concept of the feeling of absolute dependence, 
nevertheless, is ‘most qualified’ for describing the notion of a pietas in general which manifests 
itself in outward expressions (knowledge and action) in all religions. While ‘the very question 
concerning the essence of religion, because it is so indefinite, is not susceptible to solution’ 
and ‘the religious life is much too deep and too rich for it to find its correct interpretation in a 
single formula’, the feeling of absolute dependence is ‘most qualified’ to describe this universal 
reality.26 Schleiermacher, however, failed to ground his description of  piety within the bounds 
of the principia fidei, focusing solely on the subject, and became, Bavinck argues, a primary 
catalyst for the turn to religious studies.  
[Schleiermacher], in fact, by his borrowed propositions (Lehnsätze), made 
dogmatics dependent on philosophy. For a long time under the heading of 
“prolegomena,” “fundamental theology,” or “philosophical theology” and the 
like, following Schleiermacher’s footsteps, many theologians prefaced 
dogmatics with a far-ranging introduction that had an apologetic thrust. 
                                                 
24 RD 1.241.  
25 RD 1.243.  
26 RD 1.252. 
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Theology lacked a foundation of its own and was not developed from its own 
first principles; it could only undertake its task after first letting philosophy 
examine and judge its basis and right to exist. The theologian did not from the 
outset take his stance within Christianity but took his initial position outside of 
Christianity, in religion in general, in order from that vantage point to proceed to 
an exposition of Christian doctrines.27 
 
Also, Bavinck implicitly associates the trend toward the science of religion with 
Schleiermacher’s dogmatic method as explained in Ch. 3: ‘In order to remain scientific, 
[dogmatics] abandoned the knowledge of God and traded it for that of religion… its [object] 
became the religious consciousness in its historical development and psychological 
particularity’.28 Instead, Bavinck proposes the opposite. The concept ‘religion in general’ must 
be itself a Christian doctrine defined within the speech of dogmatics. While religion is indeed 
positive (but only observable in part, he adds), dogmatics begins with dogmatics and makes 
use of other disciplines only after the identification of its own principles and definitions. To 
do otherwise, is to make dogmatics dependent on ‘philosophy’ generally and the ‘science of 
religion’ specifically.  
 
For Bavinck therefore, Schleiermacher’s insight that religion is not knowing or doing but first 
the feeling of absolute dependence is indeed an adequate description of the subjective kernel 
of every religion’s husk. However, one must understand that Schleiermacher’s distinction 
between religion as feeling, knowing, and doing is rather specific. ‘Knowing’ in this trichotomy 
refers to ‘knowing about’ (science) and specifically about God. If religion was fundamentally 
knowing about God, then the one who knows most is most pious, an inadequate proposal for 
the Reformed tradition. Likewise, ‘doing’ refers to good action and encounters the same 
problem.29 In this trichotomy, therefore, religion takes shape in knowing and doing, because 
feeling ‘is strongly present in one’s most lively elements… and underlies all the expressions of 
                                                 
27 RD 1.209. Emphasis added.  
28 Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid (Wageningen: Vada Press Ltd., 1902), 21. The following 
English translations of this article were made in correspondence with translations by Bruce 
Pass, Reformed Theological Review, forthcoming in 2018.  
29 CF §3 
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one’s will’.30 Piety is fundamentally a feeling but a feeling that always takes expression in 
knowing and doing.  
 
Against the myopic principle that faith is merely assent (which Bavinck associates with 
Socinianism, Arminianism), ‘Schleiermacher had a valid point when he said that religion was 
neither a matter of knowledge nor of action but had its seat in the heart, and that the Christian 
religion differs from all other religions by the fact that everything in it is related to the 
redemption brought about by Jesus of Nazareth’.31 The cause of this ‘kernel’ is the revelation 
of the Triune God. Yet, Bavinck denies the broader ‘change’ in the ‘modern concept of 
religion’ that accompanies this definition. He characterizes it accordingly: ‘the various religions 
[now] therefore are also not to be classified according to true (ware) and false (valsche); they do 
not oppose each other as “yes” (ja) and “no” (neen). But they are all together waves in the same 
ocean, refractions of one light… There is no reasonable, pure, and unblemished religion…’.32 
Schleiermacher categorized religions, therefore, as ‘lower and higher’ in CF §8 in what Bavinck 
titles the ‘evolutionistic approach’.  
 
Because of the relegation of the knowledge of God to the activity of thinking in Kantian 
thought, to maintain its status as ‘science’ theology was forced to withdraw under the auspices 
of philosophy, and particularly a philosophy of religion. Theology was ‘the scientific, ordered 
knowledge of God [as defined in previous centuries]’ but since ‘the mouth of Kant’, he writes, 
‘theology was faced with a grave choice’:  
Faced with this choice, theology has frequently been unfaithful to its calling. 
The seduction of a scientific reputation was too powerful for it; it succumbed 
to the temptation of vain philosophy. In order to remain scientific, it 
abandoned the knowledge of God and traded it for that of religion. Its 
                                                 
30 CF §3.5. 
31 RD 4.118.  
32 Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 20. Original: ‘De verschillende godsdiensten zijn daarom 
ook niet in ware en valsche in te deelen; zij staan niet als ja en neen tegenover elkander. Maar 
zij zijn allen te zamen golven in denzelfden oceaan, straalbrekingen van één licht, schakels in 
dezelfde keten, momenten van één proces’. 
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emphasis shifted away from the world of metaphysics to history and 
psychology. Its object could no longer be the knowledge God revealed in the 
face of Christ Jesus his Son, but it became the religious consciousness in it is 
historical development and psychological particularity. As such, it now regards 
itself as having the task of first carefully studying the various religions in order 
afterwards to discover, progressing from the particular to the universal essence 
the laws and the origin of religion and finally to demonstrate, in which form 
religion comes to its purest expression.33  
 
It is due to the lineage of such epistemic theological modesty, Bavinck argues, that 
‘Schleiermacher… defined religion as the “absolute feeling of dependence.” Many objections 
have been raised against this definition’, he writes.34 The fundamental objection is directed to 
the disregard for the ‘object’ (God) in theology. But, in terms of the human subject, 
Schleiermacher’s definition of the religious element, he argues, remains true. Bavinck’s 
argument for the truth of Schleiermacher’s proposition is to appeal to the fact of general 
revelation, the imago Dei, and the universal element that humans are indeed in relation with 
God the creator.35  
                                                 
33  Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 20-21. Original: ‘Voor die keuze geplaatst, is de 
theologie menigmaal ontrouw aan hare roeping geweest. De verleiding van den 
wetenschappelijken naam was haar te machtig; zij bezweek voor de bekoring der ijdele 
philosophie. Om wetenschap te blijven, heeft zij daarom de kennisse Gods prijs gegeven en 
voor die van den godsdienst ingeruild. Haar zwaartepunt werd uit de metaphysische wereld in 
de historie en de psychologie verlegd. Haar object kon de kennisse Gods niet meer zijn, 
geopenbaard in het aangezicht van Christus Jezus, zijnen Zoon, maar werd het religieus 
bewustzijn in zijne historische ontwikkeling en psychologische eigenaardigheid. Als zoodanig 
ziet zij zich thans tot taak gesteld, om eerst de verschillende godsdiensten nauwkeurig te 
onderzoeken; om daarna, uit het bijzondere tot het algemeene opklimmend, het wezen, de 
wetten en den oorsprong der religie te leeren kennen; en om eindelijk aan te wijzen, in welke 
vormen de religie het zuiverst tot hare uitdrukking komt’. 
34 RD 1.260: ‘This definition in Schleiermacher indeed has a meaning that cannot be allowed 
to go unchallenged. In his thinking dependence is so pantheistically construed that objectively 
it relates only to the whole of the universe’. And describing Schleiermacher’s method: ‘Since 
dogmatics is a positive science and does not exist in virtue of a scientific idea but only for the 
sake of a practical purpose (to guide the church), it cannot derive its nature from its own idea 
but must in its introduction borrow certain propositions from a variety of sciences’. 
35 RD 4.276. Citing Schleiermacher in fn. 2, he writes in the body of the text: ‘There exists in 
religion a powerful social element.2 The reason for this is not hard to find: religion is more 
deeply rooted in the human heart than anything else. It is the immediate result of our being 
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What makes human beings religious beings and drives them toward religion is 
the realization that they are related to God in a way that specifically differs 
from all their other relationships. This relationship is so deep and tender, so 
rich and many-dimensional, that it can only with difficulty be expressed in a 
single concept. But certainly, the concept of dependence deserves primary 
consideration and is best qualified for this purpose.36  
 
Nevertheless, Bavinck complains in simultaneity: ‘recent theology has not derived its 
definition of religion from… the theism of Holy Scripture but from… Schleiermacher’ who 
gives the appearance of deriving the concept of religion and the borrowed propositions from 
some position of ‘neutrality’.37 In the face of Schleiermacher’s religion, he says, therefore, ja 
and nee. The ja is exposited more precisely in section three. The nee regarding religion, for 
Bavinck, is two-fold. First, he argues, the subjective essence of religion defined, the feeling of 
absolute dependence, must be logically derived from biblical-dogmatic reason within the 
theological sciences, not from borrowed sciences. Second, while the feeling of absolute 
dependence is indeed evoked by God in Bavinck’s theology according to God’s revelation to 
all of humanity through the fact of the imago Dei and general revelation to the human 
conscience, this feeling will always develop false knowledge and action until it is wedded to 
the truth of objective revelation under the agency of the regenerating Spirit of Christ: 
‘Religious feeling, however intimate and deep it may otherwise be, is pure only when it is 
evoked by true ideas’.38 Christianity, he argues, is the religio vera amid the false presentations of 
other religious feelings that fail to correspond to the objective reality of objective revelation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
created in God’s image and therefore radically integral to our nature. In religion, we regulate 
our relationship to God, the relationship that is central’. 
36 RD 1.242.  
37 Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 22. Also, RD 1.267: ‘But when, as in Schleiermacher, 
feeling is detached from faith, from the religious representation, and made into an 
independent and exclusive source and seat of religion, it loses its own quality and becomes 
completely independent of the categories of truth and untruth, good and evil. Then every 
individual feeling is already as such religious, true, good, and beautiful. And that was 
romanticism’s great fault as a whole’. 
38 CF §4.2. 
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It is worth noting here that Henk van den Belt has added some nuance to the picture of 
Bavinck on ‘religion in general’ through his analysis of the distinctions between the earlier and 
later editions of RD 1. From the first to the second, van den Belt argues, Bavinck decided to 
‘approach the phenomenon of religion from a less exclusive starting point’.39 This is to say, in 
the earlier version, his section on religion began with an assertion of the religio vera, derivative 
of the Reformed orthodox arguments, and then to a negative judgment of other religions 
from this ‘pure conception of religion’, i.e. the Christian concept. In the second and later 
editions, these comments on the ‘pure conception’ as a starting point of his description of the 
religious disposition are deleted. So, according to van den Belt: ‘whereas [Bavinck] argues 
from Christianity as the one revealed and true religion to the other religions in the first 
edition, in the later editions he argues from religion in general to Christianity, that he, of 
course, still sees as the only religio vera’.40  
 
Yet, this transition is measured. In the 1906 edition, while affirming the value of the study of 
religions, he affirms an earlier judgment that neither reflection on religious experience nor the 
science of religion can approach the essence of religion in principle or practice.41 Therefore, 
van den Belt determines:  
the conclusion is the same in the later editions, but the way that leads to this 
conclusion is different; for, instead of placing the orthodox Reformed view 
antithetically over against the other views, Bavinck sees the science of religion 
and especially the philosophy of religion as a method to grant religion its 
proper value. Instead of rendering the historical and psychological methods 
impossible, he writes that they are “insufficient and have to be augmented… 
by the philosophical or metaphysical method, which establishes the validity 
and value of religion and hence also its ideas and actions (dogma, cult, etc.)”.42 
 
One must not overstate the shift. The conclusive statements remain the same between both 
editions and the study of religion remains insufficient for defining the essence of religion. This 
                                                 
39 H. van den Belt, ‘Religion as Revelation’, 13. 
40 H. van den Belt, ‘Religion as Revelation’, 13.  
41 GD 1.200; GD 1.241; cf.  RD 1.268. Cited in H. van den Belt, ‘Religion as Revelation’, 16.  
42 H. van den Belt, ‘Religion as Revelation’, 13, 16-17; GD 1.218; cf.  RD 1.246.  
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is only a shift in the logic of presentation but not in the structure of the relation between 
religion in general and Christian theology. Bavinck categorizes the difference in Christianity 
and other religions as that between the ‘true’ and ‘false’ across his corpus. One could indeed 
map in Bavinck’s later career a growing appreciation for the human and natural sciences which 
was reflected in the introductory comments on PoR in the previous chapter. These estimations 
of value and observations of the common phenomena per religion, nonetheless, remain 
situated within a gereformeerde dogmatiek and a philosophy of revelation with the same definitions 
and conclusions. While he does indeed adopt Schleiermacher’s definition that piety is the 
feeling of absolute dependence and that this is a universal reality, he does so, according to his 
own argument, under the rationality of sacred Scripture. Bavinck concludes, then, with an 
obvious allusion to Schleiermacher: ‘For dogmatics is not a description of the pious 
conditions of the mind, no incomplete formulation of the faith of the church… but an 
exposition in scientific form of the truth revealed by God in his Word, and therefore theology 
is the knowledge of God in the proper and genuine sense of the word’. 43  Because the 
definition of religion is a dogmatic proposition, religion as the feeling of absolute dependence 
is derivative of the logic of Scripture, not the science of religion. 
 
 
5.2. Religion as Feeling, Religion as Revelation 
 
Bavinck defines religion both as the feeling of absolute dependence with regard to the subject and as the fact of 
being in relation with God objectively. ‘What is religion’? For Bavinck, pietas is the feeling of absolute 
dependence on God. As he states clearly in PoR: ‘the feeling of dependence is the core of self-
                                                 
43 Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 56. Original: ‘Want de dogmatiek met name is geen 
beschrijving van vrome gemoedstoestanden, geen gebrekkige formuleering van hetgeloof der 
gemeente, veel minder nog eene stichtelijke toespraak op een collegium pietatis, maar 
uitstalling in wetenschappelijken vorm van de waarheid, door God in Zijn Woord 




consciousness and the essence of religion’.44 But this definition only offers part of the picture. 
Bavinck’s definition of religion is simultaneously modern and orthodox. He first invites the 
reader to return to the modern philosophical dichotomy used within the entirety of his 
dogmatic theology to frame the definition: the relation between subjects and objects. In the 
section prior to his elucidation of religion in general in RD 1, he concludes his evaluation of 
the epistemic relation between the human consciousness and the fact of external being 
(objects) by adding an appeal to the Logos. The Logos of God, the eternal Word, is the creator 
of being and the creator of being as human consciousness. The unity of subject and object in 
creation is upheld by the Logos as mediator of creation who is the active agent in the 
establishment and maintenance of all relations in space and time. The ‘laws of thinking within 
us’ relate to the laws of being outside of ‘us’ because of the activity of the Logos. ‘The Logos 
who shines in the world must also let his light shine in our consciousness’.45 And, regarding 
the knowledge of God mediated: ‘in the final analysis, it is God alone who from his divine 
consciousness and by way of his creatures conveys the knowledge of truth to our mind—the 
Father who by the Son and in the Spirit reveals himself to us’. 46  He then sets the 
subject/object relation mediated by the Logos as the framework for the relationship of all of 
his major dogmatic pairs: ‘Just as in the sciences the subject must correspond to the object, 
and in religion subjective religion must answer to objective religion, so external and objective 
revelation demands an internal revelation in the subject’. 47 In another instance, he writes: 
‘similarly, there is not only an external and objective but also an internal and subjective 
revelation. The former is the external principle of the knowledge of religion (principium 
cognoscendi externum); the latter the internal principle of that knowledge (principium cognoscendi 
internum). The two principles are most intimately related’.48  
                                                 
44 PoR, 77. 
45 RD 1.233.  
46 RD 1.233. An account, therefore, of the unity of thinking and being requires a doctrine of 
faith, as argued in chapter four.  
47 RD 1.348.  




The objective is, fundamentally, the Scriptures and the subjective is the agency of the Spirit of 
Christ at regenerating work in the human consciousness. To have true religion is to have the 
unity of ‘knowing and doing’ disciplined by the Scriptures objectively and received according 
to the subjective disposition of Christian piety, the regenerated consciousness in union with the 
Redeemer. Before elucidating the details, the broad picture concerning Bavinck’s definition of 
religion includes first the fact of a universal subjective religion in the feeling of absolute 
dependence on the infinite other that manifests in knowledge and action. This feeling 
corresponds to the objective fact that God relates to all of his creatures according to the 
covenantal Creator-creature relation. He, after Calvin, considers this form of the knowledge of 
God to be ‘primal’ wherein one ‘feel[s] that God as our maker supports us by his power’. Yet, 
it is another thing altogether to ‘embrace’ and ‘apprehend God the redeemer in Christ the 
mediator’.49 This former ‘religion’, therefore, is not true religion. True religion is also objective 
and subjective. Objectively ‘the essence of the Christian religion consists in the reality that the 
creation of the Father, ruined by sin, is restored in the death of the Son of God and re-created 
by the grace of the Holy Spirit into a kingdom of God’.50 Subjectively, true religion is the 
disposition of the regenerate habitus, only possible due to the agency of the Spirit of Christ, 
and the knowledge of the Triune God.   
 
Religion only exists, therefore, in a unity of subject and object ‘just as in the sciences’. Because 
true religion is only possible through a particularized unity of the subject with the object (the 
fact of the revelation of the Triune God), the feeling of absolute dependence manifest in 
knowing and doing across all religions is necessarily false before it can be true. Religion in 
general as subject/object correspondence with general revelation means that on the objective 
side ‘religion is revelation’ because revelation is God’s activity of relating—objective religion is 
                                                 
49 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion & 2, ed. by John T. McNeill, trans. by Ford 
Lewis Battles, Vol. 1, in The Library of Christian Classics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2011), I.ii.1. 
50 RD 1.112.   
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the fact of being in relation with the God who relates universally, to all creatures, and 
particularly to the human conscious. For this reason, van den Belt can use the phrase ‘religion 
as revelation’. It is in the objective act of God in his choice to relate to ‘us’, the imago Dei, that 
religion as the feeling of absolute dependence is grounded. In Bavinck’s texts, objective 
religion, therefore, is correlative and often synonymous with objective revelation. When God 
self-manifests himself to creation, he relates to creation. When God relates, there is religion—
the fact of being a creature in relation to God, the fact of absolute depending. Bavinck 
suggests therefore that ‘objective religion’ is first God’s activity of establishing a relationship 
with the pinnacle of creation, humanity, and subjective religion (pietas), in second place, is ‘our’ 
consciousness of depending on God in response to the fact of God’s relating to ‘us’:  
Religion itself is a moral relationship. Religion is indeed based on a mystical 
union between God and humanity; however, it is not itself a substantial but an 
ethical union between human beings and their God. In the case of God, one 
cannot speak of religion. It is his indwelling in human beings that from that side fosters 
the relation to God we call religion.51 
 
This relationship between God and humanity is both general and specific. The creature in 
general is in relation to the Creator de facto. But, specifically, true religion is expressed first in 
the Old Testament primarily as an objective covenant: ‘Objective religion is identical with the 
revelation of God and consists in the covenant (ברית), which God gave to Israel and may 
therefore be called, in the full sense of the word, a divine establishment (διαθηκη)’.52 The 
prior pre-lapsarian covenant with creation was initially, per the human subject, manifest in the 
full unity of God- and self-consciousness, where the subject depended absolutely on God 
revealed objectively and subjectively. In the Edenic state, ‘the question—which of the two was 
first, external or internal revelation—is superfluous. In the selfsame moment in which God 
revealed himself to human beings by creating them in his image, the latter knew this God and 
served him, and, vice versa, served and knew him’.53 Therefore, he argues, ‘true and genuine 
                                                 
51 RD 1.262. 
52 RD 1.237. 
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religion can exist only in the complete correspondence of the internal to the external 
revelation. Those who love God—with all their heart, soul, and strength—as he is and as he 
makes himself known by revelation, these are the truly religious, images of God, servants and 
children of God; they are human beings in the full sense’.54 To be ‘fully’ human, therefore, is 
to be fully God- and self-conscious (Ch. 2). 
 
After the Fall, objective religion is manifest in the promise and ordinances of God for the 
people of God, apparent in an outlined path of righteousness (Torah). In the New Testament, 
Jesus Christ is the ‘I Am’ of objective religion, God with us, disclosing his own self-conscious 
identity as the fulfillment of the ‘way’ of righteousness. Objective religion, therefore, is God’s 
revelation of ‘the right manner of knowing and serving Him (recta verum Deum cognoscendi et 
colendi ratio)’, which is fulfilled in Jesus Christ.55  
 
Subjective religion, however, is not first a visible activity (as in dogmatic pronouncement or 
liturgical action) but a mode of being, signified by the term pietas. ‘Subjectively: religion is the 
fear of the Lord. Such fear is not timidity. Rather, in the New Testament, Εὐσεβεια indicates 
holy reverence toward God; its meaning is related to that of the Latin pietas and hence 
expresses an attitude such as is present in children toward their parents’. Also: ‘Subjective 
religion is first of all a state of being ἐξις (habitus), a certain predisposition in human beings 
that, as a result of the influence of objective religion, passes into actions (as internal or 
external worship). Such a predisposition is present in every human’.56 The ‘seed of religion’ as 
a disposition of every human soul (the desire to be who one is as God’s fully dependent 
creature) is only accurately disclosed and its needs satisfied, Bavinck suggests, in the feeling of 
absolute dependence on the Triune God. Again, ‘this relationship’, between God and 
humanity, ‘is so deep and tender, so rich and many-dimensional, that its meaning eludes a 
                                                 
54 RD 1.278–279. 
55 RD 1.238. 
56 RD 1.241. 
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singular definition. But certainly the concept of dependence deserves primary consideration and 
is best qualified for this purpose’.57 In the general subjective aspect of religion, ‘a human feels 
related to a personal being who has one’s destiny in his hands in every area of life, for time 
and eternity’.58 But pious absolute dependence on the triune God is synonymous with the 
dispositions of Christian faith and love: ‘Πιστις and ἀγαπη are the basic attitudes inherent in 
Christian piety’. 59  He iterates a similar point in his Stone lectures regarding the universal 
subjective aspect of religion in relation to the fact of the objective: ‘the sense [or feeling, gevoel] 
of dependence is the core of self-consciousness and the essence of religion. But, it is not a mere 
de facto dependence, as the unconscious and the irrational creation is dependent on God; in 
man it is a sense [or feeling] of dependence’.60  
 
Absolute dependence, while the appropriate grammar for religion, is only genuinely absolute, 
Bavinck argues, when it is directed to the God who actually relates to ‘us’. In other words, 
while the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ is a universal reality, although suppressed (e.g. 
atheism) and distorted (idolatry), the category of absolutely depending (as knowing and doing) 
is reserved for ‘true’ belief in the ‘true God’. When one feels absolutely dependent and directs 
that dependence in cognition and action toward an idol, for example, one merely feels 
absolutely dependent but is not so in reality. Absolute dependence is the condition of feeling, 
knowing, and acting with respect to the true God.  
 
This distinction is the same as that in Ch. 4, section 3 where Bavinck supposes he is ‘going 
beyond’ Schleiermacher and nuancing absolute dependence according to that which 
Schleiermacher did not see. One could describe absolute dependence, says Bavinck, as the 
unity of objective revelation and subjective religion disciplined by the Spirit. This is to say, the 
Spirit of Christ in both the agency of renewal and the work of advocation, transforms the 
                                                 
57 RD 1.242.  
58 RD 1.242. 
59 RD 1.238. 
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whole human consciousness. Accordingly, for dependence to be absolute, it must capture the 
whole of the human consciousness in correspondance to the truth, the actual, objective 
Whence. Bavinck describes his idea of religion, therefore, in ‘Religion and Theology’ in 1902: 
‘Just as subject and object must always correspond, in order to bring about anything in the 
expansive field of knowing and doing, so too a similar agreement is required in the area of 
religion. We see an object only, when the one and the same the sun illumines that object and 
our eye’. Analogously, ‘one can only speak of genuine religion, when God's command and our 
desire coincide, as obligation and virtue, as law and inclination’.61 Holy Scripture defines this 
Christian faith with respect, therefore, to two elements, the subjective and objective:  
First, over against God and his revelation, human beings are totally receptive and 
absolutely dependent on God. Second, precisely by the acknowledgment of this 
dependence, they become the beneficiaries of forgiveness, adoption as 
children, and salvation by grace. Certainly, in other religions there are analogies 
to this subjective religion in Christianity, but only in the Christian religion is 
the subjective relation of human beings to God completely normal, inasmuch 
as dependence and freedom are reconciled here.62 
 
The feeling of absolute dependence, then, when manifest in the knowings and doings of other 
religions is not absolute dependence on God, the true God, but is indeed a feeling of 
dependence on God who has revealed God. Yet, because this dependence is not manifest in 
knowing and doing in relation to the Triune God, it is not absolute. In true religion, said 
dependence is not simply a feeling of absolute dependence on the Triune God, but an 
objective actuality that captures the whole consciousness. The feeling of absolute dependence 
which manifests in knowing and acting directed toward any god other than God, is both ‘false’ 
and is, therefore, ‘relative dependence’ on some relative being. True religion is absolute 
depending on the Absolute.  
 
                                                 
61  Bavinck, Godsdeinst en Godgeleerdheid, 17. Original: ‘En zoo ook is er eerst van echten 
godsdienst sprake, als Gods gebod en onze lust, als plicht en deugd, als wet en neiging 
samenvallen’. 
62 RD 1.243.  
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The feeling of absolute dependence only becomes absolute dependence of a complete, 
ultimate register when the consciousness directs its gaze to the cross of Christ. Thus, with 
respect to life, knowledge, and religion,   
What counts is not merely existence, or pleasure, or intensity, but first of all 
content and quality. And it is precisely by truth that this content and quality are 
determined. The truth is of more value than empirical life; Christ sacrificed his 
life for it. None the less, by doing so he regained his life. Truth is worth more 
than reality; it belongs to that higher order of things in which physis, and gnosis, 
and ethos are reconciled, and in which a true philosophy gives full satisfaction 
both to the demands of the intellect and to the needs of the heart.63 
 
Absolute depending on the Absolute, he suggests, is also true freedom in contradistinction to 
the feeling of absolute dependence manifest with reference to some false deity. In the latter, 
‘we’ deny absolute dependence on the true God and, therefore, become relatively dependent 
on God by denial of God, the fact that ‘our’ will and action will not submit to the Creator. 
‘Our’ feeling of absolute dependence must become ‘conscious [or discursive] and voluntary’. 
Such absolute submission is freedom insofar as absolute dependence means becoming wholly 
human, dependent children of God.64 
By implication this absolute dependence in which human beings stand toward 
God does not exclude freedom. We are dependent but in a way that differs 
from that of other creatures. We are dependent in the manner and sense that 
we simultaneously remain rational and moral creatures who are akin to God, 
                                                 
63 PoR, 82.    
64 In Godsdeinst en Godgeleerdheid, 44, he adds: ‘Experience and discovery is not and can never be 
the foundation, the measure, or the source of revelation. It is, however, the only path on 
which the Christian religion in its absolute character can be acknowledged and recognized by 
us. Or more preferably still, the Christian religion, the revelation of God in the face of Christ 
His Son, acquires no absolute certainty for our consciousness other than on the path of saving 
faith. If the Christian religion is the absolute religion, there is no other path… If it could be 
proven along another path, it would thereby cease to be the absolute religion’. Translated by 
Bruce Pass. Original: ‘Ervaring, bevinding is niet en kan nooit wezen de grondslag, de 
maatstaf, de kenbron der openbaring. Maar zij is toch wel de weg, waarin de Christelijke religie 
in haar absoluut karakter alleen door ons gekend en erkend worden kan. Of liever nog, de 
Christelijke religie, de openbaring Gods in het aangezicht van Christus, Zijnen Zoon, krijgt 
voor ons bewustzijn geen absolute zekerheid, dan alleen in den weg van het zaligmakend 
geloof. Indien de Christelijke religie de absolute religie is, is er geen andere weg. En 
omgekeerd, indien ze langs een anderen weg bewezen moest worden, zou zij daarmede 
ophouden, de absolute religie te zijn’. 
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are his offspring and his image. We are absolutely dependent in such a manner 
that the denial of this dependence never makes us free, while the 
acknowledgment of it never reduces us to the status of a slave. On the contrary: 
in the conscious and voluntary acceptance of this dependence, we human beings arrive at our 
greatest freedom. We become human to the degree that we are children of God.65 
 
This requirement that absolute dependence be both ‘conscious and voluntary’ with respect to 
the Triune God does not negate the fact of the relation of dependence between every human 
being and the Triune God. The universality of religion is derivative of the fact of universal 
objective religion (i.e. revelation, God’s active agency in relating to humanity as Creator to 
creature). Religion, in this sense, does indeed produce false presentations (idolatry) but these 
falsities are a response to God’s true self-manifestation perceived indirectly in the religious 
element of the immediate self-consciousness, the feeling of absolute dependence (pietas). For 
Bavinck, every single human is religious because every single human is in relation with God de 
facto. Their very existence is to be in relation with their Creator and that relation has been 
revealed. That relation is, however, ethically marred but not negated. One cannot cease being 
a creature. Every human is and will be, by necessity, religious, ‘sensing the divine’ and feeling 
absolutely dependent on the Absolute. He argues therefore: the idea of ‘a “religionless” 
human is a mere construct, as thin and vacuous an abstraction as the “natural man” of 
Rousseau and the adherents of the social contract. In reality, it never existed. Religion itself [in 
the construct of the “religionless” human], like morality in the thought of Darwin, thus 
becomes completely a product of chance’.66 
 
5.3. Between Calvin and Schleiermacher 
 
Bavinck’s definition of subjective religion uses Calvin’s notion of sensus and Schleiermacher’s concepts of 
‘feeling’ and ‘dependence’ together, synonymously. The initiated reader will recognize in the previous 
elucidation of Bavinck’s definition of religion in its subjective element his adoption of not 
                                                 
65 RD 1.243. Emphasis added.  
66 RD 1.275. 
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only Schleiermacher but also Calvin. He sets the concepts ‘seed of religion’, ‘sensus divinitatis’, 
and ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ in a synonymous relation. 
Religion is an essential of human nature so integral to it and inseparably bound 
up with it that, though sin can devastate it, it cannot eradicate it. For that 
reason religion is universal and has such immense power in life and history. 
Whether one wishes or not, one always finally encounters in humans a certain 
religious propensity. One can call it by various names: “the seed of religion,” 
“a sense of divinity” (Calvin), religious feeling (Schleiermacher, Opzoomer) 
…’. 
 
More notably, in Magnalia Dei of 1909, Bavinck spends nearly two pages paralleling Calvin’s 
‘sense of divinity’ or ‘zaad der religie’ (seed of religion) with what he calls ‘gevoel der Godheid’ 
(feeling of divinity), a ‘besef van het Goddelijke buiten in ons’ (consciousness of the divine in us). At 
one point, he states that Calvin taught a ‘gevoel der Godheid’, as did ‘Paul’, the apostle.67 Zylstra, 
the translator of Magnalia Dei, like Vos, also chooses to translate the term ‘gevoel’ as ‘sense’ 
ignoring the implicit point made clearer by the fact that Bavinck defines Calvin’s ‘feeling of 
divinity’ explicitly. It contains two elements, he argues: 
In the first place, a sense [or feeling] of absolute dependence…Underneath the 
mind and will, underneath thought and action there is in us a self-
consciousness which is interdependence with our self-existence and seems to 
coincide with it… And the core of this near-identity of self-existence and self-
consciousness is the feeling of dependence. In our inmost selves we are 
immediately… conscious of ourselves as… dependent…. [Second], this sense 
[or feeling] of divinity has in itself a sense [or feeling] of the nature of that 
being on whom man feels himself to be dependent.68   
 
The persistent un-named but clear Schleiermacherian references are striking: a ‘feeling of 
absolute dependence’, ‘self-consciousness’, ‘immediately…conscious of ourselves as 
dependent, that being on whom man feels himself to be dependent’. Further, in parallel to 
Schleiermacher’s OR, Bavinck argues: ‘man is a “dependent” of the universe’. The feeling 
‘does not carry discouragement… but rather prompts man to religion… it has in it the 
                                                 
67 Bavinck, Magnalia Dei: Onderwijzing in de christelijke religie naar gereformeerde belijdenis (Kampen: 
J.H. Kok, 1909), 36. ET: Our Reasonable Faith, trans. Henry Zylstra (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1956), 42-43.  
68 Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, 43.  
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element of freedom’.69 Bavinck cites Schleiermacher nowhere in this discussion of the feeling 
of absolute dependence. Rather, he attributes Schleiermacher’s grammar directly to Calvin. He 
concludes his chapter with this remark which is worth seeing in Dutch per the use of ‘feeling’ 
instead of ‘sense’: ‘Het “gevoel der Godheid” is dus, naar Calvijns omschrijving, tegelijk het “zaad der 
religie”’ (‘The “feeling of divinity” is therefore, as Calvin wrote, the same as the “seed of 
religion”’). 70  Whereas in RD, Bavinck uses the term ‘sensus’ regarding Calvin’s ‘sense of 
divinity’, here he chooses gevoel, directly relating Calvin’s sense to the feeling of absolute 
dependence. This evidence alone is definitive of Bavinck’s interpretative parallel and is an 
instance of a peculiar self-masking of his Schleiermacherian intentions.  
 
Further, returning to the historical narrative in Ch. 2, Adriaan Steketee, Bavinck’s favorite 
lecturer at Kampen during Bavinck’s study at Leiden, made an implicit Schleiermacher-Calvin 
connection in his lecture giving an historical precedent in Bavinck’s own life for Bavinck’s 
later Calvin-Schleiermacher appropriation. As noted previously, Steketee called upon his 
audience at Kampen to loosen their grip on the philosophy of Aristotle in favor of more 
Platonic sensibilities. He turned to Schleiermacher as his premiere example for such a move. 
Bavinck praised the lecture calling it ‘beautiful’. At the end of the lecture, Steketee draws a 
parallel between the renaissance of Platonic dialogical methods but particularly ‘Plato's leer van 
deugd en plicht’ (Plato’s doctrine of virtue and duty) adapted and hidden within the robe (kleed) 
of Christianity in Schleiermacher, among others, and the work of the Reformation. In God’s 
providence, Steketee argues, from Augustine, to Luther and Calvin, and even in Dordt, ‘our’ 
fathers have preserved the doctrines of grace and updated, changed, cleaned, and hid Plato’s 
ethics within the purifying garments of the Christian faith.71 Steketee drew a line between 
Schleiermacher and the theologians the secessionist church prized most while the young 
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university student Bavinck sat in the audience, offering Bavinck perhaps an early precedent for 
his later move.  
 
In the original concept in the Institutes, Calvin argues for the ‘natural endowment’ or that 
awareness ‘naturally implanted’ (Hominum mentibus naturaliter … inditam) wherein all ‘men’ have 
an ‘understanding of his divine majesty’.72 God as active agent ‘repeatedly sheds fresh drops’ 
of the sense of the divine in the consciousness of the human subject ever-renewing God’s 
‘memory’ to them.73 All humans therefore seem to exhibit ‘some seed of religion. So deeply 
does the common conception occupy the minds of all, so tenaciously does it inhere in the 
hearts of all’!74 For Bavinck, Calvin’s doctrine of sensus is made intelligible ‘today’ by an appeal 
to Schleiermacher’s feeling. God is ever-renewing this awareness of God (as feeling) in the 
human consciousness, prior to all thinking and willing. He uses both to define subjective 
religion. 
 
Subjective religion is first an integral aspect of what a human is, religious (in relation to God), 
a response to the presence of God in his self-manifestation to the human subject as light. This 
subjective seed, which will grow into bloom at the experience of God’s objective 
manifestation in objective revelation is more precisely paralleled, for Bavinck, by the concept 
sensus divinitatis, which Bavinck understands to be a relative synonym with ‘seed’. Bavinck’s 
offers his reading of Calvin directly: 
[Calvin] specifically believed that an “awareness of divinity” (sensus divinitatis) 
was present within the human mind “by natural instinct.” … Another name he 
gives to this awareness is “the seed of religion” (semen religionis), which explains 
the universality of religion (ibid.). The conviction that there is a God is 
“naturally inborn.” It can never be eradicated (I.iii.3).75  
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A precise clarification of what Calvin meant spoken in modern grammars with respect to the 
sciences of human psychology and epistemological philosophy can only be speculative. 
Nevertheless, Calvin at least distinguishes between this inborn ‘knowledge of God’ (or it is 
better to speak of ‘divinity’) of which one is ‘master from mother’s womb’ and the knowledge 
of God acquired and ‘found’, a knowledge that must be ‘grasped for’.76 The former is simply 
there and the concept remains vague. Perhaps the obscurity is the point. The latter, in 
distinction, is gained, develops, can be right or wrong, and displays itself in external worship, 
in actions.77  No matter how one interprets the sensus with some precise delineated definition, 
Calvin’s ambiguity points to the fact that he is trying to distinguish between two aspects of 
religion: between a mere sense of divinity (a subjective sense) and the knowledge of God 
proper (hence: the institutes of the Christian religion), the knowledge acquired that is necessary 
for righteous worship of the true God. The latter is the unity of the sensus and the act of God 
in the gift of the two-fold grace by the Spirit. ‘Religion’ (religio) in this full concept is the 
knowledge and worship of the Triune God. In the fullest sense, religion is relatively 
synonymous with theology insofar as right knowledge is accompanied by worship. Bavinck 
summarizes the relationship accordingly:  
Theology… is no philosophy, which seeks an explanation of the problem of 
the world; it is no metaphysic, which traces out the final ground of being; it is 
not a heuristic or a speculative, but rather, a positive science: the knowledge of 
God in the face of Christ, the sent of the Father. It is most closely connected, 
therefore, to the Christian religion, with the faith of the congregation, with the 
confession of the church, and with the life of piety.78 
                                                                                                                                                    
themselves from the fear of God, is abundant testimony that this conviction, namely, that 
there is some God, is naturally inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very 
marrow’.   
76 Calvin, Institutes, I. iii. 3: ‘From this we conclude that it is not a doctrine that must first be 
learned in school, but one of which each of us is master from his mother’s womb and which 
nature itself permits no one to forget, although many strive with every nerve to this end’. 
77 Calvin, Institutes, I. iii. 3.  
78  Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 9. Original: ‘En de theologie is daarom geen 
philosophie, die eene verklaring zoekt van het wereldprobleem; geen metaphysica, die de 
laatste gronden van het zijn opspoort; geen heuristische of speculatieve, maar eene positieve 




Because he sets sensus parallel to Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling’, Bavinck’s appropriation of Calvin’s 
sensus reveals that Bavinck is, at least, making use of Calvin to propose a pre-discursive, 
subjective form of the ‘knowledge’ of God, already present and arising for the consciousness 
in the experience of being a self in a world. Bavinck divides Calvin’s doctrine between ‘sense’ 
or ‘seed’ and knowing (the knowledge of God). For knowledge as assent, experience and 
thinking must be added: ‘added to “this seed of religion” comes the revelation of God in his 
works; hence, now “people cannot open their eyes without being compelled to see him” 
(I.v.1)’.79 The first is the ‘light of God’ and not the ‘light of reason’, Bavinck argues. ‘God is 
indeed the light of human souls’ from their birth. Yet, ‘we’ only come to ‘knowledge of God’ 
by encountering God’s revelation in nature and Scripture.80 All people, therefore, first have an 
idea of God but the content becomes ‘defined in very divergent ways’ when the feeling of 
absolute dependence passes into knowing and doing in human experience and cognition, in 
relation to objective revelation. The lack of uniformity per religious knowledge proves that 
‘strictly speaking, natural theology never existed any more than “natural rights” and “natural 
morality”’.81 This is to say, the ‘knowledge’ of God, like the moral order, is not first acquired 
by thinking.  
 
There have been multiple interpretations of Calvin’s sensus in recent decades specific to the 
Reformed theological tradition. Alvin Plantinga, for example, describes Calvin’s concept as an 
‘innate tendency, or nisus, or disposition’ to believe in God.82 Plantinga’s point is that this 
sensus is not belief itself, which is a determination, but a disposition toward belief that gives 
rise to belief in response to nature. Humans in original creation possess, at least, a noetic 
                                                                                                                                                    
hangt daarom ten nauwste met de Christelijken godsdienst, met het geloof der gemeente, met 
de belijdenis der kerk, met het leven der vroomheid saam’. 
79 RD 2.69.   
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82 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, in Faith and Philosophy: Reason and Belief in God, 
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ability for belief, even if that ability has been destroyed to some extent by sin. Paul Helm, in 
contradistinction, associates Calvin’s sensus with cognitive, propositional knowledge of God: 
‘mankind is created not only as capable of knowing God, but as actually knowing him... belief 
in God is natural in the sense of being part of man's original condition, part of what it means 
to be really or fully human’. 83  Helm augments his reading with the terms ‘metaphysical-
cognitive’ (the knowledge that God or a god exists), and dissociates the sensus from any 
experience of God.  
 
Bavinck, similarly to Helm but with some distinction, thinks that every human believes in the 
divine and that there is an immediate awareness of the divine as a gevoel. For Bavinck, due to 
the parallel between Calvin and Schleiermacher, this sensus as ‘knowledge of God’ does not 
have the Triune God in view as its object directly because it is not a result of discursive 
cognition. Rather, it is an awareness of divinity, and is properly called a ‘feeling’ in the 
trichotomy of consciousness to dissociate it from discursive, propositional knowing. It does 
indeed arise in relation to sensation and experience. Yet, because God is not a perceptible 
object, the sensus, for Bavinck, describes an immediate feeling. The Triune God, for Bavinck, 
is indeed the cause of the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ in his revelatory agency to every 
human subject derivative of the fact of their covenantal creaturliness, but this revelation which 
arises in the human consciousness as the feeling of absolute dependence is not propositional 
knowledge as it is in Helm’s logic. Bavinck’s ‘God-consciousness’ is an indirect awareness 
following the fact of being dependent with the world and absolutely dependent on that which 
is not self or world.84 For Bavinck, because revelatory creation is the secret of the universe, 
God’s witness is everywhere presenting God both objectively and subjectively, directly and 
                                                 
83  Paul Helm, John Calvin's Ideas (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 222. Cf. ‘John Calvin, the sensus 
divinitatis, and the Noetic Effects of Sin’, International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 43 (1998): 
87-107.  
84 The fact that Calvin states that the sensus is from the mother’s womb may trouble Helm’s 




indirectly. The awareness of divinity arises, therefore, in the activity and receptivity of being in 
the world, not first as active ‘thinking’ in propositions or in ‘willing’ (or doing), but as a 
‘feeling’ or ‘sensus’. Bavinck’s use of Calvin on this point is akin to Leithart’s reading: ‘The 
sensus is not a source of knowledge in the sense that men reflect on it and deduce from that 
reflection certain conclusions about the nature of God. Rather, the sensus is a disposition or 
momentum that propels man to bow before someone or something higher than himself’.85  
 
In Bavinck’s use of Calvin and Schleiermacher on religion, he is working implicitly with the 
Pauline logic of Romans 1 and 2 that God is revealed to all and that human beings suppress 
the revelation of God. While Schleiermacher’s propositions related to piety are derivative of 
the discipline he calls ‘philosophy of religion’, Bavinck’s use of Schleiermacher’s definition of 
universal piety is derived from Pauline logic. And Bavinck’s point regarding idolatry follows 
Calvin who draws this conclusion in Institutes I.iv.1, and which Bavinck quotes: ‘As experience 
shows, God has sown a seed of religion in all men, but scarcely one man in a hundred is met 
with who fosters it, once received, in his heart, and none in whom it ripens— much less 
shows fruit in season’. Leithart, commenting on Calvin’s quote, suggests that ‘Calvin’s 
reference to “scarcely one man in a hundred” should be understood as “no one”; the whole 
thrust of Calvin’s argument in the opening chapters of the Institutes is that no man can, 
without the aid of special revelation, be fruitful in the knowledge of God’. 86 Similarly, as 
argued, for Bavinck, no human can ‘know God’ in the sense of true godsdeinst without 
objective revelation confronting a regenerate subject.87 
  
In relation to Calvin’s sensus, for subjective religion, Bavinck’s preferred expression 
                                                 
85 Peter Leithart, ‘That Eminent Pagan: Calvin’s Use of Cicero in Institutes 1.1-5’, WTJ 52 
(1990), 1-12, 9-10.  
86 Peter Leithart, ‘That Eminent Pagan: Calvin’s Use of Cicero in Institutes 1.1-5’, 11.  
87 ‘Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid’, 47: ‘If religion is not described according to the philosophical 
premises of an arbitrary intellect but according to the witness of Scripture, according to the 
experience of the pious, according to the reality of life, then everything mentioned previously 
is just an aesthetic enjoyment of a pantheistic reveling in feeling’.  
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consistently remains the ‘feeling of dependence’. Although Bavinck’s adoption is clear in the 
quotes provided already, this appropriation of Schleiermacher’s grammar can be mapped more 
specifically in two movements. As stated in Ch. 2, in CF §3, Schleiermacher first distinguishes 
religion as feeling, from the concept of religion as knowing (knowing about God) or doing. In 
CF §4, he, then associates the religious feeling with the consciousness of being absolutely 
dependent. Bavinck adopts both aspects of this religious element combining the logic of CF 
§3 and §4 as Schleiermacher did in the phrase ‘the feeling of absolute dependence’.  
 
First, for Bavinck, the sensus is a broader referent to ‘feeling’ within the trichotomy of 
knowing, doing, and feeling. Feeling, again, is a form of knowledge, but non-discursive, prior 
to all thinking and willing. His argument betrays implicit (and, on occasion, explicit) 
interaction with Schleiermacher’s CF §3: ‘Piety that constitutes the basis of all ecclesial 
communities, regarded purely in and of itself, is neither a knowing nor a doing but a distinct 
formation of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness’. 88  Religion, Bavinck argues 
accordingly, is not first a knowing. Religion as knowing is ‘based on a total misconstrual of the 
essence of religion’ where ‘knowing’ refers to science.89 He associates this problem with both 
the ‘orthodox’ and modern (the old and new): 
In earlier times people did not understand that religion was not a doctrine. 
They simply equated religion with orthodoxy, and faith with accepting as true 
some doctrine or another, and revelation with the communication of ideas. It 
was all intellectualism in either the orthodox or the rationalistic form. But now 
after Kant and Schleiermacher, we have much better insight into all these things. 
Religion is life: subjective religion is primary and central and constitutes the 
heart of objective religion.90 
                                                 
88 CF §3. Further, Bavinck defines Schleiermacher’s idea of religion in the Speeches in RD 1.265 
as follows: ‘Religion is neither thinking nor acting, neither metaphysics nor morality, but 
feeling for the infinite. The object of that feeling is not a personal God with whom a human 
lives in fellowship but the universe, the world as a whole, conceived as a unity. And the faculty 
for the perception of that infinite is not the intellect, reason, or will but feeling, the focus of 
the mind on and capacity for intuiting the infinite’. 
89 RD 1.257. 




Amid the modern interlocutors, he also deliberately sets his definition of religion as ‘feeling’ of 
dependence in contradistinction to Hegel’s ‘mind’. For Hegel ‘self-consciousness of the 
absolute mind in the finite mind is religion. Hence religion is essentially a knowing, not feeling 
or acting, but a knowing: knowing God by the finite mind or an objective divine knowing of 
himself through and in the finite mind’. 91 Knowing, however, is the ‘aim of science’, not 
religion. Religion, instead, is ‘comfort, peace, salvation’. No one, ‘not even the most profound 
philosopher’ rises above the feelings of dependence and absolute dependence. No one rises 
above religion. ‘For salvation is bound up with believing, not with knowing’.92 
 
With Schleiermacher likewise, he affirms that religion is not a doing (moral action). 
‘Unjustifiably, he writes, ‘the opinion has gained acceptance, that religion is conceived of as 
something external, that goes on completely outside of the heart’.93 Rather, ‘religion is no 
mere cultus externus, but above all a cultus internus, a knowing and serving of the heart’.94 He 
situates his definitions, therefore, between Hegel and now Kant who, he argues, offered 
religion only as a ‘way of morality’. For Kant, ‘Religion, subjectively considered, is the 
knowledge of all our duties as divine imperatives. Religion here is not directly and immediately 
grounded in human nature but only by way of morality. It has no material content of its own 
and is nothing but a further qualification of morality’. But, ‘Kant… had to admit that no actual 
                                                 
91 RD 1.255. Bavinck quotes Hegel: ‘Man only knows of God insofar as God has knowledge 
of himself in man; this knowledge is the self-consciousness of God but also a knowledge of 
the same by man, and this knowledge of God by man is the knowledge of man by God. The 
mind of man in coming to know God, is just the mind of God itself’ from G. W. F. Hegel, 
Sämtliche Werke, “Jubilee” edition, ed. H. Glockner, 22 vols. (Stuttgart, 1927–30), XVI, 428. 
(“Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Religion,” in Werke, XII, 428). 
92 RD 1.257. 
93Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 15. Original: ‘Ten onrechte heeft de meening ingang 
gevonden, dat de religie hiermede als iets uitwendigs werd opgevat, dat geheel buiten het hart 
omging’.  
94 Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 16. Original: ‘De godsdienst is geen cultus externus 
slechts, maar vóór alles een cultus internus, een kennen en dienen met het hart’. 
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religion was ever satisfied with his notion of religion’.95 Contra Kant, ‘religion… is something 
essentially different from morality… morality can be neither the foundation nor the principle, 
or the norm, or the content of religion, but, conversely, religion has to form the basis of 
morality’.96 Objectively religion is the relation to God that is God-established: ‘the relation to 
God is then the primary and central relation that governs all other human relations’.97 But the 
heart of religion, rather than a knowing (about) or doing (moral action), is the fact that human 
beings ‘feel themselves totally dependent’ because ‘human beings are totally receptive and 
absolutely dependent on God’.98 Subjective religion, therefore, is neither metaphysics nor morality, 
but the feeling of absolute dependence manifest in knowing and doing. Despite the close 
association between religion and moral action, this association, Bavinck argues, ought ‘not lead 
to a denial of the distinction between the two’.99  
 
The second aspect of Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s religion is a persistent 
emphasis on ‘dependence’ as the primary genitive referent to ‘feeling’, as previewed in 
numerous quotes already, with respect to both the relative and the absolute. Perhaps the most 
substantial explicit adoption is here: ‘There is in Schleiermacher’s definition a substantial 
element of truth. For in religion a human feels related to a personal being who has one’s 
destiny in his hands in every area of life, for time and eternity’. This personal being, however, 
is ‘not yet conceived’ as God but, all the while, God is ‘confronting us’ as the ‘Absolute 
sovereign’. Accordingly, ‘this creaturely dependence, though it is not the essence of religion, is 
its foundation’. 100  In this thesis, Bavinck divides the language of essence and foundation 
between the objective and subjective. The feeling of absolute dependence is the foundation of 
religion (that is, pietas). The essence of religion is, however, the objective, the fact of God 
                                                 
95 RD 1.259. 
96 RD 1.263.  
97 RD 1.263. 
98 RD 1.243.  
99 RD 1.262.  
100 RD 1.242–243. 
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relating to ‘us’ as active agent. God is ‘always confronting’. In PoR, however, he will use the 
term ‘essence’ with regard to pietas, the religious feeling. These terms ‘essence’ and 
‘foundation’, applied differently in each work, ought not be taken as contradictions. In PoR, 
Bavinck is referring to the essence of religion from the perspective of the subject specifically, 
thereby suggesting an alternative and corresponding objective revelation. In RD 1, he speaks 
of essence and foundation per object and subject in unity. The essence of religion is God’s 
relation to us. The foundation of religion is the feeling of absolute dependence, he argues.   
 
In addition to the explicit, there are multiple examples of Bavinck’s implicit appropriation of 
Schleiermacher’s religion. Bavinck distinguishes between the feeling of ‘fear’ or ‘devotion’ with 
respect to the relative and absolute. ‘Between λατρεια and δουλεια, between the feelings of 
fear, respect, deference, etc. as we have them toward God and those feelings as we have them 
toward creatures’ there must be a profound distinction.101 That distinction, he suggests, ‘can 
consist only in the fact that in religion the absolute dignity and power of God and absolute 
subjection on our part comes into play’. In other words, ‘we are only partially dependent on 
creatures; as fellow creatures, we are on the same level with them. God, however, is a being on 
whom we depend totally and who decides about our weal and woe in every respect’.102 This final 
quote follows directly the logic of Schleiermacher in CF §4.4: while the subject’s relation to 
the world of creatures ‘permits only a feeling of limited dependence but excludes the feeling 
of absolute dependence’, ‘feeling oneself to be absolutely dependent and being conscious of 
oneself as in relation with God are one and the same thing’. 
 
Further, Bavinck argues, that what makes an action religious is that it puts ‘us’ subjectively 
into active relation to the Whence, the God that ‘we’ already relate to in the feeling of absolute 
dependence. Religious action is religious insofar as it puts ‘us in relation to a person on whom 
                                                 
101 RD 1.242. 
102 RD 1.242. Emphasis added. 
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we, along with all things, are absolutely dependent and on whom we as human beings are 
uniquely, i.e., as rational creatures, dependent’.103 Another example of implicit appropriation: 
Religion, after all, originates only when human beings do not just ask for help 
ingeneral, as people do when they look for help from each other or from art 
and science, but when in a special way belief, trust, and a feeling of 
dependence with respect to an invisible power are aroused in their heart. 
Religion always assumes a certain distinction between God and the world, 
between the power of a being above nature and subordinate forces in nature.104 
 
Derivatively, while subjective religion is first the feeling of absolute dependence, it is never 
alone but manifest in knowing and action. ‘Under the impact of objective religion, subjective 
religion passes from its habitual state into action’.105 And regarding religion, ‘the area of its 
dominion began with the internal stirrings, with the hidden deliberations, with the secret 
inclinations of the soul and from there extends outwards to the furthest boundaries of human 
knowledge and capability’. 106  Religion, Bavinck argues, directly adopting Schleiermacher’s 
trichotomy, ‘encompasses the whole person in her thinking, feeling, and doing’.107 Therefore, 
religion and worship, are related ‘as cause and effect. Still, this does not mean that worship is a 
free invention or expression of subjective religion’.108 While objective revelation provides the 
content for the expression of subjective religion, ‘in all these religious actions, the sense of 
absolute dependence is basic and inspiring’.109  
 
In addition to the most explicit adoption of Schleiermacher’s religion, Bavinck frames his 
‘Religion and Theology’ in 1902 with what might be the clearest example of implicit 
adoption—an attack on the ‘despisers of religion’ paralleling Schleiermacher’s OR. Toward the 
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106 Bavinck Godsdeinst en Godgeleerdheid, 15. Original: ‘het gebied harer heerschappij begon bij de 
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beginning of the article he writes: ‘the despisers of religion (who are at least indifferent about 
it) continually increase in number among all classes of society. If they do not openly oppose 
religion, they regard it, nevertheless, as a “Privatsache”…’.110  
 
In a striking instance of the unity of his modern and orthodox grammars in RD 1, Bavinck 
also implicitly ties Schleiermacher’s definition of the subjective element with his explicit 
addition of the objective element from the Heidelberg catechism: 
True religion, on the other hand, consists in the kind of human disposition 
that on the one hand is rooted in a deep sense [or feeling] of one’s absolute 
dependence on God as Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, etc., and on the other 
seeks in sincerity to live according to all God’s commandments. Hence, no 
more beautiful description of religion is conceivable than that offered in the 
Heidelberg Catechism, question and answer 94: “That I, not wanting to 
endanger my salvation, avoid and shun all idolatry, magic, superstitious rites, 
and prayer to saints or to other creatures. That I sincerely acknowledge the 
only true God, trust him alone, look to him for every good thing humbly and 
patiently, love him, fear him, and honor him with all my heart. In short, that I 
give up anything rather than go against his will in any way”.111 
 
This example of unity between Schleiermacher’s subjective concept and the catechism reflects 
the fact that Bavinck supposes Schleiermacher’s explication of piety a continuation of the 
Reformed tradition rather than an aberration. Against the ethos of his climate, Bavinck makes 
explicit the relation between Schleiermacher and the ‘old dogmatics’, as it pertains to religion 
as piety: 
Schleiermacher, though striving after the liberation of theology from 
philosophy, could act in this way according to his conviction only because he 
believed he possessed in the religious feeling of absolute dependence an 
immediate revelation of the Infinite… which [with the mediation theologies 
after him] was only more or less a reflection of the old dogmatics—by means of 
                                                 
110 Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 24. Original: ‘De verachters van, de onverschilligen 
althans omtrent den godsdienst nemen onder alle klassen en standen der maatschappij 
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toch als eene „Privatsache”, waarover ieder denken kan wat hij wil’. 
111 RD 1.244–245. Also, in RD 4.447, Bavinck commending the breadth of the means of grace 
cites Calvin, Schleiermacher, and the Reformed Confessions for his argument in fn.15: J. 
Calvin, Institutes, IV; Second Helvetic Confession, #16; Westminster Confession, ch. 14.1; F. 
Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, §127.  
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speculative reasoning on the immanent requirements, needs, or experiences of 
the religious and ethical man.112  
 
Bavinck’s definition of religion after Calvin and Schleiermacher, therefore, emphasizes the 
primal experience of the relationships that comprise the unity of consciousness, between self 
and world, between relative and absolute dependence on the creaturely and transcendent, and 
the universal fact of human religiosity by determining that subjective religion is first a feeling 
of absolute dependence on God. Such a claim is situated inside of Christian dogmatics and 
not to be confused with a natural theology isolated from biblical logic. It is a reflection on the 
concept of subjective revelation conceived in tandem with the Triune God that makes 
intelligible such universal feeling and establishes the value of religions even in the situation of 
suppression and idolatry in response to the truth. Bavinck is willing with his tradition, 
therefore, to structure his idea of religion primarily between true and false. And he, with 
Schleiermacher, situates Reformation and post-Reformation theology in the language and 
logic of the modern emphasis on the subjective element of piety, particularly gevoel. 
 
Mariña offers a helpful summary of the whole of Schleiermacher’s approach that gives clarity 
to both Bavinck’s adoption and separation from Schleiermacher regarding religion and 
dogmatics: ‘Both in the Speeches and in The Christian Faith Schleiermacher offers a 
comprehensive theory of the nature of religion, grounding it in experience. In the Speeches 
Schleiermacher grounds religion in an original unity of consciousness… [and] The Christian 
Faith presents a similar analysis of religion: the feeling of absolute dependence is grounded in 
the immediate self-consciousness. In both accounts a fundamental experience grounds 
religion’.113 Mariña’s description locates Bavinck’s adoption of Schleiermacher’s religion into 
his own category of religion in general. Yet, Bavinck rejects Schleiermacher’s second move, as 
Mariña describes it: [then] ‘in The Christian Faith Schleiermacher explains that doctrines are 
                                                 
112 PoR, 213.  
113  Jacqueline Mariña, ‘Schleiermacher on the Outpouring of the Inner Fire: Experiential 
Expressivism and Religious Pluralism’, Religious Studies 40:2 (June 2004), 125-143, 126.  
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expressions of this fundamental experience; Christian doctrines are, for instance, “accounts of the 
Christian religious affections set forth in speech”. This view has been aptly labelled 
experiential expressivism’. 114   Bavinck will not affirm the movement from the primal 
experience of religion to experiential expressivism. Doctrines, Bavinck supposes, are not 
expressions of this fundamental experience but this fundamental experience is the subjective 
foundation for the possibility of dogmatic cognition in relation to the objective source of 
doctrine, the Holy Scriptures. His priority for a theological rationality determined by exegesis 
is evident in his affirmation that Scripture must ‘explain all of human living’: 
Scripture is the Book of the Kingdom of God, not a book for this or that 
people, for the individual only, but for all nations, and for all of humanity. It is 
not a book for one age, but for all times. It is a Kingdom book. Just as the 
Kingdom of God develops not alongside and above history, but in and 
through world history, so too Scripture must not be abstracted, nor viewed by 
itself, nor isolated from everything. Rather, Scripture must be brought into 
relationship with all our living, with the living of the entire human race. And 
Scripture must be employed to explain all of human living.115 
 
In alliance, therefore, with a Barthian sensibility, Bavinck suggests that Schleiermacher’s 
theology, his dogmatic method, ‘dissolve[s]… in a completely secularized science of religion’. 
In treating dogmatics primarily as a positive science of religious experience or ‘an expression 
of religious faith alone’, the process of dogmatics only describes the characteristics of 
Christian piety and fails to lay the subject before the fact of revelation, in rational 
submission.116 While Schleiermacher’s primary categorization of religions is higher and lower 
and while Barth’s is in antithesis to the idolatry of religion altogether, Bavinck with Calvin 
distinguishes between the true and false.117 In total, at the center of Bavinck’s concept of true 
religion is the unity between revelation and the human consciousness, the subjective domain 
                                                 
114 Mariña, ‘Schleiermacher on the Outpouring of the Inner Fire’, 126. Emphasis added.  
115 Bavinck, ‘KGHG’, 163.  
116 RD 1.48.  
117 Bavinck was outspoken about his repudiation for the theses surrounding lower and higher 
religions, which he generalized as the ‘evolutionistic’ method. ‘This evolutionistic 
representation, however, fails to do justice to the facts of Scripture and is incompatible with a 
number of elements that, according to the witness of Scripture, are integral to the doctrine of 
God’. RD 2.31.  
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of religion. He writes: ‘If God has not revealed God to us, then he can neither be felt or 
known’.118 The reader ought notice in that quote, the movement from ‘feeling’ to ‘knowing’, 
both of which are dependent on the revelation of the Triune God.  
 
In toto, for Bavinck, the feeling of absolute dependence as an immediate self-consciousness fills 
out philosophically the insight Augustine catalyzed and the sensus to which Calvin appealed. 
This adoption is in accordance with Bavinck’s positive response to much of the intellectual 
climate’s return to the religious in the early twentieth century: ‘there is cause for rejoicing that 
the intellectualism of the last century has been succeeded by a feeling for religion and 
mysticism, for metaphysics and philosophy; and that in religion itself there now is recognized 
a revelation of God’.119 Here, the modern sensibility has again coincided with the pre-modern, 
intellectualism has returned to feeling and shed the corruptions of ‘pure reason’. And perhaps 
one of the more explicit examples of this unity of modern and orthodox is here, combining 
once more implicitly references to Schleiermacher and the Heidelberg Catechism: 
In all…religious actions, the sense [feeling] of absolute dependence is basic 
and inspiring. Detached from this sense [feeling] of dependence, it becomes a 
religion of the letter, lip service, cold and dead formalism…True religion, on 
the other hand, consists in the kind of human disposition that on the one 
hand is rooted in a deep sense [feeling] of one’s absolute dependence on God 
as Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, etc., and on the other seeks in sincerity to 
live according to all God’s commandments.120 
 
One may summarize Bavinck’s meta-logic from both chapters four and five regarding his 
appropriation of ‘Bavinck’s Schleiermacher’ as follows: Objectively, nearly all the wisdom 
humans possess consists of the knowledge of self and the knowledge of God. No one can 
truly know themselves without simultaneously knowing God and no one can truly know God 
without knowledge of self. John Calvin’s Augustinian insight into the correlation between self-
knowledge and God-knowledge is preceded, however, by an immediate awareness of self in 
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relation to God that is prior to Calvin’s understanding of self-knowledge. To know oneself, ‘I’ 
must first be revealed to ‘me’. The self and the revelation of its essence is awoken by its 
relation to and with the world. Particularity is known only in correlation to totality. To have 
self-consciousness (zelfbewustzijn) at all, therefore, is to have world-consciousness 
(wereldbewustzijn). An awareness of ‘me’ only arises in relation to that which is not-me. This, for 
Bavinck, is the certainty of the self in immediate self-consciousness: the givenness of the self, 
the ground of the possibility of thinking making the self known in the experience of being. 
 
This immediate self-consciousness makes possible all thinking and acting. The presupposition, 
says Bavinck, of all thinking and acting, of all science and art, of all ethics and theology, is self-
consciousness, an awareness of identity. In turn, this self- and world-consciousness gives rise 
to a particular feeling, a feeling of unity with the world as together one in finitude. And, 
therefore, it is also simultaneously a feeling of an absolute dependence on that which is not 
self or world, not finite, but wholly other, on the One who gives self and world. In other words, 
our immediate self-consciousness of being in relation with God reveals to us the fact of God, 
upon whom we depend absolutely. This feeling is not cognition of an object called ‘God’, but 
an intuition or sensus of God. It is the result of the fact of God’s ubiquitous, covenantal 
revelation, starting with the ever-renewing drops of the ‘inborn’ knowledge of divinity, which 
is basic to human nature and is manifest in the fact of the universality of the arising feeling of 
absolute dependence and institutionalized religions. Humans, by nature, ‘feel themselves to be 
absolutely dependent on some absolute prior to all thinking and willing’.121 ‘We’ are, therefore, 
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Capetz, in his generalized assessment of Schleiermacher’s relation to Calvin, suggests that ‘the 
history of protestant theology since the eighteenth century is the chronicle of various attempts 
to interpret the classical Christian heritage in relation to modern thought’. 122 Accordingly, 
Bavinck consistently displays an effort to translate the theological content of his Reformed 
orthodox heritage into the grammar of modern thought. The premiere example of such is his 
relation to Schleiermacher’s conceptual framework. In this chapter, his recognition of the 
reality of Schleiermacher’s work in the spirit of Calvin’s ‘religion’ is manifest in his own 
placement of Calvin’s religious framework within a world-view of subjects and objects after 
Kant. Per the subject, Bavinck situated his conclusions with Schleiermacher. Yet, he places 
more and proper emphasis on the objective as the revelation of the Triune God thereby 
designating religion not as a development from lower to higher with respect to the positive 
study of history, but as either true or false. And while Bavinck did not, as argued prior, adopt 
the material dogmatic propositions or methodological logic of Schleiermacher’s CF, he did 
indeed adopt Schleiermacher’s philosophical grammar in order to fill out the content of his 
own dogmatic claims especially as it pertains to his definition of religion as the feeling of 
absolute dependence.   
                                                 





Is Bavinck modern, orthodox, or both? Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s 
conceptual framework pertaining to God- and self-consciousness, feeling, and absolute 
dependence is a paradigmatic example of how Bavinck perceived the theological task. 
Bavinck’s theology allows the ancient to speak to the modern and the modern to the ancient. 
He also remains fully wedded to a specific tradition, a gereformeerde dogmatiek, adopting the 
confessional commitments of his Dutch forebearers and, while moving within those 
boundaries, incorporating trajectories from theological and philosophical modernity. As he 
confessed, one cannot understand theological modernity without understanding modern 
philosophy and specifically the ‘turn to the subject’, so he in an idiosyncratic way turned to the 
subject himself. In this broad turn, more specifically, this study has unveiled that foremost 
amid modern thinkers Bavinck learned a grammar and logic from Schleiermacher for 
conceptualizing his theology in the light of the modern principle of subjectivity. 
 
Chapter one revealed an underlying structure to much of the specific treatments of Bavinck in 
the last fifty years. Namely, that the central trajectories in Bavinck scholarship revolve around 
the question of his relationship to the modern and orthodox. After Eglinton’s work, Trinity 
and Organism, tensions between his orthodoxy and theologically modern tendencies need not 
be taken as dualistic or as evidence in a ‘Jekyll-Hyde bi-polarity’ narrative. Rather, Bavinck 
ought to be understood in the way he defined his catholic task and argued that theology need 
not rely on any specific philosophical framework but can adopt an array of lexicons and logics 
for its purposes. While it is permissible to disagree with his conclusion regarding theology’s 
relation to philosophy, it is only adequate that he be read with that hermeneutical principle at 




After stating in both the introduction and chapter one that Bavinck’s adoption of modern 
grammars is above all indebted to Schleiermacher, the father of modern theology, chapter two 
together with chapter three asked ‘did Bavinck interact with Schleiermacher’s texts and adopt 
within his own corpus any of Schleiermacher’s concepts in his early career’? The answer to 
this question revealed the fact that Bavinck and Dutch theology in general had a unique 
relation to Schleiermacher and his progeny amid the German theologians of the long 
nineteenth-century. Chapter two focused on the historical relation between Schleiermacher 
and Bavinck and traced how Schleiermacher’s texts and concepts made their way from Berlin 
to Kampen by 1881 when Bavinck pronounced Schleiermacher ‘deeply misunderstood’ to his 
confessionalist theological school. Of note is that his favorite lecturer at Kampen, and his 
supervisor at Leiden were both indebted to Schleiermacher’s conceptual lineage. His father 
Jan, also, displayed evidence in writing of conceptual interaction with German philosophers 
and theologians of modernity.  
 
Chapter three, in consanguinity with chapter two, examined a host of Bavinck’s early texts to 
prove that Bavinck like Hodge perceived Schleiermacher with measured esteem between the 
typical options of demonization and exaltation. Additionally, Bavinck from the outset of his 
career especially emphasized the subject with attention to Schleiermacher’s most famous 
concepts. In his doctoral work at Leiden, Bavinck wrote his doctoral scriptie on Schleiermacher 
and used Schleiermacher to frame his dissertation on Zwingli’s ethics. Then, in his first 
publication, and consistently throughout his early career, Bavinck set his theological 
construction in conversations with the motif of self-consciousness. Chapter three also argued 
that his early adoption of this subjective emphasis was less indebted directly to 
Schleiermacher’s arguments than it was to a more generalized milieu.  
  
Part II began with chapter four focusing on Bavinck’s later career and specifically on the most 
important work, The Philosophy of Revelation. Chapter four focused on the philosophical or an 
account of epistemic unity between self and world with respect to the fact of self-
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consciousness and faith. The unity of self and world is certain in the experience of immediate 
self-consciousness, which is an original unity of the self, revealed (in the strictest sense) prior 
to all reason. For Bavinck, Augustine was the father who located the turn to the inner self as a 
method for knowing God but it is now Schleiermacher’s modern grammar that best makes 
intelligible the reality that is prior to all self-knowledge, the given nature of embodied 
consciousness. Per Manfred Frank, for Schleiermacher, accounting for the conditions of 
knowledge became a doctrine of faith.1 For Bavinck after Schleiermacher, it is only a doctrine 
of faith that can account for the conditions of knowledge. ‘Certainty’ of experience, therefore, 
is correlative with the fact of human religiosity, the certainty of faith that grounds knowing 
and doing in toto. Bavinck implicitly and subtly shows in his PoR, that he was directly working 
with Schleiermacher’s CF, using terms like schlechtinnig (untranslated) and afhankelijkheidsgevoel. 
At the climax of the work, Bavinck set Schleiermacher’s human agent in antithesis to Kant’s 
and conceptually adopted the former. 
 
Chapter five made explicit Bavinck’s adoption of Schleiermacher’s definition of religion or 
piety as the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’. While Bavinck in PoR describes religion in 
essence as the feeling of absolute dependence, in RD 1 he suggests that the feeling of absolute 
dependence is the foundation of religion. By the feeling of absolute dependence, he refers to a 
universal response to God’s general revelation in the conscious of all human beings, which 
necessarily manifests in human idolatry. In RD 1, he divides the religion between the object 
and subject. The objective foundation of religion is the fact of God’s revelation, wherein God 
is in relation with his creation and particularly with human beings as their Creator. 
Reciprocally, the foundation of religion is the feeling of absolute dependence, grounding all 
moments of the subjective, religious disposition of the human heart, and manifesting itself in 
the agency of knowing and doing. The subjective element of religion, then, is best defined not 
first as a knowing or doing, but as a feeling that serves as the ground of knowing and doing. 
                                                 
1 Manfred Frank, ‘Metaphysical Foundations: a look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic’, 33.  
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Bavinck argues that he derives this concept of subjective religion from a dogmatic, biblical 
rationality and suggests that Schleiermacher’s grammar of ‘feeling’ is the most qualified above 
all other for articulating the subjective element. 
 
After surveying the whole from chapters one to five, it is appropriate to return to the claims 
of the introduction. The introduction previewed several broad assertions that are derivative of 
Bavinck’s catholic ethic. First, in acknowledgement of the fact that the essential principles of 
contemporary theology cannot be understood without knowledge of philosophical 
movements, the fact of subjectivity became a locus in Bavinck’s work. It was in facing the 
‘challenges posed by modernity’ that his own constructive efforts reflected the content of 
those challenges: the turn to the subject. This ‘turn’ is apparent in his earliest career, from his 
first publications after Leiden, into the climax of his work in The Philosophy of Revelation. 
Second, from Bavinck’s earliest career, Friedrich Schleiermacher and his mediation progeny in 
both Germany and the Netherlands were Bavinck’s most significant modern theological 
interlocutors. Bavinck first interacted with those he deemed ‘consciousness-theologians’ 
somewhat indirectly through his father and teachers, but came to converse with their primary 
texts in his earliest publications. Third, most significantly, Bavinck adopted their terminology 
and emphases and, in fact, appropriated the concepts and arguments of Schleiermacher into 
his own corpus. In the beginning, this was evidenced by a basic turn to the principle of 
subjectivity in relation to objective revelation and reflection on the Kingdom of God. The 
direct adoption of Schleiermacher’s grammar of consciousness grew into his later career. 
Finally, this appropriation of Schleiermacherian concepts and arguments unveils precisely 
Bavinck the Reformed catholic theologian’s subjection of the demands of the modern 




‘Modern… and yet orthodox’, so begins McCormack’s study of Barth.2 This study, then, ends 
with a parallel statement about its subject Herman Bavinck: ‘orthodox… and yet modern’. It is 
in Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s grammar of consciousness, this study suggests, 
that he is first established as ‘orthodox… yet modern’. Bavinck’s Reformed orthodox identity 
does not preclude the adoption of a particularly modern philosophical grammar used for the 
expression of his confessionalist theological rationality. Bavinck is orthodox yet modern insofar as he 
subsumes the philosophical-theological questions and concepts of theological modernity under the conditions of his 
orthodox, confessional tradition. Schleiermacherian appropriation is the paradigmatic example of 
such. Bavinck adopts, therein, an Schleiermacherian grammar of consciousness, and even an 
Schleiermacherian rationality, as a primary expression of his own theological-philosophical 
discourse. Additionally, Bavinck’s appropriation of Schleiermacher’s grammar of self-
consciousness, feeling, and absolute dependence manifests Bavinck’s ethic of catholicity. 
Catholicity demands that no single grammar monopolize theological discourse. ‘Theology is 
not in need of a specific philosophy’, he argues. ‘It is not per se hostile to any philosophical 
system and does not, a priori and without criticism, give priority to the philosophy of Plato or 
of Kant, or vice versa. But it brings along its own criteria, tests all philosophy by them, and 
takes over what it deems true and useful’.3 
 
The consequences of this investigation are at least five-fold: (i) most broadly, van der Kooi is 
correct to suggest that the subject is a cornerstone of Bavinck’s theological construction in a 
way that is distinctly modern and requires attention. This study has filled out that generality 
with specific proof of this reality per Schleiermacher; (ii) subsequently, Bavinck’s relation to 
theological modernities requires re-assessment in its entirety. Swain concludes that Bavinck 
‘maintained a free relation to modern Protestantism’s revisionist program’. 4 Yet, Bavinck’s 
                                                 
2 McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, 9. 
3 RD 1.609.  
4 Scott Swain, ‘Divine Trinity’, in Christian Dogmatics, 78-106, 80. Swain’s point has only the 
doctrine of the Trinity in view. However, neither the broader claim that Bavinck is ‘free’ from 
revisions due to the impact of theological modernities, nor that Bavinck’s doctrine of the 
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paradigmatic relationship to Schleiermacher demands a re-visit of his theological construction 
across both the formal and material aspects of his work to determine his nuanced relation to 
theological modernity; (iii) in moving forward then, this study offers a fruitful heuristic to be 
used as a ground and point of investigation for Bavinck research: Bavinck is orthodox yet 
modern insofar as he subsumes the philosophical-theological questions and concepts of 
theological modernity under the conditions of his orthodox, confessional tradition. This 
general thesis provides ample room for investigation and nuance in all domains of Bavinck’s 
corpus; (iv) it is the concept and ethic of Reformed catholicity that is most basic to Bavinck’s 
identity and theological task. Reformed catholicity is the ethic that drives his nuanced relation 
to theological modernity. Such a marker of identification demands primary place in the future 
of Bavinck scholarship; (v) as Eglinton notes in the conclusion of Trinity and Organism, this 
work ‘has only begun to scratch the surface’.5 And so it is with this study. The foundations of 
nuanced historical-theological treatments of the development of Bavinck’s dogmatics and 
philosophy is, after both Eglinton’s study and the current one, set in place and beckons a 
generation of Anglophone Bavinck scholarship.  
 
Finally, at the completion of the publication of Bavinck’s RD in English in 2008, the question 
arose ‘does Herman Bavinck speak today’? Indeed, Bavinck’s work is more widely read now 
than ever. He speaks insofar as his readership has become immense. The extent of Bavinck’s 
readership and influence is clear in the briefest of comments made by Joshua Ralston in an 
IJST editorial in 2016. Ralston, working with Brian Gerrish’s Christian Faith, situates Gerrish’s 
dogmatics amid a potential conversational trilemma of influence between Schleiermacher, 
Bavinck, and Barth: ‘Reformed theologians more influenced by Barth or Bavinck than 
Schleiermacher might protest Gerrish’s understanding of the norms of theology’.6 Bavinck’s 
inclusion in this list is remarkable. Bavinck now takes his place in the community of modern 
                                                                                                                                                    
Trinity is free from modern revision, is true. See the discussion of Bavinck’s adoption of the 
grammar of ‘Absolute Personality’ in Ch. 2.   
5 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 209.  
6 Joshua Ralston, ‘Editorial’, IJST 18:3 (July 2016): 257.  
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Reformed theologians as the choice between titans, between the two: Schleiermacher and Barth. 
Indeed, Bavinck speaks today. But how so? The answer may be manifold. This study 
determines at least one aspect of Bavinck’s relevance in a double-sided answer to the question 
of Bavinck for today: ja and nee. 
 
Bavinck is for the twenty-first century insofar as his definition of Reformed catholicity and its 
task teaches the student of dogmatics that in every generation attention must be paid to the 
philosophical milieu, to the needs of the times, to the precise nature of the ‘modernity’ of 
today, to write dogmatics that is indeed for the Church in a given time. Bavinck unites in his 
catholic method that which remains true and precious, the Gospel, the authority of the sacred 
text, and the voices of old, with the particularities of his cohort. Yes, Bavinck is ‘for us’ insofar 
as his commitment to the concept and method called Reformed catholicity has timeless 
import. The timeless lesson of Bavinck’s definition of the ‘Reformed catholic’ theological 
method is built upon consistent ideas: that there is no pristine era of theology, that the 
Reformed theologian must not desire ‘to repristinate’, that dogmatics must make use of an 
array of philosophical grammars that matter ‘for today’, that theologians must ‘stand on 
theological and philosophical shoulders in order to look farther’ than those whose shoulders 
they stand on could—even surprising shoulders for those amid the confessionalist context. 
This methodological ja necessitates then a reciprocal nee. If theology must make use of an 
array of philosophical frameworks, answering the questions and concepts of its day, then 
dogmatics requires movement. Dogmatics looks back but pays attention above all to today—
to today’s people and today’s questions. Dogmatics must be written and re-written. One can 
only conclude that if Bavinck were to write the Reformed Dogmatics today, his ‘catholicity’ 
demands that it would not be the same. Bavinck, therefore, is ‘for us’ in the twenty-first 
century insofar as his ethic beckons one to learn from him, read Scripture with him, reflect on 
the material of dogmatics under his authoritative voice, and while ever-returning to him, move 
beyond him. The post-Kantian milieu, the romanticism and idealisms of the nineteenth-




One must recall Bavinck’s burden: ‘modern Calvinists do not wish to repristinate and have no 
desire for the old conditions to return… They strive to make progress, to escape from the 
deadly embrace of dead conservatism, and to take their place, as before, at the head of every 
movement’.7 Dogmatics peers into its own day and ‘takes over what it deems true and useful’, 
under the discipline of the foundations set forth by God: the being of God, the inscripturated 
revelation of God, and the witness of the Spirit of Christ upon the agent.8 A dogmatics which 
both respects social and intellectual trajectories of its today and disciplines them under the 
exegetically-grounded doctrines of old doing so with a holistic piety, absolute dependence on 
the Triune God in feeling, thinking, and doing, is Bavinck’s legacy:  
Religion, the fear of God, must therefore be the element which inspires all 
theological investigation… A theologian is a person who determines 
themselves to speak about God because he speaks out of God and through 
God. To practice theology—it is a holy work. It is a priestly ministration in the 
house of the Lord. It is religion itself, a service of God in his temple, a 
consecration of intellect and heart to the glory of His name.9 
                                                 
7 Bavinck, ‘The Future of Calvinism’, 13.  
8 RD 1.609.  
9 Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 62. Original: ‘Religie, vreeze Gods moet daarom het 
element zijn, dat alle theologische onderzoekingen bezielt. Zij moet de polsslag zijn, dien men 
in ieder dogma zachter of luider kloppen hoort. Een theoloog is iemand, die zich onderwindt 
over God te spreken, omdat hij uit en door Hem spreekt. Theologie te beoefenen — het is 
een heilig werk; het is een priesterlijke dienst in het huis des Heeren; het is zelve godsdienst, 









Bavinck, Herman. De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli. Kampen: G. Ph. Zalsman, 1880.  
---. ‘Het Geweten I-II’. De Vrije Kerk (Januari-Februari, 1881): 1. 27-37; 2. 49-58.  
---. ‘Gereformeerde Theologie’ De Vrije Kerk 7 (November 1881): 497-509. 
---. Het Rijks Gods, het hoogste goed I-V’. De Vrije Kerk 7 (April-Augustus 1881): 4.185-192; 5. 224
 234; 6.271-277; 7.305-314; 8.353-360. 
---. ‘De hedendaagsche wereldbeschouwing’. De Vrije Kerk 9 (Oktober 1883): 10.435-461.  
---. De wetenschap der H. Godgeleerheid. Kampen: G.Ph. Zalsman, 1883. 
---. ‘Het dualisme in de Theologie’, De Vrije Kerk 13 (Januari 1887) 1. 11-39. 
---. De Katholiciteit van Christendom en Kerk: Rede bij de overdracht van het rectoraat aan de Theol. School te
 Kampen. Kampen: G.Ph. Zalsman, 1888. 
---. ‘The Influence of the Protestant Reformation on the Moral and Religious Condition on
 Communities and Nations’, Proceedings of the Fifth General Council of the Alliance of the
 Reformed Churches Holding the Presbyterian System (London: Publication Committee of the
 Presbyterian Church of England, 1892): 48-55. 
---. De Algemeene Genade: Rede gehouden bij de overdracht van het Recotraat aan de Theologishce School te
 Kampen op 6 Dec. 1894. Kampen: G. Ph. Zalsman, 1894.  
---.  ‘Recent Dogmatic Thought in the Netherlands’. The Presbyterian and Reformed Review Vol. III
 (1892): 209-228. 
---.  ‘The Future of Calvinism’, The Presbyterian and Reformed Review V (1894): 1-24. 
---. Beginselen der psychologie. Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1897.  
---. Gereformeerde Dogmatiek I-IV. First Edition. Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1895-1901.  
---. Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid. Wageningen: Vada Press Ltd., 1902. 
---. De theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye, 2nd ed. Leiden: D. Donner, 1903. 
---. Christelijke wereldbeschouwing: Rede bij de overdacht van het Rectoraat aan de Vrije Universiteit te
 Amsterdam op 20 October 1904. Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1904.   
---. ‘Philosophie des geloofs’, in Annuarium of the Societas Studisorum Reformatorum. Rotterdam: Donner,
 1906, 62-72. 
---. Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring: Stone-Lezingen voor het jaar 1908, gehouden te Princeton N.J. door H.
 Bavinck. Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1908.  
---. Philosophy of Revelation: The Stone Lectures from 1908-1909. Translated by Geerhardus Vos,
 Henry E. Dosker, and Nicolas Steffens. New York: Longman, Greens, and Co., 1909. 
---. ‘Philosophy of Religion (Faith)’, in Essays on Religion, Science, and Society. Translated by Harry
 Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres. Edited by John Bolt. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
 2008, 25-32.  
 
 282 
---. Philosophie der Offenbarung, trans. Hermann Cuntz. Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s
 Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1909.  
---. Magnalia Dei: Onderwijzing in de christelijke religie naar gereformeerde belijdenis (Kampen: J.H. Kok,
 1909), 36. 
---. Modernisme en Orthodoxie: Rede gehouden bij de overdracht van het rectoraat aan de Vrije Universiteit op 20
 Oktober 1911. Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1911.  
---. ‘Modernism and Orthodoxy’. Translated by Bruce Pass, The Bavinck Review 7 (2016), 63-114. 
---. H. Bavinck. ‘Ter Gedachtenis’, in A. Steketee, Beschouwingen van een Christen-Denker. Kampen:
 J.H. Kok, 1914, v-ix. 
---. Beginselen der psychologie, tweede herziene vermeerderde druk bezorgd door Hepp. Kampen: Kok, 1923.  
---.  Our Reasonable Faith. Translated by Henry Zylstra. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956. 
---. The Certainty of Faith. Ontario: Paideia Press, 1980.  
---. ‘Common Grace’. Translated by Raymond C. van Leeuwen, Calvin Theological Journal 24:1
 (1989): 35-65. 
---. ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, trans. John Bolt, Calvin Theological Journal 27
 (1992): 220-51.  
---. Mijne reis naar Amerika, ed. George Harinck. Barneveld: Uitgeverij De Vuurbaak, 1998. 
---. ‘My Journey to America’. Translated by James Eglinton and George Harinck. Dutch Crossing:
 Journal of Low Country Studies (2017): 1-14. 
 ---. Reformed Dogmatics, Volume One: Prolegomena. Edited by John Bolt. Translated by John 
Vriend. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003. 
---. Reformed Dogmatics, Volume Two:  God and Creation. Edited by John Bolt. Translated by John
 Vriend. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004. 
---. Reformed Dogamtics, Volume Three: Sin and Salvation in Christ. Edited by John Bolt. Translated
 by John Vriend. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006. 
---. Reformed Dogmatics, Volume Four: Holy Spirit, Church and New Creation. Edited by John Bolt.
 Translated by John Vriend. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008. 
---.  ‘Foreword to the First Edition (volume 1) of the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek’. Translated by
 John Bolt, Calvin Theological Journal 45 (2010): 11-17.  
---.  ‘The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl’. Translated by John Bolt. The Bavinck Review 3 (2012):
 123-63. 
---. ‘The Conscience’. Translated by Nelson Kloosterman. The Bavinck Review 6 (2015): 113-26.  
---. H.E. Dosker to H. Bavinck, December 23, 1876. H. Bavinck Archive, Historisch
 Documentatiecentrum, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, #346/12. 
---. ‘Dagboekjes’. H. Bavinck Archive, Historisch Documentatiecentrum, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam,
 #346/16.  
---. De leer het van het geweten. H. Bavinck Archive, Historisch Documentatiecentrum, Vrije Universiteit,
 Amsterdam, #346/29.  
 
 283 
---. ‘Eene beknopte aanwijzing van den invloed van Schleiermacher op de uitlegging van der H. Schrift’. H.





Bremmer, R. H. Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten. Kampen: Kok, 1966. 
Bristley, Eric D. Guide to the Writings of Herman Bavinck. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage
 Books, 2008. 




Adams, Nicholas. ‘Hegel’, Theology and Philosophy. Edited by Oliver Crisp, Gavin D’Costa, 
Mervyn Davies, and Peter Hampson. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2011, 129-142. 
Adams, Robert Merihew. ‘Faith and Religious Knowledge’. The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich
 Schleiermacher. Edited by Jacqueline Mariña. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
 2005, 35-51. 
Allen, Michael and Swain, Scott. Reformed Catholicity: The Promise of Retrieval for Theology and
 Biblical Interpretation. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015.  
Allen, Michael, and Swain, Scott. Editors. Christian Dogmatics: Reformed Theology for the Church
 Catholic. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016. 
Allison, Henry. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 1995.  
Aubert, Annette G. German Roots of Nineteenth Century American Theology. Oxford: OUP, 2013. 
Augustine. The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Translated by John Hammond Taylor. Vols. 41–42 of
 Ancient Christian Writers. New York: Newman Press, 1982. 
---. A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (NPNF), vol. I-III, 14
 vols. Edited by Philip Schaff. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956.  
van Asselt, Willem J. and Ables, Paul H.A.M. ‘The Seventeenth Century’, in Handbook of Dutch
 Church History. Edited by Herman J. Selderhuis. Bristol: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
 2015, 259-261.  
Bacon, Francis. The Works of Francis Bacon. New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1877. 
Barth, Karl. The Theology of Schleiermacher. Edited by Dietrich Ritschl. Translated by G.
 Bromiley. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982. 
---. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. London: SCM Press, 1972.  
---. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part 2. Vol. 1, (CD I/2). Edited by Geoffrey
 William Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance. London: T&T Clark, 2004.  




Beiser, Frederick. ‘Early Romanticism’, in What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth Century Answers and
 Twentieth Century Questions. Edited by James Schmidt. Berkeley: University of California
 Press, 1993. 
van den Belt, Henk. ‘An Alternative Approach to Apologetics’, in The Kuyper Center Review:
 Revelation and Common Grace, vol. 2, Edited by John Bowlin. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
 2011, 43-60. 
---. ‘Religion as Revelation: The Development of Herman Bavinck’s View from a Reformed
 Orthodox to a Neo-Calvinist Approach’, The Bavinck Review 4 (2013): 9-31. 
---. The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust. Leiden: Brill, 2008.  
Berkouwer, G.C. Zoeken en Vinden. Herinneringen en ervaringen. Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1989. 
Billings, Todd J. ‘Catholic and Reformed: Rediscovering a Tradition’. Pro Ecclesia 23 (2014):
 132-46. 
---. ‘The Catholic Calvin’, Pro Ecclesia 20 (2011): 120-34. 
Blackwell, Albert. Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life: Determinism, Freedom, and Phantasy.
 Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982. 
---. ‘The Antagonistic Correspondence of 1801 between Chaplin Sack and His Protégé
 Schleiermacher’, Harvard Theological Review 74:1 (1981): 101-121.  
Blei, Karel. The Netherlands Reformed Church: 1571-2005. Translated by Allan J. Janssen. Grand
 Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006. 
den Boer, Hugo. 'Another Revolution: Towards a New Explanation of the Rise of Neo
 Calvinism’, in Neo-Calvinism and the French Revolution. Edited by James Eglinton and
 George Harinck. Edinburgh: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014.  
Boersma, Hans. Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry. Grand Rapids:
 Eerdmans, 2011. 
Bolt, John. A Theological Analysis of Herman Bavinck’s Two Essays on the Imitatio Christi. Lewiston,
 NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2013. 
---. ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 1. Grand Rapids: Baker
 Academic, 2003. 
---. ‘Sola Scriptura as an Evangelical Theological Method?’, in Reforming or Conforming: Post
 Conservative Evangelicals and the Emerging Church. Edited by Gary L. W. Johnson and
 Ronald N. Gleason. Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2008, 154–65. 
---. Editor. Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology.
 Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2011. 
---. Bavinck on the Christian Life: Following Jesus in Faithful Service. Wheaton, Ill: Crossway, 2015. 
à Brakel, Wilhelmus The Christian's Reasonable Service, vol. 1. Translated by Bartel Elshout.
 Morgan, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1992. 
Brandt, Richard. The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of his Theory of Scientific and
 Religious Knowledge. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1968. 
 
 285 
Bratt, James. ‘The Context of Herman Bavinck’s Stone Lectures: Culture and Politics in 1908’,
 The Bavinck Review 1 (2010): 4-24. 
---.  Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013.  
Bremmer, R. H. Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus. Kampen: Kok, 1961.  
Brock, Cory ‘Bavinck the Neo-Thomist’? MTh dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2014. 
Brock, Cory and Sutanto, Nathaniel Gray. ‘Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Eclecticism: On
 Catholicty, Consciousness, and Theological Epistemology’, Scottish Journal of Theology
 no. 3 (2017), 310-32. 
Brouwer, Rinse H. Reeling. ‘Election’, in The Cambridge Companion to Reformed Theology. Edited
 by Paul Nimmo, David Fergusson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.  
de Bruijn, J. Harinck, George. Editors. Een Leidse vriendschap: De briefwisseling tussen Herman
 Bavinck en Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, 1875-1921. Baarn: Uitgeverij Ten Have, 1999. 
de Bruijn, J. Abraham Kuyper: A Pictorial Biography. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008. 
Brunner, Emil. Die christliche Lehre von Gott. Dog. I, 3rd edition. Stuttgart: Zwingli Verlag, 1960. 
---. Die Mystik und das Wort: Der Gegensatz zwischen moderner Religionsauffassung und christilichem
 Glauben dargestellt an der Theologie Schleiermachers. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1924.  
---. The Mediator. Translated by Olive Wyon. London: Lutterworth Press, 1934.  
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion & 2. Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by
 Ford Lewis Battles. Vol. 1, in The Library of Christian Classics. Louisville, KY:
 Westminster John Knox Press, 2011.  
---. The Divine-Human Encounter. Translated by Amandus W. Loos. Philadelphia: Westminster
 Press, 1943. 
Capetz, Paul. Christian Faith as Religion: A Study in the Theologies of Calvin and Schleiermacher.
 Oxford: University Press of America, 1998. 
Cary, Philip. Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist. Oxford:
 Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Chantepie de la Saussaye, Daniel. Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, 2 vols. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr
 [Paul Siebeck], 1905. 
Cramer, J. Alex. Vinet. Leiden: Brill, 1883.  
Crouter, Richard. Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism. Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Michael Moriarty. Oxford: Oxford
 University Press, 2008. 
van Deursen, Arie Theodorus. The Distinctive Character of the Free University, 1880-2005: A
 Commemorative History, trans. Herbert Morton. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005.  
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Aus Schleiermachers Leben in Briefen, vol. I. Berlin: Reimer, 1858. 
Dorner, Isaak. A System of Christian Doctrine, vol. 1. Translated by Alfred Cave. Edinburgh:
 T&T Clark, 1880. 
Dosker, Henry Elias. ‘Herman Bavinck’, Princeton Theological Review 20, no. 3 (1922): 448-464.  
 
 286 
Echeverria, Eduardo. ‘The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology: A Catholic Response to
 Herman Bavinck’, Calvin Theological Journal 45 (2010): 87-116. 
Eglinton, James. Harinck, George. Editors. Neo-Calvinism and the French Revolution. Bloomsbury
 Publishing, 2014. 
Eglinton, James. Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck's Organic Motif.
 London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2012. 
Eichner, Hans. ‘The Genesis of Romanticism’, Queen’s Quarterly 72 (1965): 213-231. 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel. Multiple Modernities. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2002. 
Ensminger, Sven. Karl Barth’s Theology as a Resource for a Christian Theology of Religion. Edinburgh:
 Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. 
Faull, Katherine. ‘Schleiermacher and Transcendentalist Truth-Telling’ in Schleiermacher’s
 Influences on American Thought and Religious Life (1835-1920). Edited by Jeffrey A. Wilcox,
 Terrence Tice, Catherine Kelsey. Eugene: Pickwick, 2013, 293-321. 
Ferrini, Cinzia. ‘Hegel’s Transition to Spirit: Some Introductory and Systematic Remarks’,
 Hegel Studien Band 46 (2012): 117-150. 
Flipse, A. ‘The Origins of Creationism in the Netherlands: The Evolution Debate among
 Twentieth Century Neo-Calvinists’, Church History 81:1 (March 2012): 104-47. 
Frank, Manfred. ‘Metaphysical Foundations: a look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic’, in Cambridge
 Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher. Edited by Jacqueline Mariña. Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
---. The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism. Translated by Elizabeth Millán
 Zaibert. Albany: State of New York Press, 2004. 
Gay, Peter. Modernism: The Lure of Heresy. New York: Random House, 2007. 
Gerrish, B.A. A Prince of the Church: Schleiermacher and the Beginnings of Modern Theology. London:
 Fortress Press, 1984. 
---. Tradition and Modern World: Reformed Theology in the Ninteenth Century. Eugene, OR: Wipf &
 Stock, 2007. 
Gilson, Étienne. The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
 Press, 1991. 
Gockel, Matthias. ‘Mediating Theology in Germany’, in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth
 Century Theology. Edited by David Fergusson. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010,
 301–18. 
Grenz, Stanley The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei.
 Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001. 
Hanby, Michael. Augustine and Modernity. New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Harinck, George, van der Kooi C., and Vree. J. Editors. ‘Als Bavinck nu maar eens kleur bekende’,
 Aantekeningen van H. Bavinck over de zaak-Netelenbos, het Schriftgezag en de situatie van the
 Gereformeerde Kerken (November 1919). Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1994. 
Harinck, George and Winkeler, Lodweijk. ‘The Nineteenth Century’ in Handbook of Dutch
 Church History. Edited by Herman J. Selderhuis. Bristol, CT: Vandenhoeck &
 Ruprecht, 2015.  
 
 287 
Harinck, George. ‘Calvinism Isn’t the Only Truth: Herman Bavinck’s Impressions of the
 USA’, in The Sesquicentennial of Dutch Immigration: 150 Years of Ethnic Heritage; Proceedings of
 the 11th Biennial Conference of the Association for the Advancement of Dutch American Studies.
 Edited by Larry J. Wagenaar and Robert P. Swierenga. Holland, MI: The Joint
 Archives of Holland, Hope College, 1998. 
---. ‘The Religious Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion: A Case
 Study of Herman Bavinck’s Engagement with Modern Culture’, Scottish Bulletin of
 Evangelical Theology 29, no. 1 (2011): 60-77. 
---. ‘“Something That Must Remain, If the Truth Is to Be Sweet and Precious to Us”: The
 Reformed Spirituality of Herman Bavinck’. Calvin Theological Journal 38, no. 2 (2003):
 248–62. 
---. Bavinck’s Mijne reis naar Amerika. Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 1998. 
---. ‘“Land dat ons verwondert en ons betoove”: Bavinck en Amerika’, in Ontmoetingen met Herman
 Bavinck. Edited by George Harinck & Gerrit Neven. Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2006. 
---. ‘Why was Bavinck in Need of a Philosophy of Revelation?’ in The Kuyper Center Review:
 Revelation and Common Grace, vol. 2. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011, 27-42. 
Hector, Kevin. The Theological Project of Modernism: Faith and the Conditions of Mineness. Oxford:
 Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Werke in 20 Bänden, vol 8. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp,
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